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INTRODUCTION

THIS is the first in a series of annual volumes devoted to 
the history of the United States since 1890 that will be pub­
lished by the Ohio State University Press. The series, whose 
over-all title is MODERN AMERICA, is intended to facilitate 
publication of scholarly articles in all areas of recent Amer­
ican history. The editors hope that MODERN AMERICA will 
provide a publication outlet for monographic studies as well 
as synthetic and interpretative essays. 
The events of the past seventy-five years have produced 
significant changes in nearly every aspect of American life. 
In a period as brief as the span of human lifetime, however, 
it is to be expected that old and familiar elements will 
mingle with and temper the forces of change and novelty. 
The editors have, therefore, chosen Change and Continuity 
in Twentieth-Century America as the theme of the first 
volume of MODERN AMERICA. Each of the essays in the 
book is concerned in some manner with the relation of tra­
dition and innovation. 
In the 1960's, the United States stands as one of the two 
global superpowers. Many historians date the emergence 
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of America as a world power from the Spanish-American 
War and the acquisition of the Philippines. But did the 
events of 1898 result in fundamental changes in the prin­
ciples and practice of American foreign policy? Richard W. 
Leopold, in "The Emergence of America as a World Power: 
Some Second Thoughts," concludes that the years between 
1898 and 1920 witnessed no such decisive change. "In 1920, 
as in 1898," Leopold writes, "the average citizen thought 
the United States could be a world power and still adhere 
to the practices of an earlier day." 
One of the outstanding trends of the twentieth century 
has been the increasingly important role played by the fed­
eral government in safeguarding the public health, morals, 
and welfare. In the nineteenth century such activities were 
the responsibility of the states under their reserved police 
power. The assumption of these new responsibilities by the 
federal government involved formidable political and con­
stitutional obstacles. John Braeman's "The Square Deal in 
Action: A Case Study in the Growth of the 'National Police 
Power' " makes a study in depth of the passage of one of 
the milestones in this development—the meat inspection 
law of 1906. 
The greatest advance in federal activity in behalf of the 
public welfare came during the New Deal in response to 
the exigencies of the Great Depression. William E. Leuch­
tenburg, in "The New Deal and the Analogue of War," 
shows how Americans used the imagery of war to describe 
the country's plight in the 1930's and how New Dealers 
drew upon the legacy of the World War I mobilization for 
their proposals. "The legacy of the war," Leuchtenburg 
asserts, "was to prove a mixed blessing. Useful as a justifi­
cation for New Deal actions, it also served to limit and 
divert the reformers in ways that had not been anticipated." 
The shortcomings of the war analogy were in large part 
responsible for the New Deal's failure to face up to "the 
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real problems of the relation of order to liberty which the 
power of the twentieth century creates." 
This conclusion raises the question whether the New Deal 
was as much of a turning point in American history as 
many historians have believed. Richard S. Kirkendall 
examines the problem in "The Great Depression: Another 
Watershed in American History?" Kirkendall argues that 
the role of change in the 1930's has been overemphasized 
and the importance of continuity neglected. "The leading 
developments of the depression decade which are associated 
with the New Deal," he contends, "should not be viewed as 
radical new beginnings in American history but chiefly as 
significant parts of a large-scale transformation of Ameri­
can capitalism that had been under way for at least half 
a century before the 1930's." 
A significant aspect of the transformation of American 
capitalism has been the change in the relations between 
government and business. The extent of laissez faire in the 
nineteenth century has been much exaggerated; yet the 
businessman at the beginning of this century remained 
largely free from governmental restraint. The situation 
today is much changed, but the business decision-maker is 
still the key figure in the economy. Arthur M. Johnson 
shows, in his "Continuity and Change in Government-
Business Relations," that the keynote of the changing rela­
tionship between business and government has been "a 
basic pragmatism." 
Perhaps the most striking feature of the transformation 
of American capitalism in the twentieth century has been 
the rise of a powerful labor movement. Big labor has 
become, in John Galbraith's phrase, a major "counter­
vailing power" to big business. David Brody, in "The 
Emergence of Mass-Production Unionism," examines the 
revolutionary breakthrough of unionization in the mass-
production industries in the 1930's. While not underrating 
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the importance of the formation of the CIO, or of a sympa­
thetic government acting through the Wagner Act and the 
National Labor Relations Board, Brody finds that the com­
ing of World War II was decisive in the triumph of unionism 
in the mass-production industries. 
Even before mass unionization, the average American 
worker enjoyed a standard of living that was the envy of 
his European fellows. Historically, the United States has 
been regarded as the land of plenty for all. But observers 
have in recent years increasingly lamented the persistence 
of poverty in the affluent society. Robert H. Bremner, in 
"Poverty in Perspective," finds that the discovery of pov­
erty in the United States is not new to this generation—and 
he shows how changing interpretations of poverty and its 
causes reflect fundamental changes in American ideas and 
social attitudes. 
The editors extend their thanks to the contributors, to 
the many historians who have expressed interest in MODERN 
AMERICA, and to Weldon A. Kefauver of the Ohio State 
University Press. Without Mr. Kefauver's co-operation and 
assistance, this volume would not have been possible. 
The next two volumes in the series are in preparation. 
One will be devoted to "The 1920's Revisited"; the other to 
"American Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century." 
JOHN BRAEMAN 
ROBERT H. BREMNER 
EVERETT WALTERS 
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The Emergence of America as a World 
Power: Some Second Thoughts 
RICHARD W. LEOPOLD 
EARLY in 1901 a foreign diplomat declared that, during his 
brief residence in Washington, he had observed two differ­
ent nations—the United States before the War with Spain 
and the United States after that conflict.1 This remark has 
been quoted frequently to indicate the profound impact of 
the contest with Spain upon American foreign policy. Ac­
cording to this interpretation, the "splendid little war," as 
that inveterate phrasemaker John Hay called it, did more 
than terminate the bloodshed in Cuba and liberate the island 
from Spanish misrule. It also constituted a decisive factor 
in transforming the continental republic into an overseas 
empire, an empire with possessions in not only the Caribbean 
and the central Pacific but also the western Pacific and the 
South China Sea. 
There can be little doubt that the years 1898 and 1899 
formed some sort of watershed in the growth of the role 
1. Archibald Cary Coolidge, The United States as a World Power (New York, 1908), p. 121. For a recent analysis of this problem, 
different in purpose from the present one, see Ernest R. May, 
"Emergence to World Power" in John Higham (ed.), The Reconstruc­
tion of American History (New York, 1962), pp. 180-96. 
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of the United States in world affairs. The passionate debate 
between the imperialists and the anti-imperialists impressed 
upon men at the time that the republic had to choose be­
tween tradition and innovation. The foes of colonies warned 
that to embark upon the path of empire would undermine 
the cherished policy of isolationism and thrust the country 
into the maelstrom of international rivalries. Such a de­
parture from old ways would bring endless complications 
abroad, impede the reform movement at home, enhance the 
influence of the military in national affairs, and fly in the 
face of the democratic heritage. Contemporary historians 
likewise concluded that an important change had occurred. 
In 1903 John Bassett Moore, already an experienced diplo­
mat and recognized student of international law, contrib­
uted to the seventh volume of the Cambridge Modern His­
tory a chapter entitled "The United States as a World-
Power (1885-1902)." In the winter of 1906-7, Archibald 
Cary Coolidge, professor of European history at Harvard 
University, delivered at the Sorbonne a series of lectures 
which he subsequently published as The United States as a 
World Power. And in December, 1907, there appeared as the 
final narrative volume in the "American Nation" series, 
which was a co-operative enterprise designed to synthesize 
the findings of the first generation of the self-styled scientific 
historians, a book written by John H. Latane of The Johns 
Hopkins University, bearing the title of America as a World 
Power, 1897-1907. For the next half-century most writers, 
scholarly or popular, dated the emergence of the United 
States as a world power from the late 1890's and attributed 
to that new status varying degrees of change in American 
foreign policy. 
Then, in 1960, the eminent diplomatic historian, Thomas 
A. Bailey, warned against the dangers of repeating cliches 
and questioned whether the United States had suddenly 
burst forth as a world power to the thunder of Commodore 
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George Dewey's guns in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898. In 
his presidential address before the Pacific Coast Branch of 
the American Historical Association, Bailey argued that 
the United States had been a world power since July, 1776. 
He defined a world power as "a nation with sufficient power 
in being, or capable of being mobilized, to affect world poli­
tics positively and over a period of time." He pointed out 
that in territory, population, natural resources, military 
strength, and moral force the United States met that 
definition. He also noted that in the century after inde­
pendence the young republic had exerted its influence in 
all parts of the globe—in Europe, Asia, and Africa, as 
well as in the Americas. It had held aloft the torch of 
democracy and self-determination; it had broken down the 
commercial exclusiveness of Japan; it had become a granary 
for Europe. Statesmen of the major powers regarded the 
United States as part of the global equipoise; citizens of 
backward nations benefited from the endeavors of Ameri­
can educators and missionaries. The giant of the Western 
Hemisphere did not live unto itself.2 
Bailey's address was timely but not entirely convincing. 
It is healthy, of course, to have old concepts challenged. His 
distinction between a world power and a great power is 
helpful, although one might question his secondary argu­
ment that the United States joined the ranks of great 
powers at the close of the Civil War. And certainly his­
torians would do well to take a long look backward, to 
make sure of the actual role of the young republic in world 
affairs before 1898, if they are to describe accurately its 
position after that date. But in his own backward glance 
Bailey seems to have created an occasional straw man ready 
to be demolished. No reputable scholar maintains that the 
2. Thomas A. Bailey, "America's Emergence as a World Power: 
The Myth and the Verity," Pacific Historical Review, XXIX (1961), 
1-16. 
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destruction of Spain's decrepit squadron in Manila Bay and 
of her more modern vessels off Santiago two months later, 
in itself, catapulted the United States to world-power status. 
Such metamorphoses do not occur overnight. Similarly, it 
remains to be demonstrated that before 1898 the European 
chanceries very often considered seriously the response of 
the government in Washington to the power struggle out­
side the Western Hemisphere. The Franco-Prussian War, 
the clash over the Black Sea Straits, and the contest for 
empire in Africa are cases in point. As late as 1895, Russia, 
Germany, and France brought extreme pressure upon 
Japan during the peace negotiations with China without 
worrying about the reaction in America. 
Two developments in the 1890's made the United States 
a different world power from the kind Bailey describes for 
the century after 1776. The first was the annexation of 
distant colonies which gave the nation a stake in the 
equilibrium of East Asia. Largely for economic reasons— 
the fear of closed markets and the desire for railroad and 
mining concessions—a concern for the future of China 
grew rapidly in the decade between President Grover 
Cleveland's indifference to the Sino-Japanese fighting over 
Korea in 1894-95 and President Theodore Roosevelt's 
peacemaking in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. This 
concern might have come about even if there had been no 
crusade to free Cuba, but it was certainly hastened by the 
decision to retain the Philippines. The second develop­
ment, stemming from the first, was a belief among the 
people that the country's position had changed—for better 
or for worse. One cannot read widely in the writings of 
contemporaries—businessmen, educators, clergymen, poli­
ticians, and military strategists—without detecting a new 
note of confidence, a new awareness of leadership, a new 
realization of the role the republic might play on the global 
stage. These broadened horizons were evident in news­
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papers, magazines, pamphlets, consular reports, trade jour­
nals, and congressional debates. That the American people 
accepted the diplomatic consequences of being a world 
power is, however, another matter. 
The purpose of this essay is not to fix the exact date on 
which the United States became a world power or could 
rightly claim to have become a great power. Rather it 
seeks to look ahead, beyond the exciting events of 1898-99, 
to determine what effect this new position had upon subse­
quent foreign policy. What light do the decades between 
1898 and 1917 throw upon change and continuity in 
twentieth-century America? Do those years mark the end 
of one era and the start of another? Did the acquisition 
of colonies bring the advantages the imperialists had prom­
ised or the evils their opponents had predicted ? Were novel 
steps taken in world affairs? Which time-honored principles 
were modified or abandoned? What happened to isolation­
ism, neutrality, the Monroe Doctrine, non-intervention, and 
other familiar guidelines?3 
There can be no denying that overseas annexations led 
to and coincided with changes in American foreign policy. 
The addition of the Hawaiian Islands, Puerto Rico, Guam, 
the Philippines, Wake, and Tutuila between July, 1898, and 
December, 1899, posed unprecedented problems of adminis­
tration and defense. The triumph of imperialism required 
the establishment of a colonial agency, the modernization 
of the army, the redeployment of the navy, and the institu­
tion of inter-service planning. It also caused a reversal in 
long-standing attitudes toward other great powers—Eng­
land, Germany, and Russia at once, Japan a little later.4 
3. For a definition of these principles and their earlier development, 
see Richard W. Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy:
A History (New York, 1962), pp. 17-65. 
4. No citations will be given for the familiar facts that appear in 
this and succeeding paragraphs. For a critical evaluation of the 
sources from which they have been drawn, see the bibliographical 
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East Asia was one region where diplomacy revealed 
America's new position. After raising the Stars and Stripes 
in the South China Sea and in the Mariana Islands, the 
United States had to watch more closely the balance of 
power in the Orient. The threatened partition of China, 
the uncertain future of Korea, and the troublesome immi­
gration dispute with Japan confronted men in Washington 
with difficult decisions. It is hardly surprising that they 
displayed greater activity than their predecessors. Secre­
tary of State John Hay tried to redefine American aims in 
China through his circular notes of September 6, 1899, 
and July 3, 1900. In the summer of 1900, President Wil­
liam McKinley ordered ground forces from the Philippines 
and California to join a multinational expedition assembled 
to relieve the legations in Peking besieged by the insurgent 
Boxers. Still more prophetic was the willingness of Presi­
dent Roosevelt five years later to extend his good offices, 
and ultimately his mediation, to terminate the war then 
raging between Russia and Japan over Korea and Man­
churia. Back in 1894, President Cleveland had asserted that 
the conflict then in progress between China and Japan over 
the same lands touched no vital interest of the United States. 
Thus, whereas the Sino-Japanese peace in 1895 was written 
at Shimonoseki under pressure from Russia, France, and 
Germany, the settlement of 1905 was signed at Portsmouth, 
New Hampshire, under the auspices of the United States. 
The dozen years from the Portsmouth Treaty to the 
entrance into the First World War saw the American gov­
ernment continue to enlarge its role in the diplomacy of 
East Asia. Through an exchange of notes with Ambassador 
Kogoro Takahira on November 30, 1908, Secretary of State 
Elihu Root sought by all peaceful means to promote the sta­
essay in Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy, pp. 819­
48. Titles that are particularly relevant to this article are discussed
in a bibliographical note. 
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bility of the Pacific area and to support the independence 
and integrity of China, including equality of opportunity for 
commerce and industry within her borders. Each party 
to this exchange promised to respect the territorial pos­
sessions of the other in the Pacific; it was a bilateral 
non-aggression pledge that foreshadowed one provision of 
the Four-Power Treaty of December 13, 1921. A year later 
Root's successor, Philander C. Knox, tried by diplomatic 
measures to wrest from Russia and Japan control of two 
key railways in Manchuria and to place them in Chinese 
hands. More than Hay and Root, who preceded him, or than 
William Jennings Bryan and Robert Lansing, who followed 
him, Knox endeavored to bolster his policies in East Asia 
by enlisting the aid of the financial community. 
In the Caribbean, too, the years after 1898 brought 
change, but it was less precipitate and more predictable. 
The outmoded Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 gave way on 
November 18, 1901, to the second Hay-Pauncefote agree­
ment which freed the United States to build, operate, and 
defend an interoceanic canal. The Monroe Doctrine, already 
enlarged by Secretary of State Richard Olney's dictum of 
July 20, 1895, was stretched further by the Roosevelt 
Corollary of December 6, 1904. During the Anglo-Vene­
zuelan boundary controversy Olney had boasted that "today 
the United States is practically sovereign on this continent" 
and declared that his government would insist upon and 
supervise the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes 
between a European and a New World nation. Following 
the unexpectedly hostile reaction at home to the Anglo-
German blockade of the Venezuelan coast in 1902, Roose­
velt argued that the United States must exercise an inter­
national police power to prevent American states, guilty of 
flagrant wrongdoing and chronic impotence, from providing 
a justification for the use of armed force by a country from 
outside of the Western Hemisphere. Protectorates were set 
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up in Cuba and Panama by the treaties of May 22, and 
November 18, 1903, in the Dominican Republic by a modus 
vivendi of April 1, 1905 (later regularized by a treaty of 
February 8, 1907), and in Nicaragua by a less formal ar­
rangement in May, 1910. The assumption of these respon­
sibilities by the United States prompted Great Britain, 
increasingly apprehensive over the naval race with Ger­
many, to begin in December, 1904, transferring all large 
warships from the West Indies to the North Sea, thus 
leaving the American fleet predominant. Perhaps these 
developments would have occurred even if the McKinley 
administration had not ousted Spain from Cuba and dis­
membered the Spanish Empire in the Caribbean and the 
Pacific; certainly they were hastened by what transpired 
in 1898 and 1899. 
The United States looked like a world power, also, in its 
response to mounting international tensions throughout the 
globe. For the first time American delegates participated 
in European conferences to discuss problems of war and 
peace. They were present at The Hague in 1899 and 1907 
to deal with the machinery of arbitration, mediation, and 
inquiry; with the means of regulating hositlities on land and 
sea; and with the measures for reducing the burden of arma­
ments. They also attended at London, in 1909-10, a gath­
ering which labored to formulate a code of neutral rights 
and belligerent practices. The United States became a mem­
ber of the misnamed Permanent Court of Arbitration at 
The Hague in 1899, and eight years later Secretary Root 
offered a far-sighted plan for a more effective international 
tribunal. Every administration from Grover Cleveland to 
Woodrow Wilson searched for a workable formula by which 
the compulsory arbitration of certain classes of disputes 
might be incorporated in bilateral treaties. But the most 
dramatic act on the world stage came in 1905 when Presi­
dent Roosevelt employed his good offices to help to bring the 
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Russo-Japanese War to a close and to liquidate, through a 
multipartite conference at Algeciras, a dangerous Franco-
German quarrel over Morocco. Not until May, 1914, when 
Wilson permitted Colonel Edward M. House to explore in 
Europe possible means of averting an armed clash between 
the rival alliance systems did the United States again act 
so directly to preserve world peace. Once the World War 
had broken out, Wilson tried constantly to serve as peace­
maker—at first, in a disinterested attempt to end the 
bloodshed; later, in a desperate effort to avoid American 
involvement. 
To many people, in 1917, the intervention of the United 
States in the war seemed a logical consequence of the re­
public's emergence as a world power. The breakdown of 
traditional neutrality, the forging of economic entangle­
ments, and the manifestation of passionate attachment to 
rival belligerents threatened the old indifference to the out­
come of a major European conflict. Wilson was unable to 
apply the customary rules of neutrality without hurting 
Germany or to introduce a more realistic code without 
penalizing England. The sale of munitions and the exten­
sion of loans and credits gave American manufacturers and 
financiers a tangible stake in the battle, while the cotton-
grower and wheat-producer feared the loss of a lucrative 
market on the Continent. The assiduous efforts of rival 
propagandists to mold American opinion and the apparent 
commitment of articulate groups to one side or the other 
frightened the President and undercut his plea of August 
19, 1914, for his countrymen to be "impartial in thought as 
well as in action." Thus, where Roosevelt could act as 
peacemaker in 1905 without any fear of having the nation 
embroiled if he failed, Wilson knew in 1916 that failure 
would bring involvement. On May 27 of that year, he 
warned: "We are participants in the life of the world. . . . 
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What affects mankind is inevitably our affair as well as 
the affair of the nations of Europe and of Asia." 5 
How did informed citizens of 1917 interpret American 
intervention? Wilson's explanation was that the status of 
a belligerent had been thrust upon the republic. The recent 
course of imperial Germany, he told Congress on April 2, 
was "nothing less than war against the government and 
people of the United States." Wilson spoke of vindicating 
maritime rights, violations of which cost American lives, 
not of insuring an Allied victory or preserving a favorable 
equipoise in Europe and Asia. Honor, not security, was 
stressed. But in his much-quoted address the President 
discussed the aims of intervention as well as the causes, 
and he sketched the goals for which he asked America to 
give of her blood and her might. By sublimating a war to 
uphold national rights into a crusade for all mankind, he 
bolstered the notion that the United States, in the face of 
a global cataclysm, was responding as befitted a world 
power. 
Others shared Wilson's belief that by April, 1917, tra­
ditional neutrality was no longer feasible and historic iso­
lationism was both obsolete and unwise. From the outset, 
Herbert Croly's New Republic had viewed the war in the 
broadest terms; on November 7, 1914, an editorial had 
proclaimed "The End of American Isolation." One of its 
foremost writers, Walter Lippmann, supported intervention 
because it would maintain Anglo-American control of the 
Atlantic shipping lanes, a motive he would stress more 
strongly and with much more validity after June, 1940. 
Lippmann also wanted the United States to enter the war 
because he felt such a move would aid in creating a league 
of nations. Many scholars and publicists, such as George 
Louis Beer, Roland G. Usher, Walter E. Weyl, and H. H. 
5. Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd (eds.), The New 
Democracy (The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson [6 vols; New 
York, 1925-27]), II, 185. 
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Powers, advocated some form of collective action that would 
bring to a close this nation's abstention from global 
responsibility.6 
The foregoing is some evidence for the idea that the 
triumph of imperialism in 1898-99 led to a reorientation 
of American foreign policy. What can be said for the thesis 
that the acquisition of an overseas empire did not change 
decisively traditional principles and practices? 
First, there was the rapid decline in a zeal for colonies. 
Far from embarking on a big program of annexation, the 
United States gained, between December, 1899, and April, 
1917, only the Canal Zone and the Danish West Indies. The 
former was obtained in November, 1903, solely to provide 
a route for the interoceanic canal; the latter, in August, 
1916, primarily to keep them out of German hands. How 
do we account for the sudden subsidence of expansionist 
sentiment? The battle waged by the anti-imperialists in 
1899 and 1900 was partly responsible. The insurrection in 
the Philippines, with the shocking atrocities on both sides, 
was also a factor. But the best explanation lies in the nature 
of the imperialist impulse. On neither economic nor strate­
gic grounds did the United States in 1898 need outposts in 
the western Pacific. American industrialists and bankers 
did not require dependencies in which to sell surplus manu­
factures or to invest surplus capital. The urge for colonies 
under McKinley was, as Walter E. Weyl asserted in April, 
1917, "an unripe imperialism."7 Its roots were largely 
emotional; and when those emotions found an outlet in a 
successful war, the movement withered. In the Caribbean, 
to be sure, the strategic roots of imperialism nourished the 
growth of protectorates, but these last represented a limited 
and temporary type of control. And they posed less diffi­
6. Robert Endicott Osgood, Ideals and Self-interest in America's 
Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Cen­
tury (Chicago, 1953), pp. 115-34. 
7. Walter E. Weyl, American War Policies (New York, 1917), 
p. 53. 
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cult problems of defense than did the Philippines located 
6,000 miles from San Francisco. 
Revealing, too, was the failure to create a central colonial 
office. Supervision of the lands acquired in 1898 and after­
ward was divided. The Navy Department took over the 
smaller islands of Guam and Tutuila and, later, of St. 
Thomas, St. John, and St. Croix. The War Department 
governed the Canal Zone directly but handled the Philip­
pines and, after 1909, Puerto Rico through a Bureau of In­
sular Affairs. Hawaii enjoyed territorial status and came 
nominally under the Interior Department. Uninhabited 
Wake, like Midway, required no formal rule. The Bureau of 
Insular Affairs had the makings of a colonial office, but its 
authority was too restricted. To some persons, it seemed 
handicapped by being in the War Department under an 
army officer rather than in the State Department under a 
civilian. Significantly, both Congress and the public quickly 
lost interest in colonial problems; despite prodding by the 
executive, Congress passed few important laws dealing with 
the new possessions from 1902 to 1916. 
Equally disappointing was the inability of the army and 
navy to meet fully the challenges of world power. The re­
forms urged by Secretary of War Root between 1901 and 
1903 could have come—indeed should have come—whether 
or not the United States acquired colonies. An increase 
in the authorized strength of the ground forces, the abolition 
of permanent assignments to staff posts in Washington, the 
revival of the special-service schools, the creation of an 
Army War College, the overhaul of the antiquated militia 
system, and the establishment of a general staff corps were 
changes long overdue. Yet Root merely scratched the sur­
face of the deep-seated evils of the militia system, and his 
general staff corps had to undergo further development 
before it operated efficiently. Nor did Root do everything 
that was necessary. He deferred the tactical reorganization 
of the field troops, and his attempt to secure co-ordination 
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with the navy was confined to an ineffectual Joint Army-
Navy Board, founded in July, 1903. Although the army 
made more progress in the fifteen years before Sarajevo 
than in the thirty after Appomattox, it did not keep pace 
with its European counterparts and was never prepared to 
discharge completely the increased functions that came with 
empire. 
The same can be said of the navy. Superficially that serv­
ice was less in need of change. It had performed brilliantly 
against Spain and had escaped the scandals which plagued 
the War Department. Still, with new doctrines and tactics 
being adopted across the Atlantic and with new responsi­
bilities for colonies being faced across the Pacific, the navy 
could not depend upon its existing loose command structure. 
In a typical compromise between tradition and innovation, 
Secretary John D. Long created by departmental order on 
March 13, 1900, a General Board, composed of nine officers 
and presided over by the Admiral of the Navy, a rank re­
vived for Dewey. The General Board's main duties were to 
draft war plans, study construction, recommend additional 
facilities and deployment, and counsel the secretary. Its 
role, however, was purely advisory. It issued no orders and, 
lacking legislative sanction, could be abolished by any future 
secretary. It was better than anything that had gone before, 
but it was not enough. In 1909 Secretary George von Len­
gerke Meyer instituted the aide system which placed four 
officers, responsible to him, in charge of fleet operations, 
personnel, material, and inspection. Not until Congress 
enacted statutes in 1915 and 1916 for an Office of the Chief 
of Naval Operations did the sea arm possess anything re­
sembling the general-staff principle. 
More serious still was the navy's incapability of protect­
ing some of the colonies acquired in 1898. Contrary to the 
claims of the expansionists, certain islands—notably the 
Philippines—weakened rather than strengthened the mili­
tary position of the United States. The reasons were two 
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in number. First, the fleet was never big enough or balanced 
enough to control the sea lanes stretching from the Carib­
bean to the western Pacific. Second, the vessels that were 
available lacked safe anchorages and repair facilities in 
distant waters. For these deficiencies the Congress was 
largely, though by no means entirely, to blame. 
Measured by the yardstick of the past, the record of the 
legislature seemed satisfactory. Appropriations rose stead­
ily from $48,099,969 for the fiscal year 1900 to $149,763,563 
for fiscal 1916. The number of battleships in commission 
increased from five on January 1, 1900, to thirty-seven on 
October 1, 1916.8 By 1907 the United States Navy ranked 
second only to Great Britain in total tonnage. But to im­
prove upon the nineteenth century was not enough for a 
world power, and figures can mislead. The commissioning 
late in 1906 of H.M.S. "Dreadnought," the first all big-gun 
battleship, rendered obsolete every existing battleship and 
compelled nations to start building afresh. This event coin­
cided with a growing opposition to Roosevelt's construction 
policy, an opposition that caused the United States to lose 
ground as the Anglo-German race quickened. Since most 
admirals wished to allot the bulk of available funds to dread­
noughts, the American fleet soon found itself sorely lacking 
in cruisers, battle and scout, and badly trailing in destroyers, 
submarines, and auxiliaries. Not until August, 1916, did 
Congress pass, under pressure from the advocates of 
preparedness, a three-year program designed to achieve a 
well-rounded fleet that would be second to none. 
The want of adequate overseas bases can be explained 
on several grounds. One was the decline of popular interest 
in the colonies. A second was congressional apathy or, per­
haps, a reluctance of the lawmakers to devote funds to 
installations which did not benefit their constituents di­
rectly. There was more enthusiasm on Capitol Hill for 
8. B. R. Tillman, Jr. (comp.), Navy Yearbook [1916] (Washington, 
D.C., 1916), pp. 581, 638. This title appears also as Senate Document 
No. 555, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. 
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installations inside the continental United States than out­
side. Finally, the army and navy could not agree on the 
location of the main base in the Philippines. The navy 
desired Olongapo on Subic Bay; the army, Cavite on Manila 
Bay. This inter-service quarrel reached a climax just before 
Roosevelt left the White House. On November 11, 1909, 
William Howard Taft endorsed a recommendation from the 
Joint Board that no major base be established in the Pacific 
west of Hawaii and that efforts be concentrated on Pearl 
Harbor. This decision accepted a fact which had become 
evident in the preceding years, that the Imperial Japanese 
Navy dominated the area beyond the International Date 
Line. 
If after 1899 colonial and military practice revealed the 
limits within which the new world power must operate, a 
similar hesitation can be detected in its policy in East Asia. 
The goal of the open door, as defined by Hay on July 3, 
1900, remained constant, but the obstacles to its realization 
grew more formidable. First Russia, then Japan, and then 
the two antagonists in concert infringed upon the territorial 
integrity of China and violated the principle of equal com­
mercial opportunity for all. Roosevelt's peacemaking in 
1905 marked the end of an era with Japan. In the ensuing 
decade an intermittent controversy over immigration, a 
muted rivalry over sea power, and an open clash over eco­
nomic rights in Manchuria indicated how fully the vital 
interests of both nations were in conflict. And in the years 
before the First World War, as in those after it, the Ameri­
can people and their elected representatives were unwilling 
to put force behind their avowed policy in the Orient. No 
one stated the dilemma better than a leading expansionist of 
1898. Writing to Taft on December 22, 1910, former Presi­
dent Roosevelt said: 
Our vital interest is to keep the Japanese out of our country, and 
at the same time to preserve the good will of Japan. The vital 
interest of the Japanese, on the other hand, is in Manchuria and 
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Korea. It is therefore peculiarly our interest not to take any 
steps as regards Manchuria which will give the Japanese cause to 
feel, with or without reason, that we are hostile to them, or a 
menace—in however slight a degree—to their interests. Alliance 
with China, in view of China's absolute military helplessness, 
means of course not an additional strength to us, but an additional 
obligation. . .  . As regards Manchuria, if the Japanese choose to 
follow a course of conduct to which we are adverse, we cannot 
stop it unless we are prepared to go to war, and a successful war 
about Manchuria would require a fleet as good as that of England, 
plus an army as good as that of Germany. The "open-door" 
policy in China was an excellent thing, and will I hope be a good 
thing in the future, so far as it can be maintained by general 
diplomatic agreement; but as has been proved by the whole his­
tory of Manchuria, alike under Russia and under Japan, the 
"open-door" policy, as a matter of fact, completely disappears as 
soon as a powerful nation determines to disregard it, and is 
willing to run the risk of war rather than forego its intention.9 
Roosevelt's cautious realism did not go unheeded. Secre­
tary Knox had already accepted without protest Japan's 
absorption of Korea on August 29, 1910, and after one 
failure he did not again seek to upset the Russo-Japanese 
domination of the Manchurian railway system. In May, 
1915, after Bryan's vacillation during the crisis precipitated 
by the twenty-one demands Japan presented to China in 
January, Wilson did strive, and with some success, to keep 
to a minimum the concessions wrung from the government 
at Peking. But the future of the open door was still unclear 
when, after the United States entered the war, Lansing and 
Kikijuro Ishii temporarily smoothed over mutual differences 
in an ambiguous executive agreement of November 2, 1917. 
In the Western Hemisphere the triumph of imperialism 
did not transform American policy. The developments after 
9. Elting E. Morison et al. (eds.), The Letters of Theodore Roose­
velt (8 vols.; Cambridge, 1951-54), VII, 189-90. 
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1899 were more a consummation than a change. There it 
was possible for the United States to play a more active 
role without departing from traditional isolationism or 
neutrality. What had been breached was the principle of 
not interfering in the internal affairs of other nations. 
The first instance came in Spain's Cuban colony in April, 
1898; subsequent actions under the Roosevelt Corollary 
or special treaties with Cuba and Panama also violated a 
historic non-interventionism. Beginning in 1906, however, 
the men in Washington sought to allay suspicion and pro­
mote hemispheric cordiality. In that year Secretary Root 
made an unprecedented goodwill tour of South America 
and attended the Third International Conference of Ameri­
can States at Rio de Janeiro. In 1907 he did much to see 
that eighteen New World republics participated in the 
Second Hague Conference. Indeed, he had been largely 
responsible for delaying that meeting for one year so that 
it would not conflict with the gathering at Rio. In 1907, 
too, the United States and Mexico sponsored a Central 
American Peace Conference at Washington, and in 1912 
Secretary Knox visited ten Caribbean countries. 
The advent of the Democrats brought even more strenu­
ous efforts to forge a good-neighbor policy. "One of the 
chief objects of my Administration," Wilson asserted on 
March 11, 1913, "will be to cultivate the friendship and 
deserve the confidence of our sister republics." 10 At Mobile 
on October 27, he promised: "The United States will never 
again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest." n 
During 1914 Wilson and Edward M. House drew up 
a four-point Pan-American pact which contained many 
ideas he later wrote into the League of Nations Covenant. 
It guaranteed the territorial integrity of the signatories, 
10. Arthur S. Link, Wilson: The New Freedom (Princeton, N.J., 
1956), p. 320. 
11. Baker and Dodd (eds.), The New Democracy, I, 67. 
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required an amicable settlement of all pending boundary 
disputes, made obligatory the use of arbitration or inquiry 
in certain types of controversies, and experimented with an 
arms embargo to keep the peace. But the outbreak of the 
World War prevented serious consideration of the project, 
while several moves by Wilson and William Jennings Bryan 
marred this quest for inter-American harmony. The most 
serious of these was the creation of a fifth protectorate in 
Haiti, further interference in the Dominican Republic, and 
an entanglement in the revolution and counterrevolution in 
Mexico. 
There were limits, also, to how far the United States 
would go in helping avert wars. From 1899 to 1914, the 
republic broke new ground by attending the two Hague 
Conferences, by facilitating the peacemaking at Portsmouth, 
by concerning itself with a quarrel over Morocco, and by 
negotiating numerous treaties requiring the arbitration of 
certain kinds of disputes. Yet never did the government 
tie its hands for the future, commit itself irrevocably to a 
course of action, or surrender an iota of sovereignty. In 
consenting to the Act of Algeciras of April 7, 1906, and to 
the Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, the Senate added 
reservations designed to maintain inviolate the Monroe 
Doctrine and the policy of isolationism. The first of these 
disclaimed any intention "to depart from the traditional 
American foreign policy which forbids participation by the 
United States in the settlement of political questions which 
are entirely European in their scope." The second insisted 
that "nothing contained in this convention shall be so con­
strued as to require the United States of America to depart 
from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfer­
ing with, or entangling itself in the political questions of 
policy or internal administration of any foreign state; nor 
shall anything contained in the said convention be construed 
to imply a relinquishment by the United States of its tra­
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ditional attitude toward purely American questions." 12 The 
only bilateral arbitration agreements to pass the Senate 
exempted disputes affecting "the vital interests, the inde­
pendence, or the honor" of the signatories and disputes 
concerning the interests of third parties. Differences of a 
legal nature and those relating to the interpretation of a 
treaty alone had to be arbitrated. 
Two outstanding Republicans clearly denned the commit­
ment of the United States to world peace in this period. 
"In all these matters where I am asked to interfere be­
tween two foreign nations," Roosevelt wrote to Ambassador 
Whitelaw Reid in London on August 3, 1905, "all I can 
do is this. If there is a chance to prevent trouble by pre­
venting simple misunderstanding, or by myself taking the 
first step . . . when it has become a matter of punctilio 
with the two parties . . . then I am entirely willing and 
glad to see if I can be of any value in preventing the mis­
understanding from becoming acute to the danger point. 
If, however, there is a genuine conflict of interest which 
has made each party resolute to carry its point even at 
the cost of war, there is no use of my interfering. . . .  " 13 
On January 24, 1906, Henry Cabot Lodge defended in the 
Senate Roosevelt's dispatch of representatives to Algeciras. 
"The policy and interest of the United States alike demand 
the peace of the world," he said, "and it is not to be supposed 
for a moment that we are never to exert our great moral 
influence or to use our good offices for the maintenance of 
the world's peace. . .  . In entangling alliances, of course, 
no man wants to engage this country; we have no concern 
with the wars of Europe; no one for a moment would think 
12. William M. Malloy (comp.), Treaties, Conventions, Interna­
tional Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States of 
America and Other Powers, 1776-1909 (2 vols.; Washington, D.C., 
1910), pp. 2183, 2247. This title appears also as Senate Document 
No. 357, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 
13. Morison, The Letters of Theodore Rosevelt, IV, 1298. 
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of engaging us in a position where we might be involved in 
them . . . but . . . the phrase 'entangling alliances' does 
not mean that we should not unite with other nations on 
commercial questions . .  . or in the promotion of those 
great and beneficent objects which are embodied in inter­
national conventions." The presence of American delegates, 
he concluded, "will make for the advancement of our com­
merce in Morocco and will also make for what is infinitely 
more important, the peace of the world." 14 
Did the experience of the years from 1914 to 1917 per­
suade the American people to enlarge that commitment? 
Did they agree with Wilson that neutrality was "no longer 
feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is con­
cerned"? Did they endorse his "concert of free people," 
his league of nations, as a war aim? The evidence is over­
whelming that they did not. In April, 1917, Wilson and 
his associates, as well as intellectuals like Lippmann and 
Weyl, were in a minority. Few citizens feared that Germany 
would wrest control of the Atlantic; not even the President 
or his secretary of the navy knew at that time of the alarm­
ing inroads the submarine was making on British shipping. 
The war on land appeared to be a stalemate, with little 
prospect of a German victory. An invasion of American 
soil seemed very unlikely. With considerable reluctance and 
an air of resignation, most Americans concurred in Wilson's 
assertion that "the right is more precious than peace" and 
that they must "accept gage of battle with this natural foe 
to liberty." 
The debate in Congress revealed how few legislators 
followed the President beyond his immediate goals—the 
defense of American rights and the destruction of Prussian 
autocracy. A handful of critics, like Senators Robert M. La 
Follette and George W. Norris or Representatives Claude 
Kitchin and Fred A. Britten, rejected Wilson's basic prem­
ise, arguing that the United States should have and could 
have stayed out. They would have denied that America's 
14. Congressional Record, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1470. 
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emergence as a world power obligated her to fight in order 
to preserve the existing order in Europe or in Asia. The 
more ardent Republican interventionists, like Lodge or 
Senator James W. Wadsworth, carefully refrained from 
supporting the league-of-nations idea. They appealed rather 
for bipartisanship in a war against the forces of barbarism. 
They were the ones most likely to recognize the need for a 
changed foreign policy; they reflected the views of Roose­
velt, Hay, Root, and others who had shaped the course of 
the imperial republic after 1898. Most of this group favored 
a postwar alliance with England and France but said little 
on that point in April, 1917. Still other Republicans, and a 
few Democrats, stood closer to La Follette and Norris on 
the best policy for the future. While ready to vindicate 
national honor by armed force, they saw no need to depart 
from traditional practices after the guns were stilled. Thus 
Senator Warren G. Harding insisted that he was "not voting 
for war in the name of democracy" but rather in behalf of 
"the maintenance of just American rights." William E. 
Borah was more explicit in separating the quarrel with 
Germany from the creation of a future league. There can 
be, he told the Senate, "but one sufficient reason for com­
mitting this country to war, and that is the honor and 
security of our own people and our own Nation. . .  . I join 
no crusade; I seek or accept no alliances; I obligate this 
Government to no other power. I make war alone for my 
countrymen and their rights, for my country and its 
honor." 15 
Certainly the subsequent battle over the Versailles Treaty 
disclosed a widespread unwillingness to join Wilson in pro­
claiming the abandonment of isolationism and neutrality. 
The rejection of the League Covenant cannot be attributed, 
as it often has been, solely to personal enmities, partisan 
rivalries, and parochial outlooks. In seeking to break with 
the past, the President moved too far, too fast. The Ameri­
can people were not prepared to assume the moral leader­
15. Congressional Record, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 253. 
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ship he asked of them or to embrace the type of collective 
security he envisaged. In 1920, as in 1898, the average 
citizen thought the United States could be a world power 
and still adhere to practices of an earlier day. In the inter­
lude between the two World Wars, the policy-makers had 
to settle for a compromise between traditional nineteenth-
century principles and Wilson's more ambitious objectives. 
These leaders reflected the experience of 1898 to 1917 by 
taking unprecedented steps to achieve regional non­
aggression pacts, arms-control agreements, membership in 
an international court, and pledges to renounce war as an 
instrument of national policy. They also eliminated some of 
the excrescences of the imperialist adventure. But they were 
still loath to forge permanent alliances or to promise in 
advance to use armed force in a future crisis, even though 
the new world power of 1898 had become the Old World's 
creditor of 1921. It would take the lessons learned from the 
futility of that compromise and from the agony of 1940 
to 1945 to effect a true revolution in American foreign 
policy. As we look back from the troubled present, we can 
see more clearly than did the older historians that the 
emergence of the United States as a world power after the 
clash with Spain and the interwar compromise after the 
struggle against Germany—while representing change— 
were at most transitional stages in a process that culminated 
in the global commitments and constant involvement which 
characterize American foreign policy today. 
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Although many able scholars have dealt with American 
foreign policy in the period from 1898 to 1917, none has 
produced a comprehensive analysis of the United States as 
THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICA AS A WORLD POWER 25 
a world power. The best overview is in the first hundred 
pages of Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise to World 
Power, 1898-195U (New York, 1955), a volume in "The 
New American Nations Series" edited by Henry Steele 
Commager and Richard B. Morris. It rests, however, en­
tirely on printed materials. 
Works on the basic guidelines of American foreign policy 
in this period are spotty. There is no systematic treatment 
of neutrality or isolationism. Selig Adler, The Isolationist 
Impulse: Its Twentieth-Century Reaction (London, 1957) 
is helpful for popular sentiment, as opposed to governmental 
policy, but devotes less than forty pages to the years before 
1917. For neutrality, one must look to books whose primary 
concern is the years 1914 to 1917. Two works by Dexter 
Perkins do justice to the Monroe Doctrine—his heavily docu­
mented The Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907 (Baltimore, 1937) 
and the less detailed Hands Off: A History of the Monroe 
Doctrine (Boston, 1941). The latter was reissued in 1955, 
with little change, under the subtitle. John A. Logan, Jr., 
No Transfer: An American Security Principle (New Haven, 
1961) is a useful supplement. Studies of the open door, non­
intervention, and recognition would be welcome. 
Until recently an understanding of the emergence of the 
United States as a world power has been obscured by the 
myths and distortions surrounding the War with Spain. 
Although the foes of colonies lost the fight over the peace 
treaty and the election of 1900, they won the battle of words 
that followed. Ever since 1917, but especially in the 1930's, 
there has been a distinct anti-imperialist tinge to most books 
relating to McKinley, armed intervention in Cuba, and the 
decision to retain the Philippines. Several facts account 
for that coloration. Many writers disliked the economic 
and social ideas of the twenty-fifth president. Some found 
his religiosity unpalatable. Others accepted the contempo­
rary lampoons which pictured him as a puppet of Mark 
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Hanna and the trusts. Still others swallowed the nonsense 
contained in H. H. Kohlsaat's memoirs regarding his al­
leged ignorance of geography and military matters.16 Most 
influential of all, was The Martial Spirit by Walter Millis, 
a journalist without previous experience in historical writ­
ing. Published in 1931, when the author's pacifism was in 
full flower and most Americans had rejected the white 
man's burden, it stressed the satiric aspects of the war. 
Using only obvious printed sources and some of them un­
critically, Millis produced an amusing but highly over­
simplified chronicle whose pages have since been a gold 
mine for professors seeking humor for their lectures. These 
teachers often overlook the fact that Millis called his book 
"an essay in history" and not a history or work of scholar­
ship.17 
If The Martial Spirit strengthened the anti-imperialist 
caricature of McKinley and the assumptions of economic 
16. H. H. Kohlsaat, From McKinley to Harding: Personal Recol­
lections of Our Presidents (New York, 1923) has badly misled a 
large number of historians who, in quoting or summarizing the follow­
ing sentences, have denigrated McKinley. "I visited the President a 
few days after the victory [at Manila Bay]. McKinley said: 'When 
we received the cable from Admiral Dewey telling of their taking of 
the Philippines I looked up their location on the globe. I could not 
have told where those darned islands were within 2,000 miles!' Some 
months later he said: 'If old Dewey had just sailed away when he 
smashed the Spanish fleet, what a lot of trouble he would have saved
us" (page 68). Actually, McKinley knew exactly where the islands 
were. He had let stand since February 25, 1898, a preliminary order
to Dewey—who held the temporary rank of commodore, not admiral—
from Assistant Secretary Roosevelt to prepare for an attack on 
Manila in case of war with Spain. On April 24 McKinley presided 
over a White House conference which directed Dewey to sail at once 
from Hong Kong. For the next week Washington papers carried full 
stories of the impending battle, replete with maps and pictures. 
Furthermore, McKinley never envisaged Dewey's sailing away after 
the battle. Without consulting Congress or awaiting Dewey's formal 
report, McKinley decided on May 2 to send army units to enable 
Dewey to hold Cavite and eventually move on Manila. On these two 
episodes, see Leopold, The Growth of American Foreign Policy, pp. 
150-52, 180-82. 
17. Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit (Cambridge, 1931), p. 413. 
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determinists, a scholarly effort by Julius W. Pratt five years 
later rescued American imperialism from being fitted into 
the classic mold of John A. Hobson. In Expansionists of 
1898, originally prepared as lectures, Pratt paid relatively 
little attention to the origins of the Cuban crusade but con­
centrated on the growth of a new manifest-destiny senti­
ment in the 1880's and on the debate over the annexation 
of Hawaii in the 1890's. In two self-contained chapters, 
however, he analyzed the attitude of the business and re­
ligious community, mostly through specialized periodicals, 
and found that most manufacturers and financiers opposed 
a bold foreign policy until the eve of war. Only when they 
saw that the conflict would be brief and not check recovery 
from the long depression did they embrace imperialism. 
Pratt's findings have, properly, greatly influenced later 
writers.18 
For almost twenty years no one undertook a major study 
of McKinley or the War with Spain. Several minor or tan­
gential publications filled gaps or corrected earlier interpre­
tations. William E. Livezey, John A. Garraty, and Howard 
K. Beale developed the ideas of those ardent expansionists 
—Mahan, Lodge, and Roosevelt—but in the process rein­
forced the false notion that this trio directly affected 
McKinley*s decisions.19 Other important imperialists, like 
Senator Cushman K. Davis, were neglected, while key men 
of the President's inner circle, notably William R. Day, 
18. Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898: The Acquisition of 
Hawaii and the Spanish Islands (Baltimore, 1936), especially pp. 230­
316. The most systematic attempt to explain American imperialism 
in terms of the drive for outlets for surplus manufactures, capital, 
and population is in Charles A. Beard, The Idea of National Interest: 
An Analytical Study of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1934), 
a work done in collaboration with G. H. E. Smith. 
19. William E. Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power (Norman, Okla., 
1947); John A. Garraty, Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography (New 
York, 1952) ; Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of 
America to World Power (Baltimore, 1956). 
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were ignored. Beale, moreover, exaggerated Roosevelt's role 
in ordering Dewey, in case of war, to attack the Philippines 
and wrongly attributed to him a prewar desire to annex the 
archipelago.20 Books by Sylvester K. Stevens and William 
A. Russ, Jr., have supplemented, but not markedly altered, 
Pratt's story of events in Hawaii.21 George W. Auxier has 
demonstrated that yellow journalism was not confined to 
New York.22 Orestes Ferrara's sketch of the diplomacy of 
the great powers before 1898 was translated into English.23 
In a widely quoted essay Richard Hofstadter linked the 
impulse for adventure abroad with the frustration and 
discord at home—what he calls "the psychic crisis of the 
1890's." He also correctly distinguished the forces making 
for intervention in Cuba from those responsible for reten­
tion of the Philippines.24 
Then in 1959 appeared the first of four major contribu­
tions to comprehending the emergence of the United States 
as a world power. In the Days of McKinley by Margaret 
20. On February 25, 1898, according to Beale, "The Assistant 
Secretary had seized the opportunity given by Long's absence to insure 
our grabbing the Philippines without a decision to do so by either 
Congress or the President, or least of all the people" (p. 63). Such 
a conclusion is unwarranted by the facts and is unfair to McKinley. 
The latter could have revoked the order at any time in the next two 
months but chose not to do so. Instead, on April 24 he directed that 
it be put into effect. There is no evidence that Roosevelt on February
25 or McKinley on April 24 looked upon this military operation as a 
means "to insure our grabbing the Philippines." 
21. Sylvester K. Stevens, American Expansion in Hawaii, 1842­
1898 (Harrisburg, Pa., 1945); William A. Russ, Jr., The Hawaiian 
Revolution, 1893-1894 (Selinsgrove, Pa., 1959) and The Hawaiian 
Republic (1894-98) and Its Struggle to Win Annexation (Selinsgrove, 
Pa., 1961). 
22. George W. Auxier, "Middle Western Newspapers and the 
Spanish-American War, 1895-1898," Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review, XXVI (1940), 523-34. 
23. Orestes Ferrara, The Last Spanish War, trans. William E. 
Shea, (New York, 1937). 
24. Richard Hofstadter, "Manifest Destiny and the Philippines," 
in Daniel Aaron (ed.), America In Crisis (New York, 1952), pp. 
172-200. 
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Leech is not a complete biography or the work of a specialist 
in the period. The author devotes 500 of the 600 pages to the 
presidential years, and most of those center upon the war. 
Except for the diary of George B. Cortelyou, which had 
been kept from scholars for her benefit, she draws upon 
little new material, and her grasp of the political and mili­
tary problems of the day is not always sure. Yet by an 
impressionistic technique and a sympathetic approach, Miss 
Leech has produced a good portrait of McKinley, a thor­
oughly credible one that testifies to his virtues and only 
slightly underplays his shortcomings. She has demonstrated 
that the President was no weakling and made all of the 
key decisions once the war had begun. Hers is a long over­
due corrective that must be taken into account by all who 
henceforth discuss the era.25 
The second contribution came in 1961. Ernest R. May*s 
Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great 
Power is the product of a highly competent scholar who 
places his subject in a broad setting. Focusing on the period 
from the uprising in Hawaii in January, 1893, to the Sen­
ate's vote on the peace treaty in February, 1899, it covers 
more ground and probes more deeply than Pratt's lectures. 
May describes fully the Venezuelan boundary controversy 
in order to illustrate Europe's sudden realization that the 
transatlantic giant must be reckoned with. His best chap­
ters trace Spain's futile moves to muster European support 
against intervention in Cuba; in these he has exploited the 
manuscript and printed files of the Continental foreign of­
fices. He is also very good in analyzing American public 
opinion, though his treatment of McKinley's decision to 
retain the Philippines is less convincing than that of the 
President's yielding on intervention in Cuba. By August, 
1898, McKinley was master of the situation. Far from hav­
25. Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York, 1959). 
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ing to avoid being crushed by the steamroller of popular 
sentiment—the figure is May's—he did much by word and 
deed to arouse that sentiment.26 Since the personal papers 
of McKinley's circle are either non-existent or unrewarding, 
May might have enlarged his knowledge of the cabinet's 
deliberations by a more extensive investigation of news­
papers and military records in the National Archives. But 
all in all, his is an impressive volume with which future 
scholars must begin. 
The last two contributions followed in 1963. H. Wayne 
Morgan's William McKinley and His America does not alter 
the portrait drawn by Leech, but it is a much sounder his­
torical study. The author has dug more deeply into news­
papers and manuscripts, both private and archival; and if 
he tends to explain rather than to appraise many of the 
President's acts, he is not uncritical. Morgan offers the 
fullest and best account of the prewar negotiations with 
Spain; his story of the peacemaking is good but a little 
imprecise.27 He follows Pratt on the attitude of the business 
community; he differs from May in stressing less the impact 
of public opinion. Although he argues that McKinley vir­
tually decided to retain the Philippines on May 2, 1898, 
when, on the basis of incomplete reports, he dispatched 
ground troops to aid Dewey, his evidence is not convincing. 
Morgan does not even try to explain why the cabinet, having 
given no thought before May 1 to what would be done in 
event of a victory in Manila Bay, moved so promptly. A 
26. Ernest R. May, Imperial Democracy: The Emergence of 
America as a Great Power (New York, 1961). The allusion to the 
steamroller is on page 257. 
27. Syracuse, N. Y., 1963. For example, Morgan fails to make clear 
the exact sequence of events leading to the telegram of October 28, 
1898, from John Hay to William R. Day instructing the peace com­
missioners to demand all of the Philippines. For a statement on how 
an error in the Foreign Relations volume for 1898 has misled his­
torians, see Richard W. Leopold, "The Foreign Relations Series: A 
Centennial Estimate," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIX (March, 1963), 598 n. 12. 
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failure to answer a few unresolved, and perhaps insoluble, 
questions of war and peace is the chief weakness of this 
highly creditable but too hastily published book. 
The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Ex­
pansion, 1860-1898 by Walter LaFeber emphasizes the 
economic factors making for the acquisition of overseas 
possessions. It could initiate a modification of the prevail­
ing consensus among historians that has minimized material 
considerations in the coming of the war with Spain. The 
first half of the volume describes the persistence of terri­
torial ambitions from 1865 to 1889 and analyzes the 
intellectual, strategic, and economic elements in the new 
manifest destiny. The second half maintains that a quest 
for new markets dominated the diplomacy of the 1890's 
as the United States reacted to developments in Brazil, 
Venezuela, Central America, Cuba, Hawaii, and China. The 
author has done an impressive job of research and reveals 
an inquiring mind in the questions he raises. He insists 
that colonies were sought, not for their own sake, but as 
a means of opening up markets to relieve the glut of indus­
trial and agricultural goods at home. Thus, anticolonialists 
like Cleveland, Gresham, and Olney were as eager as expan­
sionists like Lodge, Beveridge, and Reid to help the busi­
nessman. LaFeber does not pretend to deal fully with the 
decision to wage war or to retain colonies; he is content 
"to stress the operative economic forces and to point out 
the interaction of events in Asia, Cuba, and the American 
business community."2S He is most convincing on this 
interaction; for, although he has produced a stimulating 
essay that must be read by all specialists in foreign policy, 
he has hurt his case by carelessness with facts, haste in 
28. The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion,
1860-1898 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1963), ix. A paper read by William Apple-
man Williams before the Mississippi Valley Historical Association at 
Cleveland on April 30, 1964, also emphasized the quest for new mar­
kets as an explanation of the triumph of imperialism in 1898. 
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composition, and an eagerness to force evidence into a 
preconceived mold. 
The question of how the United States acted as a world 
power has attracted less attention than why or when the 
republic gained that status. To be sure there are, for the 
years 1899 to 1914, many excellent works on American 
policy in the Caribbean and East Asia. Others describe 
the changed relations with the great powers; a few of these 
draw upon recently opened files of the Public Record Office 
in London.29 Julius W. Pratt has traced lucidly the ad­
ministration of the new empire; and although he did not 
tap the unprinted files of the Bureau of Insular Affairs 
and other governing bodies, his conclusions are not likely 
to be altered.30 Among the policy-makers, Roosevelt, Hay, 
Root, and Wilson have been well covered; more needs to be 
done on Taft, Knox, Bryan, and Lansing.31 Beale's study of 
29. Charles S. Campbell, Jr., Anglo-American Understanding, 1898­
1903 (Baltimore, 1957), and A. E. Campbell, Great Britain and the 
United States, 1895-1903 (London, 1960). 
30. Julius W. Pratt, America's Colonial Experiment: How the 
United States Gained, Governed, and In Part Gave Away a Colonial 
Empire (New York, 1950). Whitney T. Perkins, Denial of Empire:
The United States and Its Dependencies (Leyden, 1962), is a care­
fully executed work which not only brings up to date the analysis in 
Pratt but also discusses more fully the administration of individual 
territories under American rule. 
31. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World 
Power; William H. Harbaugh, Power and Responsibility: The Life 
and Times of Theodore Roosevelt (New York, 1961); Tyler Dennett, 
John Hay: From Poetry to Politics (New York, 1933); Philip C. 
Jessup, Elihu Root (2 vols.; New York, 1938); Richard W. Leopold, 
Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition (Boston, 1954); Arthur S. 
Link, Wilson (3 vols. to date; Princeton, N.J., 1947- ). Henry F. 
Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft (2 vols.; New 
York, 1938) is good on domestic affairs but fails to do justice to 
foreign policy. There are useful sketches of Knox, Bryan, and Lansing 
in Norman A. Graebner (ed.), An Uncertain Tradition: American 
Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1961); 
the one on Bryan by Richard D. Challener is especially good. The 
picture of Lansing after 1914 can be filled out by Daniel M. Smith, 
Robert Lansing and American Neutrality, 19H-1917 (Berkeley, Calif., 
1958) and by Burton F. Beers, Vain Endeavor: Robert Lansing's
Attempt to End the American-Japanese Rivalry (Durham, N.C., 
1962). 
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Roosevelt, while uneven in places, is particularly good on 
the peace of Portsmouth and the quarrel over Morocco. 
Still to come are reliable accounts of United States policy 
with respect to compulsory arbitration, the Second Hague 
Conference, and attempts to strengthen the machinery for 
peace from 1907 to 1914.32 Pilot essays have shown what 
can be done with the ideas of military leaders and the draft­
ing of war plans when previously classified manuscripts are 
made available.33 
The last decade has seen the historiography of the First 
World War come of age. Gone are the passionate attacks 
upon and defenses of Wilson—and the straining to draw 
lessons from the past—which marred so many writings of 
the 1920's and 1930's. Books by Arthur S. Link, Ernest R. 
May, Marion C. Siney, and Karl E. Birnbaum, to mention 
only a few, are notable for their detachment and their ap­
proach.34 May's careful probing into German sources and 
his intelligent sampling of scattered British records give 
32. Calvin DeArmond Davis, The United States and the First 
Hague Peace Conference (Ithaca, N.Y., 1962) is a helpful monograph. 
33. Fred Greene, "The Military View of American National Policy,
1904-1940," American Historical Review, LXVI (1961), 354-77; Louis 
Morton, "War Plan ORANGE: Evolution of a Strategy," World Politics, 
XI (1959), 221-50; Albert C. Stillson, "Military Policy without 
Political Guidance: Theodore Roosevelt's Navy," Military Affairs,
XXV (1961), 18-31; Richard D. Challener, "The Military and the 
Formulation of American Foreign Policy, 1900-1914," a paper read 
before the American Historical Association on December 28, 1958. 
See also, William R. Braisted, The American Navy in the Pacific,
1897-1907 (Austin, Tex., 1958). 
34. Link, Wilson: The New Freedom; Wilson: The Struggle for 
Neutrality, 19H-1915 (Princeton, N.J., 1960); Wilson the Diploma­
tist: A Look at His Major Foreign Policies (Baltimore, 1957); 
Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917 (New York, 
1954). Ernest R. May, The World War and American Isolation, 191U­
1917 (Cambridge, 1959) does not really discuss isolationism. Marion 
C. Siney, The Allied Blockade of Germany, 19H-1916 (Ann Arbor, 
Mich., 1957). Karl E. Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare: 
A Study of Imperial Germany's Policy toward the United States, 
April 18, 1916-January 9, 1917 (Stockholm, 1958). For an appraisal 
of the writings of the 1920's and 1930's, see Richard W. Leopold, 
"The Problem of American Intervention, 1917: An Historical Retro­
spect," World Politics, II (1950), 405-25. 
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authority to his analysis of American policy. In his third 
volume, Link delved even more deeply into the British side, 
while his fourth will draw upon additional private collec­
tions in England and upon the hitherto closed French 
archives. At last we shall be on firm ground in watching 
Wilson's diplomacy, and House's, as it unfolded in the major 
capitals of the world. The final word has not yet been writ­
ten on the problems inherent in the theme of this paper— 
whether the American people went to war in 1917 to uphold 
their maritime rights, forestall a German victory, or make 
the world safe for democracy and whether they intended, 
by intervening, to abandon isolationism and neutrality. But 
on all these points Robert E. Osgood's volume, cited above, 
has important things to say.35 
35. Osgood, Ideals and Self-interest in America's Foreign Relations. 
Edward H. Buehrig, Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of Power 
(Bloomington, Ind., 1955) is suggestive but not wholly conclusive. 
The Square Deal in Action: A Case Study in 
the Growth of the "National Police Power" 
JOHN BRAEMAN 
BY 1906, the Progressive movement was beginning to move 
into high gear at the national level. Safely elected in his 
own right, Theodore Roosevelt was growing increasingly 
alarmed at the multiplying signs of unrest. The marked 
jump in the Socialist vote in the 1904 elections appeared 
"ominous." "The dull, purblind folly of the very rich men; 
their greed and arrogance, . . . and the corruption in busi­
ness and politics," he complained to Secretary of War 
William Howard Taft in March, 1906, "have tended to 
produce a very unhealthy condition of excitement and irri­
tation in the popular mind. . . ." 1 In response, T.R. called 
for positive action by the federal government against cor­
porate wrong-doing and social evils.2 In his annual message 
of December, 1905, Roosevelt had laid down the basic prin­
ciples of the program which would become known as the 
1. Theodore Roosevelt to Charles Ferris Gettemy, February 1, 
1905, in Elting E. Morison et al. (eds.), The Letters of Theodore 
Roosevelt (8 vols.; Cambridge, 1951-54), IV, 1113; Roosevelt to 
William Howard Taft, March 15, 1906, ibid., V, 183. 
2. For a perceptive account of T.R.'s program, see George E. 
Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, 1900-1912 (New York, 1958), 
pp. 197-225. 
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"New Nationalism." "The fortunes amassed through cor­
porate organization," the chief executive warned Congress, 
"are now so large, and vest such power in those that wield 
them, as to make it a matter of necessity to give to the 
sovereign—that is, to the government, which represents the 
people as a whole—some effective power of supervision over 
their corporate use." The states could not do the job; only 
the federal government could deal with problems that had 
become nationwide in scope. Recent court decisions, how­
ever, had led to "a very unfortunate condition of things, 
under which these great corporations doing an interstate 
business occupy the position of subjects without a sovereign, 
neither any State government nor the National Government 
having effective control of them." The time had come, T.R. 
concluded, "to assert the sovereignty of the National Gov­
ernment by affirmative action." 3 
There were, however, formidable hurdles, constitutional 
no less than political, to carrying out this program. The 
Constitution granted no general police power to the national 
government; Congress was given no authority "to make," 
in the classic words of Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court, ". . . all manner of whole­
some and reasonable laws . . . not repugnant to the consti­
tution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of 
the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same." 4 If 
Congress were to undertake an ambitious program of na­
tional regulation and supervision of the economy, then it 
must act under one of its enumerated powers. Of the 
enumerated powers, none appeared more inviting as a 
vehicle for what Robert E. Cushman has called the "national 
police power" than the commerce clause.5 But how far could 
3. Hermann Hagedorn (ed.), The Works of Theodore Roosevelt 
(20 vols.; National Edition; New York, 1926), XV, 270-73. 
4. Leonard W. Levy, The Law of the Commonwealth and Chief 
Justice Shaw (Cambridge, 1957), pp. 247-54. 
5. Robert E. Cushman, "The National Police Power under the 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution," Part I, Minnesota Law Review, 
III, No. 5 (April, 1919), 289-303. 
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Congress undertake, under the cloak of the commerce 
clause, to regulate business activities within the states? 
As of 1906, the constitutional picture remained unclear.6 
Chief Justice John Marshal, in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), 
had defined federal authority under the commerce clause 
in sweeping terms. Before 1887, however, the commerce 
clause was interpreted primarily as a barrier against state 
interference with the free flow of interstate commerce 
rather than as a positive grant of power to Congress.7 The 
first major positive exercise of the commerce power by 
the federal government came in the Interstate Commerce 
Commission Act of 1887. Subsequent court decisions emas­
culated the legislation by denying the Interstate Commerce 
Commission rate-fixing powers; these decisions, however, 
rested upon the question of Congress's intent and not its 
constitutional authority. Justice David J. Brewer, speaking 
for the majority in Interstate Commerce Commission v. 
Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Co. 
(1897), affirmed that "Congress might itself prescribe the 
rates; or it might commit to some subordinate tribunal this 
duty. . . ." But, he held, Congress had not done so in the 
1887 legislation. ". . . If Congress had intended to grant 
such a power to the Interstate Commerce Commission," 
Brewer reasoned, "it cannot be doubted that it would have 
used language open to no misconstruction, but clear and 
direct." 8 
6. In preparing the following survey, I am deeply indebted to: 
Edward S. Corwin, The Commerce Power versus States Rights(Princeton, N.J., 1936), passim; Henry Rottschaefer, The Constitution 
and So do-Economic Change (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1948), pp. 13-24, 
28-32; Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison, The American 
Constitution: Its Origins and Development (New York, 1955), pp. 
543-608; and Alpheus T. Mason and William M. Beaney, The Supreme 
Court in a Free Society (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1959), pp. 114-17, 
151-92. 
7. James W. Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in the 
Nineteenth-Century United States (Madison, Wis., 1956), pp. 44-51. 
8. I. L. Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission: A Study
in Administrative Law and Procedure (4 Parts in 5 vols.; New York, 
1931-37), I, 11-35, 45; William Z. Ripley, Railroads: Rates and 
Regulations (New York, 1912), pp. 441-86; Interstate Commerce Com­
mission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway Co., 
167 U.S. 479 (1897). 
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Thus, T.R. in picking railroad-rate regulation as the open­
ing target in his campaign for national supervision of the 
economy was making a shrewd move. Not merely could he 
count upon strong popular backing spearheaded by the ship­
pers' organizations, but he stood on sound constitutional 
ground. That Congress itself could fix rates was not at 
issue in the struggle that followed. Its giving that authority 
to the Interstate Commerce Commission represented more 
of a stumbling block. Many "men of disinterested convic­
tion as well as those who were sheer obstructionists" had 
qualms about the constitutionality of Congress delegating 
its legislative power—that is, its power to make rates—to 
an administrative body. But the Supreme Court in the 
Cincinnati, New Orleans and Texas Pacific Railway case 
had indicated that Congress could do so. Nor did the 
"railroad" senators concentrate their fire upon this question. 
The fight in the Senate raged over the question of how far 
the rate-making authority to be granted the Interstate 
Commerce Commission should be hedged by court review.9 
Important as the Hepburn Act was in setting a "precedent, 
accepted by the courts and enlarged by later Congresses, 
. . . [for] government by administrative commission,"10 
its adoption did not constitute a major step forward in the 
extension of the national police power. Its significance, a 
leading authority acknowledged, "was not primarily in the 
wider scope of Federal control." n 
The railroads were generally recognized as within the 
scope of federal authority. But could this authority reach 
to encompass business activities carried on within the 
states? This question came to the fore in the debate over 
9. John M. Blum, The Republican Roosevelt (Cambridge, 1958), 
pp. 73-105; Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt, pp. 201-6; 
Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission, I, 40-52; Ripley, 
Railroads: Rates and Regulations, pp. 494-521; F. H. Dixon, "The 
Interstate Commerce Act as Amended," Quarterly Journal of Eco­
nomics, XXI, No. 1 (November, 1906), 22-51. 
10. Blum, The Republican Roosevelt, p. 105. 
11. Ripley, Railroads: Rates and Regulations, p. 500. 
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antitrust legislation. Did Congress have the authority to 
prohibit combinations in manufacturing simply because the 
goods made were intended for interstate commerce? The 
upshot of congressional doubts was the purposefully vague 
phraseology of the Sherman Act which left to the courts 
to decide if combinations in manufacturing were—or were 
not—included within the ban. The Supreme Court's de­
cision, in United States v. E. C. Knight Co. (1895), ap­
peared to strike a fatal blow to future use of the commerce 
clause as a vehicle for expansion of the national police 
power. In rejecting the government's suit for dissolution of 
the sugar trust, Chief Justice Melville Fuller, speaking for 
an eight to one majority, drew a sharp distinction between 
manufacturing and commerce. "Slight reflection will show," 
Fuller declared, "that if the national power extends to all 
contracts and combinations in manufacture, agriculture, 
mining, and other productive industries, whose ultimate 
result may affect external commerce, comparatively little 
of business operations and affairs would be left for state 
control." 
If not overturned, or at least modified, the Knight de­
cision would have made impossible future use of the com­
merce clause as a vehicle for the national police power. 
There is no question but that this was the overriding issue 
in the minds of the majority. ". . . The power of a State to 
protect the lives, health, and property of its citizens, and 
to preserve good order and the public morals, . . . is," Ful­
ler explained, "a power originally and always belonging 
to the States, not surrendered by them to the general gov­
ernment. . . .  " This police power was "essentially ex­
clusive" ; therefore, "the relief of the citizens of each State 
from the burden of monopoly . . . was left with the States 
to deal with. . . .  " That interstate commerce "might be 
indirectly affected was not enough" to warrant congres­
sional interference in the sphere belonging to the states. 
"It is vital," the Chief Justice insisted, "that the independ­
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ence of the commercial power and of the police power, and 
the delimitation between them, however sometimes per­
plexing, should always be recognized and observed. . . . 
[This] is essential to the preservation of . .  . our dual form 
of government; and acknowledged evils, however grave and 
urgent they may appear to be, had better be borne, than the 
risk be run, in the effort to suppress them, of more serious 
consequences by resort to expedients of even doubtful con­
stitutionality." 12 
More than any other decision, the Knight case was re­
sponsible for that never-never land Roosevelt complained 
about in which neither the federal government nor the states 
could act. In subsequent decisions, however, the Court 
backtracked. In Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United 
States (1899), the Supreme Court held that an agreement 
among pipe manufacturers to fix prices and divide markets 
was illegal under the Sherman Act. This decision, accord­
ing to a leading authority on the subject, represented, "in 
practice, if not in theory," a departure from the restricted 
view of interstate commerce taken in the Knight case. The 
decision in the Northern Securities case (1904) represented 
a further step in revitalizing the Sherman Act. That law 
included within its ban, the majority opinion by Justice 
John M. Harlan ruled, "combinations . . . among private 
manufacturers or dealers whereby interstate or interna­
tional commerce is restrained. . . .  " The following year in 
Swift & Co. v. United States (1905), a unanimous Court 
approved the "current of commerce" doctrine that would in 
the New Deal provide the rationale for an unprecedented 
expansion of federal authority under the commerce clause.13 
12. Hans Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy: Origination of 
an American Tradition (Baltimore, 1955), pp. 164-232, 445-48; 
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) ; Arnold M. Paul, 
Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law: Attitudes of Bench and 
Bar, 1887-1895 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1960), pp. 179-84. 
13. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy, pp. 452-77; Mason and 
Beaney, The Supreme Court in a Free Society, pp. 151-56. 
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The full significance of the Swift decision was not imme­
diately apparent. And important as were these decisions in 
revitalizating the Sherman Act, their significance for the 
future development of the national police power remained 
limited. The constitutional rationale for federal antitrust 
legislation was the power Congress enjoyed under the com­
merce clause "for the promotion and protection of interstate 
commerce itself"—a power that included the authority "to 
keep interstate commerce free from the obstacles and inter­
ferences resulting from monopoly and other combinations 
and conspiracies designed to destroy free competition and 
restrain trade." 14 Crucial for the future development of 
the national police power was Congress's authority to bar 
goods from interstate commerce as a weapon with which to 
force compliance with its regulations. This question came 
before the Court in Champion v. Ames (1903). In a five 
to four decision the Court upheld an 1895 federal law ban­
ning the shipment of lottery tickets in interstate commerce. 
The majority decision, written by Justice Harlan, harked 
back to Gibbons v. Ogden. " . .  . The power of Congress to 
regulate commerce among the States," Harlan declared, "is 
plenary" and thus not limited by the reserved powers of the 
states. Since the power to regulate included the power to 
prohibit, Congress could, Harlan held, bar lottery tickets 
from interstate commerce "for the purpose of guarding the 
people of the United States against the "widespread pesti­
lence of lotteries'. . . .  " Here was a clear-cut avowal of 
a national police power under the cloak of the commerce 
clause. The minority bemoaned this invasion of states' 
rights. "The power of the State to impose restraints and 
burdens on persons and property in conservation and pro­
motion of the public health, good order, and prosperity is," 
Chief Justice Fuller argued, "a power originally and always 
belonging to the States, not surrendered by them to the 
14. Cushman, "The National Police Power under the Commerce 
Clause," I, 303, 310-12. 
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General Government. . . .  " Authority to suppress lotteries 
"belongs to the States and not to Congress." "To hold that 
Congress has general police power," Fuller complained, 
"would be to hold that it may accomplish objects not en­
trusted to the General Government, and to defeat the opera­
tion of the Tenth Amendment. . . .  " 
The door appeared open for a sweeping extension of the 
national police power. But how far open? Harlan denied 
that his decision gave Congress carte blanche "arbitrarily 
[to] exclude from commerce among the States any article, 
commodity or thing, of whatever kind or nature, or how­
ever useful or valuable, which it may choose, no matter 
with what motive. . . .  " Although Congress's power over 
interstate commerce was not limited by the reserved power 
of the states, that power, Harlan warned, "may not be exer­
cised so as to infringe rights" protected by the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment. The courts must decide in 
any given instance whether Congress has exceeded the 
proper limits of its authority. "The whole subject is too 
important," Harlan concluded, "and the questions suggested 
by its consideration are too difficult of solution, to justify 
any attempt to lay down a rule for determining in advance 
the validity of every statute that may be enacted under the 
commerce clause." 15 
A possible test of the extent of the national police power 
under the commerce clause was pending before Congress 
at the beginning of 1906. This was the bill for a federal 
pure food and drug law. The pressures for congressional 
action were growing in strength. The work of Dr. Harvey 
Wiley, chief of the Bureau of Chemistry of the Depart­
ment of Agriculture, had awakened the public to the dangers 
of adulterated foods and quack drugs. Samuel Hopkins 
15. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). An excellent discus­
sion of the significance of the decision is given by Robert E. Cushman,
"The National Police Power under the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution," Part II, Minnesota Law Review, III, No. 6 (May, 
1919), 381-88. 
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Adams' expose of patent-medicine nostrums in Collier's, 
"The Great American Fraud," was creating a nation-wide 
sensation.16 In his annual message of December, 1905, 
Roosevelt had urged "that a law be enacted to regulate inter­
state commerce in misbranded and adulterated foods, drinks, 
and drugs." The federal authority must intervene, T.R. de­
clared, "to secure the health and welfare of the consuming 
public." » 
Despite the growing clamor for action, the powerful inter­
ests threatened by the law continued to stymie action with 
loud attacks upon the measure's constitutionality. "If the 
Federal Government should regulate Inter-state traffic in 
drugs on the basis of their therapeutic value," complained 
the Committee on Legislation of the Proprietary Association 
of America, "why not regulate traffic in theology, by exclud­
ing from transportation, all theological books which Dr. 
Wiley and his assistants, upon examination, should find to 
be 'misleading in any particular'?" 18 Although the Senate 
passed the bill on February 21, the possibility of House 
action appeared dim.19 Then came an unexpected bombshell. 
This was the furor that followed the publication, on Febru­
ary 15, of Upton Sinclair's The Jungle—and Theodore 
Roosevelt brilliantly exploited the popular excitement the 
book created to help overcome congressional obstructionism 
and constitutional scruples, and push through a bold exten­
sion of the national police power. 
Sinclair was a struggling young novelist and enthusiastic 
16. Mark Sullivan, Our Times, 1900-1925 (6 vols.; New York, 
1925-35), II, 471-83, 496-536; Louis Filler, Crusaders for American 
Liberalism (Yellow Springs, O., 1950), pp. 142-63; James H. Young, 
The Toadstool Millionaires: A Social History of Patent Medicines in 
America before Federal Regulation (Princeton, N.J., 1961), pp. 205­
39; Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The Health of a Nation, Harvey W. Wiley 
and the Fight for Pure Food (Chicago, 1958), esp. pp. 120-81. 
17. Hagedorn, The Works of Theodore Roosevelt, XV, 326. 
18. Young, The Toadstool Millionaires, p. 237. 
19. Anderson, The Health of a Nation, pp. 180-88. 
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convert to socialism. He had intended The Jungle as a 
"Socialist novel" that would "open the eyes of the American 
people to the conditions under which the toilers get their 
bread"—a novel that would, in his words, "blow the top off 
of the industrial tea-kettle." He spent seven weeks in the 
stockyards district of Chicago gathering background ma­
terial. He had picked "Packingtown," he explained, because 
"I knew this was a place where modern commercial forces 
held complete sway. . . .  " 2" As background color for his 
story, Sinclair included a frightening and unforgettable 
picture of the filth of the slaughterhouses, the sharp prac­
tices of the packers, and the farce of the existing govern­
ment inspection. There were the hogs dead of cholera 
turned into lard; the sales of meat from carcasses con­
demned by government inspectors as tubercular; the potted 
chicken made of tripe, beef suet, and waste ends of veal; 
the rancid butter "oxidized" by a forced-air process, re-
churned with skim milk, and sold as fresh; and most spec­
tacular, the tales of men in the cooking rooms falling into 
the vats and being overlooked for days "till all but the bones 
of them had gone out to the world as Durham's Pure Leaf 
Lard!" 21 
The Jungle had first been serialized in the Socialist weekly 
Appeal to Reason, beginning February, 1905. But finding a 
book publisher who would handle so explosive a story was 
more difficult. Five publishers fearfully rejected the book; 
finally Walter Hines Page of Doubleday, Page & Company 
20. Upton Sinclair, The Autobiography of Upton Sinclair (New 
York, 1962), pp. 99-112; Sinclair, The Brass Check, A Study of 
American Journalism (Pasadena, Calif., [1919]), p. 27; Sinclair, 
"The Condemned-Meat Industry: A Reply to Mr. J. Ogden Armour," 
Everybody's Magazine, XIV, No. 5 (May, 1906), 608-16; Sinclair, 
"What Life Means to Me," Cosmopolitan Magazine, XLI, No. 6 (October, 1906), 593; Appeal to Reason, September 17, 1904, Decem­
ber 31, 1904, January 21, 1905, January 28, 1905, March 4, 1905. 
21. Upton Sinclair, The Jungle (Signet Classic Edition; New York, 
1960), pp. 41-42, 66-67, 98-102. 
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offered to publish it if he could verify its truthfulness. After 
running their own check, the Doubleday officials were "con­
vinced that The Jungle told the truth." 22 The advance pub­
licity billed the novel as "a searching expose of . .  . the 
flagrant violations of all hygienic laws in the slaughter of 
diseased cattle, the farce of government inspection, and the 
whole machinery of feeding a world with tainted meat." 23 
The first reviews were skeptical. Even the most sympathetic 
found the book "overdrawn" and "exaggerated as to facts"; 
the more hostile denounced it as a tissue of "exaggeration 
and falsification." 24 But with each passing day, public in­
terest grew. Twenty-five thousand copies were sold within 
a month-and-a-half of publication. While its Socialist mes­
sage went largely unheeded, its disclosures about what 
Sinclair called the "condemned-meat industry" struck a 
responsive public. " . .  . I aimed at the public's heart," 
Sinclair lamented, "and by accident I hit it in the stom­
ach." 25 
The times were ripe for The Jungle. As early as the 
1870's European countries were complaining that American 
meats were not wholesome and healthful, and had begun to 
22. Sinclair, The Brass Check, pp. 32-34; The Autobiography of 
Upton Sinclair, pp. 114-16; Appeal to Reason, February 25, November 
18, December 16, 1905; Isaac F. Marcosson, Before I Forget, A 
Pilgrimage to the Past (New York, 1959), pp. 95-98; Walter Hines 
Page to James Wilson, March 8, 1906, Office of the Secretary of 
Agriculture, Record Group 16, Solicitor's Office Correspondence, File 
74, National Archives. 
23. Chicago Inter Ocean, January 27, 1906; Chicago Record-Herald, 
February 26, 1906. 
24. Independent, LX, No. 2991 (March 29, 1906), 740-41; Bookman,
XXIII (April, 1906), 195-97; Public Opinion, XL, No. 15 (April 14, 
1906), 476, 479-80; Chicago Inter Ocean, March 3, 1906; Outlook,
LXXXII (March 31, 1906), 758; Dial, XL, No. 476 (April 16, 1906), 
262; Reader, VII, No. 5 (April, 1906), 564; J. Ogden Armour, "The 
Packers and the People," Saturday Evening Post, CLXXVII, No. 37 (March 10, 1906), 6. 
25. Chicago Inter Ocean, March 31, 1906; Sinclair, "What Life 
Means to Me," p. 594. 
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restrict or prohibit imports from this country. To meet this 
threat to the American export trade, Congress had passed 
the act of March 3, 1891, requiring ante mortem inspection 
of all cattle, sheep, and hogs whose meat was intended 
for export or sale across state lines and authorizing post 
mortem inspection at the discretion of the Secretary of 
Agriculture.26 Even with this legislation, suspicions con­
tinued that all was not well in the stockyards. The "em­
balmed meat" scandal during the Spanish-American War 
had created a furor. Starting in January, 1905, the distin­
guished British medical journal, The Lancet, had run a 
series of articles assailing the Chicago packing houses as 
dirty and unsanitary and calling for stricter federal inspec­
tion. Later that year, muckraker Samuel Merwin, in a 
Success Magazine article on the monopolistic practices of 
the Beef Trust, raised the question, "Are Packers, as Is 
very often Charged, deliberately Selling Diseased Meat?" 
and answered in the affirmative.27 
The prestige of the Beef Trust was at a low ebb. Its ar­
rogance in price-fixing had aroused bitter resentment, and 
indictments were pending against five meat-packing com­
panies and seventeen of their officers—including J. Ogden 
Armour, Louis F. Swift, Edward A. Cudahy, and Ira N. 
Morris—for violation of the Sherman Antitrust Law.28 The 
26. A. D. Melvin, "The Federal Meat Inspection Service," in 
U.S. Bureau of Animal Industry, Twenty-third Annual Report, 1906 (Washington, D.C., 1908), pp. 69-78; Fred W. Powell, The Bureau of 
Animal Industry: Its History, Activities and Organization (Baltimore, 
1927), pp. 1-14, 128-30; John M. Gaus and Leon O. Wolcott, Public 
Administration and the United States Department of Agriculture(Chicago, 1940), pp. 165-71. 
27. Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York, 1959), 
pp. 316-22; Lancet, January 9, 1905, pp. 49-52, January 14, 1905, 
pp. 120-23, January 21, 1905, pp. 183-85, January 28, 1905, pp. 258­
60; and Samuel Merwin, "The Private-Car Abuses," Success Maga­
zine, VIII, No. 131 (April, 1905), 249-54. 
28. U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Report on the Meat-packing 
Industry, 1919 (6 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1918-20), I, 46-48; II, 
11-25; Arthur M. Johnson, "Theodore Roosevelt and the Bureau of 
Corporations," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLV, No. 4 
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public was prepared to believe the worst about the packers 
—and that public had become increasingly pure-food con­
scious. 
The furor reverberated in Washington. In mid-February 
of 1906 the Department of Agriculture appointed a commit­
tee of departmental experts, consisting of John Mohler, 
chief pathologist of the Bureau of Animal Industry, R. P. 
Steddom, chief of the bureau's inspection division, and 
George P. McCabe, solicitor for the department, to investi­
gate the federal inspection service in Chicago. Secretary of 
Agriculture "Tama Jim" Wilson amended the department's 
meat-inspection rules and regulations to require that the 
packing houses "be kept in a clean and sanitary condition." 
Orders went out to the local inspectors to tighten up the 
procedures for destroying condemned carcasses. "If the 
conditions described by Mr. Sinclair actually exist," Secre­
tary Wilson assured The Jungle's publisher, the abuses will 
immediately "be corrected." 29 
As the furor continued, the White House took a hand. 
Sinclair himself had sent Roosevelt a copy of the book. Com­
missioner of Corporations James R. Garfield brought over 
another copy. Although thinking that its conclusions were 
"too pessimistic," Garfield advised that its charges against 
the packers warranted investigation. So did Indiana's Sena­
tor Albert J. Beveridge. While scornful of Sinclair's "pa­
thetic belief" in socialism, Roosevelt invited him to the White 
(March, 1959), 578-82. See also United States v. Armour & Co. ct al., 
142 Fed. 808 (1906). 
29. Testimony of A. D. Melvin before the House Committee on 
Agriculture, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., Hearings . . . on the So-called 
"Beveridge Amendment" to the Agricultural Appropriation Bill (H.R.
18537) . . . (Washington, D.C., 1906), pp. 241-43; Bureau of Animal 
Industry, Twenty-third Annual Report, 1906, p. 346; A. D. Melvin 
to S. E. Bennett, March 30, 1906, and April 7, 1906, Records of the 
Bureau of Animal Industry, Record Group 17, General Corre­
spondence, 1895-1906, File 320, National Archives; James Wilson to 
Doubleday, Page & Company, March 5, 1906, Office of the Secretary 
of Agriculture, R.G. 16, Solicitor's Office Correspondence, File 74, 
National Archives. 
48 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 
House for a talk and assured him that "the specific evils 
you point out shall, if their existence be proved, and if I 
have the power, be eradicated." 30 The public-be-damned 
attitude shown by the Beef-Trust people in the past, T.R. 
confessed to Secretary Wilson, "convinces me that there is 
very little they will stop at." 31 
About the middle of March, Frank N. Doubleday sent the 
President advance proofs of three articles that were sched­
uled for publication in the May issue of The World's Work 
under the over-all title of "Selling Diseased Meat": one by 
Dr. W. K. Jaques, former head of the city's meat inspection 
at the Chicago stockyards, who had been dismissed because 
of his too vigorous action in destroying condemned meat; 
another by Thomas H. McKee, the Doubleday lawyer who 
had gone to Chicago to check upon The Jungle; and a third 
by Dr. Caroline Hedger, a physician in the packing-house 
district. All assailed the existing federal inspection as a 
farce that did not protect the consuming public from un­
wholesome and diseased meats. The Jungle could be dis­
missed as mere fiction, or socialistic claptrap; but such 
accusations in a reputable magazine could not be ignored. 
The explosiveness of the charges led Roosevelt to have sec­
ond thoughts about the wisdom of an investigation by 
experts from the Department of Agriculture since the de­
partment was, in the public mind, a defendant in the case.32 
Secretary Wilson, aware of the difficulty, had himself 
suggested an independent investigation by Commissioner of 
30. Theodore Roosevelt to Upton Sinclair, March 9, March 15, 
1906, Roosevelt Papers (Library of Congress); The Autobiography
of Upton Sinclair, pp. 118-19; Albert J. Beveridge to Albert Shaw, 
July 1, 1906, Beveridge Papers (Library of Congress). 
31. Theodore Roosevelt to James Wilson, March 12, 1906, Morison, 
The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, V, 176-77. 
32. W. K. Jaques, "A Picture of Meat Inspection," World's Work, 
XII, No. 1 (May, 1906), 7491-505; Caroline Hedger, "The Unhealth­
fulness of Packingtown," ibid., 7507-510; Thomas H. McKee, "The 
Failure of Government Inspection," ibid., 7510-514; Theodore Roose­
velt to F. N. Doubleday, March 22, 1906, Roosevelt Papers. 
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Labor Charles P. Neill; Roosevelt took up the suggestion and 
recommended that Neill take along New York social worker 
James B. Reynolds. A former professor of political economy 
at Catholic University of America, Neill had been appointed 
Commissioner of Labor in 1905, and he served as Roosevelt's 
chief trouble shooter in labor and social-welfare questions. 
Reynolds, a lawyer turned social worker, was head worker 
at the University Settlement and had long been active in 
"good-government" causes in New York City. "I want to 
get at the bottom of this matter," T.R. instructed the two 
men, "and be absolutely certain of our facts when the 
investigation is through." 33 
Meanwhile, the three departmental experts had completed 
their investigation, and on April 3 they submitted their re­
port. Roosevelt was not pleased with the result. The report 
was a long, detailed, and highly technical document which, 
the chief executive complained, "did not give me the clear, 
definite answers I wish to the charges made." At his behest, 
they made a second report on April 13, this one consisting 
of rebuttals to specific charges levied in The Lancet, The 
World's Work, and The Jungle.Si The investigators found 
the charges of unsanitary conditions grossly exaggerated. 
Sinclair, they charged, "in his anxiety to be as sensational 
and 'yellow* as possible" had "selected the worst possible 
condition which could be found in any establishment as typi­
cal of the general conditions existing. . . .  " The accusa­
tions of negligence and even malfeasance on the part of the 
federal inspectors were "willful and deliberate misrepre­
sentations of fact." 
33. Theodore Roosevelt to Charles P. Neill, March 22, 1906, ibid.; 
to James Wilson, March 22, 1906, Morison, The Letters of Theodore 
Roosevelt, V, 190. 
34. Theodore Roosevelt to Upton Sinclair, April 11, 1906, ibid., 
V, 208-9; to James Wilson, April 11, 1906, Wilson to Roosevelt, April 
11, 1906, Roosevelt to Charles P. Neill, April 16, 1906, Roosevelt 
Papers. 
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The departmental experts did, however, acknowledge 
grave defects in the existing inspection system. The federal 
inspectors had no authority under the law to destroy animals 
rejected at the ante mortem inspection; they were disposed 
of under local regulations, which permitted the sale of such 
animals at auction and their slaughter at packing houses 
not subject to federal inspection. Acting under the authority 
given him by the 1891 law, the Secretary of Agriculture 
required a post mortem inspection at plants covered by 
federal inspection. But the inspectors had no legal author­
ity to destroy meat found unsound and unhealthful; such 
meat was in practice destroyed under the threat of the 
withdrawal of the inspection. Most importantly, the pack­
ers' compliance was voluntary—a matter of business—and 
not compulsory. Although the existing law effectively 
barred the export of meats without the government stamp 
of approval, there was no similar provision to protect the 
American consumer. The law prohibited the transportation 
in interstate commerce of carcasses "or the food products 
thereof" that had been inspected and condemned; but there 
was nothing in the law, the report confessed, "to forbid any 
carrier from accepting for interstate transportation car­
casses and food products which have not had Federal 
inspection." 
Nor were these the only shortcomings. Once the carcasses 
were passed, the federal inspectors had no authority over 
the conditions under which the finished products were pre­
pared. The government label on canned meats, for instance, 
meant no more than that the carcass had been inspected at 
the time of slaughter. It was no warranty that the meat 
was fresh or even healthful. The recent amendment to the 
rules notwithstanding, the Department of Agriculture had 
no legal authority to enforce sanitary regulations in the 
packing houses. The only weapon it had was to withdraw 
its inspectors from the plant; but, as the head of the Bureau 
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of Animal Industry admitted in testimony before the House 
Committee on Agriculture, this threat was more illusory 
than real. "There is," Secretary Wilson insisted, "no lack 
of vigilance on our part, as far as we have authority in 
inspecting meats. But our authority is limited. . . ." And 
even if the department had the authority, it lacked the 
funds to police all the packing houses. " . .  . I have found 
it impossible," the Secretary complained, "to get money 
enough to appoint as many inspectors as I think necessary 
to do the work completely. . . ." Because of the inadequacy 
of its appropriation, the department had to turn down 
requests from packing houses for inspection. "We occupy a 
disagreeable position in this Department," Wilson lamented 
to the chairman of the Senate Committee on Agriculture. 
"We are held responsible for the work and do not have men 
or money enough to do it." 35 
T.R. sent the report of the departmental experts to Neill 
and Reynolds for their information, and the two special 
commissioners reported their own findings to the President 
early in May. The major emphasis of their report was 
on the negative side of the picture. They found the build­
ings badly lighted and ventilated; the floors and work­
tables, tubs, meat racks, and conveyors filthy, rotten, and 
blood-soaked; workmen's aprons blood-soaked and filthy; 
men climbing with dirty shoes or sitting in filthy clothes on 
tables where meat was handled; workmen spitting or even 
urinating on the floors; meat for canning or for sausage 
thrown in heaps on the floors; scraps of all kinds, includ­
ing pieces of rope and pigskin, turned into "potted ham"; 
35. Bureau of Animal Industry, Twenty-third Annual Report,
1906, pp. 406-56; House Committee on Agriculture, Hearings . . . 
on the so-called "Beveridge Amendment" p. 243; James Wilson to 
Redfield Proctor, May 22, 1906, Wilson Papers (in possession of Mrs. 
Albert Lehninger, Owings Mills, Md.). I wish to thank Professor 
Willard Hoing, of Baldwin-Wallace College, who is preparing a biog­
raphy of Wilson, for references from the Wilson Papers. 
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and cans of meat moldy with age heated to "liven up" the 
contents, relabeled, and placed on sale. Whereas the Depart­
ment of Agriculture report did not touch upon working 
conditions in the packing houses, the Neill-Reynolds report 
showed in detail how thousands of workers were "forced 
to spend their working hours under conditions . . . which 
are a constant menace not only to their own health, but to 
the health of those who use the food products prepared 
by them." 
Despite their sharper indictment of the packers, Neill 
and Reynolds made much the same recommendations as did 
the experts from the Department of Agriculture. The crux 
of the difficulty was that the existing inspection system 
was confined by law to passing on the healthfulness of the 
animals at the time of slaughter and the federal inspectors 
had no authority over the conditions under which the fin­
ished products were prepared. The remedy was to give 
the inspectors authority to supervise all stages in the pro­
duction of meat and meat products; authorize the Depart­
ment of Agriculture to lay down and enforce rules and 
regulations covering sanitation; and, most importantly, bar 
the shipment in interstate commerce of all meats not 
government-inspected and approved.36 By early May, the 
legal staff of the Department of Agriculture had drafted 
a bill to close the loopholes in the existing law. To forestall 
the danger of an insufficient appropriation by Congress, the 
bill provided, Secretary Wilson told the chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Agriculture, "that the packers should 
pay for the inspection." 37 
36. The initial report was given in person; the writing of the 
formal statement was not completed until June 2. The text is printed 
in House Document 873, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 4, 1906), pp. 3-11. 
The recommendations of the Department of Agriculture experts are 
given in Bureau of Animal Industry, Twenty-third Annual Report,
1906, pp. 441-42. 
37. Theodore Roosevelt to Charles P. Neill, May 4, 1906, Roosevelt
Papers; James Wilson to Redfield Proctor, May 22, 1906, Wilson 
Papers. 
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As the investigation proceeded, Roosevelt had received 
a steady barrage of letters and telephone calls from Upton 
Sinclair. A front-page story in the Chicago Tribune of 
April 10 reported that the investigators sent out by the 
Department of Agriculture had given the lie to The Jungle 
and that the chief executive intended to pillory the book 
and Sinclair in his forthcoming "The Man with the Muck-
Rake" speech. The always excitable novelist immediately 
raised the cry of "whitewash." This outburst confirmed 
Roosevelt's suspicions about Sinclair's temperamental insta­
bility. But he was too much of a moralist to permit flagrant 
wrong-doing to pass unchastened, and political no less than 
moral considerations required a full airing of the scandal. 
He assured Sinclair that he had no intention of attacking 
The Jungle in his speech or of doing anything else "until I 
have data on which to base action." The departmental report 
was merely preliminary; he needed more information be­
fore acting. ". . . You must keep your head," he chided 
the novelist. " . .  . I intend before I get through to be 
able to have authoritative reasons for saying 'proved,' or 
'unproved,' . .  . of each specific charge advanced against 
the packers."38 
No less excited were the packers. The uproar had 
alarmed them, and they feared that official government 
confirmation of unsanitary conditions in their plants would 
be financially ruinous. A representative of the packers had 
approached Neill while he was in Chicago and pleaded with 
him to withhold his report, promising that any "reasonable, 
rational, and just" recommendations would be carried out 
38. Chicago Tribune, April 10, 1906; Upton Sinclair to Theodore 
Roosevelt, April 10, 1906, and memorandum of telephone calls from 
Sinclair, April 11, 1906, Roosevelt Papers; Roosevelt to Sinclair, 
April 11, 1906, Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, V, 208-9. 
Sinclair was temporarily reassured (Sinclair to Roosevelt, April 12, 
1906, Roosevelt Papers) and later conceded that Neill and Reynolds 
"had made a most thorough and elaborate investigation . . .  " (Sin­
clair to Roosevelt, June 1, 1906, Roosevelt Papers). 
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within thirty days. Then he could return, make a new 
investigation, and publish that as his report. When the 
Commissioner replied that he was not authorized "to make 
any trades," Louis F. Swift went directly to the President 
with a promise to remedy any shortcomings found if the 
chief executive would not publish the report. But T.R. 
replied that voluntary action by the packers would not 
suffice. Shocked and indignant at the "hideous" conditions 
found in the packing houses, he insisted that "it is abso­
lutely necessary that we shall have legislation which will 
prevent the recurrence of these wrongs." 39 
L_One of the most interested readers of The Jungle had 
been Senator Albert J. Beveridge of IndianaTJThe Hoosier 
lawmaker was in the midst of a transition in his political 
beliefs: aware of the multiplying signs of popular unrest, 
he was moving toward a more progressive stance than he 
had taken in his earlier years in the Senate. [Always 
eager to bask in the spotlight, he saw immediately tHe pos­
sibility of garnering personal glory by introducing the 
legislation needed for meat inspection. When he told the 
President that he was preparing such a bill, T.R. said, 
"Bully," and invited him to consult with Neill and Rey­
nolds. By the beginning of May, he was hard at work 
drafting, he confided to a Chicago publisher-friend, "one 
of the most important bills which has been presented to 
Congress for a long while. . . .^JThen one evening he met 
Secretary of Agriculture Wilson at dinner at Gifford Pin­
chot's and learned that the department was preparing its 
own bill. Not wanting someone else to introduce a bill 
upon which he had been working, he asked the President 
39. Testimony before the House Committee on Agriculture, Hear­
ings . . . on the So-called "Beveridge Amendment," pp. 95-99; Louis 
F. Swift to William Loeb, Jr., May 24, 1906, Roosevelt Papers; 
Theodore Roosevelt to James W. Wadsworth, May 26, 1906, Morison, 
The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, V, 282-83. 
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if he could sponsor the administration measure in the upper 
chamber.40 
When the Secretary sent over the departmental bill, Bev­
eridge found it less carefully drawn than his own and 
"rejected it in toto excepting only the section on fees. . . ." 
In consultation with Wilson, A. D. Melvin, chief of the 
Bureau of Animal Industry, Garfield, Neill, and Reynolds, 
he continued rewriting and revising the bill. By mid-May, 
he had the final draft in hand-jAlthough Secretary Wilson 
gave his approval, T.R. still hesitated to commit himself 
when Beveridge asked that he send Congress a special 
message transmitting the Neill-Reynolds findings.41 While 
having no qualms about harming the packers, Roosevelt 
feared lest any further loss of confidence in American meat 
products, in this country and abroad, injure the livestock-
raisers. Having just won the bitter fight over the Hepburn 
railroad-rate bill, that canny politician wanted no undue 
haste in bearding the packers. "The matter is one of such 
far-reaching importance," he explained to Neill, "that it 
is out of the question to act hastily. We must be absolutely 
sure of our ground and must be able to form a rough fore­
cast of the effects." "2 
But the ever impatient Beveridge would brook no further 
delay. [On Monday, May 21, three days after Senate pas­
sage of"Ehe Hepburn bill, he introduced his bill in the upper 
chamber. The bill provided for a mandatory post mortem 
inspection of all cattle, sheep, swine, and goats whose meat 
40. John Braeman, "Albert J. Beveridge: From Imperialism to 
Progressivism" (Ph.D. dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 
1960), pp. 282-84; Albert J. Beveridge to John C. Shaffer, May 11, 
1906, to Albert Shaw, July 1, 1906, Beveridge Papers. 
41. James Wilson to Albert J. Beveridge, May 14, 1906, Beveridge 
to Albert Shaw, July 1, 1906, ibid.; Theodore Roosevelt to Beveridge, 
May 23, 1906, Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, V, 281-82. 
42. Theodore Roosevelt to Charles P. Neill, May 23, 1906, Roosevelt
Papers. 
56 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 
was to be sold in interstate or foreign commerce; for the 
destruction of any carcasses found "unfit for human food"; 
for the inspection and dating of all meat products and 
canned meats; for the use of "none but healthful materials 
and ingredients fit for human food" in their preparation; 
for the destruction of "all such products" found "to be 
impure, unsound, composed of unhealthful ingredients, or 
which have been treated with or contain any dyes or de­
leterious chemicals of any kind or which are otherwise 
unfit for human food." 
The Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to draw up 
rules and regulations governing sanitary conditions, "and 
it shall be the duty of the inspectors herein provided for 
to inspect the sanitary conditions of said establishments 
as well as the animals slaughtered and the meat products 
therein prepared. . . ." No meat product was to be sold 
"under any other than a true name which shall accurately 
describe said food product. . . ." After January 1, 1907, 
"no person, firm, or corporation shall transport" from one 
state to another any meats or meat products that have not 
been "inspected, examined, and marked as 'inspected and 
passed,' in accordance with the terms of this act. . . ." 
Violations would be punished by a fine of not more than 
$10,000, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, 
or by both. If the packers appealed any ruling by an 
inspector, the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture 
would be "final and conclusive." 
Beveridge realized that all these safeguards could be 
nullified by an insufficient force of inspectors. Shortage 
of funds had nullified much of the value of the existing 
inspection law. The danger was not immediate since the 
uproar over the scandals would guarantee a generous ap­
propriation for the present. But the meat industry would 
continue to grow, and the popular excitement would pass. 
Then the packers could trap Congress into voting an insuffi­
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cient appropriation with the ever popular cry of economy. 
To avert this danger, his bill authorized the Secretary of 
Agriculture to charge the packers a fee for each animal 
inspected to defray the cost of inspection. The funds avail­
able for the inspection service would thus automatically 
keep pace with the growth of the industry.43 His proposal 
was, Beveridge exclaimed to a friend, "the most per­
fect meat inspection bill in the world—that looks like an 
extravagant statement, but it is true." 44 ! 
The bill would remedy the abuses in the meat-packing 
industry. But no one could miss the wider bearings. A 
Hamiltonian, Beveridge had long believed "that the Con­
stitution must steadily grow . .  . as the people grow, and 
furnish scope for the people's power and the Nation's neces­
sities in exact proportion as the people's power and the 
Nation's necessities enlarge." Congress had the authority, 
he insisted, to do whatever was "necessary for the preser­
vation of the morality and uprightness of our people." Such 
power was "inherent" in the federal government "as an 
incident to sovereignty." 45 And as he moved towards pro­
gressivism, the Hoosier lawmaker became increasingly con­
cerned with the necessity of expanding the power of the 
national government to deal with business wrongdoing. His 
meat-inspection bill represented a major step forward in 
meeting that need. It was, Beveridge boasted to magazine 
editor Albert Shaw, "THE MOST PRONOUNCED EXTENSION OF 
FEDERAL POWER IN EVERY DIRECTION EVER ENACTED, INCLUD­
ING EVEN THE RATE BILL ITSELF." 46 
43. Congressional Record, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 21, 1906), 
p. 7127; (May 25, 1906), pp. 7420-21. 
44. Albert J. Beveridge to Henry W. Bennett, May 28, 1906, 
Beveridge Papers. 
45. Albert J. Beveridge, The Meaning of the Times and Other 
Speeches (Indianapolis, 1908), pp. 1-19. 
46. Albert J. Beveridge to Albert Shaw, May 26, 1906, Beveridge 
Papers. 
58 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 
The news of the introduction of the bill aroused a flurry 
of excitement among the packers. Themselves too much in 
disrepute to take the lead, they galvanized the stock-raisers 
into action. A close working partnership had been forged 
between the packers and the major livestock-raisers repre­
sented by the American National Livestock Association, 
and a flood of telegrams and letters came to the White 
House from the cattlemen pleading that T.R. withhold pub­
lication of the Neill-Reynolds report lest the resulting 
uproar destroy the foreign market for American meats. 
Two spokesmen for the livestock interests, William E. 
Skinner and W. L. Carlisle, met with Roosevelt on Thurs­
day, May 24, and told him that the packers had promised to 
implement in their establishments all sanitary improve­
ments found necessary. While disclaiming any wish to 
injure the "innocent" livestock-raisers of the country, the 
chief executive reiterated that legislation was required to 
prevent any recurrence of the wrongs found. If the packers 
were sincere, he insisted, they should join forces with the 
administration in passing effective legislation such as the 
Indiana senator's bill.47 
The next day, May 25, Beveridge forced the issue by 
presenting his bill as an amendment to the pending Agri­
cultural Appropriation Bill. The Senate had to go on rec­
ord, and the Hoosier lawmaker warned his colleagues that 
if a fight were made against the amendment, he would make 
a speech that would shock the country. Joining the fray, 
Roosevelt repeated his warning that he would make public 
the Neill-Reynolds report unless satisfactory legislation 
was passed. To underline what the report involved, he 
had Commissioner Neill outline his findings to the repre­
47. Chicago Daily Drovers Journal and Farm News, January 31, 
February 2, May 24-25, 1906; Chicago Record-Herald, May 24-25, 
1906; Chicago Inter Ocean, May 24-25, 1906; Chicago Tribune, May 
25, 1906. 
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sentatives of the livestock men and leading senators from 
the western cattle-raising states. After meeting with Neill, 
Skinner had a conference with Beveridge. When the 
Hoosier refused to postpone his demand for a vote on his 
amendment, Skinner telephoned the packers for instruc­
tions. In a momentary panic, they agreed to offer no oppo­
sition. Thereupon the Senate passed the amendment without 
a dissenting vote.48 Heartened by this showing, the Presi­
dent hoped for a swift House approval. If the lower chamber 
approved the Senate amendment, he told the chairman of 
the House Committee on Agriculture, the feared Neill-
Reynolds report need not be published. If a snag developed, 
he warned, publication would follow.49 
The President's appeal fell on deaf ears. Almost imme­
diately the packers regretted their weakness.! One industry 
spokesman after another hastened to deny that conditions 
were amiss in their packing houses and assailed the Senate 
amendment as hastily drawn, too rigid, and unconstitu­
tional. The labeling provision in the Senate amendment, 
the packers complained, would force the scrapping of long-
established brand names. Even worse was the provision 
for dating canned meats. Properly canned meats could 
stand for years without spoiling, a spokesman for the 
packers declared. Dating the cans would simply preju­
dice the consumer against buying stored goods. Another 
sore point was the provision forbidding the use of "any 
dyes or deleterious chemicals of any kind"; the packers 
wanted permission to use preservatives in amounts not 
injurious to health. The loudest complaints were against 
48. Albert J. Beveridge to Albert Shaw, May 26, 1906, Beveridge 
Papers; Chicago Record-Herald, Mav 26, 1906; Chicago Daily Drovers 
Journal and Farm News, May 26, 1906; Chicago Tribune, May 26, 
1906; Chicago Inter Ocean, May 26, 1906; Congressional Record, 59th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (May 25, 1906), pp. 7420-21. 
49. Theodore Roosevelt to James W. Wadsworth, May 26, 1906, 
Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, V, pp. 282-83. 
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the fee provision. The packers, the president of the Na­
tional Packing Company remonstrated, were losing a million 
dollars a year on animals which they had purchased but 
which were condemned on post mortem inspection and 
destroyed. That they should shoulder the extra burden of 
paying the salaries of the government inspectors "does not 
seem just fair. . . ." 
Underlying the issues of preservatives, dates, labels, 
and even dollars and cents was the question of power— 
whether the packers themselves or outsiders would regulate 
conditions in their plants. Government inspection could 
not be avoided, but the packers wished to salvage as much 
as possible of what they regarded as private enterprise 
from governmental interference. Under the Senate amend­
ment, an inspector could shut down an entire plant as 
unsanitary, and the decision of the Secretary of Agricul­
ture would be final. Such action, the packers claimed, 
would amount to confiscation of their property without 
due process of law, and they demanded the right to appeal 
to the courts from any ruling of the Department of Agri­
culture. The issue, the general manager of Nelson Morris 
& Company told the House Committee on Agriculture, was 
"our right to control our own business." What the packers 
opposed, Thomas E. Wilson declared, "is a bill that will put 
our business in the hands of theorists, chemists, sociolog­
ists, etc., and the management and control taken away 
from the men who have devoted their lives to the upbuilding 
and perfecting of this great American industry. . . ."50 
50. Chicago Tribune, May 26, 28-29, June 7-9, 1906; Chicago
Record-Herald, May 26, 31, June 7-8, 1906; Chicago Inter Ocean, 
May 26-28, June 5-8, 10, 1906; Chicago Daily Drovers Journal and 
Farm News, May 26, 28, June 7-8, 1906; Indianapolis Star, May 31, 
1906. The fullest statement of the packers' objections to the Senate 
amendment was given in the testimony of Thomas E. Wilson, general 
manager of Nelson Morris & Company, before the House Committee 
on Agriculture, Hearings . . . on the So-called "Beveridge Amend­
ment," pp. 5-94. Louis Filler makes some perceptive comments on 
the last point in his "Progress and Progressivism," American Journal 
of Economics and Sociology, XX, No. 3 (April, 1961), 296-97. 
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The packers had powerful friends in the House of Rep­
resentatives. A ranking member of the House Committee 
on Agriculture, William Lorimer, the notorious "blond boss" 
of Chicago and a long-time ally of the packers, vowed 
that "this bill never will be reported by my committee— 
not if Little Willie can help it." 51 Committee chairman 
James W. Wadsworth, a wealthy stock-raiser from New 
York's Genessee Valley, dismissed the charges against the 
packers as mere sensationalism. J Himself a large-scale 
cattle-raiser, he found "the whole thing . . . most costly 
to my foreign trade." iThe President, the New York con­
gressman complained, nad "let his imagination ran [sic] 
away with him" after reading "that horrid, untruthful 
book" and "sent two sociologists to inspect something they 
knew nothing about. Those men simply threw mud over 
everything and everybody." 52 
Wadsworth and Lorimer could rally strong backing in 
the House at large. Speaker "Uncle Joe" Cannon could 
not ignore the weight of the packers' influence in Illinois 
Republican circles.53 The livestock interests were clamor­
ing that the packers would recoup any fees paid by reduc­
ing the prices paid for livestock,54 and most congressmen 
from western districts were responsive to the wishes of the 
livestock men. Many other lawmakers shied at enacting 
so far-reaching an increase in the authority of the federal 
government over private industry. "The passage of the 
meat inspection amendment as it came from the Senate 
51. Chicago Record-Herald, May 24, 1906. A biographical sketch 
of Lorimer is in the Dictionary of American Biography, Supplement
One (New York, 1944), pp. 511-12. 
52. Biographical information on Wadsworth is in Alden Hatch, 
The Wadsworths of the Genesee (New York, 1959), pp. 99-111. For 
his reaction to the Senate amendment: Chicago Tribune, May 29, 
1906; James W. Wadsworth to Matilda Gay, August 5, 1906, Wads-
worth Family Papers (Library of Congress). 
53. Chicago Inter Ocean, May 27, 1906. 
54. Chicago Daily Drovers Journal and Farm News, June 8, 1906; 
Chicago Inter Ocean, May 27, June 10, 1906; Chicago Tribune, June 
3-5, 1906. 
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would mean the ultimate federalization of every single 
industry in America," complained Indiana congressman 
E. D. Crumpacker. "Carried to its logical conclusion the 
same principle would prohibit any corn, or hay, or cotton 
from interstate commerce unless it is grown according to 
rules laid down by the secretary of agriculture." 55 
In his private talks with House leaders, T.R. continued 
to wield the threat of publication of the Neill-Reynolds re­
port to force swift approval of the Senate amendment.56 
But the sensational write-ups filling the newspapers under­
cut the effectiveness of this weapon. Although he had 
promised the President to say nothing until a thorough 
investigation of his charges had been made, Sinclair was 
not the man to remain silent long. He wrote first for 
Collier's and then for Everybody's articles repeating and 
elaborating his attack. After their return from Chicago, 
Neill and Reynolds briefed him on their findings; but when 
Roosevelt continued to withhold the report, he grew more 
and more restive, publicly calling upon the chief executive 
to release it. When no action followed, the novelist leaked 
to the New York Times the substance of the still secret 
report. In a separate interview with the Times, Sinclair 
supplied additional lurid details supported by affadavits he 
had gathered. From the Times, the stories were picked up 
by newspapers throughout the country.57 
55. Indianapolis Star, May 29, 1906. 
56. Chicago Record-Herald, May 27, 29, 1906; Chicago Inter Ocean, 
May 27, 29, 1906; Chicago Tribune, May 29, 1906; Theodore Roosevelt
to Murdo Mackenzie, May 27, 1906, to James W. Wadsworth, May 29,
1906, Roosevelt Papers. 
57. Upton Sinclair to Theodore Roosevelt, April 10, 1906, ibid.; 
Upton Sinclair, "Stockyard Secrets," Collier's, The National Weekly,
XXXVI, No. 26 (March 24, 1906), 24; Sinclair, "The Condemned-
Meat Industry: A Reply to Mr. J. Ogden Armour," Everybody's
Magazine, XIV, No. 5 (May, 1906), 608-16; New York Times, May 
28-29, 1906; Sinclair, The Brass Check, pp. 41-43. Roosevelt angrily 
denounced Sinclair for making "utterly reckless statements which 
you have failed to back up by proof" (Roosevelt to Sinclair, May 29, 
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The damage had been done, the packers felt. The time 
for a peaceful accommodation had passed. Wadsworth and 
Lorimer proceeded to rewrite the Senate amendment to suit 
the packers. Their draft allowed the use of preservatives 
in quantities that would not be unhealthf ul; permitted con­
tinuance of established brand names; replaced the fee 
provision with a yearly appropriation; and added a court-
review provision to the effect that any firm injuriously 
affected by a departmental ruling could appeal "the legality 
or constitutionality of such ruling" in the federal courts. 
The inspection was limited to the post mortem examination 
of the carcasses; the provision for the inspection and dating 
of meat products and canned meats was struck out. Most 
importantly, noted the solicitor for the Agriculture Depart­
ment, the provision barring "the interstate transportation 
of uninspected meat" was "entirely omitted from the 
draft." 58 Thus the new law would be no more effective 
than the old. After a conference with his advisers, Roose­
velt lashed out at the proposed substitute. ". . . It seems to 
me," he admonished Representative Wadsworth, "that each 
change is for the worse and that in the aggregate they are 
ruinous, taking away every particle of good from the sug­
gested Beveridge amendment." 59 
His hand forced, Roosevelt had to carry out his threat. 
On Monday, June 4, he transmitted to Congress the Neill­
1906, Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, V, 287-89). The 
gist of this letter was reported hy T. R.'s friend, John Callan 
O'Laughlin, in the Chicago Tribune, May 31, June 1, 1906. 
58. "Memorandum [from George P. McCabe] for the Secretary of 
Agriculture. Comparing the draft of the Bill left with Doctor Melvin 
by Representatives Wadsworth and Lorimer, with the amendment to 
the Appropriation Act of the Bureau of Animal Industry, as passed 
by the Senate," May 31, 1906; a second memorandum entitled 
"Changes in the Beveridge Amendment Proposed by The House Draft,"
May 31, 1906, Office of the Secretary of Agriculture, Record Group 16,
Solicitor's Office Correspondence, File 74, National Archives. 
59. Theodore Roosevelt to James W. Wadsworth, May 31, 1906, 
Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, V, 291-92. 
64 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 
Reynolds report accompanied by a special message urging 
adoption of the Senate amendment. The conditions in the 
packing houses, he told the lawmakers, "are revolting." 
The loopholes in the existing law have left the door open 
"to traffic in diseased or spoiled meats." New legislation 
was necessary "which will enable the inspectors of the 
General Government to inspect and supervise from the 
hoof to the can the preparation of the meat food product." 
For a moment, the President had wavered on the fee 
question. But Secretary of Agriculture Wilson reminded 
him of how difficult it had been to obtain sufficient appro­
priations for the existing inspection service. Persuaded, 
T.R. in his message came out strongly in favor of meeting 
the expenses of the inspection by a fee paid by the packers 
for each animal slaughtered. Without this provision, he 
warned, "the whole purpose of the law can at any time be 
defeated through an insufficient appropriation. . . ."60 
The lines of battle were drawn. On Friday, June 1, after 
learning that T.R. had rejected the proposed substitute, 
Lorimer had made a hasty trip to Chicago to consult with 
the packers and returned breathing defiance. The Neill-
Reynolds report, he told a reporter, was "a gross exaggera­
tion of the conditions." The leading packers joined in issu­
ing a statement denying the charges made in the report as 
"slanders." Interviewed in Paris J. Ogden Armour declared 
that the President had "a strong personal animus against 
the packers of Chicago and is doing and will do everything 
in his power to discredit them and their business." Full-
page advertisements in the newspapers invited the public 
to visit the packing houses and judge for themselves if the 
charges were true. Two University of Illinois scientists 
60. House Document 873, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 4, 1906), 
pp. 1-11. For T.R.'s temporary wavering on the fee provision,
Theodore Roosevelt to James W. Wadsworth, May 29, 1906, Roosevelt
Papers; to Albert J. Beveridge, May 29, 1906, Morison, The Letters 
of Theodore Roosevelt, V, 289; to Wadsworth, May 31, 1906, ibid., 
291-92. 
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reported that their own investigation of the packing houses 
made "it impossible for us to believe the horrible stories 
recently appearing in print, or that anything approaching 
the described conditions really exists." 
The business community rallied behind the packers. Offi­
cers of the Illinois Manufacturers' Association and the 
Chicago Commercial Association joined in assailing the 
President for his "thoughtlessness" in releasing the Neill-
Reynolds findings "before there was an opportunity to 
establish the correctness." The directors of the Chicago 
Board of Trade went officially on record as deploring "the 
one-sided report recently issued which has given rise . . . 
to a sensational agitation fraught with serious and far-
reaching injurious results." A special investigating com­
mittee from the National Association of Manufacturers, 
consisting of St. Louis stove-manufacturer J. W. Van 
Cleave, Indianapolis carriage-maker David M. Parry, and 
Chicago industrialist Elliott Durand, concluded that the 
charges of unsanitary conditions in the packing houses were 
"the result of a conspiracy" against the packers which in­
volved high officials in Washington.61 
The newspapers were filled with alarmist stories about 
contemplated foreign action to bar American meats as well 
as about a sharp drop in meat sales within the country. 
Bewailing the impending ruin of the stock-raiser and 
farmer, spokesmen for the livestock industry demanded 
speedy action to restore confidence in American meats— 
and speedy action meant legislation on the packers' terms. 
Inspired telegrams and letters poured into Congress and 
the White House.62 But the President stood firm. While 
regretting the harm done to the livestock-raisers, he blamed 
61. Chicago Tribune, June 3-5, 7, 15, 1906; Chicago Daily Drovers 
Journal and Farm News, June 4, 6, 13, 1906; Chicago Record-Herald, 
June 5, July 15, 1906; Chicago Inter Ocean, June 5, 10, 1906. 
62. Chicago Daily Drovers Journal and Farm News, June 2, 4, 8, 
1906; Chicago Inter Ocean, June 6, 8, 10-11, 13, 1906; Chicago 
Tribune, June 4-5, 1906. 
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the injurious publicity upon "the wicked folly of the beef-
packers in fighting the legislation. . . ." The messages 
of protest coming to the White House, he complained to a 
middle-western senator, "are evidently all prepared by the 
same person." 63 
Events were moving rapidly to a climax. In an effort 
to reach an accommodation, T.R. had the Department of 
Agriculture send Wadsworth a draft bill that "would pro­
vide an inspection which would safeguard the health of 
the people and would, at the same time, be a workable 
measure." 64 Wadsworth and Lorimer then conferred with 
Louis Swift and Thomas E. Wilson, general manager of 
Nelson Morris & Company, at their rooms in the Willard 
Hotel. The two congressmen were prepared to make a 
bow toward the White House. The provision barring the 
shipment in interstate commerce of uninspected meats was 
restored. So was the provision for the inspection of meat 
products and canned meats—although not the provision 
requiring the dating of such products. On the other points 
at issue, however, Wadsworth and Lorimer would not yield. 
On the showdown vote, the House Committee on Agriculture 
divided eleven to seven—with nine Republicans and two 
Democrats for, three Democrats and four Republicans 
against—in favor of the Wadsworth-Lorimer substitute. 
On June 14, the committee formally reported the substitute 
to the House.65 
63. Theodore Roosevelt to Elmer J. Burkett, June 8, 1906; to Col. 
John N. Simpson, June 13, 1906, Roosevelt Papers. 
64. George P. McCabe to James W. Wadsworth, June 2, 1906; 
"Memorandum [from George P. McCabe] for the Secretary," June 4, 
1906, Office of the Secretary of Agriculture, Record Group 16, Solic­
itor's Office Correspondence, File 74, National Archives. 
65. Chicago Tribune, June 11, 13-14, 1906; Chicago Inter Ocean, 
June 12, 1906. The text of the substitute with Wadsworth's explana­
tion of the changes made is given in House Report A935, 59th Cong., 
1st Sess. (June 14, 1906), pp. 1-7. There were two minority reports 
filed the following day: House Report A985, Part 2, 59th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (June 15, 1906), pp. 1-3, and House Report 3468, Part 2, 59th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (June 15, 1906), pp. 1-3. 
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The President was furious. The committee substitute, he 
complained, did not provide for the nighttime surveillance 
of the packing houses, a measure required to prevent the 
illicit practices said to take place after the plants were shut. 
Nor could he approve the provision in the substitute which 
would waive for one year the civil-service requirement in 
the appointment of new inspectors. The majority report 
explained that the Department of Agriculture would need 
the year's delay in which to prepare and hold the examina­
tions for appointing the inspectors under civil service. The 
chief executive, on the other hand, saw a more sinister 
purpose: during that year, the posts would remain patron­
age appointments subject to the recommendations of the 
congressmen from the meat-packing district—men widely 
regarded as under the thumb of the packers—and the 
inspectors so named would continue in office during good 
behavior. 
Another point in dispute involved the dating of canned 
meats. Was this—or was it not—an essential safeguard for 
the consumer? Even more of a stumbling block was the 
question of fees. The draft bill prepared by the Department 
of Agriculture had tried to resolve this issue by giving the 
Secretary stand-by authority to levy fees "if the appropri­
ations made by Congress shall be inadequate to carry out 
the provisions of the Act. . . ." But the House committee re­
jected this solution and instead provided for a permanent 
appropriation of $1,000,000 a year. Since that sum would 
barely meet the estimated cost of the expanded inspection 
for the first year, the inspection service would remain at 
the mercy of yearly appropriations from Congress. These 
provisions, T.R. fumed, "are so bad that in my opinion if 
they had been deliberately designed to prevent the remedy­
ing of the evils complained of they could not have been 
worse." 
But what most agitated the President was the provision 
in the substitute conferring upon the packers the right of 
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appeal to the federal courts from "any of the rulings or 
decisions provided for in this act." Having accepted the 
inevitability of federal inspection, the packers and their 
congressional allies sought to transfer final say from the 
Department of Agriculture to the federal courts. As in the 
fight over the Hepburn bill, this question became the focal 
point of contention. Under the broad court review provision 
in the substitute, a federal judge could review the findings 
of an inspector or the Secretary of Agriculture, de novo, 
upon the facts. ". . . You would have," Roosevelt admon­
ished Wadsworth, "the functions of the Secretary of Agri­
culture narrowly limited so as to be purely ministerial; and 
when he declared a given slaughterhouse unsanitary, or a 
given product unwholesome, acting upon the judgment of 
the Government experts, you would put on the judge, who 
had no knowledge whatever of the conditions, the burden 
of stating whether or not the Secretary was right." 
Not that T.R. denied the right of judicial review. "Con­
gress cannot take away the constitutional right of the 
packers, or of anyone else, to the protection of the courts," 
he conceded. But this judicial review should be confined 
to the strictly procedural question of whether or not the 
Secretary's method of reaching his decision in any given 
case had been fair to the packers, and should not include 
a judicial reappraisal of the facts of the case. The broad 
court review provided for in the substitute would, on the 
contrary, place before the courts substantive questions of 
fact upon which they were not qualified to pass. He was 
the more sensitive on this point because of the recent 
decision by Federal District Judge J. Otis Humphrey in 
the packers' antitrust suit which freed the individual pack­
ers from prosecution. Referring bitterly to the "immunity 
bath" given the packers, T.R. charged that the committee 
substitute "would make any judge whom the packers chose 
to designate, and not the experts of the Department of 
Agriculture, the man to decide on any question of any kind 
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which the packers thought it worth while to dispute." This 
broad court review provision, T.R. insisted, "will nullify 
the major part of the good which can be expected from the 
enactment of this law." 66 
"You are wrong, 'very, very wrong/ in your estimate of 
the Committee's Bill," Wadsworth replied. Assailing the 
President for "impugning the sincerity and the competency 
of a Committee of the House of Representatives," the New 
York congressman defended the substitute as "as perfect 
a piece of legislation, to carry into effect your own views 
on this question, as was ever prepared by a Committee of 
Congress." He could not see how a provision guaranteeing 
the packers their constitutional rights of appeal to the 
courts when their property rights were threatened "can 
be justly or properly objected to." Lorimer remained as 
defiant as ever. Regardless of what the President said, the 
Chicagoan vowed, he would stand by the substitute. At a 
meeting on Friday morning, June 15, a majority of the 
house committee resolved to "stand pat." 67 
[This impasse placed Speaker of the House "Uncle Joe" 
Cannon in an embarassing plight. He was under pressure 
from his home state to back the substitute, and his personal 
inclinations favored private enterprise against govern­
mental interference. But as the leader of the Republican 
party in the House, he shrank from a bitter, last-ditch 
fight with a chief executive of his own party on so politi­
cally explosive an issue. So that Friday he went up to the 
White House for a talk with Roosevelt. He found T.R., 
66. Theodore Roosevelt to James W. Wadsworth, June 14, 1906, 
Wadsworth to Roosevelt, June 15, 1906, Roosevelt to Wadsworth, 
June 15, 1906, Roosevelt to Albert J. Beveridge, June 15, 16, 1906, 
Beveridge to Roosevelt, [June 16, 1906]; Roosevelt to George P. 
McCabe, June 16, 1906, Roosevelt to William B. Howland, June 20, 
1906, Roosevelt Papers. A detailed comparison of the House committee 
substitute with the Senate amendment was made by John Callan 
O'Laughlin in the Chicago Tribune, June 14, 1906. 
67. James W. Wadsworth to Theodore Roosevelt, June 15, 1906, 
Roosevelt Papers; Chicago Tribune, June 15-16, 1906. 
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himself, worried about splitting the party, amenable to 
peace feelers. To work out the details, the Speaker sent 
over that afternoon Representative Henry C. Adams of 
Wisconsin. A respected member of the House Committee 
on Agriculture, Adams was not tarred with the packers' 
brush, and as former food commissioner in his home state, 
was a long-time advocate of stringent pure-food legislation. 
The Wisconsin lawmaker and T.R. quickly reached an 
understanding.68 
Department of Agriculture solicitor George P. McCabe 
and James Reynolds, who were present at the meeting, 
proceeded to draw up a new bill with the agreed-upon 
changes. The one-year waiver on the civil-service require­
ment was dropped; provision was made for dating canned 
meats; the Secretary of Agriculture was given stand-by 
authority to levy fees if the appropriations from Congress 
proved insufficient; and the broad court-review provision 
was struck out. If those changes were adopted, T.R. indi­
cated, the House bill "will become as good as the Beveridge 
amendment. . . ."69 The next day, Adams called an in­
formal meeting of the available members of the House 
committee to discuss the matter. With Lorimer and Wads-
worth away for the weekend, the members present went 
along with their Wisconsin colleague. The President ap­
peared to have won nearly every point in his fight.70 
68. Chicago Tribune, June 16, 1906; Theodore Roosevelt to James 
W. Wadsworth, June 15, 1906, Morison, The Letters of Theodore 
Roosevelt, V, 298-99; to Joseph G. Cannon, June 16, 1906, ibid., 301; 
to Nicholas Murray Butler, June 16, 1906, Roosevelt Papers. A 
biographical sketch of Adams by Harvey W. Wiley is in the Dictionary
of American Biography, I, 69. 
69. George P. McCabe to Theodore Roosevelt, June 15, 1906, June 
16, 1906; George P. McCabe to Henry C. Adams, June 16, 1906, Office
of the Secretary of Agriculture, R. G. 16, Solicitor's Office Correspon­
dence, File 74, National Archives; Theodore Roosevelt to James W. 
Wadsworth, June 15, 1906, and Theodore Roosevelt to Albert J. 
Beveridge, June 16, 1906, Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, 
V, 298-99, 300-301. 
70. Chicago Tribune, June 17, 1906; Chicago Inter Ocean, June 
17, 1906. 
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Wadsworth and Lorimer returned furious, vowing no 
retreat. But the Speaker was not willing to see the impasse 
renewed. When the full committee met Monday, he paid 
them a visit to urge peace with the White House. There 
would be no fees. Cannon joined with the committee major­
ity in rejecting the provision giving the Secretary of Agri­
culture stand-by authority to levy fees as an infringement 
upon Congress's control of the purse. On the other hand, 
the permanent appropriation was raised to $3,000,000 a 
year—a sum that would provide sufficient leeway for the 
future growth of the meat industry. Although still balking 
at dating canned meats, the committee agreed to eliminate 
the civil-service waiver and to make more explicit the pro­
vision giving the inspectors access to the packing houses 
at all times, "by day or night, whether the establishment 
be operated or not." Most importantly, the committee 
agreed to strike out the court-review provision if the 
words in the Senate amendment making the judgment of 
the Secretary of Agriculture "final and conclusive" were 
cut out. With that done, Wadsworth explained, the court-
review provision became "unnecessary." 71 
Roosevelt gave his approval when Cannon brought over 
the committee's draft that afternoon. The provision in the 
Senate amendment making the Secretary of Agriculture's 
decision "final and conclusive" might, he conceded, be taken 
to violate the Constitution by appearing to deny appeals 
of any kind to the courts. As in the Hepburn bill fight, the 
question of court review was left in (to use John M. Blum's 
phrase) "purposeful obscurity." T.R. had won his major 
point. The remaining questions presented no further diffi­
culties. The permanent appropriation of $3,000,000 a year 
71. Chicago Tribune, June 18-19, 1906; Chicago Inter Ocean, June 
18-19, 1906; Chicago Daily Drovers Journal and Farm News, June 19, 
1906; Chicago Record-Herald, June 19, 1906. The text of the revised 
House committee substitute appears in the Congressional Record,
59th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 19, 1906), pp. 8720-21; Wadsworth's 
explanation, ibid. (June 19, 1906), pp. 8721-22. 
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would, he conceded, allow sufficient leeway for the future 
growth of the industry without yearly fights over the 
budget. He was not happy about the defeat of the provision 
for dating canned meats; but he was not prepared to risk 
loss of face by insisting upon what he regarded a minor 
detail.72 The Committee reported its substitute the next 
day, Tuesday, June 19, with White House approval, and the 
House approved with scant debate.73 
But when the agricultural appropriation bill was re­
turned to the Senate, new difficulties appeared. Assailing 
the packers for their sins, Beveridge protested that the 
consumer had a right to know whether his canned meat 
was five years old or five days old. To conceal the age of the 
meat "is a fraud on the consumer." No less crucial was the 
retention of the fee provision. The government seal of 
inspection, he told the Senate, would be worth millions of 
dollars in advertising to the packers. " . .  . Why should the 
people pay for the packers' inspection, instead of the pack­
ers paying for their own inspection?" The meat industry 
would continue to grow in the future. But could Congress 
be depended upon to vote the additional funds after the 
uproar passed? Was not the packers' aim to cripple the 
inspection service? 
Senator Francis Warren of Wyoming, a leading sheep-
raiser and spokesman for the livestock interests in the 
upper chamber, protested that if the packers were forced 
to pay for inspection, they would defray the cost by reduc­
ing the price paid to the stock-raiser and raising the price 
charged the consumer. Beveridge replied that if the pack­
ers could so easily shift the burden, why did they so bitterly 
fight the provision? As it is, he argued, packers paid the 
72. Theodore Roosevelt to Albert J. Beveridge, June 16, 1906, 
Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, V, 300-301; to Redfield 
Proctor, June 18, 1906, Roosevelt Papers; Chicago Tribune, June 19, 
1906; Chicago Inter Ocean, June 19, 1906; Chicago Record-Herald, 
June 19, 1906. 
73. Congressional Record, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 19, 1906), 
pp. 8720-29. 
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lowest and charged the highest the market allowed. The 
chairman of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Red-
field Proctor of Vermont, who though nearly crippled with 
rheumatism had returned to Washington to oversee passage 
of effective meat-inspection legislation, backed the Indiana 
senator. The Senate then voted overwhelmingly to disagree 
to the House substitute and stand by its version.74 
Although unwilling to reopen the fee question, T.R. did 
plead with the House leaders to restore the provision for 
dating canned meats.75 But his plea was of no avail. The 
House conferees continued to insist that canned meats could 
stay for years without spoiling. To put the date on Ameri­
can canned meats would only hurt their sale abroad in com­
petition with the products of other countries which did not 
require dating. The House conferees were even more 
adamant against any provision for fees. Finally, on Friday, 
June 29, with the session drawing rapidly to a close, Proc­
tor, the spokesman for the Senate conferees, advised his 
colleagues to bow "to make sure of the greater good. . . ." 
Swift action by the Senate followed.76 The next day, Roose­
velt signed the agricultural appropriation bill with the 
meat-inspection amendment into law.77 That law, the chief 
executive cabled the American ambassador in London to 
inform British purchasers, "can and will guarantee the 
fitness in all respects of . .  . meat containing [the] Govern­
ment stamp." 78 
74. Ibid. (June 20, 1906), pp. 8763-70, (June 23, 1906), pp. 9016-27. 
On Proctor's physical condition, Redfield Proctor to Theodore Roose­
velt, June 13, 1906, Roosevelt Papers. 
75. Theodore Roosevelt to Joseph G. Cannon, June 26, 1906, 
Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, V, 317. 
76. Chicago Inter Ocean, June 27-30, 1906; Chicago Tribune, June 
27-30, 1906; Congressional Record, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 27, 
1906), pp. 9376-78; (June 28, 1906), pp. 9569-75; (June 29, 1906), 
pp. 9655-56, 9664-65. 
77. Roosevelt sent the pen with which he signed the bill to 
Beveridge in appreciation of his role in securing the legislation, 
Theodore Roosevelt to Albert J. Beveridge, June 30, 1906, Morison, 
The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, V, 326-27. 
78. Andrew J. Giles to Theodore Roosevelt, July 2, 3, 1906, Roose­
velt to Whitelaw Reid, July 7, 1906, Roosevelt Papers. 
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The passage of the meat-inspection amendment provides 
a case study in the Square Deal. First there was the popu­
lar demand for reform triggered by a sensational expose, 
the resistance of powerful business interests and their sup­
porters in Congress, the wielding of the "big stick" by T.R., 
and finally his retreat on minor issues to achieve what he 
regarded as his major aim. In the end, the amendment's 
sponsor boasted, "we have secured nearly everything we 
went after. . . ."79 But the legislation was not passed 
without a bitter fight—and it was only T.R.'s masterful 
handling of the political situation that carried the day. 
There has been in recent years much criticism to the effect 
that T.R. was no more than a lukewarm reformer who set­
tled too readily for half a loaf.79a Yet such criticism fails to 
take into account the political climate in which he had to 
operate. The battle over the meat-inspection amendment 
79. Chicago Tribune, June 30, 1906. 
79a. A variant on this theme has been expressed in a recent book 
by Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation
of American History, 1900-1916 (New York, 1963), pp. 98-108. 
Mr. Kolko denies that the big packers opposed the Beveridge amend­
ment "save in two particulars"—the fee provision and the dating 
of canned meats. On the contrary, Mr. Kolko argues, the big packers 
favored stricter federal regulation to end the competitive advantage 
enjoyed by their smaller competitors not reached by the existing 
inspection system. 
In light of the evidence presented in this paper, I believe Mr. Kolko's
interpretation is untenable. Mr. Kolko misses what was the crucial 
issue involved in the fight over the meat inspection law. In support of
his thesis, he quotes from the testimony of Thomas E. Wilson, general 
manager of Nelson Morris & Co., before the House Committee on 
Agriculture to the effect that the packers favored stricter inspection. 
But Mr. Kolko fails to note that this statement was followed by 
Wilson's plea to the committee to save the packers from "a bill that 
will put our business in the hands of theorists, chemists, sociologists, 
etc., and the management and control taken away from the men 
who have devoted their lives to the upbuilding and perfecting of 
this great American industry . . .  " (House Committee on Agricul­
ture, Hearings . . . on the So-called "Beveridge Amendment," p. 5). 
At issue in the struggle over the court-review provision was the 
question of control—and on this issue Roosevelt took his stand and 
won his point. 
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exhibits the strength of the standpat forces. Despite the 
popular excitement, a key participant acknowledged, Con­
gress would never have acted "if Roosevelt had not picked 
up his big stick and smashed the packers over the head with 
it and their agents in the House and Senate." 80 
The uproar over the meat scandal spurred Congress into 
passing the long-blocked pure food and drug law.81 This 
law, coming on the heels of the Hepburn railroad-rate bill 
and the meat-inspection amendment, was the third epoch-
making piece of legislation passed in the first session of 
the Fifty-ninth Congress. The Hepburn Act "settled once 
for all the fundamental dominance of public over private 
interests in the functioning of the railroad industry." 82 
Despite its shortcomings, the pure food and drug act of 
1906 laid the groundwork for the present-day legislation 
that protects the American consumer from adulterated food 
and quack drugs.83 Except for minor amendments, the 1906 
statute remains the basic law under which the meat-
inspection service operates today.84 Most importantly, as a 
perceptive newspaperman observed, the three laws marked 
"a radical departure from previous governmental methods. 
In each case there is a marked tendency toward the central­
ization of power in the United States and a corresponding 
decrease in the old time sovereignty of the states, or of the 
individual." 85 
Of the three, the meat-inspection law represented per­
haps the boldest extension of the so-called national police 
80. Albert J. Beveridge to Francis Baker, August 1, 1906, Beveridge
Papers. 
81. Anderson, The Health of a Nation, pp. 188-96; Young, The 
Toadstool Millionaires, pp. 239-43. 
82. Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission, I, 39. 
83. Young, The Toadstool Millionaires, pp. 247-62. 
84. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Regulations Governing the 
Meat Inspection of the United States Department of Agriculture 
(Washington, D.C., 1957), pp. 186-95. 
85. Chicago Tribune, June 24, 1906. 
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power. Under the cloak of the commerce clause, federal 
inspectors were empowered to supervise directly activities 
carried on within the states. But would the courts approve? 
The first test came over the pure food and drug act. A 
unanimous Supreme Court in Hipolite Egg Company v. 
United States (1911) upheld the exclusion of adulterated 
and misbranded food and drugs from interstate commerce 
as "within that breadth of discretion . . . Congress pos­
sesses in the execution of the powers conferred upon it by 
the Constitution." In McDermott v. Wisconsin (1913), the 
Court reaffirmed that Congress had "full power to keep the 
channels of [interstate] commerce free from the trans­
portation of illicit or harmful articles, to make such as are 
injurious to the public health outlaws of such commerce 
and to bar them from the facilities and privileges 
thereof." 86 
The same constitutional principle underlay the meat-
inspection law. The broad authority given the Secretary 
of Agriculture under that law to prescribe rules and regu­
lations governing the inspection service was challenged as 
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to 
an administrative officer. But Federal District Judge Edwin 
S. Thomas in United States v. Cudahy Packing Co. et at. 
(1917) held that Congress could "delegate authority to the 
proper administrative or executive officer to make adminis­
trative rules, violations of which may be punished as pub­
lic offences where the act of legislation which delegates the 
authority ordains that this be done. . . ." 87 The following 
year, in Pittsburgh Melting Company v. Totten (1918), 
Justice William R. Day, speaking for a unanimous Supreme 
Court, took pains in a case involving a limited technical 
question to affirm that "the enactment of the statute was 
within the power of Congress in order to prevent interstate 
86. Hipolite Egg Company v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911); 
McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913). 
87. United States v. Cudahy Packing Co. et al., 243 Fed. 441 (1917). 
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and foreign shipment of impure or adulterated meat-food 
products." 88 
Nor did the question of the scope of judicial review cause 
difficulties. The much-feared flood of litigation in the fed­
eral courts over departmental rulings never materialized. 
When the question of whether a given product was a "meat­
food product" covered by the act came before the Supreme 
Court in Pittsburgh Melting Company v. Totten (1918), 
the justices unanimously sustained the Department of Ag­
riculture, without, however, dealing with the larger ques­
tion of the scope of judicial review. The following year, in 
Houston v. St. Louis Independent Packing Company (1919), 
the Court explicitly confirmed its adherence to "narrow" 
review. Whether or not the name of a given meat product 
was false and deceptive, Justice John H. Clarke ruled for 
a unanimous Court, "is a question of fact, the determination 
of which is committed to the Secretary of Agriculture . . . , 
and the law is that the conclusion of the head of an execu­
tive department on such a question will not be reviewed by 
the courts, where it is fairly arrived at with substantial 
evidence to support it." The record shows that the Secretary 
"in promulgating the regulation complained of acted on 
substantial evidence and with sufficient reason. . . ." ". . . 
Under such circumstances as we have here," Clarke con­
cluded, "this court will not review . . . the decision of the 
Secretary of Agriculture." 89 This position was reaffirmed 
in the case of Brougham v. Blanton Manufacturing Com­
pany (1919). ". . . The decision of the department," 
Justice Joseph McKenna held for the unanimous court, 
"unless arbitrary, is conclusive." 90 
The meat inspection law represented a landmark in the 
growth of the national police power—and its sponsor in the 
88. Pittsburgh Melting Company v. Totten, 248 U.S. 1 (1918). 
89. Houston v. St. Louis Independent Packing Company, 249 U.S. 
479 (1919). 
90. Brougham v. Blanton Manufacturing Company, 249 U.S. 495 (1919). 
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Senate was eager to push forward with new applications 
of the principle to remedy newly exposed evils. In Decem­
ber, 1906, Beveridge introduced in the upper chamber a 
bill to exclude from interstate commerce "the product of 
any factory or mine that employs children under the age of 
fourteen years." "The meat inspection bill gives an abso­
lutely satisfactory precedent," wrote an enthusiastic Gifford 
Pinchot in congratulating the Indiana senator, "and the 
remedy would be complete and instantaneous." When states' 
rights men assailed the measure as an unconstitutional in­
vasion of the reserved powers of the states, Beveridge 
replied that the decision of the Supreme Court in Champion 
v. Ames "absolutely settled" the constitutionality of his bill. 
"If this law is unconstitutional," he told T.R., "then at least 
a dozen laws already on our statute books, prohibiting 
various articles from interstate commerce, are also unconsti­
tutional." 91 
Roosevelt, unwilling to risk his prestige in a cause doomed 
to defeat and dubious about the measure's constitutionality, 
withheld his support. Without the chief executive's back­
ing, Beveridge could make no headway.92 But the seed he 
had planted came to fruition under the Wilson administra­
tion with the adoption of the Keating-Owen bill in 1916. 
The act forbade the shipment in interstate commerce of any 
products manufactured in whole or in part by children 
under fourteen or from any mine employing children under 
sixteen. The act was "the high peak of Wilsonian progres­
sivism"—and alarmed conservatives saw in the law the 
precedent for an even wider extension of the national police 
power. If the child-labor law were constitutional, the Wash­
91. Albert J. Beveridge to Gifford Pinchot, November 12, 1906, 
Pinchot to Beveridge, November 22, 1906, Pinchot Papers (Library of
Congress); Beveridge to Harriet Lake, November 22, 1907, Beveridge
to Theodore Roosevelt, November 11, 1907, Beveridge Papers. 
92. John Braeman, "Albert J. Beveridge and the First National 
Child Labor Bill," Indiana Magazine of History, LX, No. 1 (March, 
1964), 1-36. 
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ington spokesman for the National Association of Manu­
facturers complained, the door would be open for Congress 
to bar shipment "of any commodity produced in whole or 
part by the labor of men or women who work more than 
eight hours, receive less than a minimum wage, or have 
not certain educational qualifications." 93 
At this juncture, however, the Supreme Court interposed 
a check. In Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918), the Court, in a 
five to four decision, declared the law unconstitutional. To 
distinguish the case from previous decisions upholding leg­
islation barring goods from interstate commerce, the ma­
jority opinion, written by Justice Day made "the character 
of the particular subjects dealt with" the controlling factor 
in determining the law's validity. In the other cases, the 
articles prohibited were themselves harmful or deleterious; 
goods made by child labor, on the contrary, "are of them­
selves harmless." Thereupon Day revived the distinction 
made in the Knight case between commerce and manufac­
turing. The "mere fact," he held, that the goods "were 
intended for interstate commerce transportation does not 
make their production subject to federal control under the 
commerce power." Hence the child-labor law violated the 
Tenth Amendment. "To sustain this statute," Day con­
cluded, ". . . would sanction an invasion by the federal 
power of the control of a matter purely local in its charac­
ter, and over which no authority has been delegated to 
Congress in conferring the power to regulate commerce 
among the States." 94 
The decision in Hammer v. Dagenhart loomed as an in­
superable obstacle to further development of the national 
police power. The political climate of the 1920's made the 
constitutional question largely an academic one. But with 
the New Deal the issue was once again joined. The out­
93. Arthur Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910­
1917 (New York, 1954), pp. 226-27. 
94. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
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come of the bitter struggle was the switch in time that 
saved nine. By 1941, the triumph of the national police 
power was complete. In United States v. Darby (1941), 
the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. 
Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice Harlan Fiske 
Stone explicitly repudiated Hammer v. Dagenhart. Under 
its "plenary" power over interstate commerce, Congress 
can, Stone declared, "by appropriate legislation regulate 
intrastate activities where they have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce." Giving the national police power its 
most sweeping definition, Stone held that Congress had 
practically unlimited power to bar from interstate commerce 
"articles whose use in the states for which they are destined 
it may conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals 
or welfare. . . ." 95 
Underlying this triumph of the national police power was 
a fundamental change in the nation's political outlook. In 
the nineteenth century, most Americans looked to their 
state governments as the proper instrumentalities for pro­
moting the health, morals, and welfare of society. With the 
nationalizing of business and the resulting complexity of 
social relationships, men began to look to the federal gov­
ernment to solve problems that had grown beyond the capac­
ity of the individual states to handle. Nowadays when an 
evil is discovered, the immediate reaction is that Congress 
should pass a law. This change in popular attitudes is re­
flected in today's advertising. Firms proudly boast that 
their products are prepared under United States govern­
ment supervision. The fight over the meat-inspection 
amendment had its share in creating this public conscious­
ness. During the excitement aroused by Upton Sinclair's 
The Jungle, the federal government stepped forward as the 
defender of the public well-being. The lesson was not 
forgotten—and later events would reinforce its message. 
95. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
The New Deal and the Analogue of War4 
WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG 
JH[ metaphors a nation employs reveal much about how it 
perceives reality. The unconscious choice of symbols bares 
the bedrock of its beliefs. Moreover, the words people use 
are not neutral artifacts; they shape ideas and behavior. 
Just as the psychoanalyst listens for slips of the tongue or 
strange incongruities of ideas to help him understand the 
patient, or the literary critic studies the symbols in a poem 
or novel, so the historian finds it rewarding to explore the 
imagery a particular period has used, consciously or uncon­
sciously, to interpret its experience. 
In the months and years that followed the stock market 
crash of 1929, America searched for some way to make 
comprehensible what was happening. Sometimes people 
thought of the Great Depression as a breakdown of a sys­
tem, sometimes as the product of the machinations of evil 
*The writer is indebted to David Brody, Clarke Chambers, Bernard
Cohen, Paul Conkin, Robert Cross, Bertram Gross, Charles Hirschfeld, 
Richard Hofstadter, Robert Holt, Henry Kaiser, Val Lorwin, Warren 
Miller, Carl Resek, James Shideler, and Rexford Tugwell for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this essay. The essay was originally
presented as a paper at the meetings of the American Historical Asso­
ciation in New York in December, 1960, and was substantially revised
when the writer was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in 
the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford, California, 1961-62. 
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or stupid men, sometimes as the visitation of a plague like 
the Black Death. But from the very first, many conceived 
the depression to be a calamity like war or, more specifically, 
like the menace of a foreign enemy who had to be defeated 
in combat. Occasionally, the analogue of war was a general 
one, more often it referred specifically to World War I. 
When President Hoover summoned the leading industrial­
ists to meet in Washington, one financial journal com­
mented: " 'Order up the Moors!' was Marshal Foch's reply 
at the first battle of the Marne. . . . 'Order up the business 
reserves,' directed President Hoover as pessimistic reports 
flowed in from all quarters, following the stock market 
crash." 1 
For the rest of his years in office, Hoover resorted con­
stantly to the imagery of war to describe the depression.2 
In one of his addresses, he claimed that the country had just 
won its "battle of Chateau-Thierry" and must "reform [its] 
forces for the battle of Soissons." "Again and again he used 
military terms in describing the struggle in which he was 
1. Magazine of Wall Street, XLV (1929), 264, cited in J. Kenneth 
Galbraith, The Great Crash (Boston, 1929), p. 143. 
2. Hoover, observed George Seldes, "repeatedly used the figures of
speech of war in his description of the depression. It was a skillful 
association of ideas, for the war was a difficult time which ended 
happily; it was exciting; and it was the last time the whole nation 
was united."—Seldes, Years of the Locust (Boston, 1933), p. 258. The 
conviction of political leaders and publicists that reference to the 
war would evoke a favorable response suggests some modification of 
the view that the "pacifist thirties" thought of World War I only 
with abhorrence. While they viewed war as a wasteful, inhuman 
social institution, many progressives also recalled World War I as an
ennobling experience of sacrifice for the national welfare and as a 
time of economic advance. In 1931 Richard Ely wrote: "A marked 
difference between the general situation in the World War and our 
situation during Hard Times must be noticed. A war may at first be 
attended by a good deal of economic confusion and distress, but very 
soon the wages and profits mount upward and people are apparently 
more prosperous than ever. Returns of capital in many lines of 
activity are large and wages are apt to mount up to levels heretofore 
unknown." — Ely, Hard Times — The Way In and the Way Out (New York, 1931) p. 110. 
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engaged," recalled one of his aides. "He was the command­
ing officer at general headquarters, so visualized himself." 3 
Hoover's advisers perceived the crisis in the same terms. In 
June, 1931, after the President unfolded his reparations 
plan, Secretary of State Henry Stimson confided to his 
diary: "We have all been saying to each other the situation 
is quite like war."4 
In addition to employing the metaphor of war to explain 
the meaning of the depression, the 1930's drew on the ex­
perience of the economic mobilization of World War I for 
instrumentalities to combat hard times. These are two dis­
crete themes. Some who resorted to the analogue of war 
had no interest in the precedent of the wartime mobilization, 
and a few who turned to the example of the mobilization 
did not employ the imagery of war. Hence, it would be 
possible to examine these strands separately. But so closely 
did most Americans associate the metaphor of war with the 
specific legacy of the war mobilization that it has seemed 
more fruitful to discuss both these themes in a single con­
text. 
In the New Deal years, the two strands were inseparable. 
As early as his "forgotten man" speech in the 1932 cam­
paign, Franklin Roosevelt manipulated the analogue of war 
to his advantage. In that same address, he referred to the 
3. Literary Digest, CXIV (September 10, 1932), 4-5; New Republic, 
LXXII (1932), 86; Theodore Joslin, Hoover Off the Record (Garden 
City, N.Y., 1934), p. 63. "Fighting this depression is becoming more
and more like waging a war," Hoover observed. "We have the combats,
if against an unseen foe of inestimable strength. We have our men 
and we have our casualties among them."—Ibid., p. 182. 
4. Henry Stimson MS Diary, June 15, 1931, Sterling Memorial 
Library, Yale University, New Haven, Conn., Stimson MSS. For 
similar assessments of the depression, see Report of Proceedings of 
the Fiftieth Annual Convention of the American Federation of Labor (Washington, D.C., 1930), p. 366; Henry Morrow Hyde MS Diary, 
December 17, 1931, Alderman Library, University of Virginia, Char­
lottesville, Va., Hyde MSS; Justice Brandeis' dissent in New State 
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 306 (1932); Rocky Mountain News,
March 1, 1933. 
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specific operations of the war mobilization, a heritage he 
was to acknowledge on many occasions after his election to 
the presidency. But the legacy of the war was to prove a 
mixed blessing. Useful as a justification for New Deal 
actions, it also served to limit and divert the reformers in 
ways that had not been anticipated. 
In tracing the genealogy of the New Deal, historians have 
paid little attention to the mobilization of World War I. 
Instead, they have centered their interest on two move­
ments : populism and progressivism. Both were important 
antecedents—a reasonably straight line may be drawn from 
the Populist sub-treasury plan to the Commodity Credit 
Corporation, from the Pujo committee to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. Yet in concentrating on populism 
and progressivism, writers have given too little attention to 
the influence of the wartime mobilization, which may have 
been as great as the example of the Progressive era and 
certainly was more important than populism.5 
Much of the experience of the Progressive era proved 
irrelevant to the task facing Roosevelt in 1933. Very little 
in the Populist and Progressive periods offered a precedent 
5. One cannot, of course, distinguish sharply between the relative 
influence of World War I and progressivism since the war mobilization 
was, in some respects, a logical outgrowth of the Progressive move­
ment. (There were, too, other antecedents of the New Deal, notably 
the experiments of the 1920's.) Some historians of the New Deal, 
it should be noted, have been sensitive either to the indebtedness of 
the Roosevelt administration to the war mobilization or to the use 
the New Deal made of war imagery. See, especially, Frank Freidel, 
America in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1960), p. 312; Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order (The Age of Roosevelt)(Boston, 1957), pp. 37-39; Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal (The Age of Roosevelt) (Boston, 1959), p. 176; Paul Conkin, Tomor­
row a New World: The New Deal Community Program (Ithaca, N.Y., 
1959), pp. 50-54, 67. Most narratives, however, have not only ignored 
this relationship but have minimized the significance of the political 
and economic events of the war years. With respect to the war, 
historians have been chiefly interested in what happened before our 
intervention (the submarine crisis) and what happened afterwards (the League of Nations fight), not with the substance of the war 
experience itself. 
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for massive federal intervention in the economy. Many of 
the reforms of the prewar generation were modest ventures 
in regulation or attempts to liberate business enterprise 
rather than ambitious national programs of economic action. 
Moreover, in these years, reformers thought the state and 
the city more important arenas than the national capital. 
World War I marked a bold new departure. It occasioned 
the abandonment of laissez faire precepts and raised the 
federal government to director, even dictator, of the econ­
omy. The War Industries Board mobilized production; the 
War Trade Board licensed imports and exports; the Capital 
Issues Committee regulated investment; the War Finance 
Corporation lent funds to munitions industries; the Railroad 
Administration unified the nation's railways; the Fuel Ad­
ministration fixed the price of coal and imposed "coal holi­
days" on eastern industry; and the Food Administration 
controlled the production and consumption of food. The 
Lever Food and Fuel Control Act of 1917 gave the Presi­
dent sweeping powers: to take over factories and operate 
them, to fix a maximum price for wheat, and to license 
businesses in necessaries. By a generous interpretation of 
its powers, the War Industries Board supervised pricing, 
compelled corporations to accept government priorities, and 
forced companies to obey federal edicts on how to dispose 
of their products. "This is a crisis," a War Industries Board 
representative scolded steel-industry leaders, "and com­
mercialism, gentlemen, must be absolutely sidetracked." 6 
Actions of this character, as well as the proliferation of 
public corporations ranging from the United States Housing 
Corporation to the Spruce Production Corporation, proved 
important precedents for New Deal enterprises fifteen years 
later.7 
6. David Brody, Steelworkers in America: The Nonunion Era ("Harvard Historical Monographs," XLV [Cambridge, I960]), p. 206;
Iron Age, May 9, 1918, pp. 1206-13.

_ 7. If, by later standards, the experiment in controls was embryonic,

it nonetheless represented an unprecedented degree of government
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The field of labor relations may serve as a single example 
of the difference in importance of the Populist and Progres­
sive experience and that of World War I. Prior to the war, 
no serious attempt had ever been made to empower the 
federal government to uphold the right of collective bar­
gaining.8 Federal action was limited to peripheral areas. 
When class lines were drawn in labor disputes, progressives 
frequently aligned themselves against the unions.9 But in 
World War I, the War Labor Board proclaimed its support 
of union rights and, to the discomfiture of businessmen, en­
forced these rights. Many of the labor policies pursued in 
the war months would have been inconceivable a short while 
before. When the Smith & Wesson Arms Company of 
Springfield, Massachusetts, insisted on its prerogative to 
require workers to sign yellow-dog contracts, the War 
Department commandeered the plant, even though the Su­
preme Court had upheld the legality of such contracts.10 The 
government even dared to seize Western Union when the 
president of the firm denied his employees the right to join 
intervention. In the immense literature on the war mobilization, see 
Benedict Crowell and R. F. Wilson, How America Went to War (6 vols.; New Haven, 1921) ; Bernard M. Baruch, American Industry 
in the War (New York, 1941); Woodbury Willoughby, The Capital 
Issues Committee and War Finance Corporation, ("The Johns Hopkins 
University Studies in Historical and Political Science," LII [Balti­
more, 1934]) ; Me Hsin Chiang, "The United States War Industries 
Board, 1917-1918" (Master's thesis, Stanford University, 1937); 
William Clinton Mullendore, History of the United States Food 
Administration 1917-1919 (Palo Alto, Calif., 1941); Waldo G. Leland 
and Newton D. Mereness, Introduction to the American Official 
Sources for the Economic and Social History of the War (New Haven, 
1926). 
8. The most ambitious federal program was the investigation con­
ducted by the U. S. Commission on Industrial Relations (Graham 
Adams, "Age of Industrial Violence,'' [Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia 
University, 1962]). 
9. See, for example, George E. Mowry, The California Progressives 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1951), pp. 294-99. 
10. "Springfield and Bridgeport," New Republic, XVI (1918), 185­
86; Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft 
(2 vols.; New York, 1939), II, 921. 
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the Commercial Telegraphers Union.11 The panoply of pro­
cedures developed by the War Labor Board and the War 
Labor Policies Board provided the basis in later years for 
a series of enactments culminating in the Wagner National 
Labor Relations Act of 1935. 
The war gave a home to the new class of university-
trained intellectuals which had emerged in the generation 
before the war. While some of them had found a career in 
public service in state governments before 1917, few had 
worked in the national government, chiefly because there 
was so little in Washington for them to do. After the United 
States intervened, Washington swarmed with professors, 
until, one writer noted, "the Cosmos Club was little better 
than a faculty meeting of all the universities." 12 In all 
countries, he observed, professors "fought, and they man­
aged affairs, thus refuting the ancient libellous assumption 
that they constituted an absent-minded third sex. . . . " 13 
Public administrators of this type represented a new force 
in American politics. They were advisers and technicians 
but, more than that, men of influence and even of power. At 
a time when class conflicts were sharpening, they did not 
reflect particular classes so much as the thrust for power 
11. "Snubbing the War Labor Board," Survey, XL (1918), 292-93; 
"The Western Union and the Government," New Republic, XV (1918), 
163-64; Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft, II, 
919-20. For the wartime labor experience, see "Final Report of the 
Chairman of the Labor Division, War Industries Board, 1919," copy 
in Library of Congress, John P. Frey MSS, Box 15; Brody, Steel­
workers in America, Chap. X; U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, "National War Labor Board," in Bulletin No. 287 (Washington, D.C., 1922); Gordon S. Watkins, Labor Problems and 
Labor Administration in the United States During the World War ("University of Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences," VIII [Urbana, 
111., 1919]); Felix Frankfurter, "New Labor Ideas Taught by War," 
in Edwin Wildman (ed.), Reconstructing America (Boston, 1919), 
pp. 239-44. 
12. Gordon Hall Gerould, "The Professor and the Wide, Wide 
World," Scribner's Magazine, LXV (1919), 466. 
13. Ibid., p. 465. 
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of novi homines who had a significant role to play on the 
national stage. Some like Gifford Pinchot had made their 
appearance in Washington before the war, and still more 
like Charles McCarthy had been active in such reform capi­
tals as Madison and Albany, but it was the war which 
offered them an unparalleled opportunity. Randolph Bourne 
noted perceptively the "peculiar congeniality between the 
war and these men. It is as if the war and they had been 
waiting for each other." 14 Phenomena almost wholly of the 
twentieth century, they came by the 1930's to have a crucial 
part in shaping legislation and in manning the new agencies 
which their legislation developed. The passage of the Wag­
ner Act in 1935, for example, resulted less from such tradi­
tional elements as presidential initiative or the play of 
"social forces" than from the conjunction of university-
trained administrators like Lloyd Garrison within the New 
Deal bureaucracy with their counterparts on senatorial 
staffs like Leon Keyserling in Senator Wagner's office. 
This new class of administrators, and the social theorists 
who had been advocating a rationally planned economy, 
found the war an exciting adventure. The New Republic 
liberals rejoiced that the war produced a novel kind of 
democratic state which was creating a radical new order 
based on the democratization of industry. ". . . During 
the war we revolutionized our society," the New Republic 
boasted.15 These liberals distinguished themselves sharply 
from the New Freedom reformers who aimed only to achieve 
minor changes in the nineteenth-century tradition. Nation­
alists and collectivists, they looked toward a centralized state 
which would use its powers to reshape the economy in the 
interests of labor and other disadvantaged groups.16 
14. Bourne, Untimely Papers, ed. James Oppenheim (New York, 
1919), p. 129. 
15. "The Uses of an Armistice," New Republic, XVII (1918), 60. 
16. Charles Hirschfeld, "American Reform and World War I," 
paper delivered at the convention of the Mississippi Valley Historical
Association, Denver, Colo., April 25, 1959, pp. 3, 12-13. 
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Many progressives believed that Wilson's war measures 
signified both a fulfillment of Progressive hopes and a happy 
augury for the future. Enormously impressed by "the 
social possibilities of war," John Dewey observed that in 
every warring country, production for profit had been sub­
ordinated to production for use. "The old conception of the 
absoluteness of private property has received the world over 
a blow from which it will never wholly recover." 17 Thor­
stein Veblen, who worked for the Food Administration in 
1918, thought the war created new possibilities for far-
reaching social change.18 Economists viewed the War In­
dustries Board as "a notable demonstration of the power 
of war to force concert of effort and collective planning," 
and anticipated that lessons from the war could be applied 
in times of peace.19 When Wesley C. Mitchell closed his 
lectures at Columbia University in May, 1918, he remarked 
that peace would bring new problems, but "it seems im­
possible that the countries concerned will attempt to solve 
them without utilizing the same sort of centralized direct­
ing now employed to kill their enemies abroad for the new 
purpose of reconstructing their own life at home."20 "What 
we have learned in war we shall hardly forget in peace," 
17. John Dewey, "What Are We Fighting For?" Independent,
XCIV (1918), 480, reprinted as "The Social Possibilities of War," in 
Joseph Ratner (ed.), Characters and Events (2 vols.; New York, 
1929), II, 555. See, too, John Dewey, "A New Social Science," New 
Republic, XIV (1918), 293. 
18. David Riesman, Thorstein Veblen (New York, 1953), p. 119; 
Joseph Dorfman, Thorstein Veblen and His America (New York, 
1934), pp. 380-95. 
19. Curtice N. Hitchcock, "The War Industries Board: Its Develop­
ment, Organization, and Functions," Journal of Political Economy,
XXVI (1918), 566; Irving Fisher, "Some Contributions of the War 
to Our Knowledge of Money and Prices," American Economic Review, 
VIII (1918), Supplement, 257-58; Joseph Dorfman, The Economic 
Mind in American Civilization (5 vols.; New York, 1946-59), III, 
485-94. 
20. Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization, III, 
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commented Walter Weyl. "The new economic solidarity, 
once gained, can never again be surrendered." 21 
The end of the war left the administrators with a sense 
of incompletion. One writer noted unmistakable shadows 
of annoyance at the Cosmos Club when "the dark cloud of 
peace" lowered in October, 1918.22 After the war, to the 
chagrin of the planners, the economic machinery was quickly 
dismantled, but the lesson that the war had taught—that 
the federal government could mobilize the nation's resources 
in a planned economy—was not forgotten.23 Throughout the 
1920's, the more advanced Progressives looked back fondly 
toward the war mobilization which seemed to have drawn 
a blueprint for America's future. In 1927, Rexford Tugwell 
lauded the war as "an industrial engineer's Utopia." He 
wanted to co-ordinate the economy as it had been under the 
War Industries Board in "America's war-time socialism." 
"We were on the verge of having an international industrial 
machine when peace broke," he wrote ruefully. ". . . Only 
the Armistice," he lamented, "prevented a great experiment 
21. Walter Weyl, The End of the War (New York, 1918), pp. 303-4. 
Cf. Sidney Kaplan, "Social Engineers as Saviors: Effects of World 
War I on Some American Liberals," Journal of the History of Ideas, 
XVII (1956), 347-69. The war experience casts doubt on the familiar 
generalization that war is always fatal to reform. In some ways, 
the war dealt a severe blow to the progressive movement; in other 
ways, it opened up new possibilities for reform. No doubt the war 
resulted in more harm than good for progressivism, but it was not 
the totally unusable experience it has frequently been represented 
to be. 
22. "The Demobilized Professor," Atlantic Monthly, CXXIII 
(1919), 537. 
23. In the months after the armistice, economists like Wesley 
Mitchell sought to preserve the activities begun during the war, and 
men like Senator William S. Kenyon of Iowa attempted to keep alive
and even expand the work of war agencies, but in vain. See Dorfman, 
The Economic Mind in American Civilization, IV, 9-11, 365; Lucy 
Sprague Mitchell, Two Lives: The Story of Wesley Clair Mitchell and 
Myself (New York, 1953), p. 303; Wesley C. Mitchell, The Backward 
Art of Spending Money and Other Essays (New York, 1937), pp. 
42-57. 
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in control of production, control of price, and control of 
consumption." 24 
The fascination the war example held for the Progressives 
was a consequence of the fusion of nationalism and reform 
in the previous generation. Heralded by Bismarck in Ger­
many and Joseph Chamberlain in Great Britain, this con­
junction appeared in America in the martial fantasies of 
Edward Bellamy, in Francis Walker's critique of classical 
economics, in the "industrial armies" of men like Jacob 
Coxey, in the military forms of the Salvation Army, and in 
the response of certain reformers to the imperialist issues 
of the 1890's.25 In the Progressive era, this association was 
starkly revealed in the career of Theodore Roosevelt who 
thought social justice and military preparedness to be two 
aspects of a common program. 
While the confluence of nationalism and reform fascinated 
a number of progressive theorists, notably Brooks Adams, 
it was Herbert Croly who, in his seminal The Promise of 
American Life, explored the relationship most extensively. 
Croly set down the deep dissatisfaction of the Progressives 
with the quality of life in America. The homogeneity of the 
early republic, he wrote, had been fragmented by a century 
of individualism run riot. So long as the market place de­
termined values, so long as each individual or interest was 
permitted to pursue its own ends with no commitment to 
a common ideal, the result could not help but be unsatis­
24. Rexford G. Tugwell, "America's War-Time Socialism," Nation, 
CXXIV (1927), 364-65. Cf. Donald Richberg, Tents of the Mighty 
(New York, 1930), p. 82. Even the social security movement of the 
1920's was affected by the wartime precedents of government insur­
ance and of the care and rehabilitation of veterans (Clarke Chambers 
to the writer, June 23, 1962). The Railroad Administration was to 
provide the model for the New Deal's Coordinator of Transportation. 
25. In some respects, this relationship had even earlier antecedents, 
for example, in the special place that Lincoln and the Union cause 
had in the hearts of postbellum reformers. It might even be traced 
back as far as the congruence of reform and imperialism in the 
Jefferson administration. 
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tying, Croly reasoned. Reform had foundered because it 
lacked a sense of national purpose. "In this country," 
he observed, "the solution of the social problem demands 
the substitution of a conscious social ideal for the earlier 
instinctive homogeneity of the American nation." 28 
The war offered just such a "conscious social ideal." 
Through war priorities, as Bernard Baruch later explained, 
the economy could be "made to move in response to a 
national purpose rather than in response to the wills of 
those who had money to buy." -7 The nationalistic demands 
of war denied, if only for a time, the claims of the profit 
system. ". . . When production and distribution became 
really a matter of life and death, immediate and dramatic, 
every warring nation, after a few months of appalling 
waste, threw laissez-faire out of the window," noted Stuart 
Chase. "Wars must be won, and it was painfully obvious 
that laissez-faire was no help in winning them." 28 The 
individualistic, competitive economy of the prewar years 
had to submit to the discipline of conscious government di­
rection. Not business profit but the national interest was to 
determine how resources were to be allocated. The old 
system of competition, Rexford Tugwell wrote jubilantly, 
"melted away in the fierce new heat of nationalistic 
vision." 29 
When the stock market crash of 1929 precipitated the 
Great Depression of the 1930's, progressives turned instinc­
26. Croly, The Promise of American Life (New York, 1909), p. 139. 
Croly rejoiced that the Spanish-American War and the subsequent 
imperial expansion had given "a tremendous impulse to the work of 
national reform" (ibid., p. 169). See William E. Leuchtenburg, 
"Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement and 
American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916," Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review, XXXIX (1952), 483-504. 
27. Baruch, American Industry in the War, p. 29. See, too, J. M. 
Clark's perceptive article, "The Basis of War-Time Collectivism,' 
American Economic Review, VII (1917), 772-90. 
28. Stuart Chase, A New Deal (New York, 1933), pp. 84-85. 
29. Tugwell, "America's War-Time Socialism," p. 365. 
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tively to the war mobilization as a design for recovery. The 
War Industries Board, Stuart Chase pointed out, had, like 
the Soviet Gosplan, demonstrated that "super-management" 
could replace "industrial anarchy." 30 George Soule con­
tended that the war had shown that planning was neither 
beyond human capacity nor alien to American values. 
"Many of those who now advocate economic planning have 
been doing so, in one way or another, ever since the ex­
periences of 1917-18, and mainly as result of the possibili­
ties which those experiences suggested for better perform­
ance in times of peace." The same "deliberate collective 
effort" which had made possible a tremendous expansion of 
production could be turned to peacetime ends, he argued. 
"If that military and industrial army had been mobilized, 
not to kill, burn and shatter, but to substitute garden cities 
for slums, to restore soil fertility and reforest our waste 
regions, to carry out flood control, to increase the necessities 
of life available for those in the lower income groups, we 
could have achieved in a short time a large number of really 
desirable objectives," Soule claimed.31 
Such men as Gerard Swope of General Electric, a veteran 
of the war mobilization, and Otto T. Mallery, the leading 
advocate of public works in the World War I era, recom­
mended floating large federal bond issues like Liberty Bonds 
to finance a massive public-works program.32 Swope wrote 
President Hoover: "If we were faced with war, the Presi­
30. Stuart Chase, "The Heart of American Industry," in Fred J. 
Ringel (ed.), America as Americans See It (New York, 1932), p. 30. 
31. George Soule, A Planned Society (New York, 1933), pp. 184-87. 
See, too, J. Russell Smith, "The End of an Epoch," Survey, LXVI 
(1931), 333. 
32. Mallery had headed a division of the War Labor Policies Board 
charged with developing public works during the postwar transition. 
For the proposals of Mallery and Father John O'Grady, see the New 
York Times, December 30, 1931. The economist Arthur Gayer recom­
mended profiting from the Liberty Bond example by floating bonds 
for public works "in a war on growing suffering and distress" 
(Arthur D. Gayer, "Financing the Emergency Public Works Pro­
gram," American Labor Legislation Review, XXII [1932], 75). 
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dent would immediately call a special session of Congress 
to declare war and to raise armies. This unemployment 
situation in many ways is more serious even than war. 
Therefore it is suggested that an extra session of Congress 
be called and the President request it to issue a billion 
dollars of bonds, bearing a low interest rate, and that then 
a campaign be organized to sell these bonds, much as the 
Liberty Bond campaigns were organized when we entered 
the war thirteen years ago." 33 The Wisconsin economist 
Richard T. Ely went a step farther. He proposed the cre­
ation of a peacetime army which, when a depression struck, 
could be expanded by recruiting from the ranks of the un­
employed. Under the direction of an economic general staff, 
the army, Ely urged, "should go to work to relieve distress 
with all the vigor and resources of brain and brawn that we 
employed in the World War." 34 
By the middle of 1931, both businessmen and politicians 
were calling on President Hoover to adopt the procedures 
of the War Industries Board to pull the country out of the 
depression. When William McAdoo, who had headed the 
wartime Railroad Administration, proposed a Peace Indus­
tries Board in June, 1931, he found ready support. The War 
Industries Board, one correspondent wrote McAdoo, "ac­
complished wonders during the war, and there is no question 
but that a board established now to coordinate things in our 
national industries will also do wonders. This historical 
precedent is a great asset and ought to guide us in our 
national planning for the benefit of all." 35 A month later, 
Charles Beard urged the creation of a National Economic 
Council with a Board of Strategy and Planning which 
would follow the pattern of "the War Industries Board and 
other federal agencies created during the titanic effort to 
33. Swope to Hoover, October 2, 1930, Columbia University, New 
York, Gerard Swope MSS. 
34. Richard T. Ely, Hard Times, pp. 103-6. 
35. Raphael Herman to William McAdoo, June 10, 1931, Library 
of Congress, McAdoo MSS, Box 359. 
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mobilize men and materials for the World War." 36 The 
following month, Representative Chester Bolton of Ohio 
advanced a similar proposal. "If we could have another body 
like the old War Industries Board," he wrote the head of 
Hoover's voluntary relief agency, "I believe the situation 
today could be greatly bettered." 37 In September, 1931, 
Gerard Swope came forth with the most influential of all 
the pre-New Deal proposals: the "Swope Plan" to stabilize 
employment and prices through a constellation of trade 
associations under a national economic council.38 Early in 
1932, a group of more than a hundred businessmen requested 
Hoover to declare a two-year truce on destructive competi­
tion and urged him "to consider a return to war-time ex­
perience by bringing into existence A National Economic 
Truce Board."39 
The cornucopia of proposals included suggestions with 
widely differing ideological implications. Some called on 
the war example to support radical recommendations for 
national planning; others used the war precedent simply 
as a stratagem to free business of the encumbrance of the 
trust laws. Most of them had in common a demand for 
greater initiative by the federal government, and many of 
them—especially the public-works proposals—called for a 
sharp increase in government spending. 
Such proposals ran far ahead of anything President 
Hoover and his followers would countenance. Most business­
36. Charles A. Beard, "A 'Five-Year Plan' for America," Forum 
LXXXVI (1931), 5. He also proposed gigantic agricultural and 
housing programs to be "financed by Freedom Bonds and sold with 
the zeal of war issues" (ibid., p. 11). 
37. Representative Chester Bolton to Walter Gifford, August 24, 
1931, Library of Congress, Newton Baker MSS, Box 192. 
38. J. George Frederick (ed.), The Swope Plan (New York, 1931); 
Gerard Swope, Columbia Oral History Collection, pp. 123 ff. The 
Collection will be cited henceforth as COHC. 
39. "A Plea from 123 Representatives of Independent Industrial 
Units and of Labor for the Trial of a Two Years' Truce in Destruc­
tive Competition," to Herbert Hoover, February 11, 1932, copy in 
Harvey Williams to Robert Wagner, March 24, 1932, Wagner MSS, 
Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 
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men seemed chary of taking the War Industries Board as 
a model for peacetime.40 The President himself gave little 
indication of a readiness to have the federal government 
assume a larger role. To be sure, he signed an Employment 
Stabilization Bill in 1931, and gave a major share of credit 
for the measure to Mallery.41 But he deplored recommenda­
tions for lavish federal spending. Ventures of this sort, the 
President protested, would unbalance the budget and destroy 
business confidence in public credit. 
These doctrines received small credence from men who 
recalled the war expenditures. "If it is permissible for gov­
ernment to expend billions in wartime in the organization 
of production, it is no less legitimate for government in a 
great emergency of peacetime to do what it is also impos­
sible for private individuals to accomplish," reasoned the 
distinguished economist Edwin R. A. Seligman.42 The popu­
lar economic writer William Trufant Foster scolded: 
If any one still doubts that our economic troubles are mainly 
mental, let him consider what would happen if the United States 
40. For the wariness of businessmen about using the War Indus­
tries Board as a model, see U. S. Congress, Senate, Establishment of a 
National Economic Council, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Manufactures, U. S. Senate, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., on 
S. 6215, October 22 to December 19, 1931 (Washington, D.C., 1932), 
p. 174. William Appleman Williams sees men like Gerard Swope as 
representative of a new group of corporation executives who came 
out of the war with a more sophisticated approach to industrial 
problems, and views Herbert Hoover as their most important spokes­
man (Williams, The Contours of American History [Cleveland and 
New York, 1961], pp. 425-26). While this judgment seems valid for 
the 1920's, especially during Hoover's tenure as Secretary of Com­
merce, it is hardly pertinent for Hoover's presidency. The differences 
between Swope and President Hoover, sharply revealed by their 
divergent evaluations of the relevance of war to the depression, were 
more significant than their area of agreement. 
41. Dorfman, The Economic Mind in American Civilization, IV, 7. 
Moreover, Hoover had stepped up public works right after the crash. 
Still, this represented far less than the progressives demanded. 
42. Ibid., V, 672. During the fight over the sales tax in 1932, an 
Oklahoma congressman hooted at the idea that budget-balancing was 
a patriotic duty. "Those who are so anxious to balance the budget 
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declared war today. Everybody knows what would happen. 
Congress would immediately stop this interminable talk and 
appropriate three billion dollars—five billion—ten billion—any 
necessary amount. . . . 
Some day we shall realize that if money is available for a 
blood-and-bullets war, just as much money is available for a 
food-and-famine war. We shall see that if it is fitting to use 
collective action on a large scale to kill men abroad, it is fitting 
to use collective action on an equally large scale to save men 
at home.43 
Although Hoover rejected the demand that he draw on 
the war legacy to mount a program of public works, he could 
not resist for long the clamor for government initiative to 
expand relief to the jobless. By the summer of 1931, the 
number of unemployed totaled eight million. William Allen 
White wrote: "Hundreds of thousands of men, women and 
children are going to suffer terribly this winter in spite of 
all that the natural laws of economic change can do, however 
soon change may start, however rapidly it may move. Yet 
the situation is not hopeless, for if we can recreate the dy­
namic altruism outside of government which moved us 
during the war, we can harness forces that will bring relief 
and make us a better and nobler people." If Hoover could 
arouse the "latent altruism" of the people, White believed, 
great sums could be raised for relief "as we raised the 
at this time either forget or ignore the fact that we have in times 
past raised vast sums in emergencies to carry on wars without 
resorting to the general sales tax," he noted ("Soak the Poor," 
University of Oklahoma, Norman, Okla., Wilburn Cartwright MSS). 
43. Foster, "When a Horse Balks," North American Review, 
CCXXXIV (1932), 10. John Maynard Keynes wrote: "I hope that 
in the future we shall . .  . be ready to spend on the enterprises of 
peace what the financial maxims of the past would only allow us to 
spend on the devastations of war."—Keynes, "The World's Economic 
Outlook," Atlantic Monthly, CXLIX (1932), 525. See, too, Lewis 
Kimmel, Federal Budget and Fiscal Policy, 1789-1958 (Washington, 
D.C., 1959), pp. 170-72. 
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Liberty Loan, Red Cross and Y drive funds during the 
war." 44 
On August 19, 1931, President Hoover named Walter S. 
Gifford, president of the American Telephone and Tele­
graph Company, to head the President's Organization on 
Unemployment Relief. A week later Newton Baker, a mem­
ber of the Advisory Committee of the POUR, noted that Gif­
ford seemed to be planning to organize the country along 
the lines of the Council of National Defense, and added: 
"I am going a step farther and suggest that as far as possi­
ble men with military experience in the World War be used. 
They have had lessons in effective and disciplined action 
which will be valuable." 45 That fall, the Gifford committee 
launched a "mobilization" to win support for local fund-
raising drives. National advertisements proclaimed: "Be­
tween October 19 and November 25 America will feel the 
thrill of a great spiritual experience." A few weeks later, 
when Senator Edward Costigan of Colorado questioned 
the advisability of employing such techniques, Gifford re­
sponded: "We certainly did it in the war. I do not know 
that I like it, but, as I say, it is more or less the established 
practice. . . . " 46 
President Hoover made much more forceful use of the 
war precedent to meet the financial crisis of the autumn 
of 1931. In December, 1931, Hoover asked Congress to 
44. White to David Hinshaw, August 10, 1931, Library of Congress, 
William Allen White MSS, Box 135. 
45. Baker to Representative Chester Bolton, August 26, 1931, 
Newton Baker MSS, Box 192. 
46. U. S. Congress, Senate, Unemployment Relief, Hearings before 
a Subcommittee of the Committee on Manufactures, U. S. Senate, 
72d Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 174 and S. 262, December 28-30, 1931, and 
January 4-9, 1932 (Washington, D.C., 1932), p. 327. A year later, 
when Newton Baker was named to head the National Citizen's Com­
mittee for the Welfare and Relief Mobilization of 1932, the Literary
Digest explained: "The concentrated effort is under the direct com­
mand of Newton D. Baker, who, as Secretary of War under President 
Wilson, mobilized the forces of the country for the war in Europe. 
The campaign is to be the Armageddon of the Great Depression." {Literary Digest, CXIV [October 8, 19321. ?.nv. 
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create a Reconstruction Finance Corporation frankly mod­
eled on the War Finance Corporation.47 The proposal ap­
peared to originate at about the same time in the minds of 
several different men: Hoover, Federal Reserve Governor 
Eugene Meyer, who had been managing director of the WFC, 
Louis Wehle, who had been the WFC'S general counsel, and 
Senator Joseph Robinson of Arkansas.48 All drew their 
inspiration from the WFC. "The RFC was a revival of the 
War Finance Corporation, that's all, but with expanded 
powers," Meyer recalled.49 Observers were astonished by the 
speed with which Congress approved the RFC bill. "It puts 
us financially on a war basis," noted the New Republic.50 
When the RFC began operations, it employed many of the 
WFC'S old staff, followed its pattern and that of the wartime 
Treasury in financing, and even took over, with slight modi­
fications, the old WFC forms for loan applications.51 
The RFC, declared one periodical, was to be the "spearhead 
of the economic A.E.F." 52 But Hoover and his aides in­
47. William Starr Myers (ed.), The State Papers and Other Public 
Writings of Herbert Hoover (2 vols.; Garden City, N.Y., 1934), II, 6. 
48. Accounts of the origin of the RFC vary in detail. Cf. Eugene 
Meyer, COHC, pp. 612-13; Jackson Reynolds, COHC, pp. 152-53; Louis 
Wehle, Hidden Threads of History (New York, 1953), p. 77; U. S. 
Congress, Senate, Creation of a Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and 
Currency, U. S. Senate, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 1, December 18, 
19, 21, 22, 1931 (Washington, D.C., 1932). 
49. Eugene Meyer, COHC, p. 613. Meyer's initiative, and the WFC 
model, is also stressed in Gerald Nash, "Herbert Hoover and the 
Origins of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation," Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, XLVI (1959), 455-68. 
50. New Republic LXIX (1932), 291. 
51. W. Randolph Burgess, "Plans for Financial Reconstruction," 
Address at the Century Association of New York, April 7, 1932, 
Library of Congress, Ogden Mills MSS, Box 9; J. Franklin Ebersole, 
"One Year of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, XLVII (1933), 468; Wehle, Hidden Threads 
of History, p. 77. 
52. Literary Digest, CXII (February 13, 1932), 9. Congress, re­
ported the Philadelphia Record, had given the new agency "two billion 
dollars' worth of ammunition. The people are waiting to see how 
straight it can shoot" (ibid.). 
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sisted that the intervention of the RFC be held to a minimum. 
Hoover's reluctance to use the RFC as an agency in a new 
kind of mobilization suggested that the war analogy meant 
different things to different men and that it could be turned 
to conservative purposes as readily as to those envisaged by 
the progressives. While the progressives thought of the 
war as a paradigm for national planning, Hoover remem­
bered it as a time when the government had encouraged a 
maximum of voluntary action and a minimum of disturbance 
of the profit system.53 He wished the crucial decisions to be 
made, as they had been in wartime, by corporation leaders. 
He employed the metaphor of war to serve a conservative 
function: that of draining internal antagonisms onto a com­
mon national enemy.54 In his address to the Republican 
national convention in 1932, the permanent chairman, Ber­
trand Snell, declared in defense of Hoover: "He solidified 
labor and capital against the enemy." 55 
New York's Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to 
reap political advantage from these different perceptions of 
the war experience.58 In his campaign for the Democratic 
presidential nomination in 1932, Roosevelt contrasted 
Hoover's performance with the achievements of the war 
mobilization. In his "forgotten man" address in Albany 
on April 7, 1932, Roosevelt declared that American success 
53. For the determination during the war to refrain from inter­
ference with business, see Randall B. Kester, "The War Industries 
Board, 1917-1918; A Study in Industrial Mobilization," American 
Political Science Review, XXXIV (1940), 683; and Herbert Stein, 
Government Price Policy in the United States during the World War (Williamstown, Mass., 1939), p. 13. 
54. The integrative function of war is discussed in W. Lloyd 
Warner, American Life: Dream and Reality (Chicago, 1953), p. 20. 
55. Official Report of the Proceedings of the Twentieth Republican 
National Convention, 1932 (New York, 1932), p. 89. 
56. As the country entered the election year of 1932, the tempo 
of demands for a return to the war spirit quickened. See Baker 
Brownell to Gifford Pinchot, January 10, 1932, Library of Congress, 
Gifford Pinchot MSS, Box 320; John J. Pershing, "We Are at War!" 
American Magazine, CX.Ul (June, 1932), 15-17, 72, 74; B. E. F. News, 
July 2,1932. 
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in the war had been due to leadership which was not satis­
fied with "the timorous and futile gesture" of sending a 
small army and navy overseas, but which "conceived of a 
whole Nation mobilized for war, economic, industrial, social 
and military resources gathered into a vast unit." The 
United States in 1932, Roosevelt asserted, faced "a more 
grave emergency than in 1917," and in meeting that emer­
gency the Hoover administration had neglected "the in­
fantry of our economic army." "These unhappy times," 
the Governor observed, "call for the building of plans that 
rest upon the forgotten, the unorganized but the indispensa­
ble units of economic power, for plans like those of 1917 
that build from the bottom up and not from the top down, 
that put their faith once more in the forgotten man at the 
bottom of the economic pyramid." 57 Less than two weeks 
later, at the Jefferson Day Dinner at St. Paul on April 18, 
Roosevelt repeated that the nation faced an emergency 
"more grave than that of war" and once more derided 
Hoover's efforts to meet the crisis. He added pointedly: 
Compare this panic-stricken policy of delay and improvisation 
with that devised to meet the emergency of war fifteen years ago. 
We met specific situations with considered, relevant measures 
of constructive value. There were the War Industries Board, the 
Food and Fuel Administration, the War Trade Board, the 
Shipping Board and many others.58 
The 1932 election brought the Democrats to power for 
the first time since Wilson's war administration. It was 
"only natural," as Swisher has observed, "that some of the 
57. The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, ed. 
Samuel I. Rosenman (13 vols.; New York, 1938-1950), I, 624-25. At 
a Roosevelt rally in Salem, Massachusetts, James Michael Curley 
made effective use of the war analogue to berate Hoover (Salem News, 
April 6, 1932 [Holy Cross College Library, Worcester, Mass., Curley 
Scrapbooks]). 
58. Roosevelt, Public Papers, I, 631-32. 
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World-War leaders should return to federal office and that 
others should become unofficial advisers of the administra­
tion. They, like the President, thought in terms of the dra­
matic concentration of power in the federal government 
which they had helped to bring about for the defeat of a 
foreign enemy. It is not surprising that modes of procedure 
were carried over from one period to the other." 59 In the 
interregnum between Roosevelt's election in November, 
1932, and his inauguration in March, 1933, war recollections 
became even more compelling. The whole political system 
seemed doomed to self-asphyxiation. The discords of party, 
the deadlock in Congress, the maxims of the classical econo­
mists, the taboos of the Constitution all seemed to inhibit 
action at a time when action was desperately needed. In 
contrast, the war was remembered as a time of movement 
and accomplishment.60 
During the interregnum, the country debated a series of 
new proposals for utilizing the war experience to vanquish 
59. Carl Brent Swisher, American Constitutional Development(Boston, 1943), p. 878. Senator James F. Byrnes of South Carolina 
later wrote: "In our efforts to find a remedy for this situation, we 
had no guideposts. I recalled that when I went to the House of 
Representatives I had firm convictions about federal-state relations 
and the wisdom of preserving local governments, the necessity of 
maintaining a balanced budget, and like subjects; but when we entered
World War I in 1917, I recognized that, in a war emergency, principles
as well as policies had to be temporarily subordinated to the necessity
of some experimentation in order to preserve the government itself. 
The economic crisis now demanded a similar attitude."—Byrnes, 
All in One Lifetime (New York, 1958), pp. 69-70. 
60. The President's Research Committee on Social Trends pointed 
to the "surprising energy and efficiency" that had emerged in 1917,
and noted the explanation for this "development of governmental art":
"the subordination of private to public interest, the facility in recruit­
ment of the necessary talent when the boycott on government service
was lifted, the indifference to established precedent in administrative 
or other method, the freedom from hairsplitting judicial restraint, the
unification of leadership. . . . "—The President's Research Committee 
on Social Trends, Recent Social Trends in the United States (New 
York and London, 1933), p. 1539. Cf. Max Lerner, "The State in 
War Time," in Willard Waller (ed.), War in the Twentieth Century(New York, 1940), pp. 409-28. 
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the depression. Daniel Roper, who would soon be Roosevelt's 
Secretary of Commerce, suggested a few days after the 
election that the new President "appoint one 'super' secre­
tary with the other secretaries assistant to him and organize 
under this 'super' secretary the plan of the National Council 
of Defense composed of, say 21 men working without com­
pensation as they did in War times." 61 Many believed the 
crisis could be met only by vesting in the President the same 
arbitrary war powers that Woodrow Wilson had been 
given.62 The depression, declared Alfred E. Smith on Febru­
ary 7, 1933, was "doing more damage at home to our own 
people than the great war of 1917 and 1918 ever did." "And 
what does a democracy do in a war?" Smith asked. "It be­
comes a tyrant, a despot, a real monarch. In the World War 
we took our Constitution, wrapped it up and laid it on the 
shelf and left it there until it was over." 6S Four days later, 
Republican Governor Alf Landon of Kansas inquired: "Why 
not give the President the same powers in this bitter peace­
time battle as we would give to him in time of war?" 64 
As early as the spring of 1932, weeks before Roosevelt 
had even been nominated, his brain trust had requested 
Joseph D. McGoldrick and Howard L. McBain to prepare 
a memorandum on presidential war powers, for they an­
ticipated Roosevelt would need them as authority for emer­
gency acts.65 Early in January, 1933, the President-elect 
asked Rexford Tugwell to explore the possibility that the 
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 might provide the 
61. Daniel Roper to William Dodd, November 16, 1932, Library 
of Congress, Dodd MSS, Box 41. 
62. Key Pittman to Franklin D. Roosevelt, June 16, 1932, Library 
of Congress, Pittman MSS, Box 16; Henry Morrow Hyde MS Diary, 
January 4, 1933. 
63. New York Times, February 8, 1933. 
64. Willis Thornton, The Life of Alfred M. Landon (New York, 
1936), p. 84. 
65. Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York, 1939), pp. 
22—23. 
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basis for an edict embargoing gold exports. Tugwell's re­
search quickly involved him in a comedy of errors in which 
the New Dealers sought both to obtain the necessary infor­
mation without letting the Hoover Administration learn 
what they were up to and at the same time to persuade 
themselves that a statute that had been amended many times 
gave them the legal authority to do what they intended to do 
anyway.66 Governor Roosevelt's legal aides could not have 
been more co-operative. Senator Thomas Walsh, Roosevelt's 
choice to be Attorney General, promised that, if the 
President-elect found he needed the powers, he would quiet 
his doubts and rule that the old statute gave him the author­
ity he required. When, after Walsh's death, Roosevelt picked 
Homer Cummings for the post, he turned over to him the 
folder on the Trading with the Enemy Act. Cummings 
obligingly found the statute was still alive.67 
As the day of Roosevelt's inauguration approached, the 
epidemic of bank failures drove governors in state after 
state to proclaim bank holidays and raised fears that the 
economic system was on the verge of collapse. "A blight 
has fallen over all American industry," declared the Akron 
Beacon-Journal on March 3. "A foreign invader making 
easy conquest of our shores could do no worse." 68 As Roose­
velt took the oath of office, the atmosphere in Washington, 
wrote Arthur Krock, was like that "in a beleaguered capital 
in war time." 69 
Roosevelt's inaugural address on March 4, 1933 reflected 
the sense of wartime crisis. The nation, he resolved, must 
66. Tugwell, "Notes from a New Deal Diary," January 4, 1933, 
February 27, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., 
Tugwell MSS; Key Pittman to Roosevelt, February 28, 1933, Pittman
MSS, Box 16. 
67. Ernest K. Lindley, The Roosevelt Revolution (New York, 1939), 
p. 78; Rexford Tugwell, COHC, pp. 37-40. 
68. Cited in Ruth McKenney, Industrial Valley (New York, 1939), 
p. 71. 
69. New York Times, March 5,1933. 
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move "as a trained and loyal army willing to sacrifice for 
the good of a common discipline." He would ask Congress 
to adopt his legislative program, but if Congress failed to 
act and the emergency continued, the new President an­
nounced: "I shall not evade the clear course of duty that 
will then confront me. I shall ask the Congress for the one 
remaining instrument to meet the crisis—broad executive 
power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the 
power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded 
by a foreign foe." ™ 
During the "Hundred Days," President Roosevelt sought 
to restore national confidence by evoking the mood of war­
time: the feeling of national unity above any claim of 
partisan or private economic interest because the very 
existence of the country was imperiled. The opposition press 
suspended criticism of the President; business corporations, 
labor unions, and farm organizations pledged their co­
operation; and Republican leaders urged the country to 
rally around the Democratic chief executive. Governor 
Landon declared: "If there is any way in which a member 
of that species, thought to be extinct, a Republican Gov­
ernor of a mid-western state, can aid [the President] in the 
fight, I now enlist for the duration of the war." 71 
The New Deal hoped to arouse the same sense of devotion 
to the nation and the same spirit of sacrifice that had been 
displayed in the war. "It is important," wrote Rexford 
70. Roosevelt, Public Papers, II, 14-15. The task of putting people 
to work, the President stated, could be "accomplished in part by direct 
recruiting by the Government itself, treating the task as we would 
treat the emergency of a war" (ibid., p. 13). 
71. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal, p. 3. One 
periodical noted: "The country was in an exalted mood. It rose to 
greet the new President as if to support him in the repulsion of 
invading armies."—Review of Reviews and World's Work, LXXXVII 
(April, 1933), 10. In April, 1933, a Democratic senator completed 
a volume which was a sustained use of the war as a parable for 
the depression (Millard Tydings, Counter-Attack: A Battle Plan to 
Defeat the Depression [Indianapolis, 1933]). 
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Tugwell, "that we should again explore the possibilities of 
what William James called 'the moral equivalents' of war."72 
"The ordeal of war," he told Dartmouth students, "brings 
out the magnificent resources of youth. . . . The ordeal of 
depression ought to try your mettle in similar ways. . . . 
The feeling which shook humanity during the War and 
which after the War reshaped the entire civilization of 
mighty nations is called for again." 73 
When the planners of the thirties looked back at the war, 
they were most impressed by how much had been accom­
plished once the nation had been unified by allegiance to a 
common purpose. Writers like Rexford Tugwell and George 
Soule argued that the effective functioning of "a regime of 
industrial democracy" required the same spirit of "loyalty 
to larger aims" that the War Industries Board had ex­
ploited.74 Nationalistic to the core, unabashedly patriotic, 
they believed that if the country could once again give fealty 
to a transcendent ideal, the depression would be conquered 
as once the armies of the Kaiser had been. Charles Beard 
proposed a "heroic national effort" that would leave people 
"richer in goods—and still more important, in patriotic 
spirit." 75 Many conceived the New Deal not simply as a 
new kind of economic mobilization but also, as the war had 
72. Rexford G. Tugwell, The Battle for Democracy (New York, 
1935), p. 75. 
73. Ibid., p. 296. Thurman Arnold noted that in war, democracies 
"achieve unity to an extent which seems extraordinary to one viewing
the wartime economy from the tangled confusion of peacetime values."
Arnold added: "Thus, in peacetimes, when the lack of cooperation
between men is distressingly evident, and when the endless argument
about the contradictions involved in our symbols seems to have no 
hope of ending, we look back to the unity of the time when nations 
were drawn up in battle lines and we demand a moral substitute for 
war."—Arnold, The Symbols of Government (New Haven, 1935), 
pp. 243-45. 
74. The words are Tugwell's (Tugwell, The Industrial Discipline 
and the Governmental Arts [New York, 1933], p. 100). See, too, 
George Soule, A Planned Society, pp. 196-97. 
75. Beard, "A "Five-Year Plan' for America," p. 11. 
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been, a venture in "nation-saving." 76 One of the New Deal 
experiments was later to be lauded because it had led to "a 
new baptism of patriotism and an increased consciousness 
of national unity." " 
Roosevelt's first important official act was to use the au­
thority of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 to pro­
claim a national bank holiday.78 When he sent his banking 
bill to Congress, the House received it with much the same 
ardor as it had greeted Woodrow Wilson's war legislation. 
Speaker Rainey said the situation reminded him of the late 
war when "on both sides of this Chamber the great war 
measures suggested by the administration were supported 
with practical unanimity. . . . Today we are engaged in 
another war, more serious even in its character and present­
ing greater dangers to the Republic." 79 After only thirty-
eight minutes debate, the House passed the Administration's 
banking bill, sight unseen.80 
76. George N. Peek, with Samuel Crowther, Why Quit Our Own 
(New York, 1936), p. 123. Raymond Moley, it might be noted, had 
directed Americanization activities in Ohio under Governor James Cox 
during World War I. 
77. Alfred C. Oliver, Jr., and Harold M. Dudley, This New America 
(London, 1937), p. viii. See, too, the reference to "nation-building" 
in John L. Christian, "America's Peace Army," Current History, 
XLIX (1939), 43. 
78. Roosevelt, Public Papers, II, 18. Tugwell, who worked on 
the banking proclamation, referred to it as "this rather doubtful 
executive act" (Tugwell, "Notes from a New Deal Diary," March 31, 
1933). See, too, Rixey Smith and Norman Beasley, Carter Glass 
(New York, 1939), pp. 341-42. 
79. Congressional Record, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., LXXVII (March 9, 
1933), 70. 
80. "It was a grim Congress which met today, the most momentous 
gathering of the country's legislators since war was declared in 1917. 
It is trite to say that they declared war, but it is nevertheless true 
that they hurled against the enemy of depression and despondency a 
weapon which they hoped would penetrate the subtle armor of an 
allegorical or Bunyan-like antagonist."—New York Times, March 10, 
1933.^  Roosevelt's new banking act was deliberately framed to use 
the "war power" to overcome possible objections to its constitution­
ality. The President's extraordinary powers were granted "during 
time of war or during any other period of national emergency declared 
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On March 10, Roosevelt sent his second message to Con­
gress, a plea for plenary powers to slash government spend­
ing. To the dismay of progressive Republicans and liberal 
Democrats, Roosevelt proved to be as orthodox on fiscal 
matters as his predecessor. When Senator Tom Connally of 
Texas talked to Roosevelt in December, 1932, the President-
elect had stressed the importance of balancing the budget 
by cutting federal spending and had dwelt upon the consti­
tutional limitations of the President. "If it was constitu­
tional to spend forty million dollars in a war," Connally told 
Roosevelt angrily, "isn't it just as constitutional to spend 
a little money to relieve the hunger and misery of our citi­
zens?"81 The President-elect brushed aside such remon­
strances and chose instead to heed the counsel of his 
conservative choice for Budget Director, Lewis Douglas. 
After studying the wartime authority Congress had granted 
Woodrow Wilson, Roosevelt decided to ask the new Congress 
to renew those powers in order to enable the President to 
balance the budget.82 
The spirit of war crisis speeded through the economy bill. 
"It is true this bill grants a great deal of power," conceded 
Representative John McDuffie of Alabama, "but this country 
is in a state of war—not against a foreign enemy but war 
against economic evils that demand some sacrifice on your 
part and mine." Representative John Young Brown of 
Kentucky spoke even more bluntly when he scolded fellow 
Democrats: 
. .  . I may say to you that we are at war today, and the 
veterans of this country do not want you, in their name, to 
desert the standards of the President of the United States. 
by the President" (Gustav Cassel, The Downfall of the Gold Standard 
[Oxford, 1936], p. 117). 
81. Tom Connally, as told to Alfred Steinberg, My Name Is Tom 
Connally (New York, 1954), p. 148. 
82. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal, pp. 9-10. 
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I had as soon start a mutiny in the face of a foreign foe as 
start a mutiny today against the program of the President of 
the United States. [Applause.] And if someone must shoot down, 
in this hour of battle, the Commander in Chief of our forces, God 
grant that the assassin's bullet shall not be fired from the 
Democratic side of this House. [Applause] 83 
Many Congressmen disliked the Administration's economy-
bill, but feared to oppose the President. When Senator 
Wallace H. White, Jr., spoke out against the proposal, a 
Maine constituent warned him that he was "riding out to 
certain death." He agreed that White's position was logi­
cally sound, yet he cautioned that since "a state of war 
does exist," the Senator would be foolish to sacrifice himself 
by disregarding the war spirit.84 After only two days de­
bate, Congress voted the Economy Act. Senator Henry 
Fountain Ashurst of Arizona explained: "The conditions 
are as serious as war and we must follow the flag." 85 
There was scarcely a New Deal act or agency that did not 
owe something to the experience of World War I. The Ten­
nessee Valley Authority—the most ambitious New Deal ex­
periment in regional planning—grew out of the creation of 
a government-operated nitrate and electric-power project at 
Muscle Shoals during and after the war. In his message 
83. Congressional Record, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 201, 209. 
84. Wingate F. Cram to White, March 18, 1933, Library of 
Congress, Wallace White MSS, Box 1. 
85. New York Times, March 11, 1933. "The President has been 
elected as Commander-in-Chief to pull us out of this financial crisis 
and it is my purpose to stand by him," agreed Rep. Sam McReynolds 
of Tennessee (McReynolds to George Fort Milton, March 27, 1933, 
Library of Congress, Milton MSS, Box 13). At a homecoming meeting 
for the Nevada Congressional delegation, following the historic 
session of the Hundred Days, Senator Pat McCarran stated: "On 
March 9 of this year, to the astonishment of many, war was officially 
declared. . . . The war was against fear, fear that the entire govern­
ment would go into bankruptcy." Clipping, n.d., Scrapbook 44018, 
Nevada State Historical Society, Reno, Nev., James Scrugham MSS. 
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asking for creation of the TVA, President Roosevelt con­
cluded : "In short, this power development of war days 
leads logically to national planning. . . . " 86 When the TVA 
bill was introduced in April, 1933, it seemed appropriate to 
refer it to the House Military Affairs Committee. Although 
war considerations played an inconsequential part in the 
birth of the Authority, the TVA Act of 1933 stipulated that 
in case of war or national emergency, any or all of the 
property entrusted to the Authority should be available to 
the government for manufacturing explosives or for other 
war purposes. The original World War I nitrate plant, 
which was turned over to the TVA, was to be held as a 
standby which might be needed in a future war.87 When 
foes of the TVA challenged it in the courts, Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes found constitutional authority for 
the construction of the Wilson Dam by resting his ruling, 
in part, on the war power.88 The TVA was only one of a 
number of resources operations—from soil conservation to 
public power development—that employed the war rhetoric 
or drew from the World War I experience.89 
86. Roosevelt, Public Papers, II, 122. Cf. Sarah Elizabeth Boseley 
Winger, "The Genesis of TVA" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Wisconsin, 1959), pp. 580-81; Judson King, The Conservation Fight: 
From Theodore Roosevelt to the Tennessee Valley Authority (Wash­
ington, D.C., 1959), chaps, vii-viii; Norman Wengert, "Antecedents of
TVA: The Legislative History of Muscle Shoals," Agricultural History,
XXV (1952), 141-47; Kenneth McKellar to George Fort Milton, May
17, 1933, Milton MSS, Box 13. The special form of the TVA—the 
government corporation endowed with many of the powers and much 
of the flexibility of a business corporation—had first found wide 
acceptance in the war. 
87. Tennessee Valley Authority, To Keep the Water in the Rivers 
and the Soil on the Land (Washington, D.C., 1938), p. 44. 
88. Ashwander et al., v. Tennessee Valley Authority et al., 297 U. S. 
288 (1936); Joseph C. Swidler and Robert H. Marquis, "TVA in Court: 
A Study of Constitutional Litigation," Iowa Law Review, XXXII (1947), 296-326. 
89. In arguing the case for passage of the Taylor Grazing Act, 
a former senator claimed: " . .  . The remaining public domain is 
vital to the nation from a standpoint of national defense. . . . Without
an adequate supply of meat and wool the nation would be considerably
handicapped in case of war."—Holm Bursum to Charles McNary, 
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The public-housing movement of the thirties had first 
come of age during the war. In World War I, Congress 
authorized the Emergency Fleet Corporation and the United 
States Housing Corporation to provide housing for war 
workers. The war established the principle of federal inter­
vention in housing, and it trained architects like Robert 
Kohn, who served as chief of production of the housing di­
vision of the U.S. Shipping Board.90 After the armistice, 
Kohn observed: ". . . The war has put housing 'on the map' 
in this country." 91 In 1933, President Roosevelt named 
Kohn to head the New Deal's first public-housing venture. 
Imaginative wartime experiments with garden-city ideas 
paved the way for the greenbelt towns of the thirties, while 
the rural resettlement and subsistence homestead projects 
of the New Deal reaped the harvest of seeds planted by 
Elwood Mead and Franklin K. Lane in the war years.92 Roy 
Lubove has pointed out: 
April 16, 1934, Bursum MSS, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, 
N. M., Box 1. The public-power reformers of the New Deal were 
schooled in wartime agencies like the Power Section of the Emergency 
Fleet Corporation (Morris L. Cooke, "Early Days of Rural Electrifi­
cation," American Political Science Review, XLII [1948], 437) ; "U.S. 
War Industries Board, 1918," folder, J. D. Ross MSS, University of 
Washington, Seattle, Wash. One conservationist commented on his 
work on the Mississippi Valley Committee with Morris Cooke: "To all 
of us it was a great experience . . . epoch-making. . . . The exper. 
was as valuable to me as to you; it was similar to an enriching exper. 
I had under the same leadership back in 1917-18, during the war." 
Harlow Person to Donald Bower, December 9, 1935, "Quasi Official 
and Personal Correspondence of Morris L. Cooke," National Archives, 
REA Files (notes of Jean Christie). 
90. Timothy L. McDonnell, S. J., The Wagner Housing Act (Chi­
cago, 1957), pp. 7-9; Curtice N. Hitchcock, "The War Housing Pro­
gram and Its Future," Journal of Political Economy, XXVII (1919), 
241-79; Miles Colean, Housing for Defense (New York, 1940), chap. i. 
91. Robert D. Kohn, "Housing in a Reconstruction Program," 
Survey, XLII (1919), 341. The most intense interest in government 
housing, however, came not so much in the war as in the reconversion 
period, although it was triggered by the war experience. (McDonnell, 
The Wagner Housing Act, pp. 12-15). 
92. Conkin, Tomorrow a New World, pp. 50-54, 67; Roy Lubove, 
"Homes and 'A Few Well-Placed Fruit Trees': An Object Lesson in 
Federal Housing," Social Research, XXVII (1960), 469-86. 
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In such residential communities as Yorkship Village (New 
Jersey), Union Park Gardens (Delaware) and the Black Rock 
and Crane Tracts (Bridgeport, Connecticut), the Emergency 
Fleet Corporation and the United States Housing Corporation 
offered American architects and planners their first opportunity 
to apply garden city principles in comprehensive fashion: curvi­
linear street systems and street sizes adapted to function; park 
and play facilities; row-house design; the skillful spacing of mass 
and volume for maximum aesthetic effect and maximum sunlight 
and ventilation. The memory of the federal war-housing program 
persisted over the next two decades, a reminder of the potentiali­
ties of non-speculative, large-scale site planning for working-class 
housing.93 
The New Deal's program of farm price supports owed 
something to the wartime Food Administration and even 
more to a decade of proselytization by George Peek, a hard-
bitten farm-belt agitator who had served as "a sort of 
generalissimo of industry" under the War Industries 
Board.94 Peek's war experience with the ways government 
could benefit industry had led him to argue that the gov­
ernment should give the same measure of aid to the dis­
tressed farmer.95 Frustrated in the twenties by Republican 
presidents in his campaign to win support for McNary-
Haugenism, Peek pinned his hopes on the election of 
Franklin Roosevelt in 1932. "It looks to me as though in 
the campaign for Roosevelt for President we are in the 
last line of trenches and if he is not elected that agriculture 
93. Roy Lubove, "New Cities for Old: The Urban Reconstruction 
Program of the 1930's," Social Studies, LIII (1962), 205. 
94. James Shideler, "Wilson, Hoover, War and Food Control, 1917­
1918," paper delivered at the convention of the Mississippi Valley 
Historical Association, Denver, Colo., April 25, 1959; Grosvenor 
Clarkson, Industrial America in the World War (Boston and New 
York, 1923), p. 239. 
95. Gilbert Fite, George N. Peek and the Fight for Farm Parity 
(Norman, Okla., 1954), p. 32. 
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is doomed to peasantry," Peek wrote.96 Roosevelt's victory 
touched off a serious debate over how to curb farm sur­
pluses which, after months of wrangling, ended in the 
passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act in the spring 
of 1933.97 To head the new Agricultural Adjustment Ad­
ministration, Roosevelt named George Peek.98 "To him, with 
his war experience, this whole thing clicks into shape," 
Peek's wife noted, "and some of the fine men of the country 
are coming to his call as they did in 1917, and with the same 
high purpose." 99 
96. George Peek to Earl Smith, October 18, 1932, Western His­
torical Manuscripts Collection, University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo.,
Peek MSS. 
97. During the debate, Senator Smith Wildman Brookhart of Iowa 
advocated a "war emergency" plan in which the surplus would be 
"commandeered" by the government (Jackson [Miss.] Daily Clarion-
Ledger, January 23, 1933). When Roosevelt sent his farm message
to Congress, Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace announced: "In
no case will there be any gouging of the consumer. We hope to revive
the Wartime spirit in everyone to put this thing across." Time, XXI (March 27, 1933), 12. A study of Wallace's rhetoric has noted his 
fondness for military terminology in his speeches (Robert Gene King, 
"The Rhetoric of Henry Agard Wallace" [Ph.D. dissertation, Depart­
ment of Speech and Drama, Teachers College, Columbia University, 
1963]). The farm protest movement employed similar metaphors. One 
farmer told an Iowa county agent bluntly that "the World War [had] 
its slackers" and that, sixteen years after the war, the country was 
plagued by "yellow pups running around in the shape of nincom-poop­
flatheaded County Agents." Jesse Sickler to Milo Reno, April 16, 
1933, Reno MSS (privately held). 
98. Roosevelt had first offered the post to Peek's "boss," Bernard 
Baruch, who, as head of the War Industries Board, was regarded as 
the most important of the war administrators. J. F. T. O'Connor MS 
Diary, May 13, 1933, Bancroft Library, University of California, 
Berkeley, Calif., O'Connor MSS. 
99. Georgia Lindsey Peek MS memoir, "Early New Deal," Peek 
MSS. For Jerome Frank's first experience with farm issues in the 
United States Food Administration, see Jerome Frank, COHC, pp. 
52-53. "It was the greatest thing that ever happened when the 
government took charge of the wheat situation and told the big and 
little barons what price the farmers should get for their wheat," a 
Florida newspaper stated that summer. "Everyone knows what the 
government was able to do with the price of wheat during the war." 
"Why Not Government Control of Citrus Fruit?", Lakeland (Fla.) 
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Consciously devised to provide the moral equivalent to 
war that men like Tugwell sought, the Civilian Conservation 
Corps aimed to install martial virtues in the nation's 
youth.100 When the ccc enlisted its first recruits, it evoked 
memories of the mobilization of the AEF. "By the fifteenth 
of July we shall have 275,000 people all actually at work in 
the woods," Roosevelt reported a few weeks after Congress 
adopted the CCC proposal. "It is a pretty good record, one 
which I think can be compared with the mobilization carried 
on in 1917." 101 "America has a new army and has sent it 
to war," observed one writer that summer. "In two brief 
months 300,000 men have enlisted, been trained, transferred 
to the front, and have started the attack. The battle is on 
in earnest." 102 
News, July 1, 1933, clipping in P. K. Yonge Library, University of 
Florida, Gainesville, Fla., Spessard Holland MSS, Box 52. 
100. There had been widespread agitation for offering such an 
alternative to groups like the "wandering boys of the road" and the 
bonus marchers (George Rawick, "The New Deal and Youth" [Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1957], p. 40; Pelham Glassford, 
"Training Camps for the Unemployed," Institute of Industrial Rela­
tions Library, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, 
Calif., Glassford MSS, Box 1; James Harvey Rogers, "Sound Infla­
tion," Economic Forum, I (1933), 127. 
101. Roosevelt, Public Papers, II, 238. Schlesinger points out that 
Louis Howe's original plan for the CCC called for "a large-scale 
recruiting effort, bands playing and flags flying, leading to a mass 
exodus of the unemployed to the forests" (Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., 
The Coming of the New Deal, p. 337). See, too, "Memorandum for 
the Secretary of War: Subject: Civilian Conservation Corps," April 3,
1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y., Louis Howe 
MSS, Box 59. The Third Corps Area, it was observed, enrolled the 
first recruit in the "peace time army" on the anniversary of America's 
entrance into World War I (Charles Price Harper, The Administra­
tion of the Civilian Conservation Corps [Clarksburg, W. Va., 1939], 
p. 24). 
102. Harrison Doty, "Our Forest Army at War," Review of 
Reviews and World's Work, LXXXVIII (July, 1933), 31. "It repre­
sented the greatest peacetime demand ever made upon the Army and
constituted a task of character and proportions equivalent to emer­
gencies of war," Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur wrote in a 
communique to all Army Corps Area Commanders. "It was well done, 
Army. MacArthur."—Rawick, "The New Deal and Youth," p. 66. 
See, too, "Extracts from Address of Honorable George H. Dem, 
Secretary of War," n.d., Library of Congress, Dem MSS, Box 1. 
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While the agency was under civilian direction, the Army 
ran the camps.103 CCC recruits convened at army recruiting 
stations; traveled to an Army camp where they were out­
fitted in World War I clothing; were transported to the 
woods by troop-train; fell asleep in army tents to the 
strain of "Taps" and woke to "Reveille." 104 A stanza of a 
poem by a ccc worker made clear the Army's role: 
Uncle, he says to his Army, 
"You did a good job before 
When you took three million rookies 
And polished 'em up for war, 
Now if you can handle the civvies 
Like the Doughboys and the Gob, 
And stiffen their ranks till they're tough as the yanks 
I'll give 'em a great big job."105 
The ccc newspaper, frankly modeled on Stars and 
Stripes, offered a prize for the best nickname for a CCC 
worker: "You know—some word that has caught on in your 
camp—the way the word 'doughboy' was used to describe 
the American soldier in France." 106 Happy Days recounted 
the work of the "Tree Army" in the language of military 
communiques: "Company 217 at Beachy Bottoms, N.Y. has 
103. To quiet fears of military control, Roosevelt named as ccc 
Director the union leader Robert Fechner whom he had first en­
countered when both were engaged in determining war labor policies.
The real control of the camps, however, lay with the military (Tucker 
Smith to Jane Addams, March 8, 1933, Swarthmore College Peace 
Collection, Swarthmore, Pa., Jane Addams MSS, Box 22; "Unofficial 
Observer" [John Franklin Carter], The New Dealers (New York, 
1934), pp. 163-65; Rawick, "The New Deal and Youth," chap. v. 
104. Charles W. B. Hurd, "The Forestry Army at the Front," 
Literary Digest, CXVI (September 9, 1933), 5-6; Joseph Cream, "The
Genesis of the Civilian Conservation Corps" (Master's thesis, Colum­
bia University, 1955), pp. 45 ff. 
105. Reprinted in Oliver and Dudley, This New America, p. 133. 
106. Happy Days, I (May 20, 1933), 8. Cf. Levette J. Davidson, 
"CCC. Chatter," American Speech, XV (1940), 210-11. 
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been filled to full Gypsy-moth-fighting strength," or, in 
Montana, "Depression Warriors Holding Western Front." 107 
On July 1, Happy Days reported: 
The big drive has begun. Uncle Sam has thrown his full C.C.C. 
strength into the front lines of the forest. . . . The entire refores­
tation army has landed in the woods—and has the situation well 
in hand. 
In all sectors the reforestation troops are moving ahead. Battle 
lines of the Gypsy moth are beginning to crack and fall back in 
New York and New England. Yellow pine beetles are retreating 
from the mountains of Colorado and California before the on­
slaught of the C.C.C. Forest fires . . . are being repulsed on all 
flanks the moment they show their smudgy red heads through 
the trees."* 
Of all the New Deal agencies, the CCC was probably the 
most popular, because it united two objectives: "the conser­
vation of America's natural resources and the conservation 
of its young manhood." 109 Many observers believed that 
the "forestry army" embodied James's proposal for an army 
of youth enlisted in a "warfare against nature," although 
Roosevelt himself may not have been directly affected by 
James.110 The Corps, it was claimed, had rescued young 
men from meaninglessness, rebuilt bodies and character, 
107. Happy Days, I (June 3, 1933), 2; (June 24, 1933), 3.

108. Ibid., I (July 1,1933), 1.

109. Christian, "America's Peace Army," p. 43. Cf. Tulsa World, 
April 10, 1933, clipping in University of Oklahoma, Norman, Okla., 
W. A. Pat Murphy MSS. 
110. Ferdinand Silcox, "Our Adventure in Conservation: The CCC," 
Atlantic Monthly, CLX (1937), 714. Moley recalls that when the 
question of James's influence was raised, Roosevelt conceded there 
might be a relationship, but he had no conscious awareness of one. 
Then the President added: "But look here! I think I'll go ahead with
this—the way I did on beer" (Moley, After Seven Years, p. 174). 
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and given men a soldier's pride of accomplishment.111 
Speaker Rainey wrote: "They are also under military train­
ing and as they come out of it they come out improved in 
health and developed mentally and physically and are more 
useful citizens and if ever we should become involved in 
another war they would furnish a very valuable nucleus for 
our army." 112 
While the ccc, the AAA, the TVA, housing, economy, and 
banking legislation all shared in the war legacy, it was the 
National Recovery Administration that was the keystone of 
the early New Deal, and the NRA rested squarely on the 
War Industries Board example. The National Industrial 
Recovery bill, modeled on WIB procedures, wove together a 
series of schemes for government-business co-ordination of 
the kind that had prevailed in the war.113 One of the most 
influential recovery designs, sponsored by Meyer Jacobstein, 
a Rochester (New York) banker, and H. G. Moulton, presi­
dent of the Brookings Institution, recommended the creation 
of "a National Board for Industrial Recovery, with powers 
similar to those so effectively utilized during the World War 
by the War Industries Board." 114 When the President com­
missioned Raymond Moley to frame legislation for industrial 
recovery, Moley asked General Hugh Johnson, who in World 
111. A Detroit News cartoon which bore the title, "The Old 
Veterans of the Conservation Army Will Have Something Worth 
Bragging About," showed an elderly man holding a little boy by the
hand and pointing with his cane to a great forest. The caption read: 
"In 1933 I planted all of these in the great war against depression" (Hurd, "The Forestry Army at the Front," p. 6). 
112. Henry T. Rainey to K. G. Baur, March 13, 1934, Library of 
Congress, Rainey MSS, BOX 1. 
113. New York Times, April 29, 1933; Rexford Tugwell, "Notes 
from a New Deal Diary," May 30, 1933; Jerome Frank, COHC, p. 27. 
An article which appeared after this essay was written amply demon­
strates the importance of the war precedent: Gerald D. Nash, "Experi­
ments in Industrial Mobilizations: WIB and NRA," Mid-America,
XLV (1963), 157-74. 
114. Meyer Jacobstein and H. G. Moulton, "A Plan for Economic 
Recovery," Wagner MSS. 
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War I had functioned as a liaison between the Army and the 
War Industries Board, to take over for him. "Nobody can 
do it better than you," Moley coaxed. "You're familiar with 
the only comparable thing that's ever been done—the work 
of the War Industries Board." 115 The recovery bill, drafted 
by Johnson and others, won Senate approval by only the 
narrowest of margins; conservatives foresaw that the 
measure would enhance the power of the state and progres­
sives believed the proposal would encourage cartelization. 
Franklin Roosevelt was more sanguine. When the Presi­
dent signed the recovery act of June 16, he commented: 
"Many good men voted this new charter with misgivings. 
I do not share these doubts. I had part in the great co­
operation of 1917 and 1918 and it is my faith that we can 
count on our industry once more to join in our general 
purpose to lift this new threat. . . .  " 116 
Before labor would agree to the industrial-recovery pro­
gram, it insisted on the same degree of government recog­
nition of the right to organize as it had enjoyed in World 
War I. In December, 1932, shortly after he learned that 
Frances Perkins would be the new Secretary of Labor, 
Sidney Hillman sent her a memorandum which urged the 
government to pursue the kinds of policies the War Labor 
Board had initiated.117 In framing the recovery bill, W. 
Jett Lauck, who had been secretary of the War Labor 
Board, served as spokesman for John L. Lewis's United 
Mine Workers. Lauck, who sponsored a plan for "a national 
board composed of labor modeled after the War Labor 
Board," played a prominent part in shaping the labor pro­
115. Moley, After Seven Years, p. 188. 
116. Roosevelt, Public Papers, II, 252. 
117. Matthew Josephson, Sidney Hillman: Statesman of American 
Labor (Garden City, N.Y., 1952), p. 357. Hlllman had been a member 
of the Board of Control and Labor Standards for Army Clothing 
during the war. 
 719 THE NEW DEAL AND THE ANALOGUE OF WAR
visions of the legislation.118 When the national industrial-
recovery bill emerged from the drafting room, it incorpo­
rated the pivotal section 7 (a) which granted labor's demand 
for recognition of the right of collective bargaining. The 
essential provisions of 7 (a), noted Edwin Witte, were "but 
restatements" of principles first recognized by the National 
War Labor Board.119 
Franklin Roosevelt had not only had a prominent part in 
framing World War I labor policies, but had, as Gerald 
Nash has pointed out, "sketched out the blueprint for the 
War Labor Policies Board which was modeled on his di­
rective." 120 To staff the National Labor Board of 1933, the 
President named men he had first encountered in developing 
war labor programs. William Leiserson, executive secretary 
of the board, had been Roosevelt's personal adviser on labor 
affairs in 1918.m In formulating labor policy—from in­
terpreting 7 (a) through the adoption and administration 
of the Wagner Act—Roosevelt and his lieutenants drew 
heavily on war precedents. The war agencies had estab­
lished the basic principles of the New Deal labor program: 
that workers had the right to unionize, that they must 
not be discharged for union activity, and that presidential 
boards could restrain employers from denying such rights. 
More than this, they had evolved the procedure of plant 
elections to determine bargaining representatives which 
118. "Docket—Coal & Stabilization," April 24, May 6, May 23, 1933,
National Recovery Act file, Alderman Library, University of Virginia,
Charlottesville, Va., W. Jett Lauck MSS; Business Week, May 24, 
1933, pp. 3-4. 
119. Edwin E. Witte, "The Background of the Labor Provisions of 
the N.I.R.A.," University of Chicago Law Review, I (1934), 573. 
120. Nash, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and Labor: The World War I 
Origins of Early New Deal Policy," Labor History, I (1960), 49. See, 
too, Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Apprenticeship (Bos­
ton, 1952), pp. 328-32. 
121. Nash, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and Labor," p. 51. 
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was to be the crucial instrumentality employed by Roose­
velt's labor boards.122 
To head the NRA Roosevelt named the fiery General John­
son, who could boast pertinent experience not only with the 
War Industries Board but in organizing the draft.123 In 
mid-July, Johnson launched a national campaign dramatized 
by the symbol of the Blue Eagle.124 "In war, in the gloom 
of night attack, soldiers wear a bright badge on their shoul­
ders to be sure that comrades do not fire on comrades," 
explained the President. "On that principle, those who co­
operate in this program must know each other at a glance. 
That is why we have provided a badge of honor for this 
purpose. . . . "  1 2  5 
Cabinet members greeted with skepticism Johnson's pro­
posal for a mass movement to enlist the nation behind the 
NRA. Homer Cummings pointed out that the country was 
not at war, and it might be difficult to get everyone to sign 
a pledge. Johnson replied that he felt it could be put over, 
for the depression was more real than the war had been to 
122. Irving Bernstein, The New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1950), pp. 19-20; "Address by Milton 
Handler, General Counsel of National Labor Board, before the Legal 
Division of the National Industrial Recovery Administration," n.d., 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., Leon Henderson 
MSS, Box 6; Robert Wagner to Rep. William Ashbrook, April 24, 
1935, Wagner MSS. 
123. "Now the battle for recovery has shifted from the stage of 
map work at GHQ to the firing line of action," wrote Raymond Clapper. 
Administrators like Peek and Johnson were "the top sergeants of 
recovery" (Clapper, "Top Sergeants of the New Deal," Review of 
Reviews and World's Work, LXXXVIII [August, 1933], 19). 
124. The idea of an NRA insignia had been suggested by Bernard 
Baruch in a speech in May. Baruch based the proposal on a War 
Industries Board notion. (Bernard Baruch, The Public Years [New 
York, 1960], pp. 73, 251). In his speech, Baruch had declared: "If 
it is commonly understood that those who are cooperating are soldiers 
against the enemy within and those who omit to act are on the other 
side, there will be little hanging back. The insignia of government 
approval on doorways, letterheads, and invoices will become a neces­
sity in business. This method was a success in 1918."—Hugh Johnson, 
The Blue Eagle from Egg to Earth (Garden City, N.Y., 1935), p. 251. 
125. Roosevelt, Public Papers, II, 301. 
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most Americans. "Almost every individual has either suf­
fered terribly, or knows of friends and relatives who have; 
so there is waiting here to be appealed to what I regard 
as the most fertile psychology that you could imagine. . . . 
I think this has anything that happened during the War 
backed off the board." 126 
To enforce the Blue Eagle, Johnson enlisted the house­
wives of the country. "It is women in homes—and not 
soldiers in uniform—who will this time save our country," 
he proclaimed. "They will go over the top to as great a 
victory as the Argonne. It is zero hour for housewives. 
Their battle cry is 'Buy now under the Blue Eagle!' " 127 
By kindling the spirit of the Liberty Loan drives and the 
draft registration of World War I, Johnson kept alive the 
intense spirit of the Hundred Days through another season. 
"There is a unity in this country," declared Franklin Roose­
velt, "which I have not seen and you have not seen since 
April, 1917. . . .  " 128 
The Recovery Administration conceived of the depression 
as, in part, a crisis in character. The New Dealers hoped 
that businessmen would place the public weal above their 
private interests, just as the copper magnates had responded 
to Baruch's appeal in 1917 by supplying metal to the army 
and navy at less than half the market price. In 1933, busi­
nessmen were asked to accept as a patriotic duty the assign­
ment to raise wages and agree to a "truce" on price-cutting. 
126. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal, p. 113. 
127. Hugh Johnson, The Blue Eagle from Egg to Earth, p. 264. 
Johnson, who had planned and directed the draft registration, used 
many of the same techniques in administering the NRA (Peek, Why 
Quit Our Own, pp. 122-23; Russell Owen, "General Johnson Wages a 
Peace-Time War," New York Times Magazine, July 30, 1933, p. 3; 
Division of Press Intelligence, "Memorandum on Editorial Reaction, 
Week from April 30 through May 6," May 7, 1935, Louis Howe MSS, 
Box 85). Ruth McKenney observed of Akron: "Precisely like the old 
draft board, a local N.R.A. Compliance Committee was set up, its 
members the very 'best' people in town."—McKenney, Industrial 
Valley, p. 107. 
128. Roosevelt, Public Papers, II, 345. 
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The recovery drive, it was argued, would succeed only if it 
aroused the same kind of "spiritual" fervor that World War 
I had awakened. Morris Cooke wrote: 
Conversations with a good many different kinds of people 
convince me that there is needed to expedite industrial recovery 
a talk by the President in which he would read into our 57 
varieties of effort an ethical and moral quality and call on us 
individually and collectively to put our shoulders to the wheel 
just as if we were at war. . . . 
Everywhere I get the impression of our people wanting to 
be told that the main purpose of the Recovery Administration is 
not exclusively the rehabilitation of our material wellbeing but a 
reaffirmation of the spiritual values in life.129 
To man the New Deal agencies, Roosevelt turned to the 
veterans of the war mobilization.130 Top NRA officials in­
cluded Johnson's chief of staff, John Hancock, who had 
managed the War Industries Board's naval industrial pro­
gram; Charles F. Horner, the genius of the Liberty Loan 
drive; Leo Wolman, who had headed the section on produc­
tion statistics of the War Industries Board; and Major 
General Clarence Charles Williams, who had been Chief of 
129. Cooke to Louis Howe, July 3, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., Morris Cooke MSS, Box 51. Russell 
Leffingwell of the House of Morgan observed later: "Just as the war 
tore us all up by the roots, and made us seek such opportunity as 
there might be to serve our country in its need, so every man of 
good-will, every man of imagination and understanding has been 
struggling these last four and one-half years to find out how the 
human agony of the deflation could be stopped."—Leffingwell, "The 
Gold Problem and Currency Revaluation," Academy of Political 
Science, March 21, 1934, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, 
N.Y., Franklin D. Roosevelt MSS, President's Personal File 866. 
130. Political scientists had been disappointed by Hoover's failure 
to name social scientists to government agencies. "During the World 
War," wrote Arthur Holcombe, "economists and sociologists and 
statisticians were found to be very useful in Washington and were 
employed in large numbers. They should be used also in times of 
peace."—Holcombe, "Trench Warfare," American Political Science 
Review, XXV (1931), 916. 
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Ordnance in charge of the vast war purchasing.131 Many 
other New Dealers had had their first taste of government 
service during the war. The first Administrator for Public 
Works, Colonel Donald H. Sawyer, had built cantonments; 
Felix Frankfurter had chaired the War Labor Policies 
Board; Captain Leon Henderson of Ordnance had served 
with the War Industries Board; and Senator Joseph Guffey 
had worked in the War Industries Board on the conservation 
of oil.132 For many, the summer of 1933 seemed like old 
times. "Washington is a hectic place," wrote Isador Lubin 
in August. "The hotels are filled, and the restaurants re­
mind me very much of war times. One cannot go into the 
Cosmos Club without meeting half a dozen persons whom 
he knew during the war." 133 
The commandants of New Deal agencies thought of them­
selves as soldiers in a war against depression. The young 
men who came to Washington said they had "volunteered in 
peacetime." 134 Some even claimed they were conscripts. 
When Holger Cahill expressed reluctance to accept a bid 
to head the new Federal Art Project, an associate advised 
him he had no alternative. "An invitation from the Govern­
ment to a job like that is tantamount to an order. It's like 
131. One commentator noted that General Williams, as "an old 
army man, could think in terms of the government interest" ("Un­
official Observer" [John Franklin Carter], The New Dealers, p. 47). 
For the high incidence of army officers in New Deal agencies, see 
John D. Millett, The Works Progress Administration in New York 
City (Chicago, 1938), p. 221. 
132. Joseph Guffey, Seventy Years on the Red-Fire Wagon (Leb­
anon, Pa., 1952), p. 46. The New Deal's oil controls as well as the 
coal agencies Guffey helped establish rested, in part, on the precedent 
of the wartime Fuel Administration (Carl Brent Swisher, American 
Constitutional Development, p. 661). 
133. Lubin to Louis Brandeis, August 25, 1933, University of 
Louisville Law Library, Louisville, Ky., Brandeis MSS, G5. Lubin, 
United States Commissioner of Labor Statistics, had served as Thor­
stein Veblen's assistant in the Food Administration and later under 
Wesley Mitchell with the War Industries Board. 
134. Russell Lord, The Wallaces of Iowa (Boston, 1947), p. 346. 
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being drafted." 135 This theme quickly became commonplace. 
From his "general headquarters in Washington, D. C," 
reported one writer, "General" Harry L. Hopkins had or­
ganized the Federal Emergency Relief Administration as 
"only one division of the 'American Army' in the War on 
Want."136 One of Hopkins' "noncoms," a relief worker 
in northern Michigan, observed: "We were like an army, 
drafted into service during a war." She wrote of the FERA 
Field Director: ". . . He had been in the front-line trenches 
with the rest of us when the battle raged at its worst. . . .  " 
When the FERA gave way to the Works Project Administra­
tion late in 1935, her staff was broken up. "At this time," 
she commented, "I lost the other two members of my shock 
troops. . . . " 137 
The processes of New Deal government owed much to the 
war legacy. The war provided a precedent for the concen­
tration of executive authority, for the responsibility of 
government for the state of the economy, and for the role 
of Washington as the arbiter among social groups. It origi­
nated the practice of shunting aside the regular line 
agencies and creating new organizations with dramatic 
alphabetical titles. When the RFC, the first of the new 
agencies, was established, one periodical reported: "R.F.C., 
of course, is Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and the 
135. Holger Cahill, COHC, p. 340. Roosevelt told Carter Glass it 
was a "war duty" to accept the post of Secretary of the Treasury
(Daniel Roper to Edward House, January 24, 1933, Sterling Memorial
Library, Yale University, New Haven, Conn., House MSS). Note, 
too, his attitude toward Cermak's assassination in Cordell Hull, The 
Memoirs of Cordell Hull (2 vols.; New York, 1948), I, 158. Tugwell 
commented on his appointment as Assistant Secretary of Agriculture: 
"F.D.R. marshalled me into service."—Tugwell, "Notes from a New 
Deal Diary," February 18, 1933. That fall, George Creel pledged his 
"continued devotion to NRA as soldier in the ranks" (George Creel to 
Roosevelt, September 23, 1933, Library of Congress, Creel MSb, 
Box 4). 
136. William Dow Boutwell, "The War on Want: How It Is Being 
Fought—and Won!" School Life, XIX (1933), 31. 
137. Louise Armstrong, We Too Are the People (Boston, 1938), 
pp. 435, 465. 
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newspapers have fallen into the war-time habit of using 
the simple initials instead of the rather cumbersome full 
name of this anti-hard-times organization."138 The war 
offered a precedent, too, for setting up co-ordinating bodies 
like the National Emergency Council headed by Frank 
Walker.139 Not least in importance, the war experience was 
used to justify the New Deal's emergency legislation in 
the courts.140 
The war example saw service too as a way to refute op­
ponents of the President's economic policies. When critics 
objected that the country could not "afford" New Deal 
reforms, Roosevelt's supporters responded with the now 
familiar retort that if the country could spend as it had 
in war, it could spend in this new emergency. "When peo­
ple complain to me of the amount of money that the govern­
ment has been borrowing," commented Thomas Lamont of 
the House of Morgan, "I always answer it by saying: 'Well, 
if the country was willing to spend thirty billion dollars in 
a year's time to try to lick the Germans, I don't see why 
people should complain about spending five or six billion 
138. Literary Digest, CXII (February 13, 1932), 9. 
139. Leon Henderson noted a meeting with Hugh Johnson: "I 
asked—'who does your work of tieing into the adm. whole plan.' He 
said 'I do—but there isn't much done. There is no plan: not like old 
War Ind. Bd. We've got to have one soon. Walker runs too easy. 
The super-cabinet is just a lot of prima donnas sitting around—can't 
please 'em.'"—Henderson MS Diary, February 20, 1934, Henderson 
MSS. 
140. One writer noted that "the New Deal legislation was heavily 
garlanded with 'emergency clauses' describing the dire national peril. 
This was because the Court had decided during the World War that 
war powers were supreme."—"Unofficial Observer" [John Franklin 
Carter], The New Dealers (New York, 1934), p. 394. See, too, Jane 
Perry Clark, "Emergencies and the Law," Political Scic?ice Quarterly, 
XLIX (1934), 268-83. Cf. Justice Sutherland's dissent in Home 
Building and Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 471 (1934). In 
his press conference after the adverse ruling in the Schechter case, 
Roosevelt protested the Court's failure to recognize an emergency in 
view of "those war acts which conferred upon the Executive far 
greater power over human beings and over property than anything 
that was done in 1933" (Roosevelt, Public Papers, IV, 206). 
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dollars to keep people from starving.' " 141 By 1936, when 
Roosevelt returned to Forbes Field in Pittsburgh, where, 
four years before, he had promised to slash Hoover's reck­
less spending, the President concluded that the argument 
now offered the best reply to critics who accused him of a 
profligate disregard of campaign promises. "National de­
fense and the future of America were involved in 1917. 
National defense and the future of America were also in­
volved in 1933," Roosevelt asserted. "Don't you believe that 
the saving of America has been cheap at that price?" 142 
Roosevelt's argument would have been more compelling 
if he had spent at anywhere near the rate that both he and 
his conservative foes implied he had. For a time in the 
winter of 1933-34, the Administration gave a fillip to the 
economy when it embarked on lavish spending through the 
Civil Works Administration, but early in 1934, the Presi­
dent, alarmed by mounting deficits, decreed the death of 
the CWA. Distressed by Roosevelt's verdict, Senator Robert 
LaFollette, Jr., of Wisconsin inquired: "In 1917, Mr. Presi­
dent, what Senator would have dared to rise on the floor of 
the Senate and suggest that we could not fight the war 
against Germany and her allies because it would unbalance 
the Budget?" 143 The Nation voiced a similar protest: "The 
country is confronted with a vastly greater crisis than it 
had to meet in the World War but has not yet extended 
itself financially as it did at that time." 144 Progressives 
warned that unless the President began to spend at a war­
time pace the country might take years to pull out of the 
depression. The progressive Cassandras proved correct. 
141. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal, p. 498. 
142. Roosevelt, Public Papers, V, 407. Cf. Lewis Kimmel, Federal 
Budget and Fiscal Policy, pp. 190-92. 
143. Congressional Record, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., LXXVIII (Febru­
ary 8, 1934), 2174. 
144. "Not Back to Hoover, Please!" Nation, CXXXVIII (1934), 
346. 
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The New Deal mobilization of 1933-34, from which so much 
had been expected, brought disappointing economic returns. 
The crux of the difficulty lay in the fact that the meta­
phor of war was, in more than one way, inapt. As a model 
for economic action, World War I was unsatisfactory, for 
the problems confronting Roosevelt in 1933 were quite 
unlike those Woodrow Wilson had been called on to meet 
in 1917. As the Harvard economist Edwin Gay wrote: 
"War stimulates the full expansion of productive energy, 
but the deep depression cripples every economic process 
and discourages even the most sanguine business lead­
ers." 145 Some who recalled the war experience hoped that 
it could provide a prototype for the same kind of impressive 
increases in output that had been achieved in 1917-18. But 
the aims of the New Deal mobilization were not the same 
as those of the war; General Johnson even called for "an 
armistice on increasing producing capacity."146 Frank 
Freidel has pointed out: 
Unlike wartime measures, the new agencies were to reduce 
output in most areas rather than raise it, and encourage price 
increases rather than restrain them. Thus, waging a war on 
the depression was in some ways the reverse of waging one on 
a foreign foe.147 
John M. Clark has made a similar point. The war, Clark 
noted, provided precedents for emergency controls, deficit 
spending, and expanded powers for the Federal Reserve 
System, but the problems of war and of depression "were 
radically different; in fact, they were in some respects 
145. Edwin F. Gay, "The Great Depression," Foreign Affairs, X 
(1932), 529. 
146. Johnson, The Blue Eagle from Egg to Earth, p. 222. 
147. Freidel, America in the Twentieth Century, p. 312. 
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opposite to one another." 148 The question of determining 
priorities in a war economy, Clark observed, was not at all 
the same as that of reinvigorating sick industries. Clark 
concluded: 
All the machinery for allocating limited supplies of essential 
resources among conflicting uses, which played so large a part 
in the wartime controls, had no application to the depression. 
Where the actuating motives of private industry fail and the 
result is partial paralysis, the problem is essentially opposite to 
that of war.149 
These misgivings were not simply the result of hindsight. 
In the midst of the Hundred Days, the economist Paul 
Douglas warned that the country did not face the wartime 
task of rationing scarce resources but the quite different 
problem of stimulating production. "Industry must get 
some business before it can proceed to ration it out," 
Douglas gibed. He was disconcerted by the New Deal's 
obsession with the menace of overproduction when the 
critical question was how to increase purchasing power. 
Douglas noted: "Certainly those who are arguing from the 
analogy of the War Industries Board miss the point. That 
body had behind it the gigantic purchasing power of the 
government, and with this weapon it was able to instill some 
order in the industrial system. But unless the government 
creates such purchasing power in the present emergency, 
the regulatory body will be operating in a void." 150 
148. John M. Clark, Social Control of Business (New York, 1939), 
p. 424. The New Deal theorists were captivated by the idea of 
"balance." They sought to redress the imbalances between supply 
and demand, just as the war mobilizers had done. But they lacked 
the ingredients the war mobilizers could count upon: ample purchas­
ing power and massive federal spending. 
149. Ibid., p. 425. 
150. Paul H. Douglas, "The New Deal After Ten Weeks," The 
World Tomorrow, XVI (1933), 419. 
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The war analogy proved mischievous in an even more 
significant respect. The Tugwells thought of the war as a 
time when the intellectuals had exercised unprecedented 
power over the economy, and when the feasibility of a 
planned society had been brilliantly demonstrated. Yet, 
although the intellectuals did wield power, agencies like the 
War Industries Board had, after all, been run chiefly by 
business executives. If they learned anything from the war, 
it was not the virtues of collectivism but the potentialities 
of trade associations, the usefulness of the state in economic 
warfare with the traders of other nations, and the good-
housekeeping practices of eliminating duplication and waste. 
The immediate consequence of the war was not a New Jeru­
salem of the planners but the Whiggery of Herbert Hoover 
as Secretary of Commerce. While the war mobilization did 
establish meaningful precedents for New Deal reforms, it 
was hardly the "war socialism" some theorists thought it 
to be. Perhaps the outstanding characteristic of the war 
organization of industry was that it showed how to achieve 
massive government intervention without making any per­
manent alteration in the power of corporations. 
The confusion over the meaning of the war experience 
helped conceal the ambiguities of the so-called "First New 
Deal." The architects of the early New Deal appeared to 
be in fundamental agreement, since they united in rejecting 
the New Freedom ideal of a competitive society in favor 
of business-government co-ordination in the 1917 style. In 
fact, they differed sharply. Tugwell hoped that the co­
ordination authorized by the NRA would enable the Recov­
ery Administration to become an agency for centralized 
government direction of the economy, a possibility in­
sured in part by the NRA'S licensing power. Most of the 
other "First New Dealers," however, meant by business-
government co-ordination an economy in which businessmen 
would make the crucial decisions. As administrator of the 
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NRA, General Johnson gave small scope to the government 
direction Tugwell had envisaged. He never used the licens­
ing power, but relied instead on negotiation with business 
and on the force of social pressure. Like Moley and Rich-
berg and the President, Johnson placed his faith not in a 
planned economy but in voluntary business co-operation 
with government.151 
The New Deal administrators shared, too, the conviction 
of the war bureaucrats that progress would be achieved 
not through worker or farmer rebellions, but through gov­
ernment programs, conceived and executed by agency offi­
cials. A month after the armistice, Wesley Mitchell had 
voiced the need for "intelligent experimenting and detailed 
planning rather than for agitation or class struggle."152 
The war approach which the New Dealers adopted rejected 
both mass action and socialist planning, and assumed a 
community of interest of the managers of business corpora­
tions and the directors of government agencies. Roosevelt's 
lieutenants believed that the great danger to such an experi­
ment lay not in the opposition of the conservatives, who were 
discredited, but in the menace of antiplutocratic movements. 
Yet in damping the fires of popular dissent, they also snuffed 
out support they would need to keep the reform spirit alive. 
The New Dealers, distrustful of the policies of group 
conflict, sought to effect a truce like that of 1917 when class 
and sectional animosities abated. Perhaps no other ap­
proach could have accomplished so much in the spring of 
1933, yet it was a tactic which had obvious perils for the 
151. It was not merely that Johnson had the temperament of a 
war administrator who turned naturally to the tactics of social coer­
cion, but that he had well-founded doubts about whether the Supreme
Court would sanction government edicts (Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming
of the New Deal, pp. 108-9). Schlesinger also suggests that Johnson 
decided on this course because Harold Ickes moved so slowly in 
spending for public works. This seems unlikely. Johnson made this 
decision almost as soon as he took office, well before the outlines of 
Ickes' operation had become clear. 
152, Lucy Sprague Mitchell, Two Lives, p. 303. 
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cause of reform. By presenting the depression not as the 
collapse of a system but as a personalized foreign enemy, 
Roosevelt as much as Hoover sought to mend the social 
fabric. In doing so, Roosevelt, like his predecessor, de­
flected blame away from business leaders whom many 
thought responsible for hard times, and diverted attention 
from the fact that the depression was not the consequence 
of an assault by a foreign foe but evidence of internal 
breakdown. 
Even more important, the New Dealers, in the interest 
of national solidarity, tried to suppress anti-business ex­
pressions of discontent. President Roosevelt warned the 
AF of L convention in 1933: "The whole of the country has 
a common enemy; industry, agriculture, capital, labor are 
all engaged in fighting it. Just as in 1917 we are seeking 
to pull in harness; just as in 1917, horses that kick over 
the traces will have to be put in a corral." 153 General John­
son left no doubt of the intent of the President's words: 
"Labor does not need to strike under the Roosevelt plan. 
. . . The plain stark truth is that you cannot tolerate 
strikes. Public opinion . . . will break down and destroy 
every subversive influence."154 Far from operating a 
"labor government," as conservatives charged, the New 
Dealers in 1933 deeply resented strikes as acts of "aggres­
sion" which sabotaged the drive for recovery. Frances 
Perkins recalls that Johnson believed that "during the 
period when NRA was attempting to revive industry no stop­
page of work could be tolerated under any circumstances. 
153. Report of Proceedings of the Fifty-third Annual Convention of 
the American Federation of Labor (Washington, D.C., 1933), p. 307. 
In the summer of 1933, the President had made a "no strike" appeal. 
He said of it: "It is a document on a par with Samuel Gompers' 
memorable war-time demand to preserve the status quo in labor dis­
putes. . .  . It is an act of economic statesmanship."—Roosevelt, Public 
Papers, II, 318. 
154. AF of L, Proceedings, 1933, p. 359. 
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It was like a stoppage of work in war time. Anything had 
to be done to prevent that." 155 
An administrator who spurned direct government sanc­
tions but who was determined to have his way soon 
found that he was either resorting to bluster or encouraging 
vigilantism. Such had been the pattern in World War I.156 
On one occasion, the War Industries Board's price-fixing 
committee had warned a producer to co-operate, or become 
"such an object of contempt and scorn in your home town 
that you will not dare to show your face there." 15T Ray 
Lyman Wilbur, chief of the conservation division of the 
Food Administration, recalled: "Indiana I found the best 
organized state for food conservation that I had yet seen. 
The people were approaching rapidly the stage where viola­
tions of wheatless days, etc., were looked upon as unpatriotic 
enough to require that inquiries as to the loyalty of the 
guilty citizen, baker or hotel-keeper be made." 158 
If the New Dealers never ran to such excesses of vigilant­
ism, they were not beyond employing this kind of social 
coercion, and they matched the war administrators in the 
technique of bluster. "I have no patience with people who 
follow a course which in war time would class them as 
slackers," declared Attorney-General Homer Cummings of 
the alleged hoarders of gold. "If I have to make an example 
of some people, I'll do it cheerfully." 159 When Frances 
155. Frances Perkins, COHC, VII, 139-40; Roosevelt, Public Papers, 
II, 302. 
156. In a capitalist society, bluster frequently serves as a reform 
government's alternative to institutional rearrangements that would 
give government a direct share in corporation policy-determination.
President Kennedy's role in the 1962 steel-price-hike incident is a case
in point. 
157. Clarkson, Industrial America in the World War, p. 99. 
158. Edgar Eugene Robinson and Paul Carroll Edwards (eds.), 
The Memoirs of Ray Lyman Wilbur (Stanford, Calif., 1960), p. 264. 
159. Time, XXI (June 19, 1933), 12. "Hoarders are at heart 
cowards," declared Chandler Hovey, senior partner of Kidder, Pea­
body. "The government should declare that to hoard at this time is 
THE NEW DEAL AND THE ANALOGUE OF WAR 133 
Perkins hit out at the effort of the steel industry to dodge 
the intent of section 7 (a) by setting up company unions, 
she denounced these unions as "war bridegrooms," the 
popular epithet for matrimonial draft-dodging during the 
war.160 When the economist Oliver W. M. Sprague resigned 
in protest at the Administration's gold-buying policy, Hugh 
Johnson accused him of "deserting with a shot in the flank 
of the army in which he had enlisted." 161 During the Blue 
Eagle drive, Donald Richberg insisted that in a time of 
crisis there could be "no honorable excuse for the slacker 
who wastes these precious moments with doubting and 
debate—who palsies the national purpose with legalistic 
arguments." 162 
Such statements infuriated the conservatives. Senator 
Carter Glass of Virginia found particularly galling Rich-
berg's denunciation of NRA opponents as "slackers who de­
served to have white feathers pinned on them by the women 
of the country." Glass wrote of Richberg's war record: 
"He never heard a percussion cap pop; he did not know 
the smell of gun powder; he did not even reach a training 
camp to learn the difference between 'Forward March' and 
'Parade Rest.' When asked by a responsible newspaper­
man to give his war record in justification of his vitupera­
tive assault on other people, he could do no better than allege 
he had helped sell some Liberty bonds." 163 Glass's resent­
ment was shared by other conservative critics. "The man 
who lives well within his income," protested Lewis Douglas, 
unpatriotic, destructive and against the public interest."—Clipping in 
Holy Cross College Library, Worcester, Mass., David I. Walsh MSS. 
160. "Unofficial Observer" [John Franklin Carter], The New Deal­
ers, p. 178. 
161. Hugh Johnson to Carter Glass, Alderman Library, University 
of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., December 4, 1933, Glass MSS, Box 4. 
162. Richberg, The Rainbow (Garden City, N.Y., 1936), pp. 288-89. 
163. Carter Glass to Walter Lippmann, August 10, 1933, Glass 
MSS, Box 4. 
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"has come to be regarded as unpatriotic and as a slacker 
in the fight against the depression." 164 
If the rhetoric of coercion disturbed the conservatives, it 
troubled some of the New Dealers even more. In the sum­
mer of 1933, a group of AAA officials protested: 
General Johnson, in picturing the results of his campaign, has 
frequently used the analogy of the war-time 'gasless Sundays.' 
Then, General Johnson recalls, if a man drove a car on Sunday, 
his neighbors pushed the car into the ditch. Popular opinion at 
that time was so inflamed that it expressed itself by violence. 
General Johnson's analogy is profoundly significant and dis­
turbing. If his program is adopted, professional drive organiza­
tions will soon reappear in full force. Agitators may take 
advantage of the possible resulting hysteria to set group against 
group, such as farmers against wage earners, and thus defeat 
the real progress toward cooperation already made by the 
Roosevelt Administration.165 
Some even thought they detected in Johnson's adminis­
tration of the NRA the glimmerings of a corporate state.160 
164. Lewis W. Douglas, "There Is One Way Out," Atlantic Monthly, 
CLVI (1935), 267. Walter Lippmann was troubled by the frequent 
use the planners made of the war analogy (Lippmann, The Good 
Society [Boston, 1937] pp. 89-105). Cf. John M. Clark, Social Control 
of Business, pp. 463-64. 
165. "Memorandum on Proposal for Blanket-Code," July 18, 1933,
in George Peek to Frank Walker, July 18, 1933, Peek MSS (letter not
sent). The Washington correspondent of the New Republic wrote: 
"What administration officials—half-consciously, half-unconsciously—
want to do is to create a war psychosis in which any corporation head
attempting to defy Mr. Roosevelt and the N.R.A. will be at once 
identified by the country with Kaiser Bill, Hindenburg, Ludendorff 
and Grover Bergdoll."—T.R.B., "Washington Notes," New Republic, 
LXXV (1933), 340. 
166. Criticism of the New Deal as fascist was quite common, and 
not limited to concern over Johnson's predilections. A radical com­
mentary on Tugwell's The Industrial Discipline and the Governmental 
Arts noted: "The really ominous word which Mr. Tugwell has spoken
in his volume lies in his assumption that government in a capitalist 
society may be imbued with an essentially social aim that is inclusive, 
THE NEW DEAL AND THE ANALOGUE OF WAR 135 
If such was Johnson's purpose—and the grounds for 
such a supposition are unsubstantial—the General received 
no encouragement from the President. Roosevelt moved 
quickly to squelch signs of militarism. When Harry Wood-
ring, Assistant Secretary of War, wrote early in 1934 that 
the Army stood prepared to organize the CCC, veterans of 
World War I, and reliefers into a corps of "economic storm 
troops," the White House reprimanded him.167 In late 1934, 
the authoritarian-minded Johnson was let go. That same 
year, Henry Wallace, seeking to pursue a "middle course," 
wrote: "There is something wooden and inhuman about 
the government interfering in a definite, precise way with 
the details of our private and business lives. It suggests a 
time of war with generals and captains telling every indi­
vidual exactly what he must do each day and hour." 168 
Most of all, the Brandeisian faction of the New Dealers 
objected to the crisis spirit. Felix Frankfurter wrote Louis 
Brandeis: "Much too much of 'slacker' talk & old coer­
cions." 169 For the Brandeisians, the "enemy" was not 
"depression" but "business." They welcomed the breakup 
of the nation in 1934 and 1935 from the national interest 
into class and group interests. The early New Dealers had 
emphasized the war spirit of cooperation, co-ordination, 
and exhortation, because they feared that the bonds that 
held society together might be snapped. By 1935, it was 
clear that the crisis had been weathered, and the mood of 
war seemed inappropriate. Brandeisians felt free to assault 
and may, therefore, in a grave emergency find it necessary to 'compel 
or persuade a higher co-operation for a national purpose.' The 
analysis is liberal; the solution is essentially fascist."—J. B. Matthews 
and R. E. Shallcross, "Must America Go Fascist?" Harper's, CLXIX 
(June, 1934), 12. 
167. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal, p. 339; H. H. 
Woodring, "The American Army Stands Ready," Liberty, January 6, 
1934. 
168. Henry Wallace, New Frontiers (New York, 1934), p. 21. 
169. Frankfurter to Brandeis, August 2, 1933, Brandeis MSS, G6. 
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business interests, other New Dealers lost faith in their 
ability to convert businessmen, and business groups in­
creasingly viewed Roosevelt as their enemy. As in war­
time, the first enthusiasm as the troops paraded to the front 
had given way to the realization that the army was not 
invincible, the casualty lists would be long, and the prospect 
of early victory was no longer promising.170 Yet the danger 
of annihilation had been averted too, and as the sense of 
urgency lessened, the spirit of national solidarity slackened. 
"The enemies who began to emerge in the eyes or the 
imagination of men," Paul Conkin has observed of the end 
of the "wartime effort" in 1935, "were not such as could 
demand the hostility of all Americans, for these enemies 
were not natural, or providential, or foreign, but human and 
native. A class and group consciousness was forming." i  n 
Yet the rhetoric of war persisted, even when such agen­
cies of mobilization as NRA died. In the summer of 1935, 
Representative Robert L. Doughton of North Carolina ob­
served : "Of course in every War, if it has a chance at all 
to be successful, there must be a leader, and this Adminis­
tration and the Congress have been engaged in a war on 
hunger, destitute [sic], unemployment, bankruptcy and 
every evil incident to the economic life of our people." 1T2 
In his 1936 campaign, Franklin Roosevelt told a Massa­
chusetts crowd that, like Marshal Joffre at the First Battle 
of the Marne, he bore the blame for victory or defeat in 
war. "Three and a half years ago we declared war on the 
depression," the President asserted. "You and I know today 
that that war is being won." But he was quick to point out 
that the war had not yet been won. The country still needed 
170. "The Crisis of the N.R.A.," New Republic, LXXVI (1933), 349. 
171. Conkin, Tomorrow a New World, p. 130. Cf. Arthur Schles­
inger, Jr., The Politics of Upheaval (Boston, 1960), pp. 395-98. 
172. Doughton to Henry Baker, July 15, 1935, University of North
Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C., Doughton MSS, Drawer 7. 
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the services of its commander-in-chief.173 In his Franklin 
Field address, when he accepted renomination in June, 1936, 
Roosevelt declared: "I accept the commission you have 
tendered me. I join with you. I am enlisted for the duration 
of the war." m But by then references to war had become 
purely rhetorical.175 When, that very year, the Administra­
tion explored the possibility of using the war power, and 
especially the precedent of Wilson's War Labor Policies 
Board, to justify federal regulation of the hours of labor, 
it concluded that the idea was not feasible.176 
Only the New Dealers committed to a planned economy 
held fast to the earlier vision. As late as the summer of 
1939, Rexford Tugwell looked back wistfully toward the 
war collectivism. Tugwell pleaded for a reorientation of 
progressive thought away from the traditional emphases 
on freedom for business, a change that only a crisis like 
that of 1917 or 1929 would produce. Of the two, Tugwell 
thought that war offered the best hope, for 1929 had yielded 
only "atomistic reforms" while 1917 had resulted in "na­
tional organization on a unitary scheme." "How different 
it was in 1917!" Tugwell wrote. "It was possible . .  . to 
make immense advances toward industrial unity. . . . That 
great wartime release of energy was achieved by freeing 
men's minds. Quantities and qualities could be thought of 
rather than profits." No sane person would wish a war in 
173. Roosevelt, Public Papers, V, 522-23. 
174. Ibid., p. 236. 
175. Among countless examples of war rhetoric, see Roosevelt, 
Public Papers, V, 207, 475, and VII, 228, 545; Address of Governor 
George H. Earle, Wilkes Barre, Pa., March 16, 1935, Speech and News 
File No. 68, Earle MSS, Bryn Mawr, Pa. (privately held) ; Donald 
McCoy, Angry Voices: Left-of Center Politics in the New Deal Era 
(Lawrence, Kan., 1938), p. 166. 
176. Victor E. Cappa, "Two Studies of Certain Constitutional 
Powers as Possible Bases for Federal Regulation of Employer-
Employee Relations," Office of National Recovery Administration 
Division of Review, Work Materials No. 68 (Washington, D.C., March, 
1936). Mimeographed. Copy in Leon Henderson MSS, Box 17. 
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order to bring about a "purposive national organization," 
he observed. "Yet the fact is that only war has up to now 
proved to be such a transcending objective that doctrine 
is willingly sacrificed for efficiency in its service." m 
If the references to war in the later Roosevelt years were 
largely rhetorical, the rhetoric was often revealing. In his 
Franklin Field speech, Roosevelt insisted that the nation 
was waging "not alone a war against want and destitution 
and economic demoralization" but "a war for the survival 
of democracy." "We are fighting to save a great and pre­
cious form of government for ourselves and for the world," 
the President declared.178 With each passing year, the chal­
lenge of the Fascist powers was more defiant, and the 
demands of foreign affairs came to supersede the claims 
of domestic issues. New Deal agencies increasingly directed 
their attention to preparing for the eventuality of war with 
the Axis. In 1938, the TVA boasted it was "developing the 
power necessary for the large-scale operation of war indus­
tries in this well-protected strategic area." The furnaces 
at Muscle Shoals, the Authority reported, were being util­
ized to turn out phosphorus, a material "used in war for 
smoke screens and incendiary shells," and the TVA'S electric 
furnaces, the agency foresaw, "might be converted to the 
electrolytic manufacture of aluminum or of chlorine—used 
in war gases. . . ." 179 
Henry Wallace had long believed that the AAA was an 
"adjustment" program whose machinery could be used to 
177. R. G. Tugwell, "After the New Deal," New Republic, XCIX 
(1939), 324. Three years later, Stuart Chase wrote: "Nothing m the 
agenda of the New Deal was as radical as the war agenda of 1917 in 
respect to the government control of economic activity."—Chase, The 
Road We Are Traveling 1914-1942 (New York, 1942), p. 42. 
178. Roosevelt, Public Papers, V, 236. 
179. Tennessee Valley Authority, To Keep the Water in the Rivers 
and the Soil on the Land, pp. 43-44. After the war, Judson King 
claimed: "TVA and the Columbia River dams 'saved our lives' in World 
War II. They made possible production of phosphorus, nitrates, light 
metals and other war materials, including materials for the atom 
bomb."—King, The Conservation Fight, pp. 280-81. 
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increase output as well as to limit it. If there were a conflict 
beyond the ocean, a prospect he dreaded, the United States, 
he observed in 1934, could, through the Triple A, "provision 
a war . . . with far less of that plunging, uninformed and 
altogether unorganized overplanting which got us into so 
much trouble during and after the last great war." 180 A 
week before the outbreak of the European war in Septem­
ber, 1939, Wallace wrote the President that if war came 
the government might consider developing plans modeled 
on the Food Administration with which Wallace had worked 
in World War I. "When we set up County Committees in 
AAA in 1933, I couldn't help thinking what a splendid mech­
anism we would have, if we ever got into a war, to meet the 
food problem. . . . Again when we set up the Ever Normal 
Granary System, I thought how marvelously this mechanism 
with its reserve supplies would help the country in case 
of war."181 
In 1939, James V. Forrestal tried to persuade New Deal­
ers that the way to put across their program was to sell it 
as preparedness rather than reform; after all, the TVA had 
had its start in the Defense Act of 1916.182 He won few con­
180. New York Times, August 19, 1934. 
181. Wallace to Roosevelt, August 26, 1939, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
MSS, President's Secretary's File 27. Such observations may sug­
gest that, from the beginning, the New Deal was bent on war, and 
that the intervention in World War II was a logical culmination of 
Roosevelt's policies, or that there was a symbiotic relationship between 
war and the New Deal species of reform. Nothing I have found in 
my own research would support the conclusion that the New Dealers 
conspired to involve the nation in war, and very little would suggest 
an inevitable marriage of New Deal reform with war. Yet the 
relationship between progressivism and war in the twentieth-century 
state, it should be added, is a subject which is imperfectly understood 
and one which deserves more exploration and illumination. 
182. Eliot Janeway, The Struggle for Survival (New Haven, 1951), 
p. 20. Although proud of the achievements of the New Deal, Morris 
Cooke nonetheless believed that what had been done was still inade­
quate. "I am convinced," he wrote in 1938, "that we have to arouse 
something akin to a war psychology if we are really to make this a 
permanent country."—Cooke to W. C. Lowdermilk, June 30, 1938, 
cited in Jean Christie, "Morris L. Cooke'' (draft of Ph.D. dissertation, 
Columbia University, 1963). 
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verts—most liberals refused to adopt a stratagem that 
surrendered the theology of liberalism—but when the war 
in Europe led to a new emphasis on defense, the New Deal­
ers were quick enough to adapt themselves. A month after 
war began in Europe, Roosevelt phoned Wallace to call all 
bureau chiefs and ask what their experience had been in 
World War I, and how the new emergency would affect 
their present position.183 Many soon found themselves 
running the new defense agencies. Leon Henderson con­
trolled prices, AAA Administrator Chester Davis coordinated 
agriculture with defense requirements, and Brehon Som­
ervell, who had directed the WPA in New York, took charge 
of military construction. 
The NYA began to train aircraft mechanics; CCC workers 
developed target ranges and airports for the Army; TVA 
dams produced the power for aluminum needed in bomber 
production; and the REA turned out the electricity for army 
camps and naval installations.184 New Dealers charged with 
developing defense and war labor policies turned repeatedly 
to the War Labor Board's precedents.185 When war came, 
Schlesinger writes, it "almost seemed an NRA reunion. The 
child of the War Industries Board, NRA was the father of 
the War Production Board. Leon Henderson, Donald Nel­
son, Sidney Hillman, Averell Harriman, William H. Davis, 
183. Harry Slattery, Administrator of the Rural Electrification 
Administration, reported: "I told the Secretary that I was special 
assistant to Secretary Lane during the war period when he was Vice 
Counsel of the National Defense Council; . . . and that finally I was 
assigned to handle a plan for granting of land for returning soldiers,
and had that especially under me."—"Memorandum of conference with
Secretary Henry Wallace, October 11, 1939," Duke University, Dur­
ham, N.C., Slattery MSS. 
184. Kenneth Holland and Frank Ernest Hill, Youth in the CCC (Washington, D.C., 1942), p. 184; H. S. Person, "The Rural Electri­
fication Administration in Perspective," Agricultural History, XXIV (1950), 79-80; Harold Ickes, Autobiography of a Curmudgeon (New 
York, 1943), chap. xv. 
185. Frances Perkins, COHC, VII, 776 ff.; Eliot Janeway, The 
Struggle for Survival, p. 161; Matthew Woll to W. Jett Lauck, 
December 20, 1940, Lauck MSS, Correspondence. 
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Isador Lubin, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.—all had their 
training in national mobilization in the breathless days of 
1933 and 1934." 188 Many of these men, it might be added, 
had first entered government service in World War I. 
Precisely as the Keynesians had foreseen, defense and 
war demands sparked an economic boom. In the summer 
of 1940, Keynes noted that the United States had failed to 
achieve recovery, because the volume of investment had 
been "hopelessly inadequate." The "dreadful experience" 
of war might teach the United States what it had failed to 
learn in peacetime. He predicted: "Your war preparation, 
so far from requiring a sacrifice, will be the stimulus, which 
neither the victory nor the defeat of the New Deal could 
give you, to greater individual consumption and a higher 
standard of life." Keynes observed sadly: "It is, it seems, 
politically impossible for a capitalistic democracy to or­
ganize expenditure on the scale necessary to make the grand 
experiment which would prove my case—except in war 
conditions." m 
186. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal, p. 176. Tugwell 
wrote later: "New agencies were multiplying as they had not since 
1933; and in a way this period was much like that of the earlier one 
when the enemy had been the impalpable but terrifying depression. 
Franklin had, indeed, used the analogy of war at that time."—Tug­
well, The Democratic Roosevelt (Garden City, N.Y., 1957), p. 600. 
"The New Deal was some preparation for this upheaval," observed 
Marquis Childs. "It was a kind of war."—Childs, / Write from 
Washington (New York and London, 1942), p. 3. Frances Perkins 
reflected that the New Deal had, unconsciously, prepared the nation 
to meet the demands of war (Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew [New 
York, 1946], pp. 349-51). From the very beginning, however, Roose­
velt, who wished to maintain personal control of the mobilization, 
shied away from proposals to reconstitute a War Industries Board 
("Meeting with the Business Advisory Council," May 23, 1940, Frank­
lin D. Roosevelt MSS, President's Secretary's File 17). But there were 
numerous observations on how World War I could serve as a useful 
precedent. See, e.g., Maxcy R. Dickson, "The Food Administration-
Educator," Agricultural History, XVI (1942), 91-96. 
187. Keynes, "The United States and the Keynes Plan," New 
Republic, CIII (1940), 156-59. Morris Cooke, writing in the same 
issue that he did not think war orders as such would necessarily end 
unemployment, added: "But I do feel that in executing billions in war 
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Keynes's remark was to the point. The "grand experi­
ment" of the New Deal had achieved much. But it had not 
created, or indeed in any serious sense even attempted to 
create, a new model for American society. The New Dealers 
resorted to the analogue of war, because in America the 
sense of community is weak, the distrust of the state strong. 
Up to a point, the metaphor of war and the precedent of 
World War I proved invaluable. They helped provide a 
feeling of national solidarity which made possible the New 
Deal's greatest achievement: its success in "nation-saving," 
in mending the social fabric. The heritage of World War I 
justified the New Deal's claim to represent an overarching 
national interest to which business and other parochial 
interests must conform. The war proved that, at a time of 
crisis, the power of private individuals with money to turn 
the nation's resources to their own benefit could be limited 
by the prior claim of providing a "social minimum." 188 
Since the war mobilization had brought to fruition much of 
progressivism, it offered a useful example for the New 
Dealers, and since the wartime control of industry went 
much further than earlier efforts in recognizing the place 
orders we may learn a technique for deploying American manpower 
in such a way as to change, radically and permanently, our unem­
ployment outlook."—Cooke, "Can We Afford the New Deal?" New 
Republic, CIII (1940), 165. Even before the United States entered 
the war, writers were predicting that the defense program would 
provide a precedent for new government intervention to secure full 
employment in the postwar era. Business Week commented: "It is 
inconceivable that, when the defense program ends, . . . the govern­
ment will stand idly by in the midst of a great unemployment crisis 
born of nationwide demobilization. . . . The operation of the profit
motive will be limited by the dominant requirement of full employment
for the people."—Business Week, August 16, 1941, pp. 36-37, cited in 
Stuart Chase, The Road We Are Traveling, 1914-1942, p. 98. See, too, 
Arthur Feiler, "Economic Impacts of the War," Social Research, VIII 
(1941), 297-309. As World War I provided a precedent for the New 
Deal planners, so World War II taught lessons in "full employment" 
to the liberals of the Truman era. 
188. John M. Clark, Social Control of Business, pp. 782-85. 
 143 THE NEW DEAL AND THE ANALOGUE OF WAR
of the twentieth-century state, it was especially pertinent 
for some of the problems the New Deal confronted. 
Yet in other respects the war analogue proved either 
treacherous or inadequate. The very need to employ imagery 
which was so often inappropriate revealed both an impover­
ished tradition of reform and the reluctance of the nation 
to come to terms with the leviathan state. Only in war or 
in a crisis likened to war was it possible to put aside inhibit­
ing doctrines, create a sense of national homogeneity, and 
permit the government to act in the national interest. But 
once the war ended, or the sense of crisis dissipated, tra­
ditional doctrines once again prevailed. The country had 
yet to find a way to organize collective action save in war 
or its surrogate. Nor had it faced up to the real problems 
of the relation of order to liberty which the power of the 
twentieth-century state creates. 
World War II rescued the New Deal from some of its 
dilemmas and obscured others. In the war years, many of 
the New Deal programs were set aside—the WPA, Roosevelt 
said, had earned an "honorable discharge." 189 The New 
Dealers turned their talents to "manning the production 
line." The AAA helped increase farm production instead of 
restricting crops; the new industrial agencies sought to 
speed factory output rather than curtail it. Perhaps the 
greatest irony of the New Deal is the most familiar. Only 
in war was recovery achieved. Only in war did the country 
finally rescue that one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad 
and ill-nourished. Only in war was the "army of the unem­
ployed" disbanded. 
189. Malcolm Cowley, "The End of the New Deal," New Republic,
CVIII (1943), 729. 

The Great Depression: Another Watershed 
in American History? 
RICHARD S. KIRKENDALL 
THE DECADE of the 1890's, according to Henry Steel Com­
mager, is "the watershed of American history," * but a few 
historians point to the 1930's, with its Great Depression 
and New Deal, as a major watershed. When applied to 
history, the term is used in its British sense as synonomous 
with "divide" and amounts to an attempt to suggest that 
points or periods in history resemble geographical features 
such as continental divides, the lines separating drainage 
basins. Although not many historians employ this concept 
in their interpretations of the depression decade, several 
of them use similar terms and at times identify them with 
"watershed." In a major essay interpreting the New Deal 
as a revolution, Carl N. Degler writes: "as the Civil War 
constituted a watershed in American thought, so the depres­
sion and its New Deal marked the crossing of a divide from 
which, it would seem, there could be no turning back." 2 
1. The American Mind: An Interpretation of American Thought
and Character since the 1880's (New Haven, 1950), p. 41. 
2. Out of Our Past: The Forces that Shaped Modern America (New 
York, 1959), p. 416. See also Mario Einaudi, The Roosevelt Revolution (New York, 1959), p. 230. 
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The idea of a watershed renders a distorted view of the 
flow of history in the 1930's for it exaggerates the role of 
change in the period and neglects the importance of con­
tinuity. While significant changes took place during those 
years, the decade also had important ties with the past. The 
concept of continuity as well as of change needs to be em­
ployed in an analysis of the Great Depression and the New 
Deal. The chief significance of the latter lay in its major 
contributions to a development that had been under way 
since the third quarter of the nineteenth century: the rise 
of a collectivistic or organizational type of capitalism. 
Those interpreters of the 1930's who use concepts that 
stress breaks with the past usually begin with emphasis on 
the great expansion of government that took place during 
the period. "Buffeted and bewildered by the economic 
debacle, the American people in the course of the 1930's 
abandoned, once and for all, the doctrine of laissez faire." 
"The state had previously been a passive or impartial 
force. . . . Now it became the interventionist state." In 
these words, two leading historians, Louis M. Hacker and 
Carl N. Degler, describe what they call "the Third Ameri­
can Revolution." 3 
In pinning the laissez faire label on the pre-New Deal 
period, these historians accept a myth, for long before the 
1930's Americans had come to expect the government to 
deal with economic affairs in many important ways.4 Gen­
eral aspects of the New Deal can, in fact, be traced to late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century critics of laissez 
faire theories. The New Deal's pragmatic approach to the 
use of state power, its rejection of both socialism and the 
3. Hacker, "The Third American Revolution," reprinted in Edwin 
C. Rozwenc (ed.), The New Deal: Revolution or Evolution? (Boston, 
1959), p. 2; Degler, Out of our Past, p. 384. 
4. Robert A. Lively, "The American System: A Review Article," 
Business History Review, XXIX (1955), 81-95. 
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negative state, its efforts to strengthen the free-enterprise 
system by introducing essential reforms and by equalizing 
opportunity, its belief that liberal democratic values could 
be attained in a complex industrial society only by practical 
state action—all of these ideas had been developed by 
theorists of an earlier day, men such as Lester Ward, Henry 
George, Richard T. Ely, John R. Commons, Herbert Croly, 
and Louis Brandeis.5 Richard Hofstadter, in a famous 
essay emphasizing discontinuity in the New Deal, notes 
that it failed to produce a significant body of political writ­
ing comparable to that produced in the Progressive period. 
A perceptive critic, Andrew M. Scott, maintains that the 
New Deal did not need to do this: 
the task of criticizing the old ideas and shaping the new had 
largely been completed during the Progressive Era. It was be­
cause the basic thinking had already been done that the general 
approach to the crisis . . . could be agreed upon so quickly and 
with so little need for agonizing reappraisal.6 
Specific programs of the New Deal as well as its theoreti­
cal approach to problems had been worked out in the past. 
Franklin Roosevelt's administration employed both types 
of programs that the Progressives had developed to deal 
with big business. The emphasis upon acceptance and regu­
lation of it that Theodore Roosevelt had called for in the 
New Nationalism reappeared in the National Industrial 
Recovery Act, while the anti-bigness point of view of the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 and Woodrow Wilson's 
New Freedom of 1912 came to the fore again in such fea­
5. Sidney Fine, Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare State: A 
Study of Conflict in American Thought, 1865-1901 (Ann Arbor, Mich., 
1956), chap, xi; Commager, The American Mind, chaps, x, xii, xvi. 
6. Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New
York, 1955), pp. 316-17; Scott, "The Progressive Era in Perspective,"
Journal of Politics, XXI (1959), 696-98. 
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tures of the New Deal as the Public Utilities Holding 
Company Act and the Temporary National Economic Com­
mittee. In other words, both of the leading Progressive 
philosophies figured in the New Deal's enlargement of gov­
ernment.7 
To support his thesis that the New Deal marked a "drastic 
new departure . .  . in the history of American reformism," 
Hofstadter calls attention to the "many men" who had 
endorsed the Progressive movement but "found in the New 
Deal an outrageous departure from everything they had 
known and valued. . . ."8 It is true that Newton Baker, 
for example, lashed out at the increase in power of the 
national government occurring under the New Deal. Baker's 
reputation as a progressive, however, rested chiefly on his 
activities on the municipal level, in Cleveland, from 1901 
to 1916. Another survivor of the Wilson administration, on 
the other hand, Josephus Daniels, applauded the New Deal 
enthusiastically.9 Idaho's Senator Borah, another carry­
over from the Progressive era, criticized the New Deal on 
the grounds that it did not do enough to restore the old 
competitive economic system of small units, a system that 
he assumed would require only a small government. Borah, 
however, represented but one type of Progressive, the type 
labeled "traditionalist" by John Braeman and opposed to 
the "moderns" who looked to Theodore Roosevelt for poli­
7. Ibid., 692-93; Eric Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny: A His­
tory of Modern American Reform (New York 1953), chaps, xiv-xv; 
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Coming of the New Deal (The Age 
of Roosevelt [Boston, 1959]), chaps, vi-x, xxvii, xxix; Schlesinger, 
The Polities of Upheaval (The Age of Roosevelt [Boston, I960]), 
chaps, xiii, xv, xvii, xxi; Rexford G. Tugwell, The Democratic Roose­
velt: A Biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Garden City, N.Y,. 
1957), chaps, xiv-xxii. 
8. The Age of Reform, pp. 301-2. 
9. C. H. Cramer, Newton D. Baker: A Biography (Cleveland, 
1961), pp. 7, 8, 260, 267, 276, 277; E. David Cronon, "A Southern 
Progressive Looks at the New Deal," Journal of Southern History,
XXIV (1958), 151-76. 
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tical leadership. Three former followers of T.R., William 
Allen White, Peter Norbeck, and Gifford Pinchot, looked 
upon the New Deal as a revival of the Progressive move­
ment.10 In short, since that movement contained conflicting 
groups and the New Deal contained more than one part, 
old Progressives surviving in the 1930's responded in 
varied ways to the programs of that decade: as Progres­
sives, all of them rejected laissez faire; they disagreed, 
however, about the types of government action they desired. 
The Hacker-Degler interpretation is somewhat confusing 
in regard to early rejections of laissez faire in theory and 
practice. Hacker, although aware of government interven­
tion before the 1930's, seems to suggest that prior to the 
New Deal Americans had a "laissez faire, or passive, state." 
Degler, while admitting that "the rejection of laissez faire 
had a long history" and that the Progressives "limited 
business" and "assisted agriculture," implies that earlier 
departures had been temporary while "with the depression 
the nation at large accepted the government as a perma­
nent influence in the economy"; thus, the New Deal was 
not "repudiated by the Eisenhower administration, the first 
Republican government since the reforms were instituted." 
Of crucial significance here are distinctions that these 
historians make between types of state action. For example, 
they argue that prior to the New Deal the state "had refused 
to interfere significantly in the interests of the security and 
the welfare of its laboring peoples," that the "progressive 
impulse . . . continued to conceive of the state as police­
man or judge and nothing more," and that the New Deal's 
10. Marian McKenna, Borah (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1961), pp. 308, 
313, 317, 318, 320-22, 376-77; John Braeman, "Seven Progressives: A 
Review Article," Business History Review, XXXV (1961), 582; Walter 
Johnson, William Allen White's America (New York, 1947), pp. 8, 
432; Gilbert C. Fite, Peter Norbeck: Prairie Statesman (Columbia, 
Mo., 1948), pp. 192-206; M. Nelson McGeary, Gifford Pinchot: 
Forester-Politician (Princeton, N.J., 1960), pp. 393, 424. 
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"primary and general innovation was the guaranteeing of 
a minimum standard of welfare for the people of the na­
tion." Hacker refers to New Deal government as "the 
social-welfare state" while Degler calls it "the guarantor 
state." " 
Related to this is one of Hofstadter's important distinc­
tions between the Progressive movement and the New Deal. 
The latter, he suggests, had "a social-democratic tinge that 
had never before been present in American reform move­
ments." Earlier movements had been "concerned very 
largely with reforms of an essentially entrepreneurial sort 
and only marginally with social legislation," while from 
the 1930's on "American political reformism" took "respon­
sibility on a large scale for social security, unemployment 
insurance, wages and hours, and housing." 12 
In the depression crisis, the federal government did take 
on vast new responsibilities in the social-welfare field and 
make new efforts to reduce economic inequalities. Note the 
relief programs, labor provisions of the National Recovery 
Administration codes, and legislation dealing with social 
security, housing, labor standards, and taxation. These re­
sponsibilities and efforts, however, grew out of the past; 
and they included certain features of the Progressive move­
ment, especially the ideas and activities of the social work­
ers, a group that played an important, not a marginal, role 
in that movement. "Without minimizing the importance of 
the social-reform measures inaugurated during the 1930's," 
Robert H. Bremner writes, "it may be said that the meas­
ures then adopted were largely implementations, amplifica­
tions, and—in some instances—but partial fulfillments of 
the preventive social work formulated before World War 
I." "By standing firm in the old progressive faith, by ex­
11. Hacker, "The Third American Revolution," 2, 19; Degler, Out 
of Our Past, pp. 384, 393, 414-15. 
12. Age of Reform, p. 306. 
THE GREAT DEPRESSION 151 
ploring new lines of theory and practice," Clarke A. Cham­
bers points out, "the partnership of social reformer and 
social worker anticipated [during the 1920's] in broad 
concept and often in intimate detail the welfare consensus 
which marked the New Deal." 13 In this connection, atten­
tion should be paid to pre-New Deal reform movements in 
Wisconsin, New York, and Massachusetts; Theodore Roose­
velt's proposals; the Progressive party platform of 1912; 
Woodrow Wilson's suggestions in the same year, his pro­
grams a few years later; and the work of such groups as 
the National Child Labor Committee, the National Con­
sumers' League, and the American Association for Labor 
Legislation. Furthermore, individuals who contributed in 
major ways to the development of New Deal social-welfare 
programs, including Frances Perkins, Robert F. Wagner, 
David I. Walsh, Edwin E. Witte, and Arthur J. Altmeyer, 
had developed their basic ideas in this field back in the 
Progressive era.14 In short, Arthur Link's conclusion that 
"the Second New Deal" represented "the full flowering of 
social-justice progressivism" provides a more adequate view 
than Hofstadter's of the relations between this aspect of 
the New Deal and the past.15 
13. Bremner, From the Depths: The Discovery of Poverty in 
America (New York, 1956), 261; Chambers, "Creative Effort in an 
Age of Normalcy, 1918-1933," The Social Welfare Forum (1961), 271. 
14. Scott, "The Progressive Era in Perspective," 693-95; J. Joseph 
Huthmacher, "Urban Liberalism and the Age of Reform," Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, XLIX (1962), 231-41; Bremner, American 
Philanthropy (Chicago, 1960), 149-55; Arthur J. Altmeyer, "The 
Wisconsin Idea and Social Security," Wisconsin Magazine of History, 
XLII (1958), 19-25; Timothy L. McDonnell, S.J., The Wagner Hous­
ing Act: A Case Study of the Legislative Process (Chicago, 1957), 
chap, i; Elizabeth Brandeis, "Organized Labor and Protective Labor 
Legislation," in Milton Derber and Edwin Young (eds.), Labor and 
the New Deal (Madison, Wis., 1957), pp. 197-98, 230-31; Sidney 
Ratner, American Taxation, Its History as a Social Force in Democ­
racy (New York, 1942), 510-11; Robert J. Lampman, Changes in the 
Share of Wealth Held by Top Wealth-Holders, 1922-1956 (New York, 
I960), pp. 30-32. 
15. American Epoch: A History of the United States since the 
1890's (New York, 1955), p. 400. 
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Hofstadter's emphasis upon the depression in his inter­
pretation of the relations between the New Deal and the 
Progressive movement should also be questioned. He argues 
that the former was different "because its central problem 
was unlike the problems of Progressivism" and maintains 
that the central problem was the depression.16 Of course, 
the Progressives of the early twentieth century had oper­
ated in a period of prosperity, and Herbert Hoover was the 
first President to insist that the central government was 
obliged to combat dips in the business cycle.17 On the other 
hand, the anti-depression efforts of the New Deal repre­
sented its major failure: millions remained unemployed 
when war provided the stimulus the economy needed.18 
Most of the ideas that New Dealers hoped to put into action 
had been formed to deal with other problems. This suggests 
that New Dealers did not believe that the problem of depres­
sion should monopolize the center of the stage. They were 
vitally interested in the more general problems of an urban 
industrial civilization. Like the Progressives before them, 
they sought ways to realize liberal democratic values in an 
America that had been changed radically by the rise of in­
dustry and the city, and they found opportunities in the 
depression situation to enact laws embodying ideas that had 
been developing for more than half a century.19 
16. Age of Reform, pp. 301-4. 
17. Harris Gaylord Warren, Herbert Hoover and the Great De­
pression (New York, 1959). 
18. Broadus Mitchell, Depression Decade: From New Era through 
New Deal, 1929-1941 (New York, 1947), pp. 21-24, 371-72, 396-98. 
19. Scott concludes: "To a very considerable extent the history of
American political thought and controversy since the Civil War is the
history of efforts to effect a satisfactory adjustment of men's ideas 
and the changing social, economic, and political realities. When the 
Progressive Era is examined in this light, its pivotal position stands 
out in clear relief. It opened the door to the present. The Progressives 
blazed the trail; the New Dealers turned it into a thoroughfare. — 
"The Progressive Era in Perspective," 701. 
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Furthermore, the major anti-depression formula that 
emerged from the new experiences, the "Keynesian" empha­
sis upon deficit financing, had ties with the Progressives' 
fundamental assumptions concerning the role of govern­
ment. While the formula enlarged somewhat the economic 
responsibilities and significance of government, making it 
"the indispensable partner of business," 20 Keynesianism 
employed well-established powers of government, the taxing 
and spending powers; attempted to make capitalism work 
rather than to substitute another system for it; and re­
flected confidence in the ability of an active government to 
deal with economic problems.21 
This stressing of the New Deal's links with the past does 
not deny that significant changes took place in American 
political practices during the 1930's. Washington, D.C. 
became a much more important place; the number of fed­
eral employees increased more than in any earlier decade, 
with the executive branch growing from slightly less than 
six hundred thousand persons in 1933 to well over nine 
hundred thousand by 1939. One historian of American 
cities, however, notes that Washington had been emerging 
"as the political center of national affairs" for a number of 
years; that as early as World War I state authority "had 
dwindled to a shadow of its former importance. Boston's 
and Albany's, Denver's and Sacramento's loss was Wash­
ington's gain." And a student employing a statistical ap­
proach to the trend of government activity in the United 
States, while recognizing that the depression and the New 
Deal played important parts in producing the great increase 
20. John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept 
of Countervailing Power (Sentry Edition; Boston, 1962), p. 80; see 
also pp. 68-83, 177-81. 
21. Lawrence R. Klein, The Keynesian Revolution (New York, 
1947), pp. 167, 184; Harlan L. McCracken, Keynesian Economies in 
the Stream of Economic Thought (Baton Rouge, La., 1961), pp. 126­
28. 
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during the twentieth century in the size of government, 
rejects the hypothesis that this increase is to be explained 
by "a changed concept of government's functions brought 
into being under the New Deal." Instead, he suggests, the 
development was "part of a trend already established before 
the great depression." 22 
When looking, then, at the enlargement of government 
that took place during the 1930's, there seems no good rea­
son to reject the conclusion that Henry Steele Commager 
reached nearly twenty years ago. Writing in 1945, he 
insisted that "the Roosevelt revolution was no revolution, 
but rather the culmination of half a century of historical 
development. . . ."23 The depression provided the climate 
in which ideas that had been taking shape for a number of 
years could become more widely accepted by the public and 
more firmly fixed in government practices. As a conse­
quence, Americans came out of the decade with many new 
and permanent national programs and with what could 
justifiably be labeled a "big government." This matched the 
earlier rise of "bigness" in the business world. 
Turning away from the central government and looking 
at the impact of the depression and the New Deal on a 
significant group, the farmers, we again find both con­
tinuity and change. Government became more important in 
their lives and was used to make them more like the lives 
of urban people, especially like those of businessmen. Amer­
ican agriculture, however, had been moving in these direc­
tions for a number of years. 
22. Constance McLaughlin Green, American Cities in the Growth 
of the Nation (London, 1957), p. 238; Solomon Fabricant, The Trend 
of Government Activity in the United States since 1900 (New York, 
1952), pp. 3, 28-29, 32, 40, 83, 141-48; Andrew Jackson Warm, 
"Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Administrative Organization of the 
Executive Branch" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri, 1961), 
p. 353. 
23. "Twelve Years of Roosevelt," reprinted in Rozwenc (ed.), The 
New Deal, p. 20. 
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Leading the list of New Deal farm legislation was the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, a clear-cut expres­
sion of the idea that government had major responsibilities 
to the nation's farmers. Yet, much nineteenth-century land 
legislation, the establishment of educational and research 
facilities for agriculture, and the farm-credit legislation of 
the Wilson administration had been based on this idea. The 
1933 law, though, had a different focus—farm prices—and 
sought actively to change price relationships so that farm­
ers would obtain purchasing power equal to that obtained 
in an earlier and prosperous period. This focus, however, 
grew out of more than a decade of preparation and agita­
tion, beginning after the price-break of 1920 and continuing 
beyond the passage of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 
1929. During those years, the battle to get the federal gov­
ernment to accept responsibility was fought by farm groups, 
chiefly in the Middle West and South; leaders in the United 
States Department of Agriculture, especially its Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics, and in the land-grant colleges, in­
cluding M. L. Wilson and his Montana colleagues; and even 
a few urban businessmen, led by George N. Peek with his 
McNary-Haugen plan. These people took progressivism's 
positive attitude toward government action for economic 
purposes, translated it into specific programs for the farmer, 
and reinterpreted old ideas about his importance, placing 
a new emphasis upon farm purchasing power and its rela­
tion to national prosperity. These intellectual and political 
activities laid the groundwork for changes in government 
practices during the 1930's.24 
24. Arthur S. Link, "What Happened to the Progressive Movement 
in the 1920's?" American Historical Review, LXIV (1959), 845-46; 
Murray R. Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, 1790-1950: 
A Study of their Origins and Development (New York, 1953), pp. xii, 
238, 516; Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks, Agricultural Discon­
tent in the Middle West, 1900-1939 (Madison, Wis., 1951), 539-40, 
562; Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South, 1865-1933 (Berkeley, 
Calif., 1960), 281, 284-87; James H. Shideler, Farm Crisis, 1919-1923 (Berkeley, Calif., 1957); Gilbert C. Fite, George N. Peek and the 
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By calling upon farmers to regulate their production as 
a means of getting higher prices, the Agricultural Adjust­
ment Administration rejected romantic conceptions of the 
farmer as a self-sufficient yeoman and the old agrarian 
emphasis on trust-busting as the solution to the ills of agri­
culture. Instead, the farm program looked upon farming 
as another business and urged farmers to imitate the prac­
tices of successful urban businessmen, the industrialists 
who used their power to balance supply with demand at a 
profitable level. Crop control, however, was not a new idea. 
Farmers, especially in the South, had been considering it 
seriously for a generation before the New Deal came to 
power. Furthermore, New Dealers were not the first im­
portant people to suggest that farmers should look upon 
themselves as businessmen and imitate urban businessmen, 
rather than attempt to force them to change their ways. 
Since the end of the nineteenth century, at least, farm 
journals, farm organizations, and urban businessmen—the 
latter disturbed by the anti-big business slant of the 
Populist Revolt and aware of the importance, for them, of 
farm purchasing power—had been urging farmers to think 
of themselves as businessmen and to copy business methods 
so as to make profits.25 
In its basic farm legislation, the New Deal was, in effect, 
urging the farmer to participate in, rather than resist, the 
development of a collectivistic or organizational type of 
Fight for Farm Parity (Norman, Okla., 1954); Roy E. Huffman, 
"Montana's Contributions to New Deal Farm Policy," Agricultural
History, XXXIII (1959), 164-67; Clifford B. Anderson, "The Meta­
morphosis of American Agrarian Idealism in the 1920's and 1930's," 
Agricultural History, XXXV (1961), 184-85. 
25. Richard S. Kirkendall, "A Professor in Farm Politics," Mid-
America, XLI (1959), 212-14, 217; Kirkendall, "Four Economists in 
Political Process," Journal of Farm Economics, XLI (1959), 204-5; 
Hofstadter, Age of Reform, pp. 120-26; Anderson, "The Metamorpho­
sis of American Agrarian Idealism in the 1920's and 1930's," 186; 
Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States, pp. 514-15; Saloutos 
and Hicks, Agricultural Discontent in the Middle West, pp. 539-40, 
562; Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South, pp. 281, 284-87. 
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capitalism, a development that had started in the urban 
business world in the nineteenth century. One feature of 
this type of capitalism was the pressure group, and the 
New Deal helped the farmers, at least a large number of 
them, to develop a powerful pressure group. Here again, 
the development had started before the advent of the New 
Deal and a number of farm groups of this kind, led by the 
Grange, the National Farmers Union, and the American 
Farm Bureau Federation, were already active in the early 
1930's. The Farm Bureau organization however, grew 
amazingly during New Deal years. Formed shortly after 
World War I, it had declined in size after its early years 
of growth, reaching an all-time low in 1933, with only one-
third the membership of 1921. By 1941, however, mem­
bership had climbed above the previous high of 466,000. 
In this growth, government agencies, especially the exten­
sion services and the AAA, played important promotional 
roles. In the late 1930's, friction developed between the 
Roosevelt administration and the Farm Bureau, and in 
the early 1940's the latter battled successfully against sev­
eral reform and planning programs that seemed to threaten 
its interests and power. In short, a large number of com­
mercial farmers, located chiefly in the Midwest and the 
South, emerged from the 1930's with a powerful organiza­
tion capable of dealing with the newly enlarged national 
government. Like other businessmen, these farmers had 
formed an effective pressure group, and now this represen­
tative of rural businessmen co-operated politically with 
organized urban business.26 
26. Christiana McFadyen Campbell, The Farm Bureau and the 
New Deal: A Study of the Making of a National Farm Policy, 1933­
1H0 (Urbana, 111., 1962), pp. 102, 186, 194-95; Grant McConnell, 
The Decline of Agrarian Democracy (Berkeley, Calif., 1953), pp. 77, 
79, 126, 175, 180; William J. Block, The Separation of the Farm 
Bureau and the Extension Service: Political Issue in a Federal Si/stem(Urbana, 111., 1960), pp. 16, 19-21; Kirkendall, "A Professor in Farm 
Politics," 214-17. 
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In addition to efforts to promote a business orientation 
in rural America, some of the New Dealers sought also to 
make farming more scientific. They encouraged farmers 
and government officials to call upon scientists, including 
social scientists, for advice as to the best ways to use the 
land. The AAA, for example, encouraged Southern farmers, 
with some success, to shift some of their lands out of cotton, 
convert them to other uses, rotate their crops, improve their 
plowing methods, and apply more lime and fertilizer to the 
soil.27 The Taylor grazing program, based on legislation 
passed in 1934, provides another illustration of this ap­
proach. Among other aims, the program attempted, by 
regulating grazing on the public domain, to stop injury to 
those lands and to improve them. Lands found to be valu­
able chiefly for grazing were restricted to that purpose, and 
cattlemen were issued permits which allowed them to graze 
only as many animals as the range could safely carry. 
Although these men blocked effective regulation, the pro­
gram at least diminished the rate of injury, lessened over­
grazing and soil deterioration, improved the range some­
what, and prevented further homesteading, a practice that 
had resulted in destruction of the range as well as failure 
for farmers.28 
This closing of the public domain to the homesteader 
dramatized a major theme of New Deal farm policy: a 
determination to break with the tradition of agricultural 
27. John Leonard Fulmer, Agricultural Progress in the Cotton 
Belt since 1920 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1950), pp. 3, 5, 16, 169, 173-74; 
James H. Street, The New Revolution in the Cotton Economy: 
Mechanization and its Consequences (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1957), pp. 
48-49; Thomas D. Clark, The Emerging South (New York, 1961), pp. 
51-52, 66, 96. 
28. Phillip O. Foss, Politics and Grass: The Administration of 
Grazing on the Public Domain (Seattle, Wash., 1960), pp. 196, 203-04; 
E. Louise Peffer, The Closing of the Public Domain: Disposal and 
Reservation Policies, 1900-1950 (Stanford, Calif., 1951), pp. 5, 326, 
330, 339, 341; Roy M. Robbins, Our Landed Heritage: The Public 
Domain, 1776-1936 (Princeton, N.J., 1942), p. 423. 
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expansion, a tradition that assumed an abundance of farm 
land and "family farmers" was important for social and 
political as well as for economic reasons. A belief that too 
much land lay behind farmer's fences dominated the think­
ing about land policy in Roosevelt's Department of Agri­
culture. This break with tradition in the Taylor Grazing 
Act and other New Deal programs designed to improve the 
ways in which the nation used its land had roots in the 
conservation movement of the Progressive period; and it 
also grew out of the long-standing efforts of agricultural 
societies and journals, the Department of Agriculture, and 
the land-grant colleges to get farmers to operate more 
scientifically. Hoover's Secretary of Agriculture, reflecting 
ideas that had been developing in his Bureau of Agricul­
tural Economics for a decade, had announced before Roose­
velt came to power: "We have laid aside the expansionist 
philosophy carried forward from the pioneer epoch. We are 
now turning to sound economic planning for agriculture." 29 
Efforts to bring the ways of business and science into 
rural America involved attempts to reduce differences 
between urban and rural life. The Rural Electrification 
Administration worked in the same direction. When it 
went into operation in 1935, only 10 per cent of the nation's 
farms were tied to power lines; twenty years later the 
percentage had jumped to well over ninety. In that period, 
over four million farms were connected to electrical sys­
tems; the REA served 60 per cent of them. This change 
enabled rural folk to enjoy many of the features of modern 
life previously reserved for city people: electric lights, 
radios, washing machines, mechanical refrigerators, elec­
tric ranges, television sets, deep freezes, and so on. REA, 
however, did not represent the first effort by government 
29. Kirkendall, "L. C. Gray and the Supply of Agricultural Land,"
Agricultural History, XXXVII (1963), 206-14; Kirkendall, "A Pro­
fessor in Farm Politics," 215; Kirkendall, "Four Economists in the 
Ppljtipal Process," 206. 
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to "urbanize" rural America. Before this electrical pro­
gram came rural mail deliveries, parcel post, the building 
of farm-to-market roads, and the like, REA, in other words, 
formed a major part of a long-term attempt by government, 
in addition to many private groups, to promote on various 
levels "a social and cultural 'equality' for farmers," to 
shatter "the old isolation and social barrenness of rural 
living. . . ."30 
The 1930's, then, formed a significant segment of a long 
period of major changes in rural America. Nevertheless, 
farmers and farm spokesmen of the decade did not discard 
Jefferson completely. Ancient ways of thought still found 
expression. Jeffersonian democracy influenced the efforts 
to bring farmers into the planning and administration of 
farm programs, organizing them into committees on the 
state and local levels. Some farm spokesmen continued to 
speak of farming as a way of life, not a business; of the 
farmer, living close to nature and God, as morally superior 
to urban businessmen and laborers; and of the urbanization 
of America as bound to lead to national ruin.31 The family 
farm remained the characteristic unit of farming, with the 
Department of Agriculture insisting that one of its con­
tinuing major objectives was "the establishment and main­
tenance of such farms as the predominating operating farm 
unit in the United States"; and the Farm Bureau looked 
upon the farm program as designed to preserve free Amer­
ican farmers from a descent into a European-like peas­
30. Lemont Kingsford Richardson, Wisconsin REA: The Struggle 
to Extend Electricity to Rural Wisconsin, 1935-1955 (Madison, Wis., 
1961), pp. 144, 147, 149; Clark, The Emerging South, pp. 97-100. 
31. Kirkendall, "A Professor in Farm Politics," 213-17; Ander­
son, "The Metamorphosis of American Agarian Idealism in the 
1920's and 1930's," 185, 187. For an excellent study of the mixture 
of old and new ideas on rural America see Paul K. Conkin, Tomorrow 
a New World: The New Deal Community Program (Ithaca, N.Y., 
1959). 
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antry.32 The Farm Security Administration and its New 
Deal predecessors represented something quite new in farm 
policy: a concern for the rural poor comparable to that 
shown the urban poor in the social-welfare programs. The 
old philosophy, however, exerted a large influence on the 
operations of FSA, for under the Bankhead-Jones Act the 
ideal of the family farm became an explicit goal of the 
agency. The Act represented, A. Whitney Griswold has 
written, "a decision not to let economic and technological 
trends run their course, as the British had done, but to 
resist them in defense of the agrarian way of life and the 
family farm." 33 
While Jefferson's philosophy continued to be heard and to 
have some influence on policy, his idealized rural American 
operated in a far from self-sufficient fashion and was in­
volved in an elaborate system of government controls. The 
latter was somewhat unpopular. "It is clear," Gilbert C. 
Fite has concluded, "that the farmers would not voluntarily 
have reduced their acreage without attractive cash induce­
ments. They learned to live with acreage controls . . . but 
it was like accepting an unwanted child." 34 Nevertheless, 
farmers did not accept the advice of the Farmers' Inde­
pendence Council, a "propaganda organ for industry, the 
meat packers, and some large cattle interests" that preached 
an individualistic philosophy. The Council worked hard but 
unsuccessfully in the mid-1930's to turn the farmer against 
the New Deal. Clearly, he was no longer the self-reliant 
individual idealized by Jefferson.35 The farmer had become 
32. A. Whitney Griswold, Farming and Democracy (New York, 
1948), p. 15; Campbell, The Farm Bureau and the New Deal, p. 29. 
33. Griswold, Farming and Democracy, pp. 163-65; McConnell, The 
Decline of Agrarian Democracy, pp. 84—85, 94; Benedict, Farm 
Policies of the United States, p. 256. 
34. "Farmer Opinion and the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 1933," 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLVIII (1962), 673. 
35. James C. Carey, "The Farmers' Independence Council of Amer­
ica, 1935-1938," Agricultural History, XXXV (1961), 77. 
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part of the larger world of business, science, and the city, 
had joined a large organization, and had increased his 
demands upon the government for help. He was moving, 
at times reluctantly, with, rather than against, the devel­
opment of a collectivistic type of capitalism. 
No area of American life experienced more change in the 
1930's than the labor movement. Labor leaders, for ex­
ample, faced with massive unemployment and declining 
unions, changed their attitude toward government, dis­
carding Samuel Gompers' concept of "voluntarism," the 
idea that the worker should depend upon his union, not 
upon the state, and that the union should depend upon 
itself. Late in 1932, The American Federation of Labor 
reversed its earlier stand and endorsed a government pro­
gram of unemployment insurance. From that point on, 
organized labor became increasingly active in support of 
social security and stopped demanding that workers depend 
solely on the union in their quest for a larger share of the 
material benefits of the economic system.36 
Not only did organized labor change its attitude toward 
government, but the national government developed a much 
more positive view of unions and began to encourage and 
protect their growth and operations. In a series of laws 
passed from 1932 to 1935 and topped by the National Labor 
Relations (or Wagner) Act of the latter year, the national 
government insisted that workers should be free to associate 
and select representatives for collective bargaining, that 
their employers should not interfere in the exercise of these 
rights, that employees could elect their own representatives 
with the choice of the majority governing all, and that 
36. Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years: A History of the American 
Worker 1920-1933 (Boston, 1960), pp. 345, 347, 351, 353-54; Philip 
Taft, The A.F. of L. from the Death of Gompers to the Merger (New 
York, 1959), pp. 281-82, 284, 287, 293, 294; Edwin E. Witte, "Or­
ganized Labor and Social Security," in Derber and Young (eds.), 
Labor and the New Deal, pp. 271-72. 
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employers should recognize and deal with these spokesmen. 
By accepting this government protection in the organizing 
process, labor leaders departed still further from volun­
tarism, accepting the assumption of the sponsors of the 
laws that only government could overcome the obstacles in 
the organizer's path, especially the antiunion practices of 
management.37 To some disciples of Gompers the new 
developments seemed deplorable. One of them complained 
that "under Mr. Gompers' regime, the trade union move­
ment stood upon its own feet; now it must depend, to a 
large extent, upon the support of State and Federal ad­
ministration." 38 
In the 1930's, government did become much more active 
in this area. Under the Wagner Act, the administrators 
did not simply prohibit interference with the right to 
organize and encourage collective bargaining; they estab­
lished the procedures that workers employed to elect their 
bargaining units, determined those units, and influenced 
the negotiating processes and the nature and content of the 
contracts accepted by labor and management. With gov­
ernment playing such a large role in the lives of unions, the 
next logical step would be government regulation of unions 
to match government promotion of them, a sequence that 
had characterized relations between the railroads and the 
national government in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. In 1947, the federal government would take this 
second step in the labor field.39 
37. Irving Bernstein, The New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy 
(Berkeley, Calif., 1950), pp. ix, 129-30; Harry A. Millis and Emily 
Clark Brown, From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley: A Study of 
National Labor Policy and Labor Relations (Chicago, 1950), pp. 3-4, 
13-15, 29-30; Bernstein, Lean Years, pp. 391, 415. 
38. James 0. Morris, Conflict within the AFL: A Study of Craft 
versus Industrial Unionism, 1901-1938 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1958), p. 290. 
Quoting John P. Prey. 
39. Bernstein, The New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy, pp. 
148-49; Taft, The A.F. of L. from the Death of Gompers to the 
Merger, pp. 127, 130-35; R. W. Fleming, "The Significance of the 
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During those years of government promotion, the labor 
movement grew at a rapid pace. With only three million 
members in 1933, unions grew slowly in the uncertain 
situation of the next three years; and then, from 1936 to 
1941, membership doubled, jumping to well over eight mil­
lion. Furthermore, much of this growth took place in stra­
tegic sectors of the economy previously closed to unions. 
In 1935 unionism was confined largely to the needle trades, 
coal-mining, printing, public utilities, the railroads, and 
the building trades. Significantly absent from this list was 
heavy industry. By 1941, the centers of heavy industry 
had been successfully invaded; cities such as Pittsburgh, 
Detroit, and Akron, and industrial giants like United States 
Steel, General Motors, Chrysler, General Electric, Ford, 
Republic Steel, Bethlehem Steel, and Westinghouse, all for­
merly anti-union, had been transformed into union strong­
holds. A new labor group, the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, had entrenched itself "in vital centers of 
American industrial might." To one student of American 
labor, this seemed "a fundamental, almost revolutionary 
change in the power relationships of American society."40 
Certainly the labor movement had become "a major force in 
American life." 41 
Even more than big government, big labor was a develop­
ment of the 1930's. In the years following that decade 
membership doubled once more. Almost all of these gains, 
however, were made by unions that had achieved substan-
Wagner Act,'7 in Derber and Young (eds.), Labor and the New Deal, 
pp. 148-52; Doris E. Pullman and L. Reed Tripp, "Collective Bar­
gaining Developments," in ibid., pp. 356-58; Millis and Brown, From 
the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley, pp. 272, 317, 329-30, 332-34, 345, 
655-56; Walter Galenson, The CIO Challenge to the AFL: A His­
tory of the American Labor Movement, 19S5-19H, (Cambridge, 1960), 
p. 640. 
40. Galenson, The CIO Challenge to the AFL, pp. xvii, 587-92, 
642-44. 
41. Milton Derber, "Growth and Expansion," in Derber and Young 
(eds.), Labor and the New Deal, p. 42. 
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tial growth by 1939. As Milton Derber has pointed out, 
"the biggest unions of 1939 in both the AFL and CIO were, 
with only a few exceptions, the biggest unions of the 
1950's. . . ."42 
The move into heavy industry constituted a victory for 
critics of the Gompers' group that dominated the AF of L. 
Representing largely the industrial-type unions, especially 
those in the mining and clothing industries, these critics 
had been demanding for many years that workers be or­
ganized along industrial, rather than craft, lines. Unfor­
tunately, the craft unions that controlled the AF of L 
refused to accept the view of the critics. Consequently, as 
industrialism moved forward, creating mass-production 
industries and multiplying the number of unskilled and 
semiskilled workers, millions of workers remained outside 
the labor movement. Given the inflexibility of the leader­
ship of the AF of L, a new organization had to take shape 
and give expression to the views of the critics if the major­
ity of workers were to be drawn into the labor movement. 
Late in 1935, the cio emerged under the leadership of John 
L. Lewis, "perhaps the greatest entrepreneur of American 
labor organization. . . ."43 
While organizing the unorganized into industrial unions, 
the cio also accepted the critics' demand that organized 
labor champion a comprehensive program of social-welfare 
legislation and place greater emphasis upon political action 
in order to get it enacted. The new organization established 
permanent (rather than temporary, election-year) political 
machinery, committed a far greater proportion of its time, 
personnel, and money to politics and tied itself more closely 
42. Ibid., p. 42. 
43. Galenson, The CIO Challenge to the AFL, pp. 641-42; Morris, 
Conflict within the AFL, pp. 2-3; Edwin Young, "The Split in the 
Labor Movement," in Derber and Young (eds.), Labor and the New 
Deal, pp. 69-70; Taft, The A.F. of L. from the Death of Gompers to 
the Merger, pp. 155-56,166. 
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to one political party—the Democratic—than unions had in 
pre-New Deal days. Following the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act in 1947, the AF of L imitated its rival, estab­
lishing Labor's League for Political Education and explicitly 
endorsing a presidential candidate. With government play­
ing big roles in the lives of workers and their unions, large-
scale political action by the labor movement had become a 
necessity.44 
The labor movement had changed its relations with gov­
ernment and politics, its size, and its power. Nevertheless, 
it had not broken all ties with the past. As has already been 
suggested, the establishment of the cio with its industrial 
and political orientation represented the triumph of ideas 
that had been developing in the labor movement for a num­
ber of years. Furthermore, such a movement did exist at 
the beginning of the 1930's. Even though it was weak by 
comparison with the situation a decade later (and also a 
decade earlier), the movement was strong enough to pro­
vide one basis for the organizing success of the 1930's, 
efforts that were led by men who had been nurtured in the 
old organizations. In addition, the largest labor organiza­
tion at the beginning of the decade—the AF of L—re­
mained the largest after the great activities of the 1930's. 
By 1933, its membership had dropped lower than any point 
since 1916, but by 1936 the Federation had more than 
recouped its depression losses. Then, stimulated largely 
by the rise of a rival, the AF of L made strenuous and 
successful efforts to enlarge itself, developing in the process 
a greater interest in organizing the unskilled into industrial 
unions.45 
44. Morris, Conflict within the AFL, pp. 271-75; Galenson, The 
CIO Challenge to the AFL, pp. 605-6, 609-10, 643; Taft, The A.F.of 
L. from the Death of Gompers to the Merger, pp. 311-13, 322-23. 
45. Ibid., pp. 199-200, 202, 450; Derber, "Growth and Expansion," 
in Derber and Young, Labor and the New Deal, pp. 38-40; Morris, 
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The new as well as the transformed old organization 
adhered to the pro-capitalist philosophy that Gompers had 
preached for half a century. Labor power continued to be 
valued by most labor leaders chiefly as a means of obtain­
ing for wage earners a larger share of the benefits of a 
highly industrialized capitalistic system, not as a means 
of overthrowing it. Although those leaders increased their 
political activity, they continued, like Gompers before them, 
to operate within the established party system and to oppose 
the formation of a labor party.46 
The growth of the labor movement in the 1930's formed 
a highly significant part of the long-term alteration of 
American capitalism. Organization of the labor sector took 
a great leap forward in the decade, giving the wage earners 
more power to deal with previously established business 
organizations. The rise of the latter had meant new con­
trols over the workers' lives, often by bureaucracies centered 
in some metropolis outside of the workers' communities. 
Now wage earners turned to political and labor organiza­
tions with their bureaucracies which were frequently cen­
tered in Washington, D.C. The workers made this move 
to find security and a chance to "get ahead," not to create 
a radically new social and economic system. They hoped 
to discover means of fulfilling old desires to acquire mass-
produced goods, desires that had been frustrated by the 
depression and seemed now to depend for their fulfillment 
on new institutional developments.47 
Closely related to the changes in the labor movement was 
the change that took place in the relative status of the two 
major political parties. During the 1930's, the Democrats 
46. Selig Perlman, "Labor and the New Deal in Historical Per­
spective," in Derber and Young (eds), Labor and the New Deal, pp. 
366-69. 
, 47. Maurice R. Stein, The Eclipse of Community: An Interpreta­
tion of American Studies (Princeton, N.J., 1960), pp. 56-68, 92-93, 
106-7, 281; W. Lloyd Warner, The Corporation in the Emergent
American Society, (New York, 1962). 
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replaced the Republicans as the nation's majority party, 
largely as a consequence of changes in the political behavior 
of the urban working classes. Roosevelt's victories, just 
like the repeal of prohibition at the start of his regime, 
depended heavily upon discontent in the cities.48 
The discontent appeared in the election of 1932. Roose­
velt devoted most of his energies then to efforts to capture 
the West and South, especially the rural progressives who 
disliked the power of business groups in the Republican 
party and the Southerners who had voted against Alfred 
E. Smith in 1928. (Professor Schlesinger argues that "the 
essence of the Democratic problem was to bring these rural 
Democrats back into the party." 49 Nevertheless, although 
the only states and most of the cities that he failed to carry 
were in the Northeast, Roosevelt increased the strength his 
party had in urban areas, especially among the wage-
earners, carrying thirty-two of the thirty-six leading cities 
and receiving over 17 per cent more votes in those places 
than Smith had. Coal miners also deserted the Republican 
party. In 1928, Hoover had carried thirty-six of the forty-
five coal-mining counties; in 1932, Roosevelt captured 
thirty-nine of them. "Labor voted overwhelmingly against 
joblessness and Hoover's failure to deal with it," a leading 
student of labor concluded. "Workers who had voted for 
Smith in 1928 cast their ballots for Roosevelt in 1932; many 
who had voted for Hoover four years earlier switched to 
Roosevelt; and a great number who had not voted at all in 
1928 came out to support Roosevelt in 1932." 50 
48. Andrew Sinclair, Prohibition: The Era of Excess (Boston, 
1962). 
49. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old Order, 1919­
1933 (The Age of Roosevelt [Boston, 1957]), p. 237. See also chaps, 
xxvii, xxviii, xxxiii. 
50. Bernstein, The Lean Years, pp. 508-12; Frank Freidel, Franklin 
D. Roosevelt: The Triumph (Boston, 1956), pp. 8, 95-98, 240, 255, 
268-75, 285, 337, 341-51; Oscar Handlin, Al Smith and His America 
(Boston, 1958), chaps, vi-vii, pp. 167-70; Samuel Lubell, The Future 
of American Politics (2d ed.; Garden City, N.Y., 1956), p. 46. 
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These urban groups became increasingly important to 
Roosevelt after his program went into operation. "Between 
1932 and 1936," according to Samuel Lubell, "the Demo­
cratic plurality in the cities leaped 80 per cent, the biggest 
change in any single election." 51 Twelve cities of over one 
hundred thousand people had not supported Roosevelt in 
1932, but each one moved behind him four years later. Ten 
states contained the twelve cities of half a million people 
or more that could provide enough strength for a candidate 
to capture the electoral votes of the states, nearly everything 
he needed for victory. Although most of these states had 
supported the G.O.P. from the Civil War to the Great De­
pression, their cities now switched to the Democratic party 
to make it the majority party for the first time since 1860. 
In 1940 and 1944, the size of the urban majorities was 
especially important for it enabled Roosevelt to win while 
his support was declining in rural areas and small towns.52 
Important in this urban support for Roosevelt were the 
numerous children of the millions of immigrants who had 
poured into the country, chiefly from southern and eastern 
Europe, late in the nineteenth and early in the twentieth 
century. Their experiences in slums and factories made 
them interested in many of the programs that Roosevelt 
championed. The depression, striking these insecure and 
ambitious groups, strengthened their belief that they should 
turn to government for help in their quest for security and 
social mobility. They also applauded Roosevelt's appoint­
ment policies, which recognized that people of "new immi­
grant" stock could make important contributions; and they 
appreciated the equalitarian ideology of many New Dealers, 
51. Ibid., p. 36, See also pp. 46, 54. 
52. Walter Johnson, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue: Presidents and 
the People, 1929-1959 (Boston, I960), pp. 80, 92. For analyses of one 
state see Samuel T. McSeveney, "The Michigan Gubernatorial Cam­
paign of 1938," Michigan History, XLV (1961), 97-127 and Stephen 
B. and Vera H. Sarasohn, Political Party Patterns in Michigan (De­
troit, 1957), pp. 25-26. 
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which rejected the racist assumptions of many old-stock 
Americans that were implicit in immigration policy and 
other areas of American life. As these ethnic groups rallied 
behind Roosevelt, they also became more "Americanized" 
for they were turning for help to the national government, 
rather than to their own organizations, including the local 
political machines; and they and other members of the 
working class thought less in terms of the cultural differ­
ences that once had kept them apart and more in terms of 
the interests they shared as members of a class. Both immi­
grant and native workers joined forces in the cio as well as 
in the "Roosevelt Coalition." For a time, the coalition also 
contained farmers who had battled against urban groups 
in the 1920's.53 
Negro voters formed another significant element in this 
coalition. Here, too, population movements were important 
for since early in the twentieth century Negroes had been 
moving out of southern agriculture in large numbers and 
locating chiefly in northern cities, thus shifting from areas 
in which their political activity was discouraged to places 
where politicians urged them to vote. They deserted the 
Republican party and in 1936 gave a majority of their 
votes for the first time to a Democratic presidential candi­
date. (Most of the southern Negroes who voted joined in 
the change.) They did this partly out of disgust for Re­
publicans who had been taking the Negro vote for granted 
for a number of years. Even more important, with most 
Negroes in the lowest income groups and millions of them 
unemployed, they derived great benefits from the New Deal. 
53. Lubell, The Future of American Politics, pp. 29-31, 53-54; J. 
Joseph Huthmacher, Massachusetts People and Politics, 1919-1933 (Cambridge, 1959), pp. 265-67; Maldwyn Allen Jones, American 
Immigration (Chicago, 1960), pp. 299-300; Johnson, 1600 Pennsyl­
vania Avenue, pp. 77, 79-80; Oscar Handlin, Adventures in Freedom: 
Three Hundred Years of Jewish Life in America (New York, 1954), 
pp. 213-15. For a discussion of all of the groups in the coalition m 
1936 see Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval, chaps, xxii, xxiii, xxxii. 
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They also appreciated the New Deal's ideology and its 
appointment policy, which placed more Negroes in impor­
tant government jobs than Roosevelt's predecessors had. 
The New Deal marked an early stage in what C. Vann 
Woodward calls the "New" or "Second" Reconstruction, the 
period of improvement in race relations in which the nation 
has been involved for the past thirty years.54 "Somewhere 
in the mid-1930's there was a turn," Oscar Handlin has 
written, " . .  . discrimination increasingly took on the 
aspect of an anachronistic survival from the past rather 
than a pattern valid for the future." 55 
Working-class support for reform expanded along with 
the increase in working-class support for the Democratic 
party. In the border states, for example, the votes of wage 
earners in the cities and the mining regions had been con­
trolled by pro-business groups, but under the impact of the 
depression and the New Deal, these workers switched their 
political allegiance to labor leaders and reformers.56 
Samuel Lubell labels the "toppling of the dominance held 
by the Republicans for nearly three-fourths of a century" 
the "Third American Revolution." ". . . The distinctive 
54. C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (rev. 
ed.; New York, 1957), chap, iii; Elbert Lee Tatum, The Changed 
Political Thought of the Negro, 1915-19U0 (New York, 1951), pp. 139, 
147-61, 180-81; John Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom: A 
History of American Negroes (2d ed.; New York, 1956) 512-33; 
V. 0. Key, Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York, 
1949), pp. 74, 286, 290-91, 645; Alexander Heard, A Two-Party 
South? (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1952), pp. 225-28; Edwin D. Hoffman, 
"The Genesis of the Modern Movement for Equal Rights in South 
Carolina, 1930-1939," Journal of Negro History, XIV (1959), 360­
64; Johnson, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, pp. 81-82; Theodore White, 
The Making of the President, 1960 (Cardinal Edition; New York, 
1961), pp. 276-78. 
55. Race and Nationality in American Life (New York, 1957), p. 
141. 
56. John H. Fenton, Politics of the Border States: A Study of 
Political Organization and Political Change Common to the Border 
States—Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky and Missouri (New 
Orleans, 1957), pp. 206, 209, 211, 213, 215, 216. 
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feature of the political revolution which Franklin D. Roose­
velt began and Truman inherited lies," he suggests, "not 
in its resemblance to the political wars of Andrew Jackson 
or Thomas Jefferson, but in its abrupt break with the con­
tinuity of the past." Although he makes this bold statement, 
Lubell also points out that "the Republican hold on the cities 
was broken not by Roosevelt but by Alfred E. Smith," and 
goes so far as to suggest that "before the Roosevelt Revolu­
tion there was an Al Smith Revolution." 57 Perhaps he needs 
a term that recognizes that the change in the relationships 
between the major parties was evolutionary in character. 
Urban discontent with Republican rule had been growing 
for some time before the rise of Franklin Roosevelt. During 
the 1920's, and especially in the Smith-Hoover campaign 
of 1928, "new immigrant" groups and Negroes expressed 
their growing unhappiness with Republican policies that 
seemed to be dominated by old-stock, white, and upper-
income points of view. Although a Republican, Congress­
man Fiorello LaGuardia represented some of the discontent 
of lower-class urban groups in the 1920's.58 In this situ­
ation, and before the Great Depression, the Democrats made 
gains in urban areas such as Massachusetts, which, as Pro­
fessor Huthmacher points out, "stood in the forefront of 
the states most permeated by the Newer American culture 
of cities, factories, and new-stock citizens." 59 Consequently, 
Roosevelt simply carried much farther a development that 
started before he had his chance to acquire the votes and 
deal with the problems of urban groups that had supported 
Al Smith.60 
57. The Future of American Politics, pp. 3, 35, 36. 
58. Tatum, The Changed Political Thought of the Negro, pp. 65-72, 
101-8, 137, 142-43, 146, 178-79; Arthur Mann, LaGuardia: A Fighter 
against His Times, 1882-1933 (Philadelphia, 1959); Howard Zinn, 
LaGuardia in Congress (Ithaca, N.Y., 1959). 
59. Massachusetts People and Politics, p. ix. See also pp. 260-62, 
265-66 and Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in 
an American City (New Haven, 1961), pp. 49-50. 
60. Handlin, Al Smith and His America, pp. 179, 181. 
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Furthermore, questions should be raised about the signifi­
cance of the rise of the Democrats to majority status. 
Certainly the Roosevelt coalition was a very unstable ar­
rangement, unable to produce a majority vote for a Demo­
cratic presidential candidate after Roosevelt passed from 
the scene.61 A major element in the coalition with great 
power in Congress—the southern Democrats—contained 
many anti-New Dealers, unhappy with the new relations 
between Democrats and Negroes and with many of the 
economic policies that seemed to threaten important eco­
nomic interests in the South. At least as early as 1936, some 
southern voters—those in North Carolina, for example— 
when given a choice between pro- and anti-New Deal 
Democrats chose the latter and sent to Congress men who 
recognized that their political futures did not demand that 
they follow the lead of the President. Throughout the late 
1930's and beyond many southern Democrats openly rebelled 
against Democratic presidents, looking upon their domestic 
programs as betraying the traditions of the party. 
The unstable character of the Democracy presented a 
situation that Republicans could and did exploit by accept­
ing New Deal policies and practices that were attractive to 
northern urban groups and, at the same time, appealing to 
southern resentments and other anti-New Deal sentiments. 
Although a difficult game, the Republicans played it with 
some success. From 1940 on, some of Roosevelt's urban 
supporters switched to the Republican party. As time 
passed, Republicans also made impressive gains in the 
South.82 
61. See White, The Making of the President, 1960. p. 435. 
G2. Ibid., pp. 243-44, 274, 287, 425, 430, 431, 434; Lubell, The 
Future of American Politics, pp. 239, 256, 263-64; Johnson 1600 
Pennsylvania Avenue, p. 83; Elmer L. Puryear, Democratic Parti)
Dissension in North Carolina (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1962), chap, ix; Key, 
Southern Politics in State atid Nation, pp. 255, 259, 329, 330, 361-62, 
367, 472; Heard, A Two-Party South? pp. 18-19, 64-65, 151-53; 
Dewey W. Grantham, Jr., "An American Politics for the South," in 
Charles Grier Sellers, Jr. (ed.), The Southerner as American (Chapel 
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Finally, attention should be called to Lubell's suggestion 
about the class orientation of American politics. Although 
a revolution supposedly took place under Roosevelt, Ameri­
can politics maintained its middle-class character. The 
people who flocked to Roosevelt's colors did so in hopes of 
acquiring a middle-class standard of living. His programs 
helped many of them realize their ambitions and much of 
their political activity in the prosperous days after World 
War II sought to protect what they had gained. As the 
groups achieved middle-class status, they produced their 
own economic resources for political campaigns and their 
own middle-class men to lead them.63 The New Deal ex­
panded the middle class as it enlarged organizations. 
As the 1930's moved forward, business leaders found 
themselves operating in a rapidly altering situation. The 
depression challenged their prestige; the rise of big govern­
ment and big labor threatened their profits, power, and 
status. A half century earlier, business had initiated the 
development of collectivist capitalism. Now the great pro­
moters of change were working in other sectors of Ameri­
can life, bringing them into conformity with the "bigness" 
that had earlier become a characteristic of so much of the 
business world and thereby affecting the position of busi­
nessmen in major ways. 
Perhaps business leaders could have avoided the changes 
in their relations with the government and with their work­
ers if they could have avoided the sharp decline in their 
Hill, N.C., I960), pp. 162-67; Dahl, Who Governs? pp. 45, 50-51, 57­
59, 110; Tatum, The Changed Political Thought of the Negro, pp. 
138-41, 163-65, 180, 182, 184-85. For the beginnings of "modern 
Republicanism see Donald R. McCoy, "Alfred M. Landon and the 
Presidential Campaign of 1936," Mid-America, XLII (1960), 195-218; 
McSeveney, "The Michigan Gubernatorial Campaign of 1938, 126-*' 
and Donald Bruce Johnson, The Republican Party and Wendell 
Willkie (Urbana, 111., 1960). 
63. Lubell, The Future of American Politics, pp. 85, 232-34; John­
son, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, pp. 77-80. 
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prestige. "In 1929 business, particularly big business," 
writes Thomas C. Cochran, "enjoyed a degree of public 
approval unique in American history." Then came the 
crash and the depression and the growth of "an attitude 
of greater distrust of both business honesty and ability 
than had characterized any previous period. . . ." The 
public relations of one industry—electrical utilities—de­
clined "to a lower level, with the possible exception of the 
railroads in the 1880's and 1890's, than any other industry 
experienced at any time in American history." C4 To busi­
nessmen, this cataclysmic change in their status was 
bewildering. "We did not make the depression," they pro­
tested. To be distrusted and to be forced on the defensive 
were puzzling experiences for men who were confident that 
they had been giving good service to the public and their 
employees and that only a few businessmen deserved criti­
cism.65 Now they found the public and their employees 
convinced that the old leaders were unreliable and that gov­
ernment and unions must therefore become more important. 
In the new situation the government played a competitive 
role. Banks and insurance companies interested in making 
loans and investments faced competition from government 
agencies, especially the large and active Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation. (Some compensation was provided 
by the great increase in government bonds, available chiefly 
as a consequence of New Deal spending. Insurance com­
panies added heavily to their holdings of these secure, tax 
exempt, but low-yield, papers.)66 Many executives in the 
64. Thomas C. Cochran, The American Business System: A His­
torical Perspective, 1900-1955 (Cambridge, 1957), p. 140; Forrest 
McDonald, Let There be Light: The Electric Utility Industry in 
Wisconsin, 1881-1955 (Madison, Wis., 1957), p. 305. 
65. Raymond C. Miller, Killowatts at Work: A History of the 
Detroit Edison Co. (Detroit, 1957), pp. 333, 353-54. 
66. N. S. B. Gras, Business and Capitalism: An Introduction to 
Business History (New York, 1939), pp. 323, 325; Shepard B. Clough, 
A Century of Life Insurance: A History of the Mutual Life Insurance 
Company of New York, 1843-1943 (New York, 1946), pp. 253-54, 
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insurance industry complained bitterly about social security. 
"The old idea of individual responsibility is being slowly 
undermined by those who have little of the world's goods," 
an economist for the Travelers company maintained. He 
wished that everyone was obliged to read William Graham 
Sumner's "What Social Classes Owe Each Other." (A 
few companies, however, recognized quickly that the gov­
ernment's program could help them sell insurance.)67 Elec­
trical power companies encountered government producers, 
like the Tennessee Valley Authority, and co-operatives sub­
sidized by the REA. TO one utility executive, the building 
of a co-operative in his area seemed one of those irrational 
things that human beings sometimes did, a form of behavior 
he distrusted and could not understand. He looked upon 
the co-operative not only as an economic and engineering 
monstrosity, doomed to fail, but as a blemish on the land­
scape, a highly conspicuous suggestion that somewhere his 
company had been remiss in its duty. In Nebraska, the pri­
vate companies were driven completely from the field, re­
placed throughout the state by public power after Nebras­
kans concluded that their principal private enterprise— 
agriculture—could be helped if, in the matter of electricity, 
public enterprise were substituted for private.68 
302-4, 308-9, 311, 314, 316-17; Marquis James, The Metropolitan 
Life: A Study in Business Growth (New York, 1947), pp. 287-88, 298, 
305, 306, 312, 318; J. Carlyle Buley, The American Life Convention,
1906-1952: A Study in the History of Life Insurance (New York, 
1953), pp. 783-84, 789, 808; Harold F. Williamson and Orange A. 
Smalley, Northwestern Mutual Life: A Century of Trusteeship (Evanston, 111., 1957), p. 258. On the RFC's operations under Roose­
velt see Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal, chap. xxvi. 
67. Buley, The American Life Convention, pp. 709-10, 787, 793, 
818; James, Metropolitan Life, pp. 337-38; Clough, A Century of Life 
Insurance, pp. 283, 285. See "The Birth of Social Security" in Schle­
singer, The Coming of the New Deal, chap, xviii. 
68. McDonald, Let There be Light, pp. 319-20, 358-59; Miller, 
Kilowatts at Work, pp. 240-42; W. Stewart Nelson, "The Private 
Companies and a Public Power Paradox," Business History Review 
XXXV (1961), 532-49. On TVA and REA see Schlesinger, The Coming
of the New Deal, chap, xix and The Politics of Upheaval, chap. xx. 
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The new situation also brought more government regula­
tions. The New Deal, for example, imposed federal controls 
on the investment process, forced reductions in the size of 
public-utility holding companies, and employed old regu­
latory powers more rigorously. Such actions as these com­
pelled business firms to alter their behavior in a number 
of ways: henceforth, they provided more information for 
investors, enlarged and improved their accounting methods, 
expanded their legal departments, changed their deprecia­
tion and dividend policies, participated more actively in 
business associations, sent new representatives to Washing­
ton, severed ties with other firms, and the like.69 Following 
1935, new and effective federal regulations for the rapidly 
growing trucking business promoted stability for they lim­
ited competition by controlling rates and entry into the 
industry. A similar tale can be told for oil where leading 
firms demanded regulations, triumphed over the opponents 
of "monopoly" and government "interference," and obtained 
programs that promoted stability and efficiency.70 
The enlargement of government plus the efforts to base 
taxation on the ability-to-pay principle forced business firms 
69. McDonald, Let There be Light, pp. 318-20; Miller, Kilowatts at 
Work, pp. 230, 360-61; Henrietta Larson and Kenneth Wiggins 
Porter, History of Humble Oil and Refining Company: A Study in 
Industrial Growth (New York, 1959), pp. 337, 340, 525, 551-52; 
Williamson and Smalley, Northwestern Mutual Life, pp. 247-55; John 
L. Loos, Oil on Stream: A History of Interstate Oil Pipe Line Com­
pany, 1909-1959 (Baton Rouge, La., 1959), pp. 318, 351; Gertrude G. 
Schroeder, The Growth of Major Steel Companies (Baltimore, 1953), 
p. 27; James Don Edwards, "Public Accounting in the United States 
from 1928 to 1951," Business History Review, XXX (1956), 470. On 
various New Deal regulatory programs see Schlesinger, The Coming 
of the New Deal, chaps, xxvii, xxix and The Politics of Upheaval, 
chap. xvii. 
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Business History Review, XXX (1956), 78, 84, 85; Wayne G. Broehl, 
Jr., Trucks . . . Trouble . . . and Triumph: The Norwalk Truck 
Line Company (New York, 1954), pp. 38-41, 52-54; Larson and 
Porter, History of Humble Oil and Refining Company, pp. 455-56, 
478, 487, 511, 668-71; Paul H. Giddens, Standard Oil Company (Indi­
ana): Oil Pioneers in the Middle West (New York, 1955), chap. xx. 
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to pay higher taxes. In 1931, Humble Pipe Line Company, 
to take one example, paid no federal corporation and income 
taxes, while in 1941 it paid well over $3,000,000 for these 
purposes. In 1925, the tax bill for Sears, Roebuck and 
Company amounted to something more than $4,000,000, 17 
per cent of the Company's net income before taxes. In 1947, 
the bill exceeded $100,000,000, 49 per cent of net income 
before taxes. In the steel industry, the relative proportion 
of income absorbed by income and profits taxes, after fall­
ing gradually during the 1920's, rose sharply during the 
1930's.71 Writing of the new situation, W. Lloyd Warner 
suggests that 
if the entrepreneur succeeds in making a profit, an increasing 
share is taken from him. The income, excess profit, and many-
other taxes now take a large part of what the enterpriser makes, 
to be used for the collectivity and to make it possible for his 
powerful rival, the huge hierarchical government structure, to 
be financed.72 
For many firms, the 1930's also brought new and often 
effective challenges from the rapidly growing labor move­
ment. Most managers still looked upon unions as threats 
to their "right" to control their firms and insisted that 
management alone should decide who was to be paid how 
much, who was to be promoted, demoted, hired, or fired, 
how much was to be produced, and what methods and 
machines were to be used. While some companies avoided 
organization of their workers by national unions and others 
adjusted easily to the new organizations, most business 
leaders found the rise of the labor movement highly per­
71. Larson and Porter, History of Humble Oil and Pipe Line Com­
pany, p. 525; Boris Emmet and John E. Jeuck, Catalogues and 
Counters: A History of Sears, Roebuck and Company (Chicago, 1950), 
p. 661; Schroeder, The Growth of Major Steel Companies, pp. 183-86. 
On the new taxes of 1935 see Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval, 
pp. 325-34. 
72. The Corporation in the Emergent American Society, p. 31. 
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plexing and undesirable, a challenge to their belief that they 
had always taken good care of their employees. For work­
ers to turn to "outsiders" seemed an act of disloyalty and 
ingratitude. Some executives looked upon Labor Relations 
Board elections as tests of loyalty and of confidence in 
management; thus, elections that favored unions were pain­
ful and distressing as well as surprising experiences, diffi­
cult to explain. Often the only explanation that satisfied 
was that the workers had been led astray by the organizers 
and had switched the type of leadership on which they were 
dependent. Forced increasingly after 1937 to discard old 
antiunion practices and accept collective bargaining, some 
managers attempted to build constructive and harmonious 
relationships with organized labor while others remained 
unreconciled, bargaining, when necessary, at arm's length. 
By the end of the decade, few businessmen had concluded 
that unions were good for business; most of them attempted 
to limit the scope of bargaining, to bargain with local rather 
than national unions, and to bring union activities under 
government control; and many hoped that collective bar­
gaining would soon pass from the scene. Management's 
acceptance of the practice as necessary and good lay some 
distance in the future.73 
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A few business leaders both welcomed the New Deal and 
maintained rather friendly attitudes toward it. Although 
noting that "a powerful section of business" stopped sup­
porting Roosevelt, and seeing the New Deal by the end of 
1935 as "a coalition of the non-business groups, mobilized 
to prevent the domination of the country by the business 
community," Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. calls attention to cer­
tain "dissident businessmen" in this coalition. These busi­
nessmen "felt themselves handicapped by Wall Street domi­
nation of the money market," and they included "some of 
the ablest entrepreneurs in the country . . . like Joseph 
P. Kennedy who invested in both new regions and new 
industries and was willing to bet on the nation's capacity 
to resume economic growth." 74 Robert E. Wood of Sears, 
Roebuck and Co. applauded the NRA and government aid 
to the unemployed and the farmer. Wood was convinced 
that the New Deal was helping the country and thus was 
benefiting his company. "I am one of the businessmen who, 
selfishly perhaps (because my business is greatly dependent 
on the welfare of the farmer) but nevertheless, consistently, 
has supported the Agricultural Adjustment Act," he in­
formed Roosevelt late in 1934. Henry I. Harriman, presi­
dent of the United States Chamber of Commerce during 
the early days of the New Deal and a key promoter then 
of such programs as production control for agriculture, 
praised Roosevelt as late as 1940 for providing the nation 
"for the first time" with "a wise and constructive farm 
policy." 
Even these men, however, had doubts. Wood complained 
especially about tax and labor policies and advisers who 
seemed dangerously radical, and Harriman criticized Roose­
velt for lacking "the strong conviction that a sound but 
venturesome business is essential to the proper development 
74. The Politics of Upheaval, pp. 411, 443, 586. 
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of America." T6 To these friendly eyes, the New Deal seemed 
something less than the perfect servant of American 
business. 
Some business leaders opposed the New Deal from the 
very beginning. Henry Ford resisted the NRA's efforts to 
produce a variety of changes and received praise from busi­
nessmen who saw him as a symbol of opposition to big 
government.76 More typical were the businessmen who at 
first welcomed the NRA, viewing it chiefly as a way to 
escape the price-depressing competition of the early 1930's, 
and then became disillusioned with it, some because it 
favored big over small business and others because they 
believed it exalted non-business groups. The United States 
Chamber of Commerce, an early supporter, soon became 
quite critical of the NRA for giving too much power to 
government and unions. This business group wanted a 
program that would allow each of the trade associations to 
control its industry.77 Obviously, the depression had not 
effected major changes in the thought of most business 
leaders. They remained highly critical of government and 
labor power and simply wanted help in their efforts to 
control the economy, or at least their own firms.78 
With the majority of Americans rejecting such business 
theories, most business leaders from 1934 on turned to 
an American tradition, embraced it passionately, insisted 
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that the New Deal was "un-American," and worked to con­
vert their fellow citizens to this point of view. The tra­
dition was a form of conservatism that had taken shape 
late in the nineteenth century and had been used to combat 
challenges from reform and labor movements in the days 
of the Populists, the Progressives, and Samuel Gompers. 
Now, working through various organizations led by the 
Liberty League, business leaders and their political allies 
spelled out and publicized the nineteenth-century philosophy 
that stressed the free individual, limited government, natu­
ral laws of economics, property rights, business success, 
and the importance of "practical experience." Not only was 
the philosophy an old one and an authentic American tra­
dition, but the behavior of its advocates harmonized with 
traditional political methods. The Liberty League was not 
a secret conspiracy of men of great wealth seeking a strong 
man to protect their property but simply a well-financed 
pressure group that preached to the American people, failed 
in its mission, and quietly collapsed. 
Although the philosophy and methods were not new, there 
was a novel feature in the activities of the social groups 
comprising the Liberty League. In the past these groups 
had been the objects of attack by protest elements; now 
they themselves formed the loudest protest movement. 
This difference pointed to a more significant one. Earlier, 
the major advocates of change had been the builders of 
American business; now those roles were being played by 
the builders of big government and big labor, and their 
activities implied that the American people could no longer 
depend so heavily on the old leaders. Their prestige, profits, 
and power—all three were affected by the changes taking 
place, and all three were defended by a philosophy that 
attacked "bigness" in government and labor, although not 
in business.79 
79. Frederick Rudolph, "The American Liberty League, 1933­
1940," American Historical Review, LVI (1950), 21, 32-33; Morton 
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Business leaders by no means devoted themselves exclu­
sively to efforts to propagate an individualistic philosophy, 
a creed contradicted by the corporate nature of the economic 
life of many of its proponents. Taking steps that were 
more in line with the corporate aspect, they improved tech­
niques designed to convince their workers and the public 
that they could rely on businessmen. Personnel programs 
were developed which aimed in part at convincing workers 
that they had no need to turn to other organizations. Public 
relations programs were expanded to show the ways in 
which the system of private enterprise and particular 
industries and firms served the nation. Early in the 
1930's, a leading student of the corporation insisted that 
the powerful managers of the giant corporations should 
develop a broader conception of their responsibilities and 
suggested that government should provide some of the 
pressure needed to force that development.80 Now, under 
the pressures of the decade, corporate leaders more readily 
proclaimed that they had responsibilities to the whole 
community. 
Improvement and enlargement of personnel and public-
relations programs were important and permanent changes 
in the business community during the 1930's. Even here, 
however, the degree of change should not be exaggerated. 
The programs were not completely new nor simply re­
sponses to the depression and the New Deal; the programs 
had been developing for a generation. After all, managers 
before the 1930's had had to face up to reform and labor 
movements as well as the internal problems involved in 
Keller, In Defense of Yesterday: James M. Beck and the Politics of 
Conservatism, 1861-1936 (New York, 1958) ; Schlesinger, The Coming 
of the New Deal, chap, xxx; George Wolf skill, The Revolt of the 
Conservatives: A History of the American Liberty League, 1934-1940(Boston, 1962) ; Galbraith, American Capitalism, pp. 80-81, 136, 151; 
Clinton Roositer, Conservatism in America: The Thankless Persuasion (2d ed.; New York, 1962), p. 161. 
80. Richard S. Kirkendall, "A. A. Berle, Jr.: Student of the Corpo­
ration, 1917-1932," Business History Review, XXXV (1961), 56-58. 
184 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 
operating large-scale organizations; and these managers had 
developed a body of ideas and techniques on which they 
could draw to deal with the changes of the 1930's. The 
pressures of that decade formed a very important part, 
but only a part, of an extensive and long-term series of 
pressures which forced corporate executives to think in 
terms of broad responsibilities, a significant feature of a 
collectivistic type of capitalism.81 
And what should be said of the central figure in American 
history during the 1930's? Franklin D. Roosevelt provides 
a major illustration of the need to consider both continuity 
and change in an interpretation of the decade. First of all, 
he was a product of the Progressive movement. As such, 
he believed in promoting change and in using government 
for that purpose. At the same time, as a progressive, he 
also believed in maintaining ties with the past. He valued 
reform as a means not only for bringing about improve­
ments but also for preventing radical developments. 
Entering politics in 1910 as a successful candidate for 
the New York Senate, Roosevelt's reform notions then 
81. Morrell Heald, "Management's Responsibility to Society: The 
Growth of an Idea," ibid., XXXI (1957), 375-84; Norman J. Wood,
"Industrial Relations Practices of American Management, 1900-1933,"
ibid., XXXIV (1960), 404, 418, 420; Henry Eilbirt, "The Develop­
ment of Personnel Management in the United States," ibid., XXXIII (1959), 345-64; Eilbirt, "Twentieth Century Beginnings in Employee
Counseling," ibid., XXXI (1957), 311-22; Heald, "Business Thought 
in the Twenties: Social Responsibility," American Quarterly, XIII (1961), 126-39; Loren Baritz, The Servants of Power: A History of 
the Use of Social Science in American Industry (Middletown, Conn., 
1960), esp. chap, vii; Cochran, The American Business System, pp. 
67-78, 154-57, 162-63, 184-87, 194-201; Otis Pease, The Responsi­
bilities of American Advertising: Private Control and Public Influ­
ence, 1920-19U0 (New Haven, 1958), pp. 32-33, 115-16, 139-41; 
Emmet and Jeuck, Catalogues and Counters, pp. 587-601; Larson and 
Porter, History of Humble Oil and Refining Company, pp. 344-45; 
Bennett, Precision Power pp. 136-39, 160; Evelyn H. Knowlton, Pep­
perell's Progress: History of a Cotton Textile Company, 18U-19i5 (Cambridge, 1948), pp. 363 ff. Ralph M. Hower, The History of an 
Advertising Agency: N. W. Ayer and Son at Work, 1869-19U9 (Cambridge, 1949), pp. 152,175-76. 
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were limited to suggestions concerning political changes, 
although at Harvard he had been exposed to other varieties 
of progressivism. During the next decade, under the impact 
of his experiences in the New York legislature and the 
Wilson administration and his contact with Theodore Roose­
velt, Gifford Pinchot, and other Progressives, Franklin 
D. Roosevelt's position expanded. Quite naturally, in view 
of his life at the family estate in Hyde Park, he first de­
veloped an active and strong interest in conservation and 
measures that would benefit the farmer. A concern about 
the problems of urban workers developed more slowly, but 
his job as Assistant Secretary of Navy, which brought him 
into contact with business and labor leaders, helped him 
shape ideas about urban groups. By the end of the Pro­
gressive era, Roosevelt was advocating the use of govern­
ment to reform social and economic conditions.82 During 
the 1920's, he tried to impose progressive orientation as 
well as unity upon the badly divided Democratic party, 
developed a strong interest in public power and farm relief, 
maintained an interest in such matters as social-welfare 
legislation, and continued to reject the conservative notion 
that businessmen should make the essential decisions in 
America and that government should not "interfere" with 
the operations of the business system.83 
From 1929 to 1933, while he served as governor of New 
York and campaigned for the presidency, Roosevelt's pro­
gressivism grew even though, like most progressives as 
82. Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Apprenticeship 
(Boston, 1952), chaps, iv-xii; Daniel R. Fusfeld, The Economic 
Thought of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Origins of the New Deal 
(New York, 1956), chaps, ii-v; Schlesinger, The Crisis of the Old 
Order, pp. 331-67; Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Ordeal 
(Boston, 1954), chap. v. 
83. Ibid., chaps, ix, xii-xvi; Schlesinger, The Crisis of the Old 
Order, pp. 373-85; Fusfeld, The Economic Thought of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and the Origins of the New Deal, chaps, vi-viii; James 
MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York, 
1956), pp. 83-89. 
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well as the conservatives, he could not accept the "Key­
nesian" ideas about government spending that would later 
be associated with his administration.84 During these years 
he battled for measures that Progressives had advocated for 
a generation and that would become a part of the New 
Deal: conservation, government regulation of the economy, 
and social-welfare legislation. He also experimented with 
methods, such as the use of "service intellectuals" to develop 
and administer programs, that reformers like Robert M. 
La Follette had employed earlier and that Roosevelt would 
use in Washington.85 In addition, he championed more recent 
additions to the progressive agenda that would be involved 
in the New Deal, such as public power, land-planning, farm 
relief, old-age pensions, and unemployment insurance. He 
took a step toward the relief programs of the New Deal by 
calling for state aid to the unemployed, a clear denial of 
individual and local responsibility that represented an appli­
cation of progressivism's faith in government to the special 
problems of a depression. And he revealed the same con­
fusion concerning the best way to deal with big business 
that had been present in the days of Theodore Roosevelt 
and Woodrow Wilson and would form a part of the Wash­
ington scene after 1932.86 By that time, Roosevelt berieved 
that the private enterprise—private profit system should 
be retained, that "its operations were not always benevolent 
84. Fusfeld, The Economic Thought of Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
the Origins of the New Deal, pp. 4, 36-37, 180-82, 203, 205-6, 222, 254. 
85. Richard S. Kirkendall, "Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Service 
Intellectual," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIX (1962) 
456-71. 
86. Freidel, The Triumph; Bernard Bellush, Franklin D. Roosevelt 
as Governor of New York (New York, 1955); Schlesinger, The Crisis 
of the Old Order, pp. 386-403, 413-55; Tugwell, The Democratic 
Roosevelt, pp. 214 ff., 221, 230-31, 246-47; Fusfeld, The Economic 
Thought of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Origins of the New Deal, 
chaps, ix-xvi; Gertrude Almy Slichter, "Franklin D. Roosevelt s 
Farm Policy as Governor of New York State, 1928-1932," Agricul­
tural History, XXXIII (1959), 168-76; Slichter, "Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and the Farm Problem, 1929-1932," Mississippi Valley 
Historical Review, XLIII (1956), 238-58. 
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and did not always promote the general welfare," and, thus, 
that those operations should "be improved and supple­
mented by state and Federal government efforts whenever 
the need arose." 87 
Throughout the pre-1933 period, Roosevelt combined 
pragmatic methods with guiding ideals much as he did 
during his presidential years. He worked with as many 
groups as possible, seeking their support as well as their 
ideas; tested suggestions to see if they worked in practice; 
and rejected the doctrines that advocated the country's 
relying exclusively on either private or public enterprise.88 
At the same time, the basic ideals that had long been a part 
of American reform thought influenced him. In his use 
of government he respected the dignity of the human per­
sonality and sought to protect and enlarge freedom and 
opportunity for individuals.89 
The intellectual position that Roosevelt brought to Wash­
ington placed a high value on continuity as well as on 
change. Eager to avoid a revolution and convinced, as 
Theodore Roosevelt had also been, that radical changes 
could grow out of situations like the depression, F.D.R. 
insisted that reform could prevent such changes from taking 
place—that reform had a conservative function. To pre­
serve capitalism and democracy in a world in which both 
were being rejected, statesmen needed to reform capitalism 
in ways that would persuade Americans that they had no 
need to turn to other systems.90 
87. Fusfeld, The Economic Thought of Franklin D. Roosevelt and 
the Origins of the New Deal, p. 251. 
88. Schlesinger, "Sources of the New Deal," reprinted in Abraham 
S. Eisenstadt (ed.), American History: Recent Interpretations; Book 
II: Since 1865 (New York, 1962), pp. 344-50; Kirkendall, "Franklin 
D. Roosevelt and the Service Intellectual," 459-62. 
89. Clarke A. Chambers, "F.D.R., Pragmatist-Idealist: An Essay 
in Historiography," Pacific Northwest Quarterly, LII (1961), 53-55. 
90. Thomas H. Greer, What Roosevelt Thought: The Social and 
Political Ideas of Franklin D. Roosevelt (East Lansing, Mich., 1958), 
pp. 207-12; Burns, Roosevelt, chap, xii; Einaudi, The Roosevelt 
Revolution, pp. 96-97, 269-71, 340-42, 360. 
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The failure of the Socialist party, the leading radical 
organization in America, testified to the success of Roose­
velt's methods. It is ironical that, as the historian of that 
party has pointed out, "the party of Debs which had pre­
dicted the collapse of American capitalism, itself collapsed 
during the worst crisis American capitalism ever had." 
When called upon to explain this, the party's leader, Nor­
man Thomas, suggested: "What cut the ground out pretty 
completely from under us was this. It was Roosevelt in a 
word. You don't need anything more." And Professor 
Shannon agrees that Roosevelt "did undercut most of their 
actual and potential support. The story of the decline of 
the Socialist party since 1933 is, for the most part, the 
story of the political success of the New Deal." 91 In short, 
Roosevelt both changed and preserved American capitalism. 
In the process, he strengthened faith in American democracy 
by promoting reform programs that encouraged Americans 
to believe that their political system could make their eco­
nomic system serve their interests.92 
The watershed concept, as well as others that emphasize 
breaks with the past, should be avoided in interpretations 
of the 1930's. The Great Depression and the New Deal 
created major changes in American life but also maintained 
important connections with an earlier America. The lead­
ing developments of the depression decade which are asso­
ciated with the New Deal should not be viewed as radical 
new beginnings in American history but chiefly as signifi­
cant parts of a large-scale transformation of American 
91. David A. Shannon, The Socialist Party of America: A History (New York, 1955), pp. 229, 235, 250. See also Murray B. Seidler, 
Norman Thomas: Respectable Rebel (Syracuse, 1961), p. 119 and 
Donald R. McCoy, Angry Voices: Left-of-Center Politics in the New 
Deal Era (Lawrence, Kan., 1958), pp. 191-93. 
92. For a quite different view of Roosevelt's relations with democ­
racy see Edgar Eugene Robinson, The Roosevelt Leadership, 19SS­
19%5 (Philadelphia, 1955). 
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capitalism that had been under way for at least half a 
century before the 1930's. During those pre-New Deal 
years, American business lost its individualistic character 
and, although some unsuccessful attempts were made to 
restore that, somewhat more successful efforts sought to 
bring government and various economic groups into har­
mony with the collectivistic trends. Then in the years of 
the depression and the New Deal, big government became 
firmly established, promoted the rise of big labor, and con­
ducted similar, fairly successful efforts designed to get the 
farmer to conform to the new type of capitalism. Big busi­
ness lost some of its power but little of its size, and so 
Americans emerged from the decade with an economy 
dominated by the interplay among large public and private 
organizations and with lower-income groups hoping and 
expecting to improve their status within the system, not to 
destroy the system—which, in later years, became even 
more firmly established.93 
93. For discussions related to the main thesis of this essay see 
Galbraith, American Capitalism; Kenneth E. Boulding, The Organiza­
tional Revolution: A Study in the Ethics of Economic Organization(New York, 1953); Calvin B. Hoover, "The American Organizational 
Economy," reprinted in Eisenstadt (ed.), American History, pp. 
480-90; Rowland Berthoff, "The American Social Order: A Conserva­
tive Hypothesis," American Historical Review, LXV (1960), 495­
514 and Warner, The Corporation in the Emergent American Society. 

Continuity and Change in Government-
Business Relations 
ARTHUR M. JOHNSON 
ADJUSTMENT °f Public and private economic interests lies at 
the very heart of much of American history, especially 
since the turn of the century. The results have given the 
economy and the society many of their distinctive character­
istics and have produced a unique amalgam of government 
and business functions and responsibilities. The task of 
identifying and explaining the key elements of continuity 
and change in these relationships is a difficult one, and 
many paths are open. Here, we shall look at government and 
business in terms of decision-making that affects the eco­
nomic life of the nation, seeking to differentiate between 
the establishment of principles, which constitute the frame­
work of the basic relationship, and their implementation, 
which determines specific relationships and their conse­
quences. The analysis will be in terms of the federal 
government and large-scale, corporate enterprise, while 
stressing that the results of adjustment between the two 
have had major implications for private decision-making 
in all kinds of business, large and small, which in the aggre­
gate can be conveniently called the "business system." 
192 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 
Given the rapidity and complexity of technological ad­
vances, the size and power of business units engaged in 
mass production and distribution, the increased demands 
of non-business groups on government, the interrelatedness 
and interdependence of national and international economic 
activity, and the economic and military crises of this cen­
tury, the maintenance of a tolerable balance between gov­
ernment and business decision-making for the economy is 
a tribute to the processes that have facilitated change. 
Despite a marked increase in governmental powers and 
functions, the business decision-maker has remained a key 
figure in the economy. A remarkably complex set of gov­
ernmental processes—political, legislative, administrative, 
and legal—and equally complex processes of manipulation 
and adaptation by business have provided continuity while 
accommodating major changes in government-business re­
lations. The purpose of this essay is to examine some of 
these processes, particularly as they have been revealed in 
adjustments made to three major challenges to business 
decision-making in the economy: the decline of price com­
petition and the concentration of economic power associated 
with large-scale production; the collapse of the economy 
under the impact of business depression; and the challenge 
of global war and continued defense preparedness based on 
fast-moving technology. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the American 
businessman was at the height of his power. His decisions, 
made free from governmental restraints or with positive 
governmental aid and encouragement, had revolutionized 
the economy and with it the society. As an industrial 
power, the United States had risen in a few short decades 
to challenge and then overtake the leaders of the Old World. 
Large aggregations of capital had begun to characterize key 
sectors of the economy such as oil, steel, meat-packing, and 
railroads. At the end of the nineteenth century, a great 
GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS RELATIONS 193 
wave of mergers had begun to concentrate control of far-
flung enterprises, and the movement was continuing una­
bated.1 Through concentration of control, business sought 
by its own devices to achieve a measure of stability and 
certainty that competition in the classical sense would not 
permit. Overproduction, excessive competition, and the 
heavy capital investment in fixed facilities contributed to 
this movement, which was replacing the entrepreneur with 
the financier as the leading figure in big business. 
As business units had become larger and their owner­
ship more concentrated, governmental functions had re­
mained static or had atrophied. The heads of major enter­
prises seemingly possessed resources that challenged those 
of the head of the federal government. The reversal of 
their respective roles in the years that followed was a 
triumph of pragmatic processes that confirmed the principle 
of government's supremacy without destroying the business 
system. 
Change was in the air in 1900, but the direction that 
change would take was not yet clear. Reviewing the work 
of the Fifty-sixth Congress, the Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle took some pleasure in noting the lack of accom­
plishment. While regretting that nothing had been done 
to reform the consular service or to reduce war-revenue 
measures, the Chronicle was pleased that such "ill-judged 
or half-considered measures" as the ship-subsidy bill, anti­
trust legislation, a bill for a new cabinet-rank Department 
of Commerce, and the Nicaraguan Canal bill had been left 
to their just deserts. Some of these, the Chronicle felt, 
represented serious departures from traditional policy and 
reflected the restlessness and agitation of the times.2 Iron 
Age, journal of the iron and steel industry, lamented the 
1. An analysis of the turn-of-the-century merger movement and 
its successors is in Ralph L. Nelson, Merger Movements in American 
Industry, 1895-1956 (Princeton, N.J., 1959). 
2. Commercial and Financial Chronicle, June 9, 1900, p. 1121. 
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trend toward paternalism and nationalization seen in va­
rious proposals or enactments affecting railroads, telephone 
and telegraph, savings banks, and in aids to labor, such 
as workmen's compensation and old-age assistance. As 
practiced abroad and advocated by American economists, 
reformers, and even government reports, such measures 
were denounced by Iron Age as representing a "pronounced 
shift to socialism" and the first step toward "demoraliza­
tion of the individual." 3 These views of leading business 
publications, which were not atypical, suggest the range of 
problems that confronted a newly industrialized nation and 
the position of many businessmen with respect to them. 
The basic question was how the gains of large-scale en­
terprise could be preserved without the abuse of private 
economic power. Or, in different terms, how could concen­
tration of ownership and control in basic industries be 
reconciled with traditional American values associated with 
decentralized business decision-making and economic oppor­
tunity for the individual? 
More than a decade earlier the nation had adopted two 
basic approaches to this problem: regulation of railroads as 
an answer to the absence of competition or the presence of 
uneconomic competition, and punitive action for restraints 
on competition. In the interim, however, the triumph of the 
political and legislative processes represented by the Act 
to Regulate Interstate Commerce (1887) and the Sherman 
Antitrust Act (1890) had been rendered largely impotent. 
The former was incapacitated by court decisions depriving 
the Interstate Commerce Commission of power over rail 
rates.4 The latter was hamstrung by the ruling in the E. C. 
3. "Paternalism and Industrial Development," Iron Age, June 28, 
1900, p. 17. 
4. Following a series of reverses at the hands of the Supreme
Court, the ICC announced in its 1897 annual report: "The people should
no longer look to this commission for a protection which it is power­
less to extend," 
 195 GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS RELATIONS
Knight case (1895) that deprived the antitrust law of effect 
with respect to "close" combinations or mergers, though 
they could suppress competition just as readily as "loose" 
combinations or overt conspiracies in restraint of trade 
with which the courts dealt harshly.5 
The establishment of a principle through legislation and 
the watering-down of it in implementation has been a key 
characteristic of changing government-business relations. 
At the moment a major statute affecting business is signed, 
and perhaps for a time thereafter, it may seem to the public, 
and to businessmen, that a significant change in government-
business relations has occurred. Frequently, however, the 
results are long in coming, and then they may come in quite 
unanticipated ways. Thus, businessmen are often more 
alarmed at the prospect of change involving new govern­
mental functions than the results warrant. For example, 
Charles E. Perkins, president of the Chicago, Burlington & 
Quincy Railroad, had been greatly alarmed about the pas­
sage and potential consequences of the Interstate Commerce 
Act, which he believed violated management's decision-
making prerogatives. He communicated these feelings to 
stockholders through the medium of the railroad's annual 
reports and, apparently, directly to corporation lawyer 
Richard Olney. Writing to Perkins in 1892, Olney had 
advised against any move to abolish the ICC. With real 
insight into the nature of the pragmatic governmental pro­
cess, he wrote: 
The Commission, as its functions have now been limited by the 
Courts, is, or can be made of great use to the railroads. It satis­
fies the popular clamor for government supervision of railroads 
at the same time that the supervision is almost entirely nominal. 
5. Merle Fainsod, Lincoln Gordon, and Joseph C. Palamountain, 
Jr., Government and the American Economy (3d ed.; New York, 
1959), pp. 451-52. 
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Further, the older such a commission gets to be, the more inclined 
it will be found to be to take the business and railroad view of 
things. It thus becomes a sort of barrier between the railroad 
corporations and the people and a sort of protection against hasty 
and crude legislation hostile to railroad interests.6 
Many critics of the administrative process would find little 
difficulty, though small comfort, in agreeing with Olney's 
statement of its weaknesses. 
Business adaptation to the Supreme Court's interpreta­
tion of the Sherman Act was equally pragmatic and chal­
lenged the very purposes for which the Act had been 
adopted. The alliance between government and business 
was so close during this period that the same Olney as 
Attorney General, after the government's setback in the 
Knight case, declared that the outcome only demonstrated 
the futility of initiating such cases.7 Building on this atti­
tude and the Supreme Court's position on "close" combina­
tions, businessmen and financiers moved into a great merger 
movement free from the fear of antitrust prosecution.8 
The rising public demand that government demonstrate 
its supremacy over, rather than subservience to, business 
found a receptive response in Theodore Roosevelt, who 
entered the White House by accident in 1901. No enemy of 
big business as such, he recognized that failure to meet this 
demand for government action could result in big business 
6. Quoted in James M. Smith and Paul L. Murphy (eds.), Liberty
and Justice, a Historical Record of American Constitutional De­
velopment (New York, 1958), pp. 292-93. 
7. Asserting that he had anticipated the decision (which in part 
reflected poor handling of the government's case), Olney wrote that
he had "taken the responsibility of not prosecuting under a law I be­
lieved to be no good" (quoted in Fainsod, Gordon, and Palamountain,
Government and the American Economy [3d ed.], p. 450). 
8. Noting that the Sherman Act had been deliberately allowed to 
become a "dead letter," the United States Investor (March 1, 1902, 
p. 381) declared: "Great industries have been built up in alleged 
contravention of dead letter laws, and upon the stability of these 
industries depends the welfare of thousands and millions of the peo­
ple in the United States." 
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undermining the very system of private decision-making 
that had given it power. Thus he began early to talk about 
national control of corporations and revision of the tariff, 
without actively promoting legislation to accomplish either 
objective. On the other hand, by focusing public attention 
on specific issues of governmental versus business power, 
he created a favorable environment for executive, legisla­
tive, and judicial actions with respect to business. His task 
was to steer a middle course between pressures for drastic 
action and no action at all. 
Roosevelt's basic strategy was to revive the antitrust law 
as a source of uncertainty for business and to strengthen 
the powers of the ice. The former was accomplished when, 
on his initiative, the government launched a successful 
action against the Northern Securities Company, a railroad 
holding company in which J. P. Morgan, James J. Hill, E. 
H. Harriman, and other leading business and financial 
figures were prominent. The incredulity with which this 
attack was received by Morgan is reflected in the story that 
he suggested that his lawyer and Roosevelt's attorney gen­
eral, Philander C. Knox, get together and settle the problem. 
Whether the story is apocryphal or not, it is in keeping 
with the comfortable relationship that had existed up to 
that time between business and government.9 
In 1904 the Supreme Court sustained the government's 
contention that mere possession of power to suppress com­
petition was sufficient to place the Northern Securities 
Company in violation of the Sherman Act.10 This decision 
in conjunction with one rendered the following year against 
the meat-packers,11 was sufficient to establish the new 
potency of the antitrust statute. 
9. Morgan himself went to Washington to discuss the prosecution 
with Roosevelt. According to one report, "Mr. Morgan is a very sore 
man indeed. The attack on the Northern Securities Company has 
cut him to the quick."—Ibid., March 29, 1902, pp. 574-75. 
10. Northern Securities Company v. U.S., 193 U.S. 197 (1904). 
11. Swift & Co. v. U.S., 196 U.S. 375 (1905). 
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Meantime, the administration had sought and obtained 
additional powers for the ice. The Elkins Act of 1903 
strengthened the rebating section of the Interstate Com­
merce Act, and in 1906 the Hepburn Amendment to the 
basic statute not only expanded the jurisdiction of the 
Commission but added to its powers, especially those re­
lating to railroad rates. These legislative victories gave 
new importance to the administrative process as a means of 
exercising governmental supervision over business, thus 
setting a precedent that in subsequent decades became an 
increasingly important factor in government-business re­
lations.12 After the excitement engendered among railroad 
leaders and the public by the build-up to these measures was 
dissipated in legislative action, however, the process of ad­
justment settled down to the relative anonymity that 
characterizes the implementation of much legislation affect­
ing business. 
Having vindicated the antitrust principle, Roosevelt had 
no desire to implement it indiscriminately to destroy big 
business. Frankly contemptuous of the courts and fearful 
of their willingness to apply the statute literally to "every 
combination" in restraint of trade, whether meritorious 
(i. e., reasonable) or not (i. e., unreasonable), he sought to 
modify the law to place this discretion in the hands of an 
administrative body. His endeavor to shift power from one 
branch of the government to another ran into congressional 
opposition and popular allegiance to the Sherman Act as a 
statement of the nation's dedication to competition. Mean­
while, Roosevelt drew his own distinctions between "good" 
and "bad" trusts in selecting targets for prosecution. Thus 
Standard Oil found itself in the courts while United States 
12. The most perceptive study of the Roosevelt strategy is John 
M. Blum, "Theodore Roosevelt and the Hepburn Act: Toward an 
Orderly System of Control," Elting E. Morison et al. (eds.), The 
Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (8 vols.; Cambridge, 1951-54), VI, pp. 
1558-71. 
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Steel and International Harvester received the presidential 
blessing.13 Undoubtedly the co-operation extended by top 
officials of the latter concerns in connection with Roosevelt's 
attempt to change the Sherman Act stood them in good 
stead. But even the managers of the steel corporation had 
acknowledged the new element of uncertainty under the 
antitrust law by consulting the President in advance on 
their proposed acquisition of the Tennessee Coal, Iron & 
Railroad Company. 
Other legislation of this period, such as the Pure Food 
and Drug Act, and other presidential activity, such as inter­
vention in the anthracite-coal strike, had implications for 
government-business relations; but Roosevelt's lasting con­
tribution in this area was his emphasis on the principle of 
government's right and capacity to curb business. The 
assertion and illustration of the principle, even if the re­
sults were of a limited short-run nature, were sufficient to 
alert businessmen to a new form of uncertainty and to 
satisfy the public that government possessed the means to 
curb abuses of private economic power.14 In this way, a diffi­
cult transitional period was bridged; the traditions of pri­
vate decision-making in a competitive economy associated 
with small-scale units were preserved while the perpetuation 
of large-scale enterprise in important sectors of the economy 
13. See Arthur M. Johnson, "Theodore Roosevelt and the Bureau 
of Corporations," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLV (March, 
1959), 571-90. 
14. The thesis of this essay was succinctly expressed by investment 
banker Jacob H. Schiff in his comment on the lower court's decision 
in the Northern Securities case. In April, 1903, he wrote that this 
decision might prove a "blessing in disguise," for "promotion" had 
been overdone. Also, he had great faith in the country's adaptability. 
In his words, "The American people have a particular faculty for 
adapting themselves to conditions as they exist, and in due time the 
effects and results of even the conditions now created will wear off."— 
Cyrus Adler, Jacob H. Schiff; His Life and Letters (2 vols.; New 
York, 1928), I, p. 112. 
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was assured. To make the transition complete, however, it 
was necessary first for the judicial process and then for 
the electorate formally to confirm it. 
Certainty that the antitrust law had teeth and uncertainty 
about the way that it would be interpreted were important 
elements in its effectiveness as an indirect restraint on busi­
ness decision-making. The United States Supreme Court's 
decisions in the Standard Oil and American Tobacco cases 
(1911), which had been initiated before Roosevelt left office, 
succeeded in maintaining this delicate balance. While find­
ing each of the combinations guilty of violating the Sherman 
Act and ordering their dissolution, the Court also announced 
the so-called "Rule of Reason." In effect, the judiciary 
claimed for itself the right to exercise discretion as to the 
reasonableness or unreasonableness of a given combination, 
thus performing the function that Roosevelt had advocated 
for an administrative body.15 While the announcement of 
the Rule of Reason was hailed with enthusiasm by some 
leading businessmen, it did not completely replace uncer­
tainty with certainty. The mere fact of combination was 
now clearly no offense under the law, as at one time during 
this period it appeared that it might be. On the other hand, 
the general language of the Sherman Act and the procedural 
requirement that it be spelled out in case-by-case develop­
ment still left for businessmen a large area of uncertainty 
as to what constituted actionable offenses. Again, this 
was in the pragmatic tradition of government-business 
relations.16 
15. A concise and rewarding review of the Rule of Reason is in 
Milton Handler, Antitrust in Perspective, the Complementary Roles 
of Rule and Discretion (New York, 1957), chap. i. 
16. Addressing a luncheon meeting of the Iron and Steel Manu­
facturers at the Metropolitan Club in New York, May 29, 1911, Judge 
E. H. Gary of the United States Steel Corporation cautioned his 
audience against interpreting the recent decisions as permitting 
business to make its own rules of conduct. If such an interpretation
were adopted, he said, "We shall find that as a result and in the long 
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While the major antitrust prosecutions initiated by the 
Republican Roosevelt eventuated in satisfactory legal de­
cisions, the changes wrought by them were less impressive. 
In the Northern Securities case, the dissolution of the hold­
ing company and the distribution of its railroad stocks to 
their original owners left control where it had been.17 The 
dissolution of the Standard Oil and American Tobacco com­
binations took place on the same basis. Ironically, in the case 
of Standard Oil, the public disclosure of the combination's 
financial picture as a result of the antitrust proceedings 
skyrocketed the value of its stocks and resulted in windfall 
profits for those fortunate enough to own or acquire an 
interest in the constituent companies. Co-ordination of the 
activities of these companies continued through common 
ownership and by virtue of long-established relationships 
which no legal decree could destroy overnight. Here, as 
elsewhere, the pragmatism of the governmental process and 
of businessmen in adjusting to the requirements of public 
policy made the change gradual. Eventually, of course, 
ownership became widely dispersed and rival Standard Oil 
companies dwarfed the combination from which they were 
separated in 1911. While the appearance of change result­
ing from the court's decision was greater than the reality, 
the seeds of long-range change had been sown, governmental 
action had vindicated public expectations, and the spe­
cific enterprises had ample scope to adapt to their altered 
situation. 
run we will suffer by reason of such an attitude." His fears were justified, his prophecy correct, but the "long run" proved to be a 
period of twenty years—a perspective few businessmen, including 
Gary, could be expected to keep in focus. 
17. Justice White, who had dissented from the decision, noted the 
inconsistency of the remedy. "If the conspiracy and combination 
existed and was illegal," he wrote, "my mind fails to perceive why it 
should be left to produce its full force and effect in the hands of the 
individuals by whom it was charged the conspiracy was entered into."
—Northern Securities Company v. U.S., 193 U.S. 197 at 373. 
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The presidential election of 1912 took the form of a 
popular referendum on the acceptability of the principle of 
governmental supervision of business and ways of imple­
menting it in the future. Running on the Progressive 
ticket, Roosevelt pitched his campaign to the familiar theme 
that large-scale enterprise and co-operation were inevitable 
in many sectors of the economy and that the task was to 
keep business in line through governmental supervision. 
Democrat Woodrow Wilson paid obeisance to popular con­
cern for the small businessman, but he did not oppose big 
business that played "fair." Whether one adopted this ap­
proach or Roosevelt's, it called for increased governmental 
intervention in business decision-making. Eugene V. Debs, 
the Socialist candidate, called for a substitution of govern­
mental for business decision-making in key areas of the 
economy, while William Howard Taft placed primary em­
phasis on the efficacy of the legal process in dealing with 
business. 
The election of Wilson gave final confirmation to the 
principle of government supremacy over business and set 
the stage for its legislative implementation through the ad­
dition of new government functions. Creation of a central 
banking system combining public and private elements and 
adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment, providing for an 
income tax, were fraught with major long-run implications 
for business decision-making because of their potential im­
pact on the cost and productivity of capital, which go to 
the heart of the business system. However, these implica­
tions were, once again typically, decades in working them­
selves out. 
Of more immediate importance was confirmation of the 
principle that governmental regulation involving continu­
ous administrative relationships with business was to be 
a cornerstone of public policy in areas other than public 
utilities. Implementation of the principle was to be limited 
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and primarily in the interest of small business. Mainte­
nance of "fair competition" was to be the objective, and 
reliance was to be placed on a supposedly expert body that 
could gradually define it. In the words of the conference 
report on the Federal Trade Commission bill: "The most 
certain way to stop monopoly at the threshold is to prevent 
unfair competition. This can be best accomplished through 
the action of an administrative body of practical men thor­
oughly informed in regard to business, who will be able 
to apply the rule enacted by Congress to particular business 
situations, so as to eradicate evils with the least risk of 
interfering with legitimate business operations." Authority 
to proceed in this direction was contained in Section 5 of the 
FTC Act which declared that "unfair methods of competition 
in commerce are hereby declared unlawful." 
Typical of the multifaceted congressional approach to 
problems involving business, the FTC Act was accompanied 
by another statute, the Clayton Act, which attempted to be 
relatively specific where the former was vague. Thus it 
prohibited price discrimination, exclusive dealing leases, 
sales, contracts, discounts, and rebates where any of these 
practices resulted in substantially lessening competition 
or tended to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. 
Other sections of the statute prohibited certain interlocking 
directorates or acquisition of stock in one corporation by 
another where the results in terms of competition or mo­
nopoly were similar to those of price discrimination out­
lawed in the Act. Such provisions were intended to provide 
the businessman with somewhat greater certainty as to the 
nature of antitrust offenses while organized labor was 
recognized in its exemption from the antitrust law. En­
forcement was to be shared between the FTC and the Justice 
Department. 
Substantively, this legislation added little that was new, 
but the concept and the procedures specified for implement­
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ing it were important in confirming the course laid out for 
government-business relations during the first decade of the 
century. They were an affirmation that prevention of busi­
ness abuses through continuing governmental supervision, 
publicity, and the exercise of administrative discretion was 
as important as punishment. The new statutes potentially 
thrust government further into the areas of managerial 
decision-making, but primarily in the marketing area. The 
loopholes in the law, the philosophy of the FTC, and the 
time-consuming character of administrative and legal pro­
cesses delayed—where it did not negate—the impact of this 
legislation on business decision-making.18 
It has been the thesis of the preceding pages that the 
pragmatic character of governmental processes and business 
response to them had, by 1914, brought about a workable 
adjustment between public and private interests while lay­
ing the foundations for future significant changes in gov­
ernment-business relations. Above all, the process had been 
gradual. The principle that government could supervise 
and punish business to protect society's interest in private 
decision-making was firmly established. Although the prin­
ciple was far from fully implemented, its existence was 
recognized by businessmen and it met the requirements for 
action demanded by the electorate. The unique character­
istics of its expression lay in the flexibility, multiplicity, 
and adaptability of the individual processes that were in­
volved. As a result, even though the potential for rapid 
and drastic change in government-business relations had 
been suggested, the degree of effective change in the param­
eters of business decision-making was relatively small. 
The adjustment achieved between government and busi­
ness in the years 1901-14 did not seriously encroach on 
18. The long process of giving meaning and effect to Section 7 of 
the Clayton Act is traced in David D. Martin, Mergers and the 
Clayton Act (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959). 
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business decision-making, and it gained for businessmen one 
more opportuniity to determine the pace and direction of 
economic activity with little or no governmental interven­
tion. In a far more complex economy than that of the nine­
teenth century, business achieved some notable triumphs, 
especially in fields that were basically scientific, techno­
logical, or engineering in nature. Meanwhile, changes in 
the economy invalidated the premises on which some earlier 
restrictive legislation, such as the Interstate Commerce Act, 
was based, and governmental functions intended to restrain 
business were put to business uses. 
Co-operation between business and government was a 
hallmark of the World War I era, and the lessons of co­
operation were carried over into the organization of 
industry-wide trade associations which played an increas­
ingly important role in business relations with government. 
In the postwar decade, government was once more subordi­
nated to business. The political and legislative processes 
offered few threats to the freedom of business decision-
making. The judicial process frustrated or modified the 
limited efforts of government administrators to apply re­
straints, and the administrators themselves turned to aiding 
business. The new era for the FTC began when W. E. 
Humphrey was appointed to the Commission in 1925 and 
denounced its use as an "instrument of oppression and dis­
turbance and injury instead of a help to business."19 
Thenceforth the Commission took a leading role in en­
couraging self-regulation of business and, in co-operation 
with the Department of Commerce, helped trade associ­
ations to develop codes governing trade practices. 
In this favorable environment, a new merger movement 
unfolded with the same immunity from governmental re­
straint as the great similar movement at the turn of the 
19. Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old 
Order, 1919-1988 (The Age of Roosevelt), (Boston, 1957), p. 65. 
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century. By 1930 the corporate ownership of business had 
been impressively concentrated, while management had be­
come further separted from ownership. The famous Berle 
and Means study of the nation's 200 largest non-financial 
corporations as of January 1, 1930, showed that they con­
trolled 49.2 per cent of non-banking corporate wealth, re­
ceived 43.2 per cent of the income in that category, and 
represented about 38 per cent of all the business wealth in 
the country.20 Forecasting still further developments in 
the same direction, the authors of this study saw a need 
"for the claims of the community to be put forward with 
clarity and force." 21 
Meanwhile, the collapse of the economy under the on­
slaught of depression raised the question of the way in 
which these claims would be put forward. The economic 
catastrophe that overtook the country had revealed the 
weaknesses of a business system allowed too much freedom 
to regulate itself. "The danger in our situation," declared 
Dean Wallace Donham of the Harvard Business School, 
"lies not in radical propaganda, but in lack of effective 
business leadership." — A demoralized business community, 
like the rest of the electorate, turned to government for 
answers. 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt radiated confidence, but 
he had no master plan for recovery. As Dexter Perkins has 
20. Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property (New York, 1933), pp. 28-31. 
21. In the view of Berle and Means it seemed "almost essential" 
to the survival of the corporate system that those exercising control 
of major corporations act to balance the claims of the various groups
in the community and assign to each a part of the income stream on 
the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity" (ibid., p. 356). 
For Berle's later views, see The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution (New York, 1954). For the other views on the contemporary corpora­
tion and its significance, see Edward S. Mason (ed.), The Corporation
in Modern Society (Cambridge, 1959). 
22. Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old 
Order, p. 181. 
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observed, "he was experimental rather than revolution­
ary." 23 Therefore, in the pragmatic tradition, multiple 
approaches to the nation's economic problems were adopted. 
Many of them had their roots in the past, and they were 
frequently contradictory. For example, the type of business 
co-operation fostered by trade associations in the 1920's 
was given governmental support and exemption from the 
antitrust laws in the National Industrial Recovery Act of 
1933. Later the same or similar practices were attacked 
under the leadership of Assistant Attorney General Thur­
man Arnold, spurred by the findings of the Temporary 
National Economic Committee. The principle of direct 
governmental supervision of business established in the 
period 1901-14 was given new vitality and meaning as the 
statutes of that era were strengthened, and the administra­
tive process assumed a new importance. The principle of 
government competition with private enterprise, recognized 
during the Wilson administration in the "yardstick" opera­
tion of naval shipyards as a check on private naval con­
tractors, was revived—most notably in the Tennessee Valley 
Authority. Statutes such as the Securities and Exchange 
Act, the Natural Gas Act, and the Public Utility Holding 
Company Act imposed restraints on specific types of busi­
ness activity.24 
Once again the impact of change was absorbed, though 
less completely than before, by the frictions and discon­
tinuities of governmental processes. Although the legisla­
tive process was speeded up in the early days of the New 
Deal to cope with the emergency, the judicial process re­
23. Dexter Perkins, The New Age of Franklin Roosevelt, 1932-1945 
(Chicago, 1957), p. 74. 
24. The Securities and Exchange Act as a regulatory device placed 
major reliance on publicity and afforded the investor some protection 
against misleading information but not against errors in investment 
judgment. The Natural Gas Act, on the other hand, as the result 
of judicial interpretation (Phillips Petroleum Co. v. State of Wis­
consin, 346 U.S. 934 [1954]) brought the Federal Power Commission 
into problems of direct price control. 
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suited in the invalidation of one major measure after 
another until 1937. A bitter battle developed between the 
President and the Supreme Court, but both Congressional 
and popular allegiance to the traditional interrelationship 
of governmental processes defeated Roosevelt's plan to 
"pack" the Court. Nevertheless, in 1937, that tribunal 
finally abandoned its oft-asserted right to invalidate legisla­
tive acts for conflicting with its interpretation of substan­
tive due process of law. Furthermore, it began to show 
increased reluctance to review administrative acts for com­
pliance with procedural due process. 
The change in the Supreme Court's position weakened 
an important element in the chain of governmental pro­
cesses which up to 1937 had helped business to alter, deflect, 
or absorb the impact of change in government-business 
relations. While the courts still remained open to business­
men challenging the constitutionality of restrictive legisla­
tion or the legality of specific administrative determinations, 
this avenue of relief became considerably less important 
than it had been previously. 
Although the reforming zeal of the New Deal was on the 
wane by 1938 and businessmen's confidence in their ability 
to cope with economic problems had revived, some important 
changes in government-business relationships had occurred. 
The administrative process took on a new significance for 
many businesses. Organized labor received the sanction 
and support of government, thereby imposing a direct and 
immediate restraint both on business influence in govern­
ment and on managerial decisions with respect to the human 
element in production. And, finally, government assumed, 
on an experimental basis, a new responsibility for perform­
ance of the economy through deficit spending and the use 
of fiscal and monetary controls to affect the environment of 
entrepreneurial decisions on the allocation of capital. 
These changes in government-business relations had a 
potential for replacing private with public decisions that 
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had not existed previously; yet they still left businessmen 
with room to adapt. Thus the labor relations expert, the 
tax expert, and the legal expert assumed a new promi­
nence in business management. While business had always 
softened the impact of change in its relations with govern­
ment by adaptation, this process became increasingly im­
portant as exploitation of time-consuming governmental 
processes proved less rewarding. 
Despite some fundamental changes in the environment 
and conditions of business decision-making under the New 
Deal, government did not replace business as the primary 
mechanism for allocating resources in the economy.25 Busi­
ness had by no means lost all its influence in government, 
and numerous measures, such as the Buy American Act of 
1933 and the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, reflected this 
fact. Government support of stabilizing devices—in the oil 
and sugar industries, to mention only two—removed some 
elements of uncertainty in business decision-making and 
revealed government as an ally as well as antagonist of 
business. 
Whether additional governmental intervention in the 
economy might have occurred as a result of continued de­
pression is an academic question since the coming of World 
War II, and then its aftermath, wrought further basic 
changes in government-business relationships that have re­
versed and modified, as well as strengthened, the develop­
ments of the 1930's. 
The war emergency not only ended the problems arising 
from depression but brought about a new era of government-
business co-operation. The productive capacity of the na­
tion was strained to the limit, while government added 
25. In 1940, federal expenditures on goods and services accounted 
for only about 6.2 per cent of all goods and services produced in that 
year. U.S. Bureau of Census, Historical Statistics of the United 
States, 1789-1945 (Washington, D.C., 1949), p. 12. 
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to industrial facilities operated by business for the war 
effort. In the mobilization of these resources, businessmen 
became bureaucrats. The co-operative and compulsory de­
vices developed during World War I were refurbished and 
supplemented. The conflicts of the preceding decade be­
tween business and government were submerged, if not 
forgotten, in the common effort for the nation's survival. 
The situation was well illustrated by the petroleum in­
dustry. As the nation balanced on the brink of war, the 
major oil companies selling gasoline in the Midwest were 
smarting under the verdict of the Supreme Court that they 
had violated the antitrust law in following practices that 
the companies claimed had been sanctioned under the Na­
tional Recovery Administration and subsequently.26 Thur­
man Arnold's Antitrust Division was preparing a suit 
against the major oil companies and the industry's leading 
trade association, the American Petroleum Institute. Pipe­
line affiliates of these companies faced prosecution for 
alleged violation of the Elkins Act. With the United States 
involvement in the world conflict, however, these pro­
ceedings were quickly suspended. The industry turned to 
meeting war's demands; oilmen took government posts; 
pipeliners accepted a consent decree and, with government 
authority and funds, went to work on the problem of build­
ing emergency pipelines to take the place of tankers lost 
to German submarines. 
Some old controversies died harder than others. Charges 
and countercharges flew back and forth between some public 
officials and Standard Oil Company (New Jersey) execu­
tives in connection with the synthetic rubber program. The 
company's president was hailed before a Senate committee 
to explain prewar agreements with I. G. Farben in con­
26. U.S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). Frank 
Freidel has suggested that the antitrust drive was encouraged by 
Roosevelt to forestall drastic Congressional action (The New Deal m 
Historical Perspective [Washington, D.C., 1959], pp. 18-19). 
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nection with synthetic rubber patents, but once this ritual 
was performed Jersey Standard settled down to producing 
the essential commodity in facilities financed by the 
government. 
Technological and managerial proficiencies developed in 
business were applied to other fields important to the war 
effort. For example, large companies like DuPont, General 
Electric, and Union Carbide were asked to share in pio­
neering the development and operation of nuclear facilities, 
with government providing the capital and exercising over­
all planning and control. It has been charged that big 
business profited unduly from such wartime relationships. 
Benefits were said to have ranged from quick tax write­
offs and acquisition of government-built plants at a fraction 
of their cost to patents and know-how derived from war 
work at government expense.27 But if big business benefited 
from war contracts and war work, small business also made 
effective claims on government. The Small Defense Plants 
legislation of World War II provided specific recognition 
of these interests and was the forerunner of the Small 
Business Act of 1953, which has made government the 
guardian and financial backer of the entrepreneur conduct­
ing a business "independently owned and operated . . . 
and not dominant in its field of operation." 28 
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the war experi­
ence was the speed with which direct government controls 
on labor, business, and consumer were abandoned after the 
war. Government allocation of resources and wage, price, 
and credit controls had centralized wartime decision-making 
for the economy, but within a year of V-J Day most of these 
restraints had been abandoned. The responsiveness of the 
27. See Walter Adams and Horace M. Gray, Monopoly in America: 
The Government as Promoter (New York, 1955). 
28. The way in which small business sought and received govern­
ment aid and encouragement is told in Harmon Ziegler, The Politics 
of Small Business (Washington, D.C., 1961). 
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political and legislative processes to major groups in the 
economy had not been deadened by war. 
In the transition to more normal operations, government 
undertook to affect directly the postwar environment of 
competition in certain industries by the terms on which it 
disposed of defense facilities. The Reynolds and Kaiser 
companies, for example, had government aid in challenging 
Alcoa's long-time monopoly in the aluminum industry, while 
the latter company found itself the loser in a landmark anti­
trust case that repudiated the Supreme Court's earlier 
stand that unexercised monopoly was no offense under the 
Sherman Act. On the other hand, the pragmatic and con­
tradictory character of governmental processes was illus­
trated by the fact that the Attorney General found no 
objection in 1946 to the sale of the government's Geneva, 
Utah, steel plant to U.S. Steel, which thus gained some 50 
per cent of the Pacific Coast's ingot capacity. 
During the war, government began to assume the fi­
nancial risks of innovation in many areas at the frontiers 
of science. The continuation of world crisis after the end 
of active hostilities appears to have confirmed this govern­
mental function. Federal funds, for example, have under­
pinned the development of commercial jet transportation 
as well as electronics and rocketry. The large military 
research-and-development budget underlies the health of 
many a business, large and small. 
Political and military decisions, directly or indirectly, 
affect many private entrepreneurial decisions. In its normal 
operations, government is a major customer for many busi­
nesses. In connection with defense activities, governmental 
decisions on what to buy for national stockpiles of strategic 
materials, as well as what weapons system to emphasize or 
de-emphasize, have repercussions on firms only partially 
devoted to government business. Business strategy and 
profits may well hinge on the perceptiveness with which 
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managers evaluate the government market for goods and 
services. A direct link between such public and private 
decision-making is provided by the interchange of personnel 
between government and business, whereby generals and 
admirals have been lured to private concerns while business­
men have been called to top government posts, especially in 
the defense establishment. 
The latter development suggests that the problems of 
management and control in government have increasingly 
paralleled those in business, and the similarities have even 
extended to the form in which government activities are 
organized. A corporate form characterizes many govern­
ment financial and business-type activities. Although this 
form was tried by government during World War I, it did 
not come into prominence until the 1930's. Perhaps the 
most notable example was the Reconstruction Finance Cor­
poration, organized in 1932 to provide financial aid to busi­
ness and active until 1953. The RFC was followed by an 
impressive number of other public corporations, including 
the TVA, the Production Credit Corporation, and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation. 
Business-type agencies of the government have also 
entered into business relationships with one another and 
with private corporations. For example, while the TVA 
displaced private electrical utilities in its area and the allo­
cation of its costs has been the subject of continuing contro­
versy, it has developed working relationships with private 
power companies and has even gone into the money market 
with its own securities. Privately owned companies of 
various types have profited from markets opened up or 
supplied by the TVA. Such intermingling of activities could 
only be the product of a pragmatic system of government-
business relations given time to work itself out. 
In this tradition, the experimentation of the New Deal 
was followed by formal adoption of the principle of govern­
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mental responsibility for full employment and the increased 
use of monetary and fiscal controls in shaping the environ­
ment of private business decision-making. The significant 
Employment Act of 1946 asserted government's responsi­
bility "to promote maximum employment, production, and 
purchasing power," though it was to do so "in a manner 
calculated to foster and promote free competitive enterprise 
and the general welfare." The wording of section 2 of the 
Act, from which these quotations are taken, reflects the 
compromises forced in the legislative process by the con­
flict between labor and liberal groups, who wished to see 
fiscal policy made the primary means of insuring full em­
ployment, and business and conservative groups, who were 
unprepared to make this the sole objective of the legislation 
or fiscal policy the only means to achieve it.29 
The 1946 Employment Act is based on the concept of 
countercyclical activity (i.e., government spending more 
than it taxes to offset economic contraction and reversing 
the process to check inflationary pressures) aided by Fed­
eral Reserve and Treasury policies affecting the cost and 
availability of credit. "Built-in stabilizers" such as income 
taxes and unemployment insurance, which are geared to 
the level of income, supplement the countercyclical devices. 
Like other major principles mentioned in this chapter, that 
of governmental responsibility for full employment has 
undergone a slow process of testing and development. De­
fense and foreign-policy spending, plus a high level of 
domestic economic activity, have prevented major crises 
that would require full implementation of the principle. 
Fiscal action in 1949 and operation of built-in stabilizers in 
1957-58 dampened recession, but monetary policy failed to 
check postwar inflation. 
29. An excellent study of the pragmatic approach to this legisla­
tion is contained in Stephen K. Bailey, Congress Makes a Law, the 
Story Behind the Employment Act of 1946 (New York, 1950). 
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These devices for combining stability with growth in 
the economy rely heavily on business response to the finan­
cial environment created by government. The level and 
type of taxation, for example, affect the profitability of 
business and, therefore, the incentives for private invest­
ment. A businessman-entrepreneur is taxed differently 
from one who conducts his enterprise in corporate form, 
and a corporation with income of less than $25,000 a year 
is taxed differently from one that earns more. The entire 
structure and financial strategy of a business today may 
be significantly related to such statutory tax provisions 
and their administrative interpretation. While government 
thus conditions the environment for financial decision-
making, it does not control most specific decisions. Each 
businessman is free to adapt to his environment in the 
manner he thinks best. Similarly, he is free to attempt to 
change the environment as it affects him specifically or as 
it affects the whole business system. As a result of the 
developments of the last sixty years, however, the con­
temporary businessman is considerably less free than his 
counterpart in 1900 to make decisions, financial or other­
wise, without reference to the framework of government-
business relations. 
No matter how the impact of change has been absorbed, 
the steady growth of governmental power to affect business 
for better or for worse is a phenomenon of major im­
portance to business management. Under these pressures, 
deliberate flouting of government or public opinion does 
not characterize most business decision-making. Profes­
sional managers of American business today realize that 
arbitrary use of power can provoke unfavorable public 
reactions that will be reflected in or through government, 
bringing new restraints on their freedom of decision-
making. The lesson of government-business relations in 
this century, and particularly in the last thirty years, is 
216 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 
quite clear in this respect. Inadequate acceptance of it 
has brought well-deserved obloquy to a few leading con­
cerns and businessmen in the past few years.30 Their diffi­
culties have emphasized anew that however pressing the 
business requirements for a certain line of action, if the 
possibility of directly affronting governmental authority or 
public opinion is involved, the manner of meeting these 
requirements is an important ingredient of the results. 
If one reviews developments in government-business re­
lations during the past sixty years, the following major 
changes stand out. First, the role of business in the econ­
omy has been made conditional on performance and business 
acceptance of government as the vehicle through which the 
public's wants and needs can be effectively expressed. Sec­
ond, along with this change, businessmen have found that 
both managerial and entrepreneurial decisions are affected 
and limited by government, both directly and indirectly. 
Accordingly, the implications of these decisions have had 
increasingly to be considered in this light. Third, while 
other groups have looked to government to curb business, 
business has also sought and found answers to some of its 
problems through government, thus inviting further con­
trol. Fourth, government has been forced by circumstances, 
such as war, to rely more than ever before on business. 
Furthermore, government has utilized business forms and 
procedures in conducting its business. The interchange 
between the two has been reflected by the transmigration 
of public officials into business and, in times of emergency, 
30. For an account of one such episode, see John Herling, The 
Great Price Conspiracy, the Story of the Antitrust Violations in the 
Electrical Industry (Washington, D.C., 1962). For a general indict­
ment of big business, see Theodore K. Quinn, Unconscious Public 
Enemies (New York, 1962). For an analysis and rebuttal of such 
charges, see John D. Glover, The Attack on Big Business (Boston, 
1954). 
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businessmen into government. As a result, government and 
business have become linked in complex relationships that 
defy precise description. 
Underlying the changes in relations has been the conti­
nuity provided by the processes involved. Their common 
characteristic has been a basic pragmatism which has en­
couraged flexibility, variety, and specificity in the relation­
ships. The political and legislative processes have offered 
avenues for the establishment of new principles governing 
basic relationships and have provided an outlet for the 
popular emotions and economic pressures that accompany 
conflicts of group interests. The implementation of the 
results has involved administrative and legal processes, 
where the time-lag has frequently been great. In the past 
these processes, because of their change-absorbing charac­
teristics, have generally given business ample time to adapt 
to new governmental restraints and, though sometimes 
abused, have helped to preserve private decision-making in 
the economy. On the other hand, the history of government-
business relations since 1900 shows that over-all change has 
itself been a long-run process consisting of experimentation, 
establishment of a principle, and implementation on a 
gradual basis. Therefore, by the time implementation be­
comes meaningful, the economy may have changed to the 
extent that the principle involved needs to be revised or 
discarded. Again, time-consuming governmental processes 
retard change and tend to confirm rigidities that limit 
adjustments to new conditions, whether by business or 
government. The problems confronting the nation's trans­
portation system stem in part from such rigidity in both 
the principles and implementation of regulation. As Presi­
lent Kennedy pointed out in his transportation message of 
April, 1962: "A chaotic patchwork of inconsistent and 
often obsolete legislation and regulation has evolved from 
a history of specific actions addressed to specific problems of 
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specific industries at specific times. This patchwork does not 
fully reflect either the dramatic changes in technology of the 
past half century, or the parallel changes in the structure of 
competition."31 Such are the costs of reliance on a 
pragmatic process of achieving and cushioning change in 
government-business relations. 
Since the turn of the century there has been remarkable 
continuity in Congressional approval of broad grants 
of power to executive departments and semi-autonomous 
agencies. They have made the government administrator 
a partner in many business decisions, even if in absentia. 
Especially since the mid-1930's this development has begun 
to limit the range of managerial adaptation to changing eco­
nomic conditions and has rendered the legal process, once a 
bulwark of business against government, a less rewarding 
avenue for challenging basic principles of government-
business relations or their implementation.32 The latter 
process has become so continuous and direct that the possible 
business benefits to be derived by appealing from it are 
often lost in the time consumed. Resort to the political 
and legislative processes has the same drawbacks. Thus, 
an increasingly higher premium has been placed on the 
businessman's ability to anticipate, avoid, or adapt to ad­
ministrative expressions of governmental power. The task 
is not necessarily a difficult one; co-operation as well as 
combat marks many of these relationships. Still, the time, 
money, and skills devoted to such matters increase the 
cost of doing business, which is ultimately borne by the 
consumer. 
31. Message from the President of the United States, "The Trans­
portation System of Our Nation," 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., House Doc. 
384 (1962), p. 2. 
32. Justice Jackson, a decade ago, noted that "the rise of ad­
ministrative bodies probably has been the most significant legal trend
of the last century and perhaps more values today are affected by 
their decisions than by those of all the courts, review of administra­
tive decisions apart."—FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, at 487 (1952). 
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The most recent principle of direct governmental respon­
sibility for the performance of the economy has not yet 
been fully implemented or tested. Business still exercises 
the primary, if conditional, role in guiding the nation's 
economic affairs. The extent of public aid to business, 
direct and indirect, is testimony to business influence in 
government and to government's reliance on business. More 
importantly, perhaps, it reveals the electorate's continuing 
allegiance to private-business decision-making, even in cases 
where business has to be publicly supported or controlled. 
No better illustration of the pragmatic character of conti­
nuity and change in goverment-business relations could be 
advanced. 

The Emergence of Mass-Production Unionism 
DAVID BRODY 
AT THE coming of the New Deal, American organized labor 
was an arrested movement. Membership was slightly under 
three million in 1933. The unionized portion of the non­
agricultural labor force—one-tenth—remained unchanged 
after thirty years. It was not only a matter of numbers. 
Labor strength was limited to the needle trades, public 
utilities (excluding communications), coal-mining, building 
construction, and the railroads. A vacuum existed in manu­
facturing, above all, in the mass-production sector. Organ­
ized labor had not breached the industries characterized by 
the giant firm; by multiplant operation for a national mar­
ket; by an advanced technology involving mechanization and 
division of labor; and by a work force composed primarily 
of unskilled and semi-skilled men. The mass-production 
core—iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, rubber, electrical 
products, chemicals and petroleum, and food-processing— 
seemed impervious to trade unionism. 
The great breakthrough occurred after 1935. A decade 
later, most of the mass-production industries had experi­
enced thorough unionization. The consequences were, of 
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course, profound. It was, as Walter Galenson said, "a 
fundamental, almost revolutionary change in the power re­
lationships of American society." *• The accomplishment had 
its origin in the 1930's. But the favoring climate of that 
decade failed to carry the new unionism to its conclusion. 
Ultimately, permanent success came from the very events 
that ended the Great Depression and the New Deal. 
The unionization of the mass-production industries still 
requires explanation; that is the purpose of this preliminary 
2essay.
The achievement began within the changing labor move­
ment. The central fact, obviously, was the creation of the 
Congress of Industrial Organizations (initially, the Com­
mittee for Industrial Organization) as the unionizing 
agency for the basic industries. Several related questions 
claim our attention here. What was the necessity that split 
organized labor? What did the cio bring to bear that had 
been lacking in the American Federation of Labor approach 
to the unionizing of mass production? And, finally, was the 
union effort decisive in accounting for the organization of 
the mass-production sector? 
The irreconcilable issue seemingly was a matter of struc­
ture: industrial versus craft unionism. Industrial organ­
ization—the inclusion of all workers in an industry within 
one union—was a choice closed to the AF of L for several 
reasons. Foremost was the numerical dominance of the 
craft unionists: since theirs were the interests to be injured, 
industrial-union resolutions had never mustered a majority 
1. Walter Galenson, The CIO Challenge to the AFL (Cambridge, 
1960), p. xvii, and for growth of union membership, pp. 583-93. 
2. Important recent research based on new sources has added much
information on this subject. The documentation will reveal my debts.
But no satisfying analysis has emerged from this scholarship. It was 
this conclusion which led to the undertaking of the present essay. 
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in AF of L conventions. The Federation was also in a con­
stitutional bind. Jurisdiction was exclusive: only one union 
could hold rights to a given category of workers. And it 
was absolute: a union did not have to organize its juris­
diction in order to maintain its right. The craft unions 
had a kind of property interest within the basic industries. 
Beyond that was the immovable fact of trade autonomy; 
the locus of power rested with the national unions. The 
AF of L was a voluntary institution, William Green ob­
served, and therefore had "no power to compel any union 
or person to do anything."3 Even the passage of an 
industrial-union resolution, Philip Taft has pointed out, 
"would not have forced any craft union to surrender its 
jurisdiction, nor compelled unions to amalgamate with 
each other." 4 There was, finally, the subtle role of macht­
politik within the labor movement. Themselves lacking 
power, Federation officers respected it in other hands. The 
power realities ordinarily favored the craft interests, and 
so, therefore, did the inclination of the AF of L leader­
ship. (William Green, agreeing as he did with the view­
point of the Lewis group, surely displayed that practical 
quality when the chips came down in 1935 and after.) 
These considerations remained binding during the his­
toric debate over structure that took place in the mid-1930's. 
At the AF of L convention of 1934 in San Francisco the 
issue was joined over the question of chartering national 
unions in the automobile, cement, aluminum, and other un­
specified mass-production fields. Industrial-union sentiment, 
stimulated by recent events, forced the convention to recog­
nize that "a new condition exists requiring organization 
upon a different basis to be most effective." But the conven­
3. James 0. Morris, Conflict within the AFL: A Study of Craft 
Versus Industrial Unionism, 1901-1938 (Ithaca, N. Y., 1958), p. 8. 
4. Philip Taft, The A.F. of L. in the Time of Gompers (New York, 
1957), p . ZOO. 
224 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 
tion also wanted to "fully protect the jurisdictional rights of 
all trade unions organized upon craft lines. . . ."5 This 
second statement carried more weight. The Executive Coun­
cil, to which the actual choice was left, excluded tool-, die-, 
and machine-making workers and parts plants from the 
jurisdiction of the new United Automobile Workers and 
maintenance and machine-installing men from the United 
Rubber Workers. The fateful Atlantic City convention of 
1935 ratified the decision against industrial unionism. 
It was a choice that John L. Lewis and his supporters 
could not accept. They insisted, as Charles Howard of 
the Typographical Union said, that "in the great mass-
production industries industrial organization is the only 
solution." The aftermath of the 1935 convention was inde­
pendent action that turned rapidly into dual unionism. 
It has been hard to hold the momentous events of 1934-35 
in perspective. The debate then was couched in the ter­
minology of industrial unionism, and the outcome was the 
creation of a group of strong industrial unions. So it 
seemed to follow that the conflict over structure was the 
key to the formation of the Cio. That conclusion misplaces 
the emphasis. 
The AF of L did not lack an alternative arrangement. No 
less than his critics, Samuel Gompers had seen the inappro­
priateness of the original craft structure for emerging 
American industrialism. Over the years, there had devel­
oped a response to mass production. Gompers had early 
accepted the need "to organize our fellow workers in un­
skilled labor." 
With the invention of new machines and the application of new 
forces, the division and subdivision of labor, many workers who 
had been employed at skilled trades find themselves with their 
5. AF of L, Proceedings (1934), pp. 586-7. 
 225 THE EMERGENCE OF MASS-PRODUCTION UNIONISM
occupations gone. . . . Thus we see the artisan of yesterday the 
unskilled laborer of today. 
The essential device was the federal labor union. Gathered 
first into these mixed local bodies, the unorganized would be 
drawn off by occupation into the appropriate national unions 
or into local trade unions affiliated, as were the federal 
unions, directly with the AF of L. The federal labor unions, 
said Gompers, were "the recruiting ground for the trade 
union movement." 6 
Besides organizing non-craft workers, the Federation 
tried to alter the existing structure to make room for them. 
Charters were granted to national unions covering the 
unskilled and semi-skilled within single industries; for 
instance, the Hod Carriers in construction and the Tin Plate 
Workers in tin plate manufacture. But Gompers' preference 
was for the less skilled to find a place within the "primary 
unions," that is, national unions covering the occupations 
specific to an industry.7 To that end, the AF of L urged 
unions to amalgamate or to accept broader jurisdictions. 
The optimum result was a national union covering all occu­
pations specific to an industry, irrespective of the skills 
involved, plus common labor. Such residual jurisdictions in 
fact were operative at some time in practically every mass-
production industry before the 1930's. The craft unions 
were not victimized thereby. Defining its position in the 
Scranton Declaration of 1901, the AF of L adhered as 
closely to the "fundamental principle" of craft organization 
"as the recent great changes in methods of production and 
6. Ibid. (1897), pp. 6,15. 
7. For lack of an apt term in the literature, I have coined the 
phrase "primary union" to describe organizations with residual jurisdiction in mass-production fields. It should be noted that the 
local unions of these nationals tended to be organized around trades 
or departments rather than plants, as would be the case with in­
dustrial unions. 
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employment make possible." 8 Primary jurisdictions would 
not normally encompass such inter-industry occupations as 
teamsters, carpenters, machinists, and similar trades. 
Co-ordination, finally, was encouraged. The primary and 
craft unions had to act together in the basic industries. As 
early as the Scranton Declaration, the suggestion had been 
made of "closely allying the sub-divided crafts" through 
"the organization of district and national trade coun­
cils. . . .  " Much of the subsequent co-operation, particu­
larly in joint organizing drives, was on an informal and 
sporadic basis. During and after World War I, national 
unions in meat-packing joined together only when faced 
with the need for common decisions. In steel, on the other 
hand, twenty-four national unions acted in 1918-20 through 
the permanent National Committee for Organizing Iron and 
Steel Workers. At the district level, local unions had formal 
bodies in the Schenectady plant of General Electric for over 
a decade after 1911, in meat-packing centers from 1901 
to 1904 and again in Chicago from 1917 to 1920, and in 
steel during the union upsurge of the war period. The 
departments of the AF of L also promoted joint union 
activity. The Metal Trades Department chartered local 
councils and mounted co-operative organizing drives, for 
instance, in the automobile industry in 1914 and 1927. In­
adequate though most of these ventures were, they did not 
show that organizational unity was unattainable under 
the primary-craft structural arrangement for the mass-
production fields. 
The AF of L was adhering to this established plan in 
1935. Its advocates insisted that the formula was workable. 
8. AF of L, Proceedings (1901), p. 240. AP of L organizing as­
sistance, for instance, required prior agreement, as the Butcher 
Workmen were informed in 1915, "that when the employees of the 
meat trust are organized, [they] shall be assigned to their respective 
organizations" (AF of L Executive Council Minutes, February 21-26, 
1916, p. 5). 
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The separation of craft workers would not, after all, be 
numerically important in mass production. The rubber 
industry was a case in point. Its labor force, according to 
a breakdown in the census of 1930, was composed of the 
following: 
559 carpenters 
395 compositors, linotypers, and typesetters 
915 electricians 
1,206 mechanics 
1,148 stationary engineers 
482 millwrights 
4,665 machinists 
805 plumbers 
300 toolmakers 
1,267 truck drivers 
456 painters and glaziers 
80,835 operatives 
29,123 laborers9 
Jurisdiction over the last two categories would give a rub­
ber workers' union nearly 90 per cent of the labor force 
in the industry. William Hutcheson of the Carpenters could 
not see why organization would be impeded by separating 
"a comparatively small number as compared to the total 
number employed in the rubber industry." And co­
ordination could surely be made to work. John Frey was 
convinced that "joint negotiations and joint agreement 
reached through the [Metal Trades] Department forms the 
most effective answer to . .  . the so-called industrial form 
of trade union organization . . . enabling an employer to 
negotiate but one agreement which will cover all his em­
9. Harold S. Roberts, The Rubber Workers: Labor Organization
and Collective Bargaining in the Rubber Industry (New York, 1944), 
p. 98. 
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ployees. . . ."10 In September, 1934, this policy had been 
adopted for the metal and building trades. Both AF of L de­
partments entered negotiations on this basis with the 
Anaconda Copper Company. 
If not the optimum solution, the AF of L alternative 
nevertheless seemed adequate and reasonable. The primary-
craft formula could not be ruled out as unworkable on the 
basis of past experience. While deprecated by Lewis adher­
ents, it could not by itself drive the breach in the labor 
movement. 
Nor, for that matter, could the appeal of industrial 
unionism. "Much has been said about principles in the war 
between the C.I.O. and the A.F. of L.," commented the 
informed labor consultant Chester M. Wright in 1939. 
"As I see it, the whole dispute is one involving tactics and 
practices. I fail to find any principles involved at any 
point." n Earlier, industrial unionism had involved funda­
mental differences. Its advocates had been mainly Socialists 
and others seeking to make the labor movement a vehicle 
for political action and/or basic social change. That was 
not the case in the 1930's. Industrial unionism then was 
directed only at the mass-production industries, not, as in 
the amalgamation movement of the early 1920's, at the 
entire economy. The ideological groundwork was mostly 
gone. John L. Lewis himself had opposed the amalgama­
tionists of the postwar period. His emergence as industrial-
union leader in the early New Deal period presumed that 
the debate over structure did not reflect basic differences 
about the role of the trade-union movement. 
The antagonists were not doctrinaire even on the narrow 
structural issue. Bitter opponents of Lewis as they were, 
the Carpenters, Machinists, and Electrical Workers were 
10. Philip Taft, The A.F. of L. from the Death of Gompers to the 
Merger (New York, 1959), pp. 86, 91. 
11. Chester M. Wright, Here Comes Labor (New York, 1939), p. 47. 
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themselves asserting industrial jurisdiction over limited 
areas between 1934 and 1936.12 For his part, Lewis was not 
rigid on industrial unionism. When the AF of L Executive 
Council was considering in February, 1935, what craft 
groups to exclude from an auto workers' union, Lewis 
pleaded that the "cavilling be deferred until in the light of 
what accomplishment is made in the objective we can take 
up the question of dividing the members, that contention 
over the fruits of victory be deferred until we have some 
of the fruits in our possession." While he retained hope 
in the AF of L, Lewis did not commit himself to industrial 
unionism.13 
It was not in itself of importance. Lewis was a prag­
matist in the dominant tradition of American trade union­
ism. Labor leaders responded, as William Green said, to 
"the fact, not a theory but a situation actually exist­
ing. . . ."14 The formation of the cio was a drastic 
measure which, from Lewis' standpoint, had to yield a 
commensurate return. The structural reform of industrial 
unionism was not such a return. Nor, in fact, was it 
absolutely precluded from the pragmatic labor movement. 
Industrial unions could find a place—as did the United Mine 
Workers of America itself—within the AF of L. The 
Butcher Workmen had put the fact neatly back in 1922 
when the issue over requesting industrial jurisdiction in 
meat-packing arose. It would be better, the convention 
decided, first to unionize the industry "and then by reason 
of the strength that would accompany such an organization, 
take and retain control over all men of whatever craft 
12. Morris, Conflict Within the AFL, p. 177; Robert A. Christie, 
Empire in Wood: A History of the Carpenters' Union (Ithaca, N.Y., 
1956), chap, ix; Mark Perlman, The Machinists: A New Study in 
American Trade Unionism (Cambridge, 1961), pp. 90-91. 
13. Taft, A. F. of L. from the Death of Gompers, pp. 105, 107; 
AF of L, Proceedings (1934), p. 588. 
14. Taft, A. F. of L. from the Death of Gompers, p. 106. 
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employed in the industry." 15 The obstacles to that first 
point—not the second—were the operative ones in 1935. 
What excited Lewis and his adherents was a concrete 
objective: the organization of the mass-production indus­
tries. That accomplished, the structural issue would 
resolve itself and would, in any case, not be of great mo­
ment. "The fundamental obligation is to organize these 
people," Lewis insisted. The resulting problems should be 
considered "after we had accomplished organization and 
not before, after the fact of organization has been accom­
plished [,] not tie on reservations that will in themselves 
deter an effective campaign." 16 This revealed the heart of 
the crisis: would the AF of L take the measures necessary 
for the organization of mass-production workers? 
Industrial unionism fitted into this larger context. The 
immense influence of the idea sprang from the contempo­
rary assessment of the psychology of industrial workers. 
"I know their state of mind," William Green asserted, 
speaking of the automobile workers. ". . . If you tell them 
to go here, you here and you there, you will never get 
anywhere. They are so closely related and inextricably 
interwoven they are mass minded." 17 In her perceptive 
Industrial Valley, Ruth McKenney described the problem 
as she saw it in Akron rubber plants. 
. . . The machinists and the electricians kept coming to the 
Federal local meetings. [The AFL organizer] could never make 
them understand they were supposed to stay away, supposed to 
belong to a separate union. He could never teach them that their 
interests were different from the common ordinary rubberworker. 
Stubbornly and stupidly they clung to the Federal locals.18 
15. Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North 
America, Proceedings (1922), pp. 18, 35, 81-82. 
16. Taft, A. F. of L. from the Death of Gompers, p. 107. 
17. Ibid.; AF of L, Proceedings (1934), p. 592. 
18. Ruth McKenney, Industrial Valley (New York, 1939), p. 109. 
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Industrial unionists had here an explanation for the failure 
to hold the thousands of industrial workers who had flocked 
into the AF of L federal unions in 1933. Sidney Hillman 
noted, for example, that during the NRA period over 40,000 
rubber workers had been organized. Then the AF of L 
"started to divide those workers among the different unions 
claiming jurisdiction over them. As a result of that pro­
cedure, the membership of the rubber workers union fell as 
low as 3,000." 19 
The problem was tactical. Since industrial labor was 
"mass minded," the first stage of organization had to be on 
a mass basis. "Vice President Lewis said there is a psy­
chology there among the men . . . ," read the minutes of 
the February, 1935, meeting of the AF of L Executive 
Council. "What he has in mind [is that] the time to quarrel 
over jurisdiction is after we organize the men rather than 
before." 20 William Green shared Lewis' view. The mass-
production industries should be organized "as best we can, 
then after they are organized if the question [arises] on the 
jurisdiction of an international union, perhaps by education 
we can bring about respect among these workers of the 
jurisdiction of the national and international unions." 21 
That reasoning explained the hopefulness following the 
San Francisco convention of 1934. The objectives then 
enunciated seemed irreconcilable: to protect craft juris­
dictions and to organize mass-production fields on "a differ­
ent basis." But an apparent accommodation had emerged 
from the many hours of talks off the floor of the convention. 
The Executive Council was "directed to issue charters for 
19. Mathew Josephson, Sidney Hillman: Statesman of American 
Labor (New York, 1952), p. 385. 
20. AP of L Executive Council Minutes, January 29-February 14, 
1935, p. 213. I have utilized the Council minutes in this account.
have, however, thought it more helpful to give references to Taft or 
Galenson except in instances in which selections from the minutes do 
not appear in those secondary sources. 
21. Taft, A. F. of L. from the Death of Gompers, p. 91. 
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National or International Unions"—the instructions did not 
specify precise jurisdictions. Second, "for a provisional 
period" the chartered unions should be under AF of L 
direction "in order to protect and safeguard the members 
of such National and International Unions as are char­
tered. . . ." Both these points—temporary AF of L control 
and an undefined jurisdiction—were included in John L. 
Lewis' seven-point program for an automobile union which 
was presented to the Executive Council in February, 1935. 
And there was a final point: 
That all questions of overlapping jurisdiction on the automobile 
parts and special crafts organizations encountered in the ad­
ministration policy be referred to the Executive Council for 
consideration at such time as the Council may elect to give these 
questions consideration.22 
"This proposal is in strict conformity with the action of the 
A. F. of L. convention of 1934," Lewis explained, "and in 
proposing it I intend that if this policy does an injury to any 
international union that the union thus affected will have 
the right to take up these questions with the Executive 
Council of the American Federation of Labor and I assume 
that judgment will be rendered in conformity with . . . the 
record of the previous actions of the Council." 23 
Confronting the proposal, the craft leaders could not 
accept it. Dan Tobin of the Teamsters saw "some merit" 
22. Ibid., p. 105; AF of L, Proceedings (1935), pp. 94-96, 538. 
At the San Francisco convention of 1934, Lewis' explanation of the 
industrials union resolution was thoroughly unrevealing, no doubt 
for good tactical reasons. The most he would say, when pressed, was 
that the jurisdictional decisions rested with the Executive Council (to which he and his supporter David Dubinsky were being added). 
But see the speech of Mathew Woll, AF of L, Proceedings (1934), 
pp. 593-94; also, the editorial in the American Federationist, XLI (November, 1934), 1177. 
23. AF of L Executive Council Minutes, January 29-February 
14,1935, pp. 68-69, 218-19. 
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in Lewis' view and was willing to permit a "dispensation 
for six months or so in the hope we will unscramble them 
later on. . . ."24 But others, above all Wharton of the 
Machinists, had higher stakes in the automobile field. They 
were responding to the realities of the American labor 
movement: could they successfully exert their jurisdictional 
rights after organization had occurred on an industrial 
basis ? In fact, they had grown critical even of the standard 
AF of L practice of placing skilled recruits in federal unions 
because these recruits then became reluctant to transfer 
to the appropriate craft unions.25 William Hutcheson of the 
Carpenters thought the jurisdictional question "should be 
straightened out now to avoid trouble." 26 The Executive 
Council so decided: specific groups were excluded from the 
jurisdiction of the Auto Workers and, at the next Council 
meeting, of the Rubber Workers. In essence, the craft 
unions were refusing to gamble—at long odds—their vested 
rights in order to unionize mass-production workers. Tobin 
put the fact bluntly: "We are not going to desert the funda­
mental principles on which these organizations have lived 
and are living to help you organize men who have never 
been organized." 2T 
The jurisdictional problem was only the most visible of 
the obstacles to effective action. National unions with 
old-line leadership had primary jurisdiction in a number of 
basic industries—most importantly, the Amalgamated As­
sociation of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers. The industrial 
bloc agreed with Green's view that "the officers of the 
24. Ibid., pp. 214-15. 
25. See Morris, Conflict within the AFL, pp. 152-58; Sidney Fine, 
"The Origins of the United Automobile Workers, 1933-35," Journal 
of Economic History, XVIII (September, 1958), 254-55. 
26. AF of L Executive Council Minutes, January 29-February 14, 
1935, p. 213. 
27. AF of L Executive Council Minutes, April 30-May 7, 1935, p. 
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Amalgamated cannot organize these workers with their 
own resources or with the set-up as is. . .  . The change 
has been taking place but the Amalgamated has been 
standing committed to its old tradition policy." Lewis 
urged the chartering of another national union with juris­
diction over steel. The craft unionists refused to abrogate 
the sacred rights of an autonomous union, as William 
Hutcheson said, "even if it was in bad straits."28 They 
were willing to permit others to mount a steel campaign, 
but the bulk of the steelworkers would have to go into an 
organization which had amply proved its incapacity. Ex­
clusive jurisdiction and trade autonomy seemed to be 
immutable principles. 
Finally, the necessary resources were not being directed 
to the organization of the basic industries. The income of 
the labor movement accumulated in the national unions, 
not in the Federation. President Green was able to augment 
his organizing staff by only fifteen in the critical year 1933. 
The affiliated unions were unwilling either to raise the per 
capita going to the AF of L or to expend adequate funds 
directly in the organizing effort. (The response to Green's 
appeal in March, 1936, for funds for a steel drive totaled 
$8,625 from five unions.) The flabbiness of the financial 
support could be gauged by the later reaction to the cio 
threat: AF of L organizing expenses during 1937-39 were 
triple those of 1933-35.29 Nor were the unions with juris­
diction in the basic industries roused to a common effort. 
No joint drives were mounted in 1933-34 that would com­
pare to those of earlier years in steel, autos, textiles, and 
meat-packing. The AF of L convention of 1934 instructed 
the Executive Council not only to charter national unions 
in mass-production industries but to inaugurate a union 
28. Taft, A. F. of L. from the Death of Gompers, p. 116. 
29. Morris, Conflict within the AFL, p. 162. 
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drive in steel. The Council had done nothing beyond passing 
a resolution by the time of the fateful convention of 1935. 
At bottom, the AF of L was experiencing a crisis of 
will. Lewis bitterly commented in May, 1935, "that some six 
months have gone by since we adopted that resolution in 
San Francisco and there still remains the fact that there 
has been no administration of that policy, no execution of 
the promissory note that this Federation held out to the 
millions of workers in the mass-production industry. . . . 
Neither do I understand there is any immediate desire to 
carry out that policy. . . .  " 3  0 The choice rested with the 
controlling craft unionists. And they were not really com­
mitted to organizing the mass-production workers. Dan 
Tobin of the Teamsters, for instance, spoke contemptuously 
of "the rubbish that have lately come into other organiza­
tions." A widespread feeling was, as Mathew Woll said in 
1934, that the industrial workers were "perhaps unorganiza­
ble." Tobin was saying in February, 1936, that "there isn't 
a chance in the world at this time to organize the steel­
workers." 31 
To John L. Lewis, the basic obstacle was the indifference 
of the craft leaders. They were the object of his plea at 
the 1935 convention: 
Why not make a contribution to the well-being of those who are 
not fortunate enough to be members of your organizations? . . . 
The labor movement is organized upon a principle that the strong 
shall help the weak. . .  . Is it right, after all, that because some 
of us are capable of forging great and powerful organizations of 
30. AF of L Executive Council Minutes, April 30-May 7, 1935, 
p. 115. 
31. Ibid., p. 174; Taft, A. F. of L. from the Death of Gompers, p. 
118; Edward Levinson, Labor on the March (New York. 1938), p. 
84; also, the speech of A. O. Wharton, AF of L, Proceedings (1935), 
pp. 569-72. 
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skilled craftsmen in this country that we should lock ourselves 
up in our own domain and say, "I am merely working for those 
who pay me"? 
The AF of L had to choose between becoming "an instru­
mentality that will render service to all of the workers" and 
resting "content in that comfortable situation that has pre­
vailed through the years. . . ." Convinced at last that the 
craft bloc preferred the second path, Lewis saw independent 
action as the only remedy to "twenty-five years of con­
stant, unbroken failure." 32 
Mass-production unionization merged with industrial un­
ionism only when hope was lost in the AF of L. Actually, 
this began to happen months before the Atlantic City con­
vention of 1935. Lewis started to shift his ground after the 
defeat of his program for an auto union at the February 
meeting of the Executive Council. At the May meeting, he 
did not try to apply his compromise formula to the Rubber 
Workers. Rather, he wanted "the jurisdiction granted to 
the organization to cover all workers employed throughout 
the rubber industry." Nothing was said at the subsequent 
convention either in Lewis' arguments or in the Minority 
Report about the postponement of jurisdictional questions 
until after the achievement of mass-production organization 
(although there were such intimations in the speeches of 
Lewis' supporters Charles Howard and Sidney Hillman).33 
The full commitment to industrial unionism became evident 
32. AF of L, Proceedings (1935), pp. 534, 536, 541. 
33. Ibid., pp. 526, 746; AF of L Executive Council Minutes, April 
13-May 7, 1935, pp. 113-16. At the May meeting of the Council a 
resolution was offered to postpone the jurisdictional decision on the 
Rubber Workers until after they had formed an international and 
drawn up a constitution with a proposed jurisdiction. This compro­
mise came not from Lewis but, significantly, from AF of L Secretary 
Morison, probably with Green's backing. The craft majority refused 
this alternative, as well as Lewis' offer to exclude "those engaged in 
new construction work." (Ibid., pp. 135-39.) 
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in Lewis' offer of $500,000 toward an AF of L steel-organiz­
ing fund on February 22, 1936. One condition was that "all 
steel workers organized will be granted the permanent right 
to remain united in one international union." 34 
Having opted for independent action, Lewis had every 
reason to espouse industrial unionism: it was a desirable 
structural reform; it would draw in unions such as the Oil 
Workers and the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers that were 
having jurisdictional troubles within the AF of L;35 and, 
above all, it would serve as a rallying cry in the union rivalry 
and in the organizing field. But industrial unionism re­
mained a subordinate consideration. When the occasion 
demanded, it was sacrificed to the necessities of the organiz­
ing task and to the inevitable ambitions for the cio as an 
institution.36 Nor did industrial unionism fulfill the expec­
tations of earlier advocates. No real transformation was 
worked in the objectives of the labor movement. Differing 
in some ways, the rival federations were, as Chester Wright 
insisted, "brothers under the skin," and the passage of 
twenty years was time enough to permit them to join in a 
merger. 
The CIO had been created with the fixed purpose of or­
ganizing the mass-production industries. Liberated from 
past practice and vested interest, the effort could be made 
with optimum effectiveness. Starting fresh, the cio thor­
oughly exploited its opportunity. 
34. Galenson, CIO Challenge to AFL, p. 79 (my italics). 
35. See, for example, Vernon H. Jensen, Nonferrous Metals In­

dustry Unionism, 1932-195b: A Story of Leadership Controversy

(Ithaca, N.Y., 1954), chap, iii; Lowell E. Gallaway, "The Origin and

Early Years of the Federation of Flat Glass Workers of America,"

Labor History, II (Winter, 1962), 100-102.

36. In some instances, for example, CIO unions attempted to keep

groups out of bargaining units if a close election was forthcoming

or in order to avoid trouble with the strategic Teamsters. (11 NLRB

950 [1939], 14 NLRB 287 [1939], 16 NLRB 334 [1939], 21 NLRB 1189
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The previous restrictions were immediately thrown off. 
The separation of skilled men no longer, of course, consti­
tuted an impediment to organization. Funds in massive 
amounts were now injected in some areas. The Steel Work­
ers Organizing Committee received in six years $1,619,613 
from outside sources, as well as the services of many or­
ganizers who remained on the payrolls of other unions.37 
In part, the money came as direct contributions from afflu­
ent CIO affiliates. The Mine Workers and the Clothing 
Workers, frankly anxious for the organization of industries 
related to them, directed most of their assistance to steel 
and textiles, respectively. The rest of the CIO income came 
from a high per capita tax of five cents a month. Propor­
tionately, the investment far surpassed what had been 
possible within the AF of L (although, it should be 
noted, the latter in response was doing likewise). Finally, 
the CIO was able to build the new industrial unions, par­
ticularly those which first took the form of organizing com­
mittees, free from the restricting hand of the past. There 
were instances, notably in steel and textiles, where AF of L 
unions with old-line leaders came over to the CIO, but they 
were held to subordinate roles. Able officials were recruited 
from men rising from the ranks or, as in the case of steel, 
from experienced unionists elsewhere in the CIO. 
The job of organizing was meanwhile changing radically. 
First, mass-production workers were bursting with mili­
tancy. The upsurge of NRA-inspired unionism, for instance, 
was very largely spontaneous. At the time, it seemed to 
William Green "a sight that even old, tried veterans of 
our movement never saw before." Another official believed 
it would surpass in "numbers, intensity, and duration" the 
union experience of World War I.38 Even before the Cio, 
popular militancy was expressing itself in internal resist­
37. Galenson, CIO Challenge to AFL, p. 110. 
38. Morris, Conflict within AFL, p. 147. 
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ance to AF of L policies and/or in independent unionism, 
and in rank-and-file strikes such as that at the Toledo Chev­
rolet plant in April, 1935.39 The second change followed 
from the Wagner Act. For the first time, workmen had the 
legal right to express through majority rule their desires 
on the question of union representation. On the counts of 
both rank-and-file sentiment and federal law, success came 
to depend on the union appeal, hitherto of secondary im­
portance, to the workingmen. To this requirement, the CIO 
responded brilliantly. 
The ingredients of success were unremitting effort and 
a mastery of the techniques suited to the special conditions 
of the mass-production industries. A pool of effective or­
ganizers for this work could be drawn from CIO affiliates, 
above all, the Mine Workers; from left-wing groups; and 
from militants within the industrial ranks. In addition to 
using the standard methods, CIO organizers emphasized 
rank-and-file participation. These were the instructions to 
a group of adherents in Fort Worth on how to organize 
their Armour plant: 
It takes Organizers inside the plant to Organize the plant. 
The Committee that organized the Oklahoma City plant was a 
voluntary committee established inside the plant. 
You cannot wait for the National Organizer to do all the 
work. . . . You people here can have a Union, but you will have 
to work to build it. 
Typically, an intricate network of unpaid posts was estab­
lished in cio plants, so that "more men are given responsi­
bility, and our organization becomes more powerful and 
39. On the experience in automobiles, see Fine, "Origins of the 
United Automobile Workers," passim, and Sidney Fine, "The Toledo 
Chevrolet Strike of 1935," Ohio Historical Quarterly, LXVII (1958), 
326—56. 
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more closely knit." The aim was to avoid "bureaucratic" 
rule by putting the leadership, as one organizer said, not in 
a few hands, but in "the whole body, in one, acting as 
one." 40 
Another significant CIO tactic arose out of sensitivity to 
the deep-seated resentments of the workers. At the plant 
level, grievances characteristically received aggressive sup­
port. When the men saw "how the CIO was fighting to 
protect workers' rights . . . ," a Packinghouse Workers' 
official explained, they flocked into the organization. Direct 
action was another expression of CIO militancy. Sudden 
strikes and slowdowns, although often against official policy, 
were frequently encouraged by local officers. For, as one 
functionary observed of the stoppages at the Armour Chi­
cago plant, they "demonstrated to all, union members and 
non-union members, that the CIO had plenty of stuff on the 
ball and that there was no such thing as waiting for some­
thing to happen." 41 
The effectiveness of the cio had another dimension. The 
basic industries had drawn the newcomers and underprivi­
leged of American society. Eastern Europeans and then, 
when the flow of immigrants was stopped by World War I, 
migrants from the South filled the bottom ranks of mass-
production labor. The colored workers had unquestionably 
been among the chief obstacles to earlier union efforts. 
William Z. Foster, who had taken a leading part in the 
AF of L drives of World War I, admitted that "we could 
not win their support. It could not be done. They were 
constitutionally opposed to unions, and all our forces could 
40. Joint Executive Board Minutes, Oklahoma City and Ft. Worth
Locals, Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee, August 9, 1942;
District 2 Conference Minutes, PWOC, January 14, 1940, Files of 
United Packinghouse Workers of America; People's Press, July 23, 
1938. 
41. Arthur Kampfert, "History of Unionism in Meat Packing," 
MSS in UPWA Files; CIO News. Packinghouse Edition, November 5, 
1938, p. 8. 
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not break down that opposition." 42 The problem was of 
diminishing magnitude in the 1930's. Negro workers, mostly 
new arrivals from the South fifteen years before, had gone 
through a lengthy adjustment. In addition, racial tensions 
had largely abated. There would be no counterpart to the 
Chicago race riot of 1919 which had disrupted the union 
drive in the stockyards. Yet the Negro workers still required 
special treatment. 
Here again the CIO capitalized fully on the opportunity. 
It became an aggressive defender of Negro rights. After 
a foothold had been gained in the Armour Chicago plant, 
for example, one of the first union victories was to end the 
company practice of "tagging" the time cards of colored 
employees: "the Stars will no longer offend the Negro work­
ers of Armour & Co." The initial informal agreement at the 
Swift plant included a company pledge to hire Negroes in 
proportion to their numbers in the Chicago population.43 
The AF of L could not match these zealous efforts. From 
the start, Gompers had insisted on the necessity of organiz­
ing the colored workers, not out of concern for "social or 
even any other kind of equality," but to insure that they 
would not "frustrate our every effort for economic, social 
and political improvement." 4i This view prevailed, before 
as well as during the New Deal, wherever the membership 
of Negroes was essential to the success of a union. But 
many craft affiliates could afford to exclude or segregate 
such workers, and the Federation reluctantly accepted what 
it could not prevent. Besides being tainted by discrimina­
tion, the AF of L failed to crusade even where it favored 
racial equality. Doing so, the CIO swept the Negroes in mass 
42. Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in Chicago 
(Chicago, 1922), p. 429. 
43. CIO News. Packinghouse Edition, January 2, 1939, p. 2; Kamp­
fert, "History of Unionism in Meat Packing." 
44. Gerald N. Grob, "Organized Labor and the Negro Worker, 
1865-1900," Labor History, I (Spring, 1961), 168. 
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production into its ranks. The same sensitivity to non­
economic factors marked the CIO approach to immigrant 
and female labor and to the fostering of public support 
through political work and such communal activities as the 
"back of the yards" movement in the Chicago packing-house 
district. 
The labor movement thus generated an effective response 
in the basic industries. A further question remains: Was 
this the decisive change? It does not seem so. More than 
the incapacity of organized labor had prevented earlier 
success. Had everything else remained constant, the cio 
effort alone would not have resulted in permanent unioniza­
tion of the mass-production sector—nor, for that matter, 
would it even have been attempted. 
The sense of urgency was significant. At his last AF of L 
convention, John L. Lewis told Powers Hapgood that a union 
drive in the basic industries in the past "would have been 
suicide for organized labor and would have resulted in com­
plete failure. But now, the time is ripe; and now the time 
to do those things is here. Let us do them."45 The American 
system of industrial relations was being profoundly shaken 
during the mid-1930's. "Conditions as they exist now," 
Charles Howard told the Atlantic City convention, "make it 
more necessary, in my opinion, for effective organization 
activity than at any time during the life of the American 
Federation of Labor." 46 
In retrospect, employer resistance looms largest in ac­
counting for the long years of union failure in mass pro­
duction. The sources of that hostility need not be explored 
here. Suffice it to say that American industrialists found 
compelling reasons and, more important, adequate means 
for resisting labor organization. Lewis noted the "great 
45. Hapgood quoting Lewis in Saul Alinsky, John L. Lewis: An 
Unauthorized	 Biography (New York, 1949), p. 80. 
46, Ibid., p. 70; AF of L, Proceedings (1935), p. 525. 
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concentration of opposition to the extension and logical 
expansion of the trade union movement." 
Great combinations of capital have assembled great industrial 
plants, and they are strong across the borders of our several 
states from the north to the south and from the west in such a 
manner that they have assembled to themselves tremendous 
power and influence. . . . 
"There is no corporation in America more powerful than 
these corporations—General Motors and Ford," William 
Green said respectfully. "Everybody knows their financial 
strength. . .  . It is a fact we have always recognized." 47 
No real possibility of countering the resources and advan­
tages available to industry had earlier existed; the power 
balance had been overwhelmingly against labor. 
In the 1930's, a new legal framework for industrial rela­
tions emerged. In the past, the right to organize had fallen 
outside the law; unionization, like collective bargaining, 
had been a private affair. Within normal legal limits, 
employers had freely fought the organization of their 
employees. Now that liberty was being withdrawn. World 
War I had first raised the point. The National War Labor 
Board had protected workers from discrimination for join­
ing unions and thus contributed substantially to the tem­
porary union expansion of the war period. The lesson was 
inescapable. Unionization in the mass-production industries 
depended on public protection of the right to organize. The 
drift of opinion in this direction was discernible in the Rail­
way Labor Act of 1926 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 
1932. But the real opportunity came with the advent of the 
New Deal. Then key union spokesmen, notably Green and 
Lewis, pressed for the insertion of the famous section 7a in 
47. AP of L, Proceedings (1935), p. 535; AF of L Executive Coun­
cil Minutes, January 29-February 14, 1935, p. 64, also, for example, 
p. 213. 
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the National Industrial Recovery Act. After an exhilarating 
start, section 7a foundered; loopholes developed and en­
forcement broke down long before the invalidation of the 
NRA. But the intent of section 7a was clear, and it soon 
received effective implementation. 
"If the Wagner bill is enacted," John L. Lewis told the 
AF of L Executive Council in May, 1935, "there is going 
to be increasing organization. . . ." 48 The measure, enacted 
on July 5, 1935, heavily influenced Lewis' decision to take 
the initiative that led to the cio. For the Wagner Act did 
adequately protect the right to organize through a National 
Labor Relations Board clothed with powers of investigation 
and enforcement. Employer opposition was at long last 
neutralized. 
The Act made it an unfair labor practice for an employer 
"to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the 
exercise" of "the right of self-organization." This pro­
tection unquestionably freed workers from fear of employer 
discrimination. Stipulation cases required the posting of 
such notices as the following at a Sioux City plant: 
The Cudahy Packing Company wants it definitely understood 
that . .  . no one will be discharged, demoted, transferred, put 
on less desirable jobs, or laid off because he joins Local No. 70 
or any other labor organization. . .  . If the company, its officers, 
or supervisors have in the past made any statements or taken any 
action to indicate that its employees were not free to join Local 
No. 70 or any other labor organization, these statements are now 
repudiated.49 
Even more persuasive was the reinstatement with back 
pay of men discharged for union activities. The United 
Auto Workers' cause at Ford was immensely bolstered in 
48. Taft, A. F. of L. from the Death of Gompers, pp. 89-90. 
49. 31 NLRB 967-68 (1941). 
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1941 by the rehiring of twenty-two discharged men as the 
result of an NLRB decision which the company had fought 
up to the Supreme Court. By June 30, 1941, nearly twenty-
four thousand charges of unfair labor practices—the major­
ity involving discrimination—had been lodged with the 
NLRB.50 More important in the long run, vigorous enforce­
ment encouraged obedience of the law among employers. 
Assured of their safety, workers flocked into the unions. 
The law also resolved the knotty problems of determining 
union representation. During the NRA period, company 
unions had been widely utilized to combat the efforts of 
outside organizations. The Wagner Act now prohibited em­
ployers from dominating or supporting a labor union. Legal 
counsel at first held that "inside" unions could be made to 
conform with the law by changing their structure, that is, 
by eliminating management participation from the joint 
representation plans. The NLRB, however, required the 
complete absence of company interference or assistance. 
Few company unions could meet this high standard, and 
large numbers were disestablished by NLRB order or by 
stipulation. In meat-packing, for instance, the Big Four 
companies had to withdraw recognition from over fifteen 
company unions. Only in the case of some Swift plants did 
such bodies prevail over outside unions in representation 
elections and become legal bargaining agents.51 Besides 
eliminating employer-dominated unions, the law put the 
selection of bargaining representatives on the basis of 
majority rule. By mid-1941, the NLRB had held nearly six 
thousand elections and cross-checks involving nearly two 
million workers. Given a free choice, they overwhelmingly 
preferred a union to no union (the latter choice resulting in 
50. Harry A. Millis and Emily Clark Brown, From the Wagner 
Act to Taft-Hartley (Chicago, 1950), p. 77. 
51. James R. Holcomb, "Union Policies of Meat Packers, 1929­
1943" (Master's thesis, University of Illinois, 1957), pp. 101-2, 124, 
139, 161—62. 
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only 6 per cent of elections in 1937 and, on the average, in 
less than 20 per cent up to the passage of the Taft-Hartley 
Act). Having proved its majority in an "appropriate" 
unit, a union became the certified bargaining agent for all 
employees in the unit. 
An unexpected dividend for union organization flowed 
from the Wagner Act. In the past, the crisis of mass-pro­
duction unions had occurred in their first stage. Rank-and­
file pressure normally built up for quick action. Union 
leaders faced the choice of bowing to this sentiment and 
leading their organizations into suicidal strikes—as hap­
pened on the railroads in 1894, in the stockyards in 1904, 
and in steel in 1919—or of resisting the pressure and seeing 
the membership melt away or break up in factional conflict 
—as occurred in meat-packing after World War I. The 
Wagner Act, while it did not eliminate rank-and-file pres­
sures, eased the problem. A union received NLRB certifica­
tion on proving its majority in a plant. Certification gave 
it legal status and rights which could be withdrawn only 
by formal evidence that it lacked majority support. Defeat 
in a strike did not in any way affect the status of a bar­
gaining agent. Restraint, on the other hand, became a feas­
ible policy. The CIO unions as a whole were remarkably 
successful in resisting workers' demands for national strikes 
in the early years, although not in preventing local trouble. 
The resulting dissidence could be absorbed. The Packing­
house Workers Organizing Committee, for instance, was in 
continual turmoil from 1939 to 1941 because of the con­
servative course of Chairman Van A. Bittner; but internal 
strife did not lead to organizational collapse there or else­
where, NLRB certification permitted labor leaders to steer 
between the twin dangers—external and internal—that 
earlier had smashed vigorous mass-production unionism. 
Years later, the efficacy of the Wagner Act was acknowl­
edged by an officer of the most hostile of the major packing 
THE EMERGENCE OF MASS-PRODUCTION UNIONISM 247 
firms: ". . . The unions would not have organized Wilson 
[and Company] if it had not been for the Act." 52 That 
judgment was certainly general in open-shop circles. 
Yet the Wagner Act was not the whole story. For nearly 
two years while its constitutionality was uncertain, the law 
was virtually ignored by antiunion employers. And after 
the Jones and Laughlin decision in April, 1937, the effect 
was part of a larger favoring situation. John L. Lewis was 
not reacting to a single piece of legislation. He saw devel­
oping in the mid-1930's a general shift toward unionization. 
The change was partly in the workers themselves. Their 
accommodation to the industrial system had broken down 
under the long stretch of depression. The resulting resent­
ment was evident in the sitdown strikes of 1936-37, which 
involved almost half a million men. These acts were gen­
erally not a calculated tactic of the union leadership; in 
fact, President Sherman Dalrymple of the Rubber Workers 
at first opposed the sitdowns. Spontaneous sitdowns within 
the plants accounted for the initial victories in auto and 
rubber.53 Much of Lewis' sense of urgency in 1935 sprang 
from his awareness of the pressure mounting in the indus­
trial ranks. A local auto-union leader told Lewis in May, 
1935, of talk about craft unions' taking skilled men from 
the federal unions. "We say like h they will and if it 
is ever ordered and enforced there will be one more inde­
pendent union." 54 Threats of this kind, Lewis knew, would 
surely become actions under existing AF of L policy, 
52. James D. Cooney, in Holcomb, "Union Policies of Meat Pack­
ers," p. 173. 
53. Galenson, CIO Challenge to AFL, pp. 135 ff., 269 ff.; Roberts, 
Rubber Workers, pp. 144 ff.; McKenney, Industrial Valley, Part III. 
On the spontaneous character of the decisive shutdown of the Ford 
River Rouge complex, see Irving Howe and B. J. Widick, The UAW 
and Walter Reuther (New York, 1949), pp. 100-101. 
54. Fine, "Origins of the United Automobile Workers," p. 280. 
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and, as he warned the Executive Council, then "we are 
facing the merging of these independent unions in some 
form of national organization." 55 That prophecy, Lewis 
was determined, should come to pass under his control. The 
cio succeeded in large measure because it became the ve­
hicle for channeling the militancy released by the Great 
Depression. 
The second factor that favored union organization was 
the impact of the depression on the major employers. They 
had operated on a policy of welfare capitalism: company 
paternalism and industrial-relations methods were expected 
to render employees impervious to the blandishments of 
trade unionism.56 The depression forced the abandonment 
of much of this expense and, beyond that, destroyed the 
workers' faith in the company's omnipotence on which 
their loyalty rested. Among themselves, as an official of 
Swift and Company said, industrialists had to admit that 
grounds existed for "the instances of open dissatisfaction 
which we see about us, and perhaps with us. . . ." 57 
The depression also tended to undermine the will to fight 
unionization. Anti-union measures were costly, the La 
Follette investigation revealed. The resulting labor troubles, 
in addition, cut deeply into income. The Little Steel com­
panies, Republic in particular, operated significantly less 
profitably in 1937 than did competitors who were free of 
strikes. Economic considerations seemed most compelling, 
not when business was bad, but when it was getting better. 
Employers then became very reluctant to jeopardize the 
anticipated return of profitable operations. This appar­
ently influenced the unexpected decision of U. S. Steel to 
55. Taft, A. F. of L. from the Death of Gompers, pp. 89-90. See 
also, for example, Howard's speech, AF of L, Proceedings (1935), p. 
525. 
56. See, for example, Irving Bernstein, The Lean Years: A History 
of the American Worker, 1920-1933 (Boston, 1960), chap. iii. 
57. F. I. Badgeley, National Provisioned October 28,1933, pp. 82-84. 
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recognize the Steel Workers Organizing Committee. In 
1937 the Steel Corporation was earning substantial profits 
for the first time during the depression; net income before 
taxes that year ultimately ran to 130 million dollars. And 
the first British purchases for defense were just then in 
the offing. During the upswing, moreover, the competitive 
factor assumed increasing importance. Union firms had 
the advantage of avoiding the disruptions incident to conflict 
over unionization. Certainly a decline of 15 per cent in its 
share of the automobile market from 1939 to 1940 con­
tributed to the Ford Company's retreat of the following 
58 year.
Finally, the political situation—the Wagner Act aside— 
was heavily weighted on the side of labor. Management 
could no longer assume governmental neutrality or, under 
stress, assistance in the labor arena. The benefits accruing 
to organized labor took a variety of forms. The Norris-
LaGuardia Act limited the use of injunctions that had in 
the past hindered union tactics. A federal law prohibited 
the transportation of strikebreakers across state lines. The 
Thornhill decision (1940) declared that antipicketing laws 
curbed the constitutional right of free speech. Detrimental 
governmental action, standard in earlier times of labor 
trouble, was largely precluded now by the emergence of 
sympathetic officeholders on all levels, from the municipal 
to the national. Indeed, the inclination was in the opposite 
direction. The response to the sitdown strike illustrated 
the change. "Well, it is illegal," Roosevelt commented. "But 
shooting it out and killing a lot of people because they have 
violated the law of trespass . .  . [is not] the answer. . . . 
There must be another way. Why can't those fellows in 
General Motors meet with the committee of workers?"59 
58. Galenson, CIO Challenge to AFL, pp. 93-94, 108-9, 182. 
59. Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York, 1946), p. 
322. 
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This tolerance of unlawful labor acts, as sitdowns were 
generally acknowledged to be, could not have happened at 
any earlier period of American history. These were neg­
ative means of forwarding the labor cause. 
But political power was also applied in positive ways. 
The La Follette investigation undermined antiunion tactics 
by exposure and, among other ways, by feeding information 
on spies to the unions.60 At critical junctures, there was 
intercession by public officials ranging from President 
Roosevelt and Labor Secretary Perkins down to Mayor 
Kelly of Chicago. Governor Frank Murphy's role in the 
General Motors controversy is only the best known of a 
number of such mediating contributions to the union 
cause.61 At the start of the cio steel drive Pennsylvania's 
Lieutenant-Governor Thomas Kennedy, a Mine Workers' 
officer, announced that organizers were free to move into 
steel towns and that state relief funds would be available 
in the event of a steel strike. The re-election of Roosevelt 
in 1936 no doubt cast out lingering hopes; many employers 
bowed to the inevitable after F.D.R.'s smashing victory 
with labor support. 
These broader circumstances—rank-and-file enthusiasm, 
economic pressures on management, and the political con­
dition—substantially augmented the specific benefits flowing 
from the Wagner Act. In fact, the great breakthroughs at 
U. S. Steel and General Motors in early 1937 did not result 
from the law. The question of constitutionality was re­
solved only some weeks later. And the agreements them­
60. Robert R. R. Brooks, When Labor Organizes (New Haven, 
1937), p. 72. 
61. J. Woodford Howard, "Frank Murphy and the Sit-Down 
Strikes of 1937," Labor History, I (Spring, 1960), 103-40; Barbara 
W. Newell, Chicago and the Labor Movement: Metropolitan Unionism 
in the 1930's (Urbana, 111., 1961), pp. 178-79; George Mayer, Floyd
B. Olson (Minneapolis, 1951), pp. 159-60. For a summary of New 
Deal "sensitivity" to labor, see Milton Derber and Edwin Young (eds.), Labor and the New Deal (Madison, Wis., 1957), chap. v. 
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selves did not accord with the provisions of the Wagner 
Act. The unions dared not utilize procedures for achieving 
certification as bargaining agents in the auto and steel 
plants. Lee Pressman, counsel for the SWOC, later admitted 
that recognition could not then have been won "without 
Lewis' brilliant move" in his secret talks with U. S. Steel's 
Myron C. Taylor. 
There is no question that [the swoc] could not have filed a peti­
tion through the National Labor Relations Board . . . for an 
election. We could not have won an election for collective bar­
gaining on the basis of our own membership or the results of the 
organizing campaign to date. This certainly applied not only to 
Little Steel but also to Big Steels2 
Similarly, the New York Times reported on April 4, 1937: 
"Since the General Motors settlement, the union has been 
spreading its organization rapidly in General Motors plants, 
which were weakly organized at the time of the strike." 
The NLRB could not require either U. S. Steel or General 
Motors to make agreements with unions under those cir­
cumstances. Nor did the companies grant the form of rec­
ognition contemplated in the Wagner Act, that is, as exclu­
sive bargaining agents. (This would have been illegal under 
the circumstances.) Only employees who were union mem­
bers were covered by the two agreements. These initial 
Cio victories, opening the path as they did for the general 
advance of mass-production unionism, stemmed primarily 
from the wider pressures favorable to organized labor. 
The Wagner Act proved indecisive for one whole stage 
of unionization. More than the enrollment of workers and 
the attainment of certification as bargaining agent was 
needed in unionization. The process was completed only 
62. Alinsky, Lewis, p. 149. 
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when employers and unions entered bona fide collective bar­
gaining. But this could not be enforced by law. Meaning­
ful collective bargaining was achievable ultimately only 
through the interplay of non-legislative forces. 
The tactics of major employers had shifted significantly 
by the 1920's. Their open-shop doctrine had as its declared 
purpose the protection of workingmen's liberties. "We do 
not believe it to be the wish of the people of this country," 
a U. S. Steel official had said, "that a man's right to work 
shall be made dependent upon his membership in any or­
ganization." 63 Since the closed shop was assumed to follow 
inevitably from collective bargaining, the refusal to recog­
nize unions was the fixed corollary of the open shop. The 
argument, of course, cut both ways. Open-shop employers 
insisted that their employees were free to join unions 
(whether or not this was so). The important fact, however, 
was that the resistance to unionism was drawn tight at the 
line of recognition and collective bargaining. That posi­
tion had frustrated the attempt of the President's Industrial 
Conference of October, 1919, to formulate principles for 
"genuine and lasting cooperation between capital and labor." 
The union spokesmen had withdrawn in protest against the 
insistence of the employer group that the obligation to 
engage in collective bargaining referred only to shop com­
mittees, not to trade unions.64 In effect, the strategy was 
to fight organized labor by withholding its primary function. 
Federal regulation of labor relations gradually came to 
grips with the question of recognition and collective bar­
gaining. During World War I, the NWLB only required 
employers to deal with shop committees. Going further, the 
NRA granted employees the right to "bargain collectively 
63. David Brody, Steelworkers in America: The Non-Union Era 
(Cambridge, 1960), p. 176. 
64. Lewis L. Lorwin and Arthur Wubnig, Labor Relations Boards: 
The Regulation of Collective Bargaining under the National Indus­
trial Recovery Act (Washington, D.C., 1935), pp. 13-18. 
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through representatives of their own choosing. . . ." This 
was interpreted to imply an obligation of employers to deal 
with such representatives. The major failing of section 7a 
was that the NRA did not implement the interpretation. 
In practice, determined employers were able, as earlier, to 
escape meaningful negotiation with trade unions.*13 It seems 
significant that the permanent union gains of the NRA 
period came in those areas—the coal and garment in­
dustries—where collective bargaining did not constitute a 
line of employer resistance. Profiting by the NRA experi­
ence, the Wagner Act established the procedure for deter­
mining bargaining agents and the policy of exclusive rep­
resentation and, by the device of certification, withdrew 
recognition from the option of an employer. 
But recognition did not mean collective bargaining. Sec­
tion 8 (5) did require employers to bargain with unions 
chosen in accordance with the law. Compliance, however, 
was another matter. In the first years, hostile employers 
attempted to withhold the normal attributes of collective 
bargaining. When a strike ended at the Goodyear Akron 
plant in November, 1937, for example, the company insisted 
that the agreement take the form of a "memorandum" 
signed by the mediating NLRB regional director, not by com­
pany and union, and added that "in no event could the 
company predict or discuss the situation beyond the first 
of the year." 68 (Although the Rubber Workers' local had 
already received certification, it would not secure a contract 
for another four years.) Westinghouse took the position 
that collective bargaining "was simply an opportunity for 
representatives of the employees to bring up and discuss 
problems affecting the working force, with the final decision 
65. On the difficulties over this question in the automobile industry, 
see Irving Fine, "Proportional Representation of Workers in the 
Automobile Industry," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, XIII 
(January 1959), 182-205. 
66. Roberts, Rubber Workers, p. 223. 
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reserved to the company. It rejected the notion of a signed 
agreement because business conditions were too uncer­
tain. . . ."67 Some companies—for instance, Armour in 
April, 1941—unilaterally raised wages while in union nego­
tiations. The contractual forms were resisted: agreements 
had to be verbal, or take the form of a "statement of policy," 
or, if in contractual terms, certainly with no signatures. 
These blatant evasions of the intent of section 8 (5) were 
gradually eliminated: a series of NLRB and court rulings 
prohibited the refusal to negotiate or make counteroffers, 
the unilateral alteration of the terms of employment, and 
opposition to incorporating agreements into written and 
signed contracts. 
The substance proved more elusive than the externals of 
collective bargaining. "We have no trouble negotiating with 
Goodyear," a local union president observed, "but we can 
never bargain. The company stands firmly against anything 
which does not give them the absolute final decision on any 
question." 68 The law, as it was interpreted, required em­
ployers to bargain "in good faith." How was lack of good 
faith to be proved ? The NLRB tried to consider the specific 
circumstances and acts, rather than the words, of the 
employer in each case. That cumbersome procedure was 
almost useless from the union standpoint. Delay was easy 
during the case, and further evasion possible afterward. 
Barring contempt proceedings after a final court order, 
moreover, the employer suffered no penalties for his ob­
struction; there was no counterpart here for the back-pay 
provisions in dismissal cases. The union weakness was 
illustrated at Wilson & Co. The Cedar Rapids packing 
plant had been well organized since the NRA period, but 
67. Twentieth Century Fund, How Collective Bargaining Works: 
A Survey of Experience in Leading American Industries (New York, 
1945), pp. 763-64. 
68. Roberts, Rubber Workers, p. 247. 
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no agreement was forthcoming from the hostile manage­
ment. In 1938 the union filed charges with the NLRB. Its 
decision came in January, 1940, and another year was con­
sumed by the company's unsuccessful appeal to the Circuit 
Court. The negotiations that followed (interrupted by a 
strike which the union lost) led nowhere because, a union 
official reported, Wilson "as always . . . tried to force the 
Union to accept the Company's agreement or none at all." 69 
The contract which was finally consummated in 1943 re­
sulted neither from an NLRB ruling nor from the free 
collective bargaining that was the aim of the Wagner Act. 
Clearly, "good faith" was not to be extracted from recalci­
trant employers by government fiat. 
The collective-bargaining problem had a deeper dimen­
sion. The bitter-enders themselves constituted a minority 
group in American industry. For every Westinghouse, 
Goodyear, Ford, and Republic Steel there were several 
major competitors prepared to abide by the intent of the 
law and enter "sincere negotiations with the representatives 
of employees." But, from the union standpoint, collective 
bargaining was important for the results it could yield. 
Here the Wagner Act stopped. As the Supreme Court noted 
in the Sands case, "from the duty of the employer to bar­
gain collectively . . . there does not flow any duty . .  . to 
accede to the demands of the employees." 70 No legal force 
sustained the objectives of unions either in improving 
wages, hours, and conditions or in strengthening their posi­
tion through the union shop, master contracts, and arbitra­
tion of grievances. 
The small utility of the law in collective bargaining was 
quickly perceived by labor leaders. The CIO packing-house 
69. National Wilson Conference Minutes, PWOC, February 14, 1942, 
UPWA Files. See also, 19 NLRB 990 (1940). 
70. Quoted in Joseph Rosenfarb, The National Labor Policy and 
How It Works (New York, 1940), p. 197. 
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union, for instance, did not invoke the Wagner Act at all 
in its three-year struggle with Armour. The company, in 
fact, objected to the intercession of Secretary of Labor 
Perkins in 1939 on the ground that the union had not 
exhausted, or even utilized, the remedies available through 
the NLRB.71 The dispute actually did involve issues which 
fell within the scope of the Wagner Act. But the union 
clearly was seeking more effective ways—federal pressure 
in this case—of countering Armour's reluctance to nego­
tiate and sign contracts. For the prime union objective 
was a master contract covering all the plants of the com­
pany organized by the union, a concession which could only 
be granted voluntarily by the company. Collective bargain­
ing, both the process itself and the fruits, depended on the 
working of the other advantages open to the unions in the 
New Deal era. 
Where negotiation was undertaken in "good faith," there 
were modest initial gains. The year 1937, marking the 
general beginning of collective bargaining in mass produc­
tion, saw substantial wage increases as the result of nego­
tiations and/or union pressure. In steel, the advances of 
November, 1936, and March, 1937, moved the unskilled 
hourly rate from 47 cents to 62*4 cents. In rubber, average 
hourly earnings rose from 69.8 cents to 76.8 cents; in 
automobiles, from 80 to 93 cents. Other gains tended to be 
slender. The U. S. Steel agreement, for instance, provided 
the two major benefits of time-and-a-half after eight hours 
and a grievance procedure with arbitration. The vacation 
provision, on the other hand, merely continued an existing 
arrangement, and silence prevailed on many other ques­
tions. The contracts were, in contrast to later ones, very 
thin documents.72 Still, the first fruits of collective bar­
gaining were encouraging to labor. 
71. New York Times, September 12, 1939. 
72. For an analysis of the U. S. Steel agreement, see Robert R. R. 
Brooks, As Steel Goes . . .: Unionism in a Basic Industry (New 
Haven, 1940), chap. viii. 
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Then the economy faltered again. In 1938 industrial 
unions had to fight to stave off wage cuts. They succeeded 
in most, but not all, cases. Rates were reduced 15 per cent 
at Philco after a four months' strike. Less visible conces­
sions had to be granted in some cases. For example, the 
SWOC and UAW accepted changes which weakened the griev­
ance procedure at U. S. Steel and General Motors.73 The 
mass-production unions were, in addition, hard hit by 
the recession. Employment fell sharply. The UAW esti­
mated that at the end of January, 1938, 320,000 auto pro­
duction workers were totally unemployed and most of the 
remainder of the normal complement of 517,000 were on 
short time. The union's membership was soon down to 
90,000. It was the same story elsewhere. In the Chicago 
district of the SWOC, dues payments fell by two-thirds in 
the twelve months after July, 1937 (that is, after absorb­
ing the setback in Little Steel).74 Declining membership 
and, in some cases, internal dissension rendered uncertain 
the organizational viability of the industrial unions. And 
their weakness in turn further undermined their effective­
ness in collective bargaining. They faced a fearful choice. 
If they became quiescent, they would sacrifice the support 
of the membership. If they pressed for further concessions, 
they would unavoidably become involved in strikes. By so 
doing, they would expose their weakened ranks in the one 
area in which labor legislation permitted the full expression 
of employer hostility—and in this period few even of the 
law-abiding employers were fully reconciled to trade 
unionism. 
Collective bargaining was proving a severe obstacle to 
the new mass-production unions. The Wagner Act had little 
value here; and the other favoring circumstances had de­
clining effectiveness after mid-1937. Hostile employers were 
73. Ibid., p. 211; Galenson, CIO Challenge to AFL, p. 158. 
74. Galenson, CIO Challenge to AFL, p. 157; Newell, Chicago and 
the Labor Movement, p. 144. 
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evading the requirement of negotiating in good faith. For 
the larger part, the industrial unions achieved the first 
approximation of collective bargaining. But from 1937 to 
1940 very little more was forthcoming. The vital function 
of collective bargaining seemed stalled. The situation was, 
in sum, still precarious five years after the formation of 
the cio. 
John L. Lewis had made something of a miscalculation. 
The promise of the New Deal era left mass-production 
unionism short of permanent success. Ultimately, two for­
tuitous circumstances rescued the industrial unions. 
The outbreak of World War II finally ended the American 
depression. By 1941, the economy was becoming fully en­
gaged in defense production. Corporate profits before taxes 
leaped from 6% billion dollars in 1939 to 17 billion in 
1941. The number of unemployed fell from 81/& million 
in June, 1940, to under 4 million in December, 1941. It was 
this eighteen-month period that marked the turning point 
for the cio. Industry's desire to capitalize on a business up­
swing, noted earlier, was particularly acute now; and rising 
job opportunities and prices created a new militancy in the 
laboring ranks. The open-shop strongholds began to crum­
ble. Organization came to the four Little Steel companies, to 
Ford, and to their lesser counterparts. The resistance to col­
lective bargaining, where it had been the line of conflict, 
was also breaking down. First contracts were finally being 
signed by such companies as Goodyear, Armour, Cudahy, 
Westinghouse, Union Switch and Signal. Above all, col­
lective bargaining after a three-year gap began to produce 
positive results. On April 14, 1941, U. S. Steel set the pat­
tern for its industry with an increase of ten cents an hour. 
For manufacturing generally, average hourly earnings from 
1940 to 1941 increased over 10 per cent and weekly earn­
ings 17 per cent; living costs rose only 5 per cent. More 
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than wages was involved. Generally, initial contracts were 
thoroughly renegotiated for the first time, and this produced 
a wide range of improvements in vacation, holiday, and 
seniority provisions and in grievance procedure. Mass-
production workers could now see the tangible benefits 
flowing from their union membership. These results of 
the defense prosperity were reflected in union growth: CIO 
membership jumped from 1,350,000 in 1940 to 2,850,000 in 
1941.75 
The industrial unions were arriving at a solid basis. That 
achievement was insured by the second fortuitous change. 
American entry in the war necessitated a major expansion 
of the federal role in labor-management relations. To pre­
vent strikes and inflation, the federal government had to 
enter the hitherto private sphere of collective bargaining. 
The National War Labor Board largely determined the 
wartime terms of employment in American industry. This 
emergency circumstance, temporary although it was, had 
permanent consequences for mass-production unionism. 
The wartime experience disposed of the last barriers to 
viable collective bargaining. 
For one thing, the remaining vestiges of anti-unionism 
were largely eliminated. The hard core of resistance could 
now be handled summarily. In meat-packing, for instance, 
Wilson & Co. had not followed Armour, Swift, and Cudahy 
in accepting collective bargaining. In 1942 the NWLB 
ordered the recalcitrant firm to negotiate a master contract 
(Wilson was holding to the earlier Big Four resistance to 
company-wide bargaining). Years later in 1955, a company 
official was still insisting that Wilson would not have ac­
cepted "a master agreement if it had not been for the war. 
75. Joel Seidman, American Labor from Defense to Reconversion (Chicago, 1953), pp. 27, 31, 32; Galenson, CIO Challenge to AFL, 
p. 587; on contract terms, Twentieth Century Fund, How Collective 
Bargaining Works, passim. 
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Such an agreement is an unsatisfactory arrangement; today 
or yesterday." 76 Subsequent negotiations having yielded 
no results, a Board panel itself actually wrote the first 
Wilson contract.77 
Beyond such flagrant cases, the NWLB set to rest an issue 
deeply troubling to the labor-management relationship in 
mass production. With few exceptions, the open shop 
remained dogma even after the acceptance of unionism. 
"John, it's just as wrong to make a man join a union," 
Benjamin Fairless of U. S. Steel insisted to Lewis, ". . . 
as it is to dictate what church he should belong to." 78 The 
union shop had been granted in auto by Ford only; in rub­
ber, by the employers of a tenth of the men under con­
tract;79 in steel, by none of the major producers (although 
they had succumbed under pressure in the "captive mines"). 
The issue was profoundly important to the new unions. The 
union shop meant membership stability and, equally signifi­
cant, the full acceptance of trade unionism by employers. 
The NWLB compromised the charged issue on the basis of a 
precedent set by the prewar National Defense Mediation 
Board. Maintenance-of-membership prevented members 
from withdrawing from a union during the life of a con­
tract. Adding an escape period and often the dues checkoff, 
the NWLB had granted this form of union security in 
271 of 291 cases by February, 1944. The cio regarded 
maintenance-of-membership as a substantial triumph. And, 
conversely, some employers took the measure, as Bethlehem 
and Republic Steel asserted, to be a "camouflaged closed 
shop." Among the expressions of resentment was the indi­
cation in contracts, following the example of Montgomery 
76. Holcomb, "Union Policies of Meat Packers," p. 172. 
77. 6 War Labor Reports 436-41 (1943). 
78. Benjamin F. Fairless, It Could Only Happen in the United 
States (New York, 1957), p. 38. 
79. Roberts, Rubber Workers, p. 310. 
 261 THE EMERGENCE OF MASS-PRODUCTION UNIONISM
Ward, that maintenance-of-membership was being granted 
"over protest." 80 This resistance, however, was losing its 
force by the end of the war. The union shop then generally 
grew from maintenance-of-membership. 
The war experience also served a vital educational func­
tion. A measure of collective bargaining remained under 
wartime government regulation. Both before and after 
submission of cases to the NWLB, the parties involved were 
obliged to negotiate, and their representatives had to par­
ticipate in the lengthy hearings. From this limited kind of 
confrontation, there grew the consensus and experience 
essential to the labor-management relationship. Wartime 
education had another aspect. The wage-stabilization policy, 
implemented through the Little Steel formula by the NWLB, 
tended to extend the issues open to negotiation. Abnormal 
restraint on wages convinced labor, as one cio man said, 
that "full advantage must be taken of what leeway is 
afforded" to achieve "the greatest possible gains. . . ."81 
As a result the unions began to include in their demands a 
variety of new kinds of issues (some merely disguised 
wage increases) such as premium pay, geographical differ­
entials, wage-rate inequalities, piece-rate computation, and 
a host of "fringe" payments. Thus were guidelines as to 
what was negotiable fixed for use after the war and a 
precedent set that would help further to expand the scope 
of collective bargaining. The collapse of economic stabiliza­
tion then also would encourage the successive wage in­
creases of the postwar rounds of negotiation. However 
illusory these gains were in terms of real income, they 
endowed the industrial unions with a reputation for 
effectiveness. 
80. Seidman, American Labor from Defense to Reconversion, 
chap. vi. 
81. Officers' Report, 2nd Wage and Policy Conference, July 8-10, 
1943, PWOC, UPWA Files. 
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Finally, the wartime restrictions permitted the groping 
advance toward stable relations to take place in safety. The 
danger of strikes that might have pushed the parties back to 
an earlier stage of hostilities was eliminated. Strikes there 
were in abundance in the postwar period, but these could 
then be held to the objective of the terms of employment, 
not the issue of unionism itself. Nothing revealed more of 
the new state of affairs than the first major defeat of an 
industrial union. The packing-house strike of 1948 was a 
thorough union disaster in an industry traditionally op­
posed to trade unionism. Yet the United Packinghouse 
Workers of America recovered and prospered. As one of 
its officials noted with relief, it was the first time in the 
history of the industry that a " 'lost' strike did not mean 
a lost union." 82 
Unionization thus ran its full course in mass production. 
The way had been opened by the New Deal and the Great 
Depression. The legal right to organize was granted, and 
its utilization was favored by contemporary circumstances. 
John L. Lewis seized the unequalled opportunity. Breaking 
from the bounds of the labor establishment, he created in 
the CIO an optimum instrument for organizing the mass-
production workers. These developments did not carry 
unionization to completion. There was, in particular, a 
failure in collective bargaining. In the end, the vital prog­
ress here sprang fortuitously from the defense prosperity 
and then the wartime impact on labor relations. From the 
half-decade of war, the industrial unions advanced to their 
central place in the American economy. 
82. Packinghouse Worker, August 20, 1948, p. 7. 
Poverty in Perspective 
ROBERT H. BREMNER 
IN THE MIDDLE °f the nineteenth century an English visitor 
reported that the most obvious feature of American life was 
"the nearly entire absence, certainly of the appearance, and 
in a great degree of the reality, of poverty." "It is the 
blessed privilege of the United States," said Lord Carlisle, 
"that they have not, as a class, any poor among them." 
Gushing abundance struck him as the characteristic of the 
land, general ease and comfort the condition of the great 
bulk of the people. Yet Englishmen, he thought, looked 
healthier, stouter, rosier, and jollier than Americans. The 
United States, he concluded, quoting an American inform­
ant, was "probably the country in which there was less 
misery and less happiness than in any other of the world." 1 
Since Carlisle's day, and no doubt before, a host of 
observers, imported and domestic, have cited material 
abundance and emotional starvation as the twin phenomena 
1. "Lord Carlisle's Lecture at Leeds," Littell's Living Age, XXVIII (1851), 197, 203. George William Frederick Howard, Seventh Earl 
of Carlisle (1802-1864), visited the United States and Canada in 
1841-42. He wrote the preface for the English edition of Uncle Tom's 
Cabin (London, 1853). 
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of American culture. To say that riches cannot buy happi­
ness is trite, but creative writers, journalists, philosophers, 
and social scientists say it every day, sometimes with such 
conviction, eloquence, or erudition that they earn reputa­
tions for profundity. Multimillionaires like Andrew Carne­
gie used to contrast the tribulations of the rich with the 
advantages of the poor; retired army officers still denounce 
the yearning for individual and social—but not national— 
security; and everybody laughs or shudders at the American 
appetite for the light taste, chewing-enjoyment, and the 
soft crust. Nobody, however, has as yet succeeded in con­
vincing the American people that poverty buys happiness. 
The common attitude still seems to be that if we are going 
to be unhappy we might as well take advantage of such 
comforts as credit cards and trading stamps procure. "I've 
been rich and I've been poor," said a popular singer, "and 
believe me, rich is better." 
The extent of poverty in the United States has always 
been a disputed subject. By comparison with the misery 
in which so large a portion of the world's population lives 
and dies, America has no poverty. But obviously part of 
the American people are poor, and some portion of them 
are miserably poor, when compared with the rest of their 
countrymen. The poverty they suffer imposes handicaps 
on them and their children and casts a shadow on the happi­
ness of the nation. 
The American poor are periodically rediscovered, each 
time with a sense of shock. Their plight is usually presented 
as a novel problem—and perhaps it is, for each generation 
views poverty from a changed perspective and sees it in a 
new light. It may be useful, therefore, to summarize the 
voluminous literature on the subject produced during the 
past six decades and review what leading authorities have 
had to say about the extent, meaning, causes, and conse­
quences of poverty in modern America. 
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For more than sixty years after 1900 serious and in­
formed students have asserted there was no justification 
for the survival of poverty in a country as rich, free, pro­
gressive, and productive as the United States. Paradoxi­
cally, those who were most firmly convinced that poverty 
was unnecessary generally arrived at high estimates of its 
extent, while those who assumed the laws of God, nature, 
or human nature decreed a certain amount of economic 
hardship usually denied poverty was a serious problem in 
the United States. But the study of poverty abounds in 
paradox. For example, nearly anything said of wealth 
might also be said of poverty. Like wealth, poverty is a con­
dition some people inherit and others acquire; it can be 
deserved or undeserved, a blessing or an affliction; and it 
is hard to define: X is poor in comparison to Y and rich in 
comparison to Z. Paradox aside, something can be said of 
poverty that cannot be said of wealth: poverty means want, 
wealth means surplus. 
The particular want of the American poor was money. 
From the turn of the century to the 1960's expert witnesses 
agreed that insufficient income was the crux of the poverty 
problem. Obvious and inescapable as the conclusion seemed, 
its acceptance represented a departure from the nineteenth-
century tendency to emphasize moral factors and depend­
ency as the central issues in poverty. Over the years, in 
governmental and academic parlance, "low-income status" 
all but supplanted "poverty." As a practical matter, since 
the lower depths of degradation were easy to recognize, 
only the upper limits of low income had to be defined. 
Beginning at the bottom of the social scale poverty extended 
upward to whatever level of income the observer deemed 
appropriate. 
After 1900 investigators drew the poverty line at annual 
earnings ranging from $460 at the start of the century, to 
$2,000 around 1929, and $4,000 in the late 1950's and early 
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1960's.2 The progressive elevation of the line reflected the 
rising cost of living as well as higher standards of need 
and want. As definitions broadened and the general popu­
lation increased, estimates of the number of people in pov­
erty also mounted. In 1904 Robert Hunter declared that no 
less than 10 million and perhaps as many as 15 to 20 million 
Americans lived in poverty; a generation later in 1933, I. 
M. Rubinow estimated that the number was 25 million; 
and in 1963 Dwight Macdonald set the figure at 42.5 
million.3 Needless to say other students arrived at other 
estimates. There was general agreement, however, that in 
relation to total population the poor declined from at least 
one-third of all the people in the country in the mid-1930's 
to about one-fifth in I960.4 
The qualitative standards twentieth-century students 
used to define and describe poverty were perhaps even more 
significant than the quantitative. In Poverty (1904), Rob­
ert Hunter described the poor as people whose earnings 
were insufficient to provide the food, clothing, and shelter 
needed to maintain physical efficiency.5 Hunter took this 
definition from two English students, Alfred Marshall and 
2. Robert Hunter, Poverty (New York, 1904), p. 52; Maurice 
Leven, Harold G. Moulton, and Clark Warburton, America's Capacity 
to Consume (Washington, D.C., 1934), pp. 55-56; Conference on Eco­
nomic Progress, Poverty and Deprivation in the U.S.: The Plight of 
Two-Fifths of a Nation (Washington, D.C., 1962), p. 2. 
3. Hunter, Poverty, pp. v-vi, 12-13, 25; I. M. Rubinow, "Poverty," 
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, XI (New York, 1937), 285-87; 
Dwight Macdonald, "Our Invisible Poor," New Yorker, January 19, 
1963, p. 94. 
4. Robert J. Lampman, The Low Income Population and Economic 
Growth (Washington, D.C., 1959), pp. 4-5; Michael Harrington, The 
Other America: Poverty in the United States (New York, 1962), 
p. 182; Herman P. Miller, "Is the Income Gap Closed? 'No'." New 
York Times Magazine, November 11, 1962, p. 50 and "New Definitions 
of Our 'Poor'," New York Times Magazine, April 21, 1963, p. 11; 
Conference on Economic Progress, Poverty and Deprivation in the 
U.S., pp. 2, 20-22. 
5. Hunter, Poverty, pp. 5-9. 
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B. Seebohm Rowntree. Both Marshall and Rowntree dis­
tinguished between the income necessary for merely sus­
taining life and the larger amount required to keep human 
beings in efficient working order, but they differed on the 
content of the efficiency standard. Marshall stressed the 
items which should be included among the "necessaries," 
Rowntree noted the many "desirables" (such as postage, 
newspapers, entertainment, travel, and education) which 
had to be excluded. At best (and it was better than mere 
subsistence) the physical-efficiency standard provided for 
human needs on about the same level as those of reasonably 
well-tended steam engines.6 
Rigorous as the physical-efficiency standard was it 
brought a substantial number of independent but poorly 
paid workers within the definition of poverty. No doubt 
that this is why Hunter, a social worker and settlement 
resident, adopted it. He rejected the notion, common among 
late nineteenth-century reformers, that poverty became a 
social problem only when the poor applied for relief or 
charity. He devoted a sizable portion of his book to the 
problems of pauperism, but he was not really interested in 
paupers and he did not find their lot a challenging subject 
of research. "Paupers," he said, "are not, as a rule, un­
happy. They are not ashamed; they are not keen to become 
independent; they are not bitter or discontented." Vastly 
more important and much more distressing, in Hunter's 
opinion, was the condition of self-supporting toilers in fac­
tories, mines, and sweatshops who, in spite of their best 
efforts, received "too little of the common necessities to keep 
themselves at their best, physically." Too often confused 
either with the willfully idle, or with moderately well-paid 
artisans, these toilers comprised an almost forgotten class. 
6. Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (London, 1890), pp. 
120-21; B. Seebohm Rowntree, Poverty: A Study of Town Life (Lon­
don, 1901), pp. 86-87, 132. 
268 CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 
They worked hard but lived miserably, always on the verge 
of want and constantly exposed to accident, sickness, unem­
ployment, and other hardships which might cost them their 
independence—that is, make them seek assistance. "The 
decision to apply for public aid," said Hunter, "is perhaps 
the greatest crisis in the life of the poor." Once driven or 
enticed into pauperism, the poor were irreclaimable.7 
In the thirty years after 1904, Hunter's successors lifted 
the poverty line well above the minimum necessary for 
maintaining physical efficiency. Even before American entry 
into World War I, students denned poverty to include per­
sons whose incomes were inadequate to support "a normal 
standard of living," "decent and wholesome life," and "a 
fair amount of comfort and . .  . a certain degree of mental 
in addition to physical efficiency." 8 At the start of the 
1920's John Gillin brought the idea of "social efficiency" into 
the definition. People were poor, Gillin write in Poverty and 
Dependency (1921), if either because of inadequate earn­
ings or because of unwise expenditures they were unable 
to "function usefully" according to the prevailing standards 
of society.9 The most striking advance in the poverty line, 
however, came during the Great Depression. I. M. Rubinow, 
in The Quest for Security (1934), identified the poor as the 
millions of wage-workers and salaried employees whose 
earnings fell below "the level of the true American standard 
of life." To Rubinow the "true American standard" pro­
vided for comfort, recreation, education, and participation 
7. Hunter, Poverty, pp. 3, 5-6, 71. 
8. Owen R. Lovejoy, "Report of the Committee on Standards of 
Living and Labor," Proceedings of the National Conference of Chan­
ties and Correction, 1912, p. 388; Jacob Hollander, The Abolition of 
Poverty (Boston and New York, 1914), p. 2; Maurice F. Parmelee, 
Poverty and Social Progress (New York, 1916), p. 91. 
9. John Lewis Gillin, Poverty and Dependency. Their Relief and 
Prevention (New York, 1921), p. 23. See also Robert W. Kelso, 
Poverty (New York, 1929), p. 3. 
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in group activities. "In short," Rubinow declared, "it means 
opportunity to enjoy life." 10 
At the start of the twentieth century William Dean 
Howells commented that poverty was not the lack of things 
but the fear and dread of want. With rising standards and 
expectations of living, insecurity—once the prerogative of 
the upper and middle classes—spread through nearly all 
levels of society. Reformers had long contrasted the anxiety 
of struggling white-and-blue-collar workers with the indif­
ference of ne'er-do-wells who had given up the struggle for 
independence. In the presidential campaign of 1928, Her­
bert Hoover called fear of poverty, old age, and unemploy­
ment "the greatest calamities of human kind." n It was 
not until the 1930's, however, when millions of Americans 
lived in actual want, that insecurity—the fear and dread of 
want—became a crucial social issue. "Although we have 
suffered neither revolution, famine nor war, and our coun­
try is surfeited with food and goods," wrote Abraham Ep­
stein in 1933, "insecurity stalks the land and misery prevails 
to a degree we never before experienced." 12 
No one enumerated the various conditions of American 
poverty as succinctly or as movingly as Franklin Roosevelt 
did in his Second Inaugural Address. His dramatic phrase, 
"one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished," 
climaxed a series of short paragraphs in which he cited 
insufficiency, insecurity, indecent living conditions, inequal­
ity, and—characteristically—low-purchasing power as chal­
10. I. M. Rubinow, The Quest for Security (New York, 1934), 
pp. 8, 16. 
11. "The Worst of Being Poor" [William Dean Howells], Harper's
Weekly, XLVI (1902), 261. Hoover is quoted in the New York Times,
October 23, 11)28. 
12. Abraham Epstein, Insecurity: A Challenge to America (New 
York, 1933), p. 657. 
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lenges to democracy.13 Yet even while listing the nation's 
economic ills, President Roosevelt affirmed faith in the 
possibility of translating national wealth into "a spread­
ing volume of human comforts hitherto unknown" and of 
raising the lowest standard of living "far above the level 
of mere subsistence." 14 
In 1944, when war prosperity had vastly altered the 
national economic and social picture, Roosevelt called on 
the Congress and people of the United States to begin lay­
ing plans for "the establishment of an American standard 
of living higher than ever before known." No matter how 
high the general level of prosperity, he said, we cannot 
be content if some fraction of the population—whether 
one-third, one-fifth, or one-tenth—"is ill-fed, ill-clothed, 
ill-housed and insecure." 15 Roosevelt's message on an Eco­
nomic Bill of Rights (January 11, 1944) outlined the essen­
tials of a security standard: a useful and remunerative 
job; earnings sufficient to provide food, clothing, and rec­
reation; a decent home; adequate medical care; protection 
against the economic hazards of old age, sickness, accident, 
and unemployment; and a good education. These rights, in 
the President's words, constituted "a new basis of security 
and prosperity." 16 
In the two decades after 1944 the majority of the Ameri­
can people moved in the direction Roosevelt pointed, toward 
"new goals of human happiness and well-being." The 
13. Samuel I. Rosenman (comp.), The Public Papers and Addresses 
of Franklin D. Roosevelt, VI (New York, 1941), pp. 4-5. Roosevelt's 
estimate of one-third of the nation in poverty was conservative. Ac­
cording to a report issued by The National Resources Committee, 
Consumer Incomes in the United States: Their Distribution in 
1935-36 (Washington, D.C., 1938), two-thirds of the twenty-nine 
million families studied had yearly incomes under $1500. 
14. Rosenman (comp.), Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, VI, 4. 
15. Ibid., XIII (New York, 1950), 40-41. 
16. Ibid., p. 41. 
 271 POVERTY IN PERSPECTIVE
essentials of security, although not secured for all, were 
accepted—as Roosevelt had said—"so to speak," as rights. 
In the 1960's, students defined poverty much as they had in 
earlier years: economic inability to maintain minimum 
standards of health, housing, food, clothing, and education.17 
But the minimum standards were higher because the normal 
standard, enjoyed and expected by the bulk of the popula­
tion, provided comforts and conveniences no previous gene­
ration had known. Hence, as numerous troubled observers 
noted, the psychological hardships of poverty, the con­
sciousness of inequality and feeling of inferiority, were as 
burdensome and possibly more galling than ever.18 Meas­
ured by objective physical standards the condition of the 
American poor was deplorable. It became even sorrier 
when—as was increasingly the custom—wants and needs 
were measured by cultural standards. Poverty, an econo­
mist wrote in 1958, "is the sense of deprivation stemming 
from inability to possess or consume what others have." 19 
Five years later a New Yorker correspondent, in a widely-
praised article, summed up the case: "Not to be able to 
afford a movie or a glass of beer is a kind of starvation— 
if everybody else can." 20 
During the twentieth century the elaborate charts of the 
causes of poverty and dependency which late nineteenth­
17. Gabriel Kolko, Wealth and Power in America (New York, 
1962), p. 70; Harrington, The Other America, p. 179. 
18. Harrington, The Other America, p. 179; Max Lerner, America 
as a Civilization: Life and Thought in the United States (New York, 
1957), p. 337; John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society (Boston, 
1958), pp. 323-24; Miller, "Is the Income Gap Closed? 'No'," p. 50, and
"New Definitions of Our 'Poor'," p. 11. Cf. Walter E. Weyl, The New 
Democracy (New York, 1912), p. 221, n. 1. 
19. Moses Abramovitch, "Economic Goals and Social Welfare in 
the Next Generation," in Committee for Economic Development, Prob­
lems of United States Economic Development, I (New York, 1958), 
p. 196. 
20. Macdonald, "Our Invisible Poor," p. 132. 
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century reformers drew went out of fashion. Their place 
was taken by equally elaborate but matter-of-factly-worded 
catalogues of the "characteristics" of the low-income popu­
lation. The characteristics most often cited at mid-century 
were old age, youth, broken families (especially those 
headed by women), physical handicap or infirmity, low edu­
cational attainment, non-white status, non-employed status, 
residence in depressed rural areas and decaying industrial 
communities, and low-paid, unskilled employment in indus­
try, retail stores, service trades, and agriculture.21 Low 
wages and income loss stemming from unemployment, sick­
ness, accident, old age, and death or desertion of bread­
winner had been recognized as causes of want for many 
years. Rural distress came to the fore in the 1930's; the 
poverty of depressed areas and racial minorities received 
more attention after World War II than in earlier years. 
On the other hand, after about 1930, immigration and 
"hereditary degeneracy" ceased to be regarded, as they had 
been in the first two decades of the century, as important 
factors in poverty.22 Personality defects, such as laziness 
and immorality, although still cited as characteristics of the 
poor, were increasingly thought to be as much results as 
causes of poverty.23 
21. U. S. Congress Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 
Characteristics of the Low-Income Population and Related Federal 
Programs (Washington, D.C., 1955); Lampman, Low Income Popu­
lation and Economic Growth, pp. 4-12. 
22. Robert Hunter, Maurice Parmelee, John L. Gillin, and Thomas 
Nixon Carver all expressed concern about immigration and favored 
restriction. See, for example, Hunter, Poverty, pp. 261-317. Later 
writers, however, including Dwight Macdonald and Michael Harring­
ton, have praised the energy of the immigrants of 1890-1910 and have
lamented the seeming lack of aspiration of the internal migrants (Negroes, Puerto Ricans, and "poor whites") of the 1950s. For 
changing attitudes on "hereditary degeneracy" see James L. and 
Katherine M. Ford, The Abolition of Poverty (New York, 1937), 
pp. 49-66. 
23. W. D. P. Bliss (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Social Reform (New 
York and London, 1898), pp. 1072-75; Thomas Sewall Adams and 
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Until the 1920's the study of poverty was nearly always 
associated with social reform. The fundamental causes of 
poverty, as reformers then saw them, were social, the reme­
dies political: tenement-house legislation, abolition of child 
labor, maximum-hour and minimum-wage laws, assured 
compensation for industrial accidents, social insurance, 
stricter regulation or prohibition of liquor sales, and immi­
gration restriction. The poor could not protect themselves 
against "dying wages," "famine for work," and the hazards 
of employment in "wildcat industries," but society could if 
it would. Hence it was "social recklessness" that reform­
ers deplored, the heavy costs of inaction and neglect that 
alarmed them. Poverty was not only unnecessary but unjust. 
It was caused by society's failure to protect the weak 
against exploitation by the strong and from destruction by 
the impersonal forces of modern economic life.24 
Opinion on the cause and cure of poverty took a new turn 
in the early 1920's following publication by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research of an authoritative study of 
the amount and distribution of the national income. Wesley 
C. Mitchell, the guiding spirit of the Bureau, had a scholar's 
distaste for "the savage dependence on catastrophes for 
progress," and he deemed reform by agitation or class 
struggle "a jerky way of moving forward, uncomfortable, 
and wasteful of energy." 25 The method Mitchell proposed 
was quantitative analysis of social processes, with constant 
Helen L. Sumner, Labor Problems (New York, 1905), pp. 151-53; 
Charles Horton Cooley, Social Organization: A Study of the Larger 
Mind (New York, 1909), p. 292. 
24. Hunter, Poverty, p. 98; Edward T. Devine, "The Dominant Note 
of the Modern Philanthropy," Proceedings of the National Confer­
ences of Charities and Correction, 1906, pp. 4-5; Walter Rauschen­
busch, Christianity and the Social Crisis (New York, 1907), p. 217; 
Lovejoy, "Report of the Committee on Standards of Living and Labor," 
p. 381; Weyl, The New Democracy, p. 321. 
25. Mitchell is quoted in Arthur F. Burns, The Frontiers of Eco­
nomic Knowledge (Princeton, N.J., 1954), p. 63. 
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improvement and conscious application of analysis to mat­
ters affecting social welfare. The Bureau's study was 
prompted in part by Mitchell's and his associates' desire to 
learn whether the national income was adequate to pro­
vide a decent living for all Americans. The findings were 
not reassuring. National and per capita income had in­
creased in the decade after 1909 and both were greater in 
the United States than in other countries. Otherwise neither 
the size nor the distribution of income offered grounds for 
complacency. The estimated national income in 1918—$61 
billion—was so distributed that almost half of the total 
went to the fortunate fifth of the population whose incomes 
were in excess of $1,700 a year. Even if national income 
had been more equitably distributed, $61 billion was not 
large enough to provide bountifully for a population in 
excess of one hundred million.26 
The lesson economists drew from these findings was the 
need for boosting national income by expanding production. 
If we seek to abolish inequalities, and thereby curtail pro­
duction, wrote Henry R. Seager, a long-time advocate of 
social insurance, "instead of making the poor richer we may 
merely cause us all to grow poorer together." 27 In The 
Tragedy of Waste (1925), Stuart Chase, no apologist for 
inequality, said his book was based on the assumption not 
enough goods and services were normally produced to keep 
the majority of American families above the poverty line. 
"A subsistence level standard for the whole population is 
billions of dollars—and millions of tons of physical goods— 
short of being won." 28 Even as Chase wrote, however, a 
26. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., Income in the 
United States: Its Amount and Distribution, 1909-1919 (2 vols.; New 
York, 1921-22) I, pp. ix, 146-47. 
27. Henry R. Seager, "Income in the United States," Survey,
XLVII (1921), p. 270. 
28. Stuart Chase, The Tragedy of Waste (New York, 1925), pp. 
265, 268. 
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new industrial revolution, promising and bringing new 
quantities of both necessities and luxuries, was under way. 
In 1929, while admitting "recent developments may appear 
less satisfactory in retrospect than they appear at present," 
Wesley Mitchell cited advances in per capita income as evi­
dence that since 1921 Americans had found ways of produc­
ing more physical goods per hour of labor than ever before.29 
Not poverty but prosperity was the preoccupation of the 
1920's—and perhaps of all decades. Certainly the recovery 
of prosperity was the goal of government and people in the 
1930's. In both the 1920's and 1930's the state of the na­
tional economy was a more challenging issue than the con­
dition of the poor, and in each the elimination of poverty 
was presented as a matter of economic necessity quite as 
much as of social justice. In the years between the wars, 
the trouble with the poor was simply that they were too 
numerous; their chief fault was that they did not buy 
enough. Expansion of purchasing power was as essential 
to the national welfare in the ten years after 1929 as in­
creased productivity had seemed in the preceding decade. 
The extravagance of the rich does not hurt the poor, Stuart 
Chase commented after five years of depression, but the 
rich suffer when the poor are hard up—because "the spend­
ing power of the masses, even more than their earning 
power," keeps the economic system going. Gilbert Seldes 
made the same point. Poverty will not be abandoned for 
moral reasons, he wrote in 1936. "It will be abandoned 
because poverty is the great enemy of the large-scale pro­
ductive system or because the victims of poverty will organ­
ize themselves to destroy the system entirely." 30 
29. President's Conference on Unemployment, Committee on Re­
cent Economic Changes, Recent Economic Changes in the United 
States (2 vols.; New York, 1929), II, pp. 862, 909. 
30. Stuart Chase, The Economy of Abundance (New York, 1934), 
pp. 293-94; Gilbert Seldes, Mainland (New York, 1936), p. 307. 
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During the Depression the insecurity of the average man 
and woman loomed as a more pressing problem than the 
special needs of the poor. Through various stratagems the 
New Deal attempted to solve the nation's economic woes by 
bringing purchasing power and production into a working 
relationship. President Roosevelt, always concerned with 
recovery, consistently sought a business-like justification 
even for humanitarian reforms. He was interested in the 
poor not only for their own sake, but because their poverty, 
expressed in inability to buy the products of farm and fac­
tory, denied work and productiveness, strength and security, 
to the rest of the nation. The sympathetic but unsentimental 
attitude of the New Deal era to poverty was well expressed 
in the Final Report of the Temporary National Economic 
Committee, published in 1941: 
. . . Many of our more serious problems of economic imbalance 
are due to the sad plight of more than a third of our people 
whose meager incomes, unstable employment, unhealthful living 
conditions, and limited cultural opportunities constitute a sub­
stantial drag on the economy's forward march toward recov­
ery and expansion.31 
For a dozen years after 1941 the economy went forward, 
fast and far, despite the drag of a substantial amount of 
poverty. High employment, rapid economic growth, and 
the stabilizers built into the economy during the New Deal 
reduced but did not eliminate poverty. In the decade follow­
ing 1953, a period marred by recessions, increasing unem­
ployment, and a slowing-down of the rate of economic 
growth, the drag of poverty once again became noticeable. 
The aged, migrants, sharecroppers, persons of low skill and 
little education, newcomers to great cities, and victims of 
31. United States Temporary National Economic Committee, Final 
Report and Recommendations (Washington, D.C., 1941), p. 21. 
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technological progress or of racial prejudice either did not 
participate in or fell behind in the general advance. Oddly 
but characteristically these groups were called "the new 
poor." As in the past one school of thought maintained the 
proper way to correct economic distress was "by raising 
the productivity of those at the bottom of the income scale 
rather than by transferring income from the rich to the 
poor." Another school, increasingly vocal after the mid-
fifties, called for a more direct attack on inequality through 
governmental action to increase purchasing power, raise 
living standards, strengthen social security, and improve 
public services.32 
"Modern democrats recognize that the abolition of pov­
erty is the most immediate question before the world today," 
wrote Walter Lippman in 1914.33 Fifty years later the Cold 
War, the population explosion in already hungry continents, 
and the emergence of proud new poverty-stricken nations 
made the question even more urgent. As the world moved 
further into the second half of the twentieth century, the 
great powers competed not only in missiles and moon-shots 
but in the well-being of their people, and sought friends on 
the basis of their efficiency in meeting human needs. Mean­
while advances in the social sciences gave the study of pov­
erty new dimensions. Instead of being regarded solely as a 
physical or economic condition, poverty came to be viewed 
as an emotional, cultural, intellectual, and political problem 
of grave importance in both developed and undeveloped 
areas of the earth. 
32. Harrington, The Other America, p. 10. The quotation about 
raising the productivity of those at the bottom of the income scale is
from Burns, Frontiers of Economic Knowledge, p. 137; the other 
school is best represented by Galbraith, The Affluent Society, pp. 
328-31 ;Max Lerner, America as a Civilization, pp. 337-39; Confer­
ence on Economic Progress, Poverty and Deprivation in the U.S., p. 1. 
33. Walter Lippmann, Drift and Mastery (New York, 1914), p. 258. 
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In these circumstances the truism that poverty is itself 
the most general and abiding cause of poverty took on fresh 
meaning. In the United States a host of issues directed 
popular and scholarly attention to the obstinate, weed-like 
character of poverty. The challenge and frustrations of 
foreign economic assistance, the efforts of individuals and 
organizations to help the people of poor countries break 
the vicious circle of poverty, and—at home—clamor over 
the "welfare mess" and investigations of "hard core" relief 
families, perplexing problems of urban renewal and area 
redevelopment, the fight for racial equality, and widely pub­
licized surveys of social status and mobility—all contrib­
uted, in various ways, to awareness of poverty's tendency 
to perpetuate itself. Along with this awareness, and partly 
inspired by it, came a revival of interest in a long-neglected 
class, the very poor in the lowest layer of society. 
In 1904 Robert Hunter called poverty a "culture bed for 
criminals, paupers, vagrants, and for such diseases as 
inebrity, insanity, and imbecility." In the 1960's anthro­
pologists, and those influenced by their work, were content 
to call poverty a culture. Oscar Lewis, in The Children of 
Sanchez (1961), described the culture of the very poor as 
"a way of life, remarkably stable and persistent, passed 
down from generation to generation along family lines." 
Michael Harrington, applying the culture concept to the 
American poor, asserted in The Other America (1962): 
"Poverty in the United States is a culture, an institution, 
a way of life." 34 Lewis, like Hunter before him, believed 
that wherever the miserably poor happened to live, whether 
in Mexico City or Harlem, Glasgow or Paris, their way of 
life was strikingly similar, and vastly different from the 
34. Hunter, Poverty, pp. 64-65; Oscar Lewis, The Children of 
Sanchez (New York, 1961), p. xxiv; Harrington, The Other Amer­
ica, p. 16. 
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behavior expected or demanded as normal by the dominant 
culture.35 
The economic attributes of the culture of poverty, as 
Lewis and Harrington reported them in the 1960's—unem­
ployment, underemployment, low wages, unskilled employ­
ment, child labor, no savings, buying in small quantities, 
borrowing from loan sharks, and use of secondhand furni­
ture and clothing—had a familiar ring. Hunter, Jacob Riis, 
and Charles Loring Brace had found similar conditions 
among the very poor slum dwellers of their day. The same 
was true of bad housing, sickness, and high death rates in 
the culture of poverty. Earlier students had customarily 
used words like shiftlessness, improvidence, drunkenness, 
immorality, irresponsibility, brutality, and lawlessness when 
writing of "paupers" or "the dangerous classes." Lewis and 
Harrington avoided the judgmental language of their prede­
cessors but recorded similar characteristics: lack of aspira­
tion, present-time orientation, alcoholism, early initiation 
into sex, consensual marriage, desertion of mothers and 
children, violence in settling disputes, hostility to outsiders, 
mistrust of government, and hatred of the police.30 
The difference between the new and older observers of 
the culture of poverty lay not in findings but in interpreta­
tion and attitude. Earlier students had seen poverty nega­
tively, as deprivation of such necessities as work, privacy, 
decency, health, and self-respect. The new writers pre­
sented poverty positively, as a style of life adopted to meet 
the problems of a particular environment and to make 
existence in that environment bearable. Robert Hunter, as 
noted above, hated the conditions which drove the poor into 
35. Lewis, Children of Sanchez, pp. xxv-xxvii, and Five Families: 
Mexican Case Studies in the Culture of Poverty (New York, 1959), 
p. 2; Hunter, Poverty, pp. 3-4. 
36. Lewis, Children of Sanchez, pp. xxvi-xxvii; Harrington, The 
Other America, pp. 16-17. 
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pauperism, but he could not summon up much sympathy 
for paupers. "There is no mental agony here," he wrote, 
"they do not work sore; there is no dread; they live miser­
ably but they do not care." Michael Harrington, dealing with 
the same kind of people, was convinced that they did care 
and that they experienced "mental suffering" of a kind 
unknown among the more fortunate classes.37 Lewis and 
Harrington had as much sympathy for the miserables, and 
as much tolerance for their failings, as Hunter and his 
generation had for the struggling toilers. 
The favorable response of critics and readers to Lewis's 
and Harrington's books suggested fairly widespread con­
cern, or at least curiosity, about the lives of desperately poor 
people. Accounts of low life have often found a market 
among middle-class readers. But considered in connection 
with other trends the new interest in an old problem could 
be interpreted as the opening of another chapter in the study 
of poverty. By the latter half of the twentieth century the 
United States had at last reached a stage of economic and 
social development which permitted its people to turn their 
thoughts and apply their skills to the treatment of the 
oldest, saddest, and stubbornest forms of want. Hopefully, 
it could be anticipated that in the years ahead these kinds of 
want would be studied as respectfully, and the sufferers' 
needs met at least as effectively, as earlier generations had 
examined and provided for other conditions of poverty. 
37. Hunter, Poverty, p. 4; Harrington, The Other America, p. 2. 
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